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Preface
LonDial08 completes the first one dozen meetings of the Semantics and Pragmatics
of Dialogue workshop series (SEMDIAL). It brings SEMDIAL to a city well known
for the ability of its underground users to avoid dialogue even in the tightest rush hour
crush. The SEMDIAL series premiered in Munich in 1997 (MunDial’97), at the ini-
tiative of Anton Benz and Gerhard Ja¨ger. Since then, it has been held in all the Eu-
ropean countries that have hosted the FIFA World Cup at least once, and the Nether-
lands (Twente (Twendial98), Amsterdam (Amstelogue99), Gothenburg (Go¨talog00),
Bielefeld (BiDialog01), Edinburgh (Edilog02), Saarbru¨cken (DiaBruck03), Barcelona
(Catalog04), Nancy (Dialor05), Potsdam (BranDial06), and Decalog (Rovereto07)).
Whereas its initial orientation was linguistic semantics/pragmatics, the focus of
SEMDIAL has broadened significantly over the years. It now covers a wide range of
topics that concern the development of models of dialogue, ranging from work on the
design of artificial conversational agents and human interaction with robots, to psy-
cholinguistic studies and computational modelling of disfluencies, gesture, gaze, and
the acquisition of conversational competence by children. SEMDIAL has become the
premiere forum for presenting this kind of work. Following an initiative that originated
in Decalog, LonDial will feature the launch of a major international journal devoted to
the study of dialogue (see the SEMDIAL website for details).
LonDial coincides with the concluding meeting of the Leverhulme Trust Network
Dialogue Matters: Securing Foundations for Dialogue Technology Development. Dia-
logue Matters, which has been in existence since summer 2005, is an interdisciplinary
network set up to encourage collaboration on the study of dialogue among linguists,
psychologists, and computer scientists, from sites in Europe and the U.S. Based in Lon-
don, Dialogue Matters has hosted five fruitful and fun workshops on topics that include
Miscommunication, Language Evolution and Change, Incrementality and Clarification
in Dialogue, and Dialogue Dynamics: the Scaling up Challenge.
The programme for LonDial consists of invited presentations by Susan Fussell,
David Traum, and Andrzej Wis´niewski, as well as contributed papers, including a spe-
cial session on Dialogue Situated in Joint Action, and posters. These contributions
were selected from the 30 submissions we received. Each was reviewed by three ex-
perts. From the submissions, 16 were accepted as regular papers for oral presentation
(including those in the Special Session), and 8 as posters (of which 7 will be presented).
A further 3 short papers were accepted as late breaking submissions to be presented as
posters.
Our reviewers performed marvellously, punctually producing many very detailed
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and helpful reviews. Thank you to Maria Aloni, Nicholas Asher, Ellen Gurman Bard
(organizer of the Special Session), Raffaella Bernardi, Patrick Blackburn Johan Bos,
Miriam Bouzouita, Susan Brennan, Justine Cassell, Eve Clark, Paul Dekker, Jan-Peter
de Ruiter, Raquel Ferna´ndez, Ruth Filik, Simon Garrod, Elsi Kaiser, Ruth Kempson,
Stefan Kopp, Staffan Larsson, Alex Lascarides, Ian Lewin, Colin Matheson, Greg
Mills, Fabio Pianesi, Martin Pickering, Manfred Pinkal, Paul Piwek, Massimo Poe-
sio, Hannes Rieser, David Schlangen, Mark Steedman, Amanda Stent, Matthew Stone,
Ipke Wachsmuth.
LonDial is not receiving financial support from the manufacturer of the eponymous
hair care products. We are, however, extremely grateful for: generous financial support
from Dialogue Matters, from the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London,
and from the Department of Computer Science, Queen Mary University of London;
endorsement by the ACL Special Interest Groups SIGdial and SIGsem; and, last but
not least, tireless work by Eleni Gregoromichelaki, Miriam Bouzouita, Arash Eshghi
and Ruth Kempson, the local organizers.
Jonathan Ginzburg
Pat Healey
Yo Sato
London, June 2008
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Extended Abstract: Computational Models of Non-cooperative dialogue
David R Traum Institute for Creative Technologies
University of Southern California
Marina Del Rey, CA 90292 USA
traum@ict.usc.edu
Cooperativity is usually seen as a central concept
in the pragmatics of dialogue. There are a num-
ber of accounts of dialogue performance and inter-
pretation that require some notion of cooperation
or collaboration as part of the explanatory mecha-
nism of communication. For instance, Grice’s coop-
erativity principle and associated maxims are used
to explain conversational implicature (Grice, 1975).
Searle uses general principles of cooperative conver-
sation to account for indirect speech acts (Searle,
1975). Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs use a principle of
“least collaborative effort” as a goal of the processes
of grounding and accepting referring expressions.
(Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).
Alwood (Allwood, 1976) considers that full-
blown communication requires at least some degree
of cooperation, and defines ideal cooperation be-
tween a number of interacting normal rational agents
as adherence to the following principles:
1. they are voluntarily striving to achieve the same
purposes,
2. they are ethically and cognitively considering
each other in trying to achieve these purposes.
3. they trust each other to act according to 1 and 2
unless they give each other explicit notice that
they are not’. consisting of four parts:
Most advanced computational work on dialogue
agents has also generally assumed cooperativity.
Simple dialogue systems, e.g (Sutton et al., 1996),
are programmed to react directly to specific types
of inputs, without doing much pragmatic reason-
ing. Some advanced systems are formulated as
agents that reason about attitudes such as belief,
desire, and intention, e. g. (Cohen and Perrault,
1979; Allen and Perrault, 1980). These systems do
means-ends reasoning to develop plans that further
their goals which can be adopted as intentions, and
also recognize the plans of others. There is still
a tension between the model of individual agency
and coordinated action, which is often modelled
using principles of cooperativity, collaboration in-
cluding such notions as joint intentions (Cohen and
Levesque, 1991) and Shared Plans (Grosz and Sid-
ner, 1990). These notions are used to automate the
kinds of pragmatic reasoning described by Grice and
Searle and compute speaker meaning using contex-
tual knowledge as well as compositional semantics.
This notion of cooperativity in conjunction with ra-
tional agency can be a powerful mechanism for al-
lowing systems to engage in human-like flexible di-
alogues.
The cooperative principles are reasonable for the
vast amount of domains that people have built di-
alogue systems for: service or information provid-
ing systems, in which the goals of both the sys-
tem and user can be seen to coincide. What hap-
pens, though, when there is no shared goal, or co-
operation breaks down in other ways, e.g., lack of
cognitive or ethical consideration (and/or follow-
through) or lack of trust? Many models have little
to say about this kind of dialogue, and in fact dis-
parage non-cooperative behavior in human-machine
dialogue because it “easily leads to miscommuni-
cation and an unnecessarily long, complicated, and
perhaps failed dialogue because of the system’s lim-
ited abilities to detect, handle, and recover from a
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non-cooperative dialogue flow.” (Klein et al., 1999;
Hajdinjak and Mihelic, 2004). While cases of dia-
logue systems that are intentionally non-cooperative
are not yet common for human-computer dialogue,
there are a number of applications in which they are
important, including:
intelligent tutoring systems, e.g. (Zinn et al.,
2002), in which the tutor must sometimes over-
ride the local desires of the student for the as-
sumed greater good of education
commercial bargaining agents, e.g., (Jameson
et al., 1994; Jameson andWeis, 1995), in which
the buyer and seller have opposite goals, at least
in terms of price.
more generally, assistant agents in which the
agent may talk to someone other than its owner,
in which it should take up the goals of its owner
rather than others whom it may engage in dia-
logue with.
role-playing training agents, in which the
agents are playing roles which are not coopera-
tive in order to let a user practice and learn how
best to deal with such situations. (Traum et al.,
2008; Traum et al., 2007)
In (Traum and Allen, 1994), we presented a model
of coordinated dialogue behavior that did not rely on
cooperativity for basic interaction. In that view, di-
alogue behavior could be motivated either by indi-
vidual goals (which might or might not be shared or
cooperatively adopted) or obligations, which are im-
posed by norms of social interaction and can be ig-
nored only with potential social penalties. This had
the potential to handle question-answering in non-
cooperative situations, but the Trains system which
used it (Allen et al., 1995) was highly cooperative.
More recently, we have been working on a num-
ber of virtual humans, who engage in face to face
spoken dialogue and act as role-players for do-
mains such as non-team negotiation (Traum et al.,
2005), as shown in Figure 1, multiparty negotiation,
as shown in Figure 2, and questioning interviews
(Traum et al., 2007), as shown in Figure 3. In these
domains, cooperativity is an achievement rather than
an assumption. The agents can choose to be coop-
erative or uncooperative. Dialogue must proceed in
Figure 1: SASO-ST Negotiation in the Clinic: Dr
Perez
both of these cases, and in fact, dialogue is one of
the principal means of increasing cooperativity. We
thus need accounts of aspects of dialogue behav-
ior in which cooperativity does not play an essential
role, as well as other computational mechanisms for
specific uncooperative behaviors.
Figure 2: SASO-EN Negotiation in the Cafe: Dr
Perez (left) looking at Elder al-Hassan
This talk will outline some cases of noncoopera-
tive communication behavior and computational di-
alogue mechanisms that can support these kinds of
behavior, including generating, understanding, and
deciding on strategies of when to engage in uncoop-
erative behavios. Behaviors of interest include
unilateral topic shifts or topic maintenance
avoidance
competition
unhelpful criticism
12
withholding of information or services
lying & deception
competition
antagonism
rejection of empathy
Figure 3: Tactical Questioning: Hassan
The decision of whether to be cooperative or not
and how to behave in each case depends on a number
of factors, including the standard notions of belief,
desire, intention, obligation, and initiative, but also
factors such as trust, solidarity, power, status, and
respect.
We will present preliminary computational mod-
els of these factors and illustrate their use with ex-
amples of interactions with the characters shown in
Figures 1, 2, and 3.
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A Grounding Approach to Modelling Tutorial Dialogue Structures
Mark Buckley and Magdalena Wolska
Dept. of Computational Linguistics
Saarland University
66041 Saarbrücken, Germany
{buckley|magda}@coli.uni-sb.de
Abstract
Pedagogically motivated analyses of tutorial
dialogue have identified recurring local se-
quences of exchanges which we propose to be
analysed analogously to grounding structures.
In this paper, we present a model describing
such local structures in which a learner and a
tutor collaboratively contribute to building a
solution to a task. Such structures are mod-
elled as “grounding” exchanges which oper-
ate at the task level, i.e. at the level of deep
understanding of the domain. Grounding a
learner’s contributions depends on the tutor’s
beliefs as to the learner’s level of understand-
ing. We treat this explicitly by requiring suffi-
cient domain-level evidence to be shown for
a contribution to be grounded. This work
attempts to link general theories of dialogue
with observations from pedagogical science.
1 Motivation
Successful conversational communication depends
strongly on the coordination of meanings and
background assumptions as to the state of the
world (Clark, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002; Thomason et
al., 2006). Dialogue participants try to achieve a sit-
uation in which they mutually believe that their ut-
terances are interpreted as intended and that their as-
sumptions as to the shared knowledge, the common
ground, agree. To this end, they engage in a process
called grounding (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Traum,
1999), whose purpose is to ensure explicit align-
ment of (mutual) beliefs. Grounding can serve to
avoid or recover from communication failures aris-
ing from problems which may range from low level
signal-related issues through the interpretation of the
propositional content up to the level the communica-
tive intentions of speech acts.
Grounding is a general pragmatic phenomenon
in cooperative communication that is independent
of the purpose of the verbal activity, be it socially-
motivated spontaneous conversation or task oriented
verbal communication such as information seeking,
negotiation, problem solving or dialogue-based in-
struction. The latter scenario is additionally inher-
ently prone to misalignment of beliefs beyond the
level of the communicative intentions of speech acts:
namely at the level of deep understanding of the
tutored domain. First, tutoring is typically charac-
terised by an asymmetry of knowledge possessed by
the tutor and the learner (Munger, 1996; Lee and
Sherin, 2004). Second, there is an uncertainty on
the part of the tutor as to the learner’s deep under-
standing and the overall knowledge state. In fact,
empirical research shows that tutors tend to have dif-
ficulties in estimating the learner’s deep understand-
ing (Chi et al., 2004). Still, dialogue-based one-
on-one instruction, even by non-experts, has been
shown to produce higher learning gains than other
forms of teaching (Bloom, 1984; Moore, 1993). One
of the factors that makes a difference in the effi-
ciency of instruction is adaptivity of tutorial feed-
back and explanation. Nückles et al. (2006) show
that tutors who are better informed on the learn-
ers’ prior knowledge can better adapt their feedback.
Another important feature of efficient tutoring are
locally targeted pedagogical actions. Graesser et al.
(1995) show in an empirical study that tutors typi-
cally do not focus on cognitive alignment, i.e. do not
strive to establish complete understanding of the stu-
dents’ state of beliefs. Instead they tend to perform
specific targeted tutoring moves that locally address
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the student’s (lack of) progress on the task at hand.
Motivated by these findings we have been inves-
tigating discourse and dialogue phenomena in the
context of dialogue-based tutoring with the ultimate
goal of building a tutoring system for mathematical
theorem proving. Our approach to modelling tuto-
rial dialogue draws on the empirical evidence from
the above-mentioned studies and can be summarised
by the following observations:
On the one hand, tutorial dialogue is in many re-
spects different from other types of dialogue. The
model of cooperative interpretation must address
the learner’s utterances not only in terms of their
function as speech acts, but also as demonstra-
tions of knowledge, that is, it is dependent on the
adopted pedagogical strategy. Motivated by peda-
gogical goals and licenced by his authority, the tu-
tor may be the “uncooperative” interlocutor in the
sense that he/she may demand presentation of pieces
of knowledge that the learner had left implicit, or
may even refuse to provide information requested by
the learner (overriding dialogue obligations valid in
other dialogue genres) attempting to lead the learner
to self-discovery of knowledge. The structure of tu-
torial dialogue is moreover characterised by system-
atically recurring sub-structures. The role of these
is to address the learner’s knowledge contributions
and to monitor, at least to some extent, the learner’s
deep understanding, allowing feedback and cooper-
ative behaviour to be adapted to what the student has
previously shown to have understood.
On the other hand, tutorial dialogue is still a type
of dialogue, that is, it is characterised by the gen-
eral phenomena present in any dialogue genre and
should lend itself to modelling in terms of general
notions of dialogue. However, because it is a spe-
cial type of dialogue, the model’s parameters (e.g.
the contents of the information state, models of di-
alogue state transitions, obligations, and cooperativ-
ity) must be adjusted to the genre’s characteristics.
This work is an attempt to apply notions from
general dialogue theory to tutorial dialogue. In par-
ticular, we will try to show parallels between the
structure of grounding at the speech acts level and
the local structures in tutorial dialogue which re-
semble grounding, but address the deep understand-
ing of the domain. We will call these commu-
nication level grounding and task level grounding
respectively. We start by exemplifying these lo-
cal structures with dialogue excerpts from our cor-
pora (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2 we briefly in-
troduce grounding according to Traum (1999). In
Section 2.3 we present our framework for task level
grounding and point at the differences between it
and Traum’s model. Section 3 presents the model
formally and steps through an example, before we
summarise our conclusions in Section 4.
2 Tutorial Dialogue Structures as
Grounding Exchanges
Tutorial dialogues have been shown to exhibit lo-
cal patterns, referred to by Graesser et al. (1995)
as dialogue frames, related to the pedagogical goals
that tutors follow. We will argue that the structure
of dialogue frames is similar in character to that of
Traum’s Discourse Units (Traum, 1999), the basic
building blocks of which are utterances which con-
tribute to achieving mutual understanding. Our goal
is to attempt to unify these two views on (tutorial)
dialogue structure in a grounding-based model of tu-
torial dialogue, which we present in the next section.
2.1 Dialogue Frames in Tutoring
In a corpus-based analysis of the collaborative na-
ture of tutorial dialogue Graesser et al. identify lo-
cal interaction patterns which make one-on-one tu-
toring, even by non-experts, effective in producing
learning gains. They consist of the following steps,
all of which but step 2 may be omitted:
Step 1 Tutor asks a question.
Step 2 The student offers an answer
Step 3 Tutor gives feedback on the answer
Step 4 Tutor and student collaboratively improve the
quality of the answer, whereby the tutor can for in-
stance elaborate on the answer, give a hint, pump
the student for more information, or trace an expla-
nation or justification.
Step 5 The tutor assesses the student’s understanding
of the answer, for instance by explicitly asking
whether the student understood.
Similar structures were revealed by our analysis
of the two corpora of tutorial dialogues on math-
ematical theorem proving (Wolska et al., 2004;
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Benzmüller et al., 2006) which we have collected.1
(1) and (2) are examples of such exchanges2:
(1) S0 (R ◦ S)−1 = {(x, y)|(y, x) ∈ (R ◦ S)}
T0 correct
S1 (R ◦ S)−1 = {(x, y)|(y, x) ∈ {(x, y)|∃z(z ∈
M ∧ (x, z) ∈ R ∧ (z, y) ∈ S}}
T1-1 okay,
T1-2 but you could have done that more simply
(2)S19-1: (R ◦ T ) = (T−1 ◦ R−1)−1 (by exercise W),
S19-2: then it must also hold that (S ◦ T ) = (T−1 ◦
S−1)−1
T25: Why does this follow from exercise W?
S20: (R ◦ S) = (S−1 ◦ R−1)−1 (according to exer-
cise W), then it must also hold that (S ◦ T ) =
(T−1 ◦S−1)−1 and (R◦T ) = (T−1 ◦R−1)−1
T26-1: All other steps are appropriate,
T26-2: but the justification for (R ◦ T ) = (T−1 ◦
R−1)−1 is still missing.
S21: (R ◦ T )−1 = (T−1 ◦ R−1) (by exercise W)
T27: Yes.
The building block of such exercises is the proof
step, a contribution which consists of a formula
which the step derives, a justification, premises, and
possibly other components. Proof steps may be un-
derspecified, for instance by only providing the de-
rived formula. This leads to them possibly having to
be augmented in order to be acceptable.
In (1) we see a simple case of a student’s con-
tribution being accepted by the tutor. In terms of
Graesser’s dialogue frames, S0 corresponds to step
2 and T0 to step 3. Because the tutor is immediately
satisfied that the student has understood the answer,
steps 4 and 5 are not performed. S1 and T1 form a
new dialogue frame which is the same as the first ex-
cept that step 4 is realised in T1-2 by the tutor, who
elaborates on the answer.
(2) is a more complex example which begins with
the student’s contribution in S19 (Graesser’s step 2).
It consists of two contributions, however only the
first one (S19-1) is discussed. Similarly to S0 in
(1), the contribution is incomplete in that the student
does not provide the premise that allowed him/her
to conclude that the contribution in S19-1 holds, but
rather leaves it implicit. Here however, the tutor is
not satisfied with the incomplete step and responds
with a request to elaborate the answer (step 4) in
1The corpora were collected in Wizard-of-Oz experiments.
The 2004 corpus contains 22 dialogues (775 turns in total) in
the domain of naive set theory. The 2006 corpus contains 37
dialogues (1917 turns) in the domain of binary relations.
2Sx and Tx label student and tutor utterances respectively.
T25, skipping the feedback (step 3). Instead of ad-
dressing this request, the student offers a new contri-
bution, leaving the request in T25 pending. In T26-1
the tutor gives feedback on both S19 and S20 (step
3 for both of these contributions) and continues by
repeating the request for elaboration in T26-2. The
student then addresses this request by supplying the
missing premise in S21 (step 4) which the tutor ac-
cepts in T27, thereby closing the dialogue frame.
Our analysis of the two tutorial dialogue cor-
pora revealed that structures such as the ones de-
scribed above systematically recurred in the domain
of proof tutoring in the context of the conducted ex-
periment. Locally, the dialogue structures indeed
typically reflect Graesser’s steps 2 though 4, with
individual proof steps being proposed (step 2) and
subsequently optionally elaborated (step 3) and eval-
uated (step 4), in either order. Due to the student
having the initiative in our experimental setup step 1
is seldom found in our data.
In the corpora elaboration requests were most
commonly initiated because the inferences proposed
by the students were only partially specified. Typi-
cally, the students provide a formula (or an equiva-
lent worded statement) leaving out, for instance, the
inference rule, the way it should be applied or the
premises. This means that part(s) of the task-level
steps are left implicit (or tacit), possibly resulting in
them not being grounded. In the tutoring domain the
question of whether an underspecified step (or more
generally, an incomplete knowledge demonstration)
can be accepted (i.e. grounded) depends, for in-
stance, on pedagogical factors (in the case of math-
ematical proofs, for example on the tutor’s notion of
an “acceptable” proof (Raman, 2002)) and the tu-
tor’s beliefs as to the student’s knowledge state.
2.2 The Grounding Acts Model
Traum (1999) defines a set of Grounding Acts which
are identified with particular utterance units and per-
form specific functions towards the achievement of
mutual understanding. The content of an utterance
can become grounded as a result of an exchange
containing Grounding Acts; such possibly multi-
turn sequences are referred to as Discourse Units
(DU). DUs can contain the following acts:
Initiate begins a new DU with a new utterance unit.
Continue adds content to an act.
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Acknowledge is evidence of understanding of the cur-
rent utterance unit. This evidence can be of differ-
ing strength, e.g. demonstration of the understood
meaning or performance of a relevant continuation.
Repair changes the content of the current utterance unit.
ReqRepair requests repair of a previous act by sig-
nalling non-understanding.
ReqAck asks the dialogue participant to acknowledge
understanding of a previous act.
Cancel abandons the current DU without grounding.
In the DU in example (3), taken from Traum (1999),
the content of the initiating utterance I1-1 and the
continuation I1-2 has been successfully grounded by
the acknowledgement Grounding Act in R1.
(3) I1-1 Move the box car to Corning initI
I1-2 and load it with oranges contI
R1 ok ackR
Our previous example (1) also exhibits this structure
within the DU, where S0 and S1 are initiations and
T0 and T1-1 are acknowledgements. We now show
that in tutorial dialogue, in addition to the commu-
nicative level of Traum’s model, grounding also op-
erates at the task level.
2.3 Grounding in Tutorial Dialogue
We have exemplified the parallels between the struc-
tures found in tutorial dialogue and grounding ex-
changes and will now make these parallels more
explicit. We will interpret dialogue frames as dis-
course units and the actions within dialogue frames
as grounding acts.
What is grounded in the course of a discourse unit
is a piece of domain content which contributes to
the domain-level task. In tutoring this is a knowl-
edge demonstration — we will use the term solu-
tion step. Proof steps become grounded by being
first proposed and then accepted by the tutor, pro-
vided that the tutor has sufficient evidence to believe
that the student has deeply understood how the step
was derived. To reach this state the student may be
obliged to supply evidence of having understood the
step, and this evidence can be of varying strength. In
this sense supplying evidence is similar to Traum’s
Acknowledge, and a request for evidence is simi-
lar to ReqAck. We list the set of actions as well as
who can perform them in the course of grounding a
solution step in Table 1.
Propose S,T propose a solution step
ReqEv S,T request evidence showing under-
standing of the current step
SuppEv S give evidence showing understand-
ing of the current step
Accept T accept that the student has under-
stood the current step
Reject T reject the step (due to incorrectness
or non-understanding)
Table 1: Task level grounding actions and speakers
Augment an elaboration of the current step
Reword paraphrase of the current step
Claim positive answer to “do you understand?”
Verbatim repeat back the step verbatim
Table 2: Types of evidence of understanding
In the same way that Clark and Schaefer (1989)
identify different types of evidence of understand-
ing, the action SuppEv encompasses a number of
different ways of showing understanding of a solu-
tion step. From our analysis of the data, we propose
the four categories listed in Table 2 from strongest
to weakest. Although verbatim repetition of the con-
tent being grounded is the strongest evidence type in
Clark and Schaefer’s communication level ground-
ing model, at the task level it is the weakest form,
since it does not show any understanding beyond
recognition of the original signal. Claiming under-
standing is self-reflection on the student’s own be-
lief state, and for our purposes is a weak form of
evidence. Rewording is a strong indication of un-
derstanding, but does not add anything to the current
content which is being grounded. The strongest ev-
idence type is augmenting the current solution step
with further information. This shows that the student
understands even those components which were not
stated in the proposal phase of the discourse unit.
In keeping with Clark and Schaefer’s observation
that evidence must be “sufficient for the current pur-
pose”, the tutor’s decision of whether to consider
this evidence sufficient to show understanding of the
current content (and then to accept the step) depends
on both a student model and the pedagogical strat-
egy being followed. Indeed for different teaching
domains this notion of sufficient will be defined dif-
ferently according to the demands of the task and the
domain dependent teaching goals.
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According to this model the annotation of exam-
ple (2) from the previous section, where subscripts
index individual steps under discussion, is:
S19-1 Propose1
S19-2 Propose2
T25 ReqEv1
S20 Propose3
T26-1 Accept2,3
T26-2 ReqEv1
S21 SuppEv1 (Augment: premise)
T27 Accept1
The proposal made in S19-1 is eventually grounded
in T27, but in between a new proposal is made (S20),
showing that more than one solution step can be un-
der discussion at once.
Contrasts with Traum’s model We have bor-
rowed many concepts from and shown parallels to
Traum’s Grounding Acts model, so here it is useful
to highlight some key differences. The main differ-
ence is that task level grounding works at a higher
level than Traum’s communication level grounding
model. Our model does not deal with meaning but
rather with deep understanding, and the object being
grounded is part of the task being explicitly talked
about. Accordingly, actions contributing to task
level grounding are motivated by task level goals,
such as completing the current exercise, whereas
Traum’s Grounding Acts contribute to successful
communication as a whole. Communication level
grounding does however still operate as usual in par-
allel. We refer to example (2), in which the utterance
T25 has two functions: at the communication level
it grounds the propositional content initiated in S19
but at the task level it continues the discourse unit.
A further difference is the roles of dialogue partici-
pants and their goals. In tutoring our model does not
consider the roles of speaker and hearer, but rather
student and tutor, necessary because of the asymme-
try of roles in tutorial dialogue; students are obliged
to demonstrate understanding but tutors are not.
In summary, we have found a correspondence be-
tween general grounding structures and the struc-
tures found in tutoring. In order to treat these sub-
dialogues in terms of grounding we need a model of
grounding with a higher level object: the task level
step. In the next section we introduce the more for-
mal machinery to model these sequences.
3 A Model of Task Level Grounding
Our discourse unit is a subdialogue which begins
with the proposal of a task level step and which ends
with this step being either accepted or rejected by the
tutor. In the previous section we have motivated this
choice by showing its equivalence to both Graesser’s
dialogue frames and Traum’s Discourse Units. The
objects which are under discussion and which are
to be grounded in these subdialogues are solution
steps, here proof steps, and the conditions which af-
fect this are a student model, the tutor’s pedagogi-
cal strategy, the correctness, relevance and granular-
ity of the step, as well as some definition of what
it means for evidence to be sufficient. The internal
structure of solution steps should be defined for the
task at hand — here we use a solution step for math-
ematical proofs consisting of a formula which is de-
rived, a justification for deriving the formula, and
the premises used by the justification. In this section
we present the machinery necessary to model these
phenomena and step through example (2).
We assume that the dialogue system has access
to two expert systems: a pedagogical manager and
a mathematical domain reasoner. The pedagogical
manager (Fiedler and Tsovaltzi, 2003) is responsible
for the teaching strategy that the system follows, as
well as for maintaining the student model. The do-
main reasoner (Dietrich and Buckley, 2007; Schiller
et al., 2007) evaluates solution steps with respect to
correctness, granularity and relevance, and can re-
solve missing components of underspecified steps.
The model uses the categorisations of utterance
types in terms of their function in the DU (Table 1)
and evidence types (Table 2) that play a role in the
grounding exchanges we are considering. We will
now additionally define a dialogue state which rep-
resents intermediate stages of the discourse unit, fol-
lowed by a finite state machine which encodes the
transitions between dialogue states and their effects.
3.1 Dialogue State
The dialogue state used in our model is an extension
of our previous work on common ground (Buckley
and Wolska, 2007), reduced to those aspects rele-
vant to this presentation. It consists of four parts
and is shown in Figure 1. The common ground (CG)
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
CG
[
S-STEPS 〈〉
]
PENDING
〈
ID step1
FORMULA “(R ◦ T ) = . . .”
JUSTIFS “exercise_W”
PREMISES

〉
LU
SPEAKER studentMOVES propose, ...
S-STEP step1

OUTPUT

Figure 1: The dialogue state
contains an ordered list3 of the solution steps which
have been grounded in the process of solving the
task (S-STEPS). The solution steps which are cur-
rently under discussion but are not yet grounded are
stored in PENDING. The latest utterance (LU) in the
dialogue is represented by a structure containing in-
formation about the speaker who performed the ut-
terance, the dialogue moves it realised, and the so-
lution step, if any, that it contained. Finally the di-
alogue moves that the system should verbalise next
are collected in OUTPUT. Both LU/MOVES and OUT-
PUT store complete dialogue moves, however here
we only list task-level grounding actions. When
task-level grounding has been successful, the solu-
tion step moves from PENDING to CG/S-STEPS.
3.2 Transitions between Dialogue States
Figure 2 presents a finite state machine encoding
the transitions between dialogue states in a discourse
unit. A Propose moves the dialogue into a state in
which there is an ungrounded solution step. From
here the tutor can either accept the step directly, thus
grounding the step, or ask for further evidence of un-
derstanding, after which it is necessary for the stu-
dent to supply evidence before the discourse unit can
be in the state in which the solution step is grounded.
The transitions (Table 3) are given as sets of pre-
conditions and effects on the dialogue state. We omit
additional processing such as information exchange
with system modules. The conditions we use are
stated informally — “evidence (in)sufficient” is de-
cided by the pedagogical module, drawing on infor-
mation from the dialogue state as well as its own
3This is a strong simplification — a complete treatment
would require a more detailed structure for solution steps.
t1 pre Propose ∈ LU/MOVES
eff PENDING := LU/S-STEP
t2 pre evidence insufficient, ne(PENDING)
eff OUTPUT := ReqEv
t3 pre evidence sufficient, ne(PENDING)
eff OUTPUT := Accept,(feedback)
push(CG/S-STEPS,pop(PENDING))
t4 pre SuppEv ∈ LU/MOVES
eff possibly update solution step
t5 pre evidence insufficient
eff OUTPUT := ReqEv
t6 pre evidence sufficient
eff OUTPUT := Accept,(feedback)
push(CG/S-STEPS,pop(PENDING))
Table 3: Preconditions and effects of transitions (ne de-
notes “non-empty”)
student model. Transition t3 moves from a state in
which a solution step has been proposed to a state
in which that solution step has been grounded. If the
evidence for understanding the step is sufficient, and
there is content under discussion (ne(PENDING)),
then an Accept and possibly some feedback is gen-
erated, and the solution step is moved from PEND-
ING to CG/S-STEPS. This transition equates to
Graesser’s step 3 in the dialogue frame. Transitions
t2 and t5 both cover the situation where the evidence
presented is not sufficient to show understanding,
and both result in ReqEv being generated, and the
solution step(s) that were in PENDING remain there
(Graesser’s step 4). When evidence is supplied, we
follow transition t4, which updates the solution step
in the event that evidence of the type Augment was
supplied. Although it is not included in the FSA, at
any stage a discourse unit can be abandoned, possi-
bly with a Reject action. This decision can be taken
for instance in the state “evidence supplied” when
the tutor believes that the student will not be able to
show understanding of the step.
Because there can be more than one solution step
under discussion at one time, as in example (2), we
assume that a separate instance of the FSA is run
for each one. An acceptance can thus address more
than one solution step. Like downdating questions
under discussion, we allow acceptances to ground
as many solution steps as necessary. We also note
that transitions in the model are only made in reac-
tion to task-level grounding actions, so that as long
as other actions are being performed, the FSA stays
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solution step
ungrounded
t1:
LU=propose
evidence
requested
t2: evidence
insufficient
solution step
grounded
t3: evidence
sufficient
evidence
supplied
t5: evidence
insufficient
t6: evidence
sufficient
t4: LU=SuppEv
Figure 2: The FSA describing task-level discourse units
in the same state. This allows other levels in the di-
alogue to be modelled, for instance communication
level grounding, off-topic talk or meta talk. Indeed
this model can be integrated with a computational
model of communication level grounding such as
presented by Matheson et al. (2000) if we assume
that their grounding acts are dealt with before gen-
erating any task level grounding actions. This way
problems at the communication level are handled be-
fore understanding problems at the task level.
Example Figure 1 shows the dialogue state after
utterance S19 in example (2), where the Propose in
utterance S19-1 has put a solution step in PENDING.
The tutor considers that with the current context and
student model, there is not sufficient evidence of un-
derstanding of the solution step. Transition t2 is
therefore executed, generating a ReqEv action, re-
alised in utterance T25. Skipping forward to S21
(S20 to T26-2 deal similarly with a different solution
step), we recognise a SuppEv action, which takes us
through transition t4. Since the evidence supplied in
S21 is of type Augment, we update the solution step
by adding the premise the student stated as shown:PENDING
〈
ID st1
FORMULA “(R ◦ T ) = . . .”
JUSTIFS “exercise_W”
PREMISES “(R ◦ T )−1 = . . .”

〉
Now the tutor can reassess whether this more com-
plete solution step is evidence that the student has
understood fully, and finds that it is. The transition
t6 then generates the Accept in T27 and additionally
moves the solution step to the common ground. The
final dialogue state is shown in Figure 3.
4 Conclusions and Related Work
We take advantage of observations about recur-
ring local structures in tutorial dialogue highlighted
by Graesser’s analysis and recognise that there ex-

CG | S-STEPS
〈
ID st1
FORMULA “(R ◦ T ) = . . .”
JUSTIFS “exercise_W”
PREMISES “(R ◦ T )−1 = . . .”

〉
PENDING 〈〉
LU
SPEAKER tutorMOVES accept, ...
S-STEP

OUTPUT

Figure 3: Final dialogue state
ist systematic parallels between these and Traum’s
grounding exchanges. This motivates our compu-
tational model, which is analogous to Traum’s but
operates on a level which directly addresses under-
standing of the domain. Our model sees these local
structures as discourse units whose objects are solu-
tion steps, and thus operates at the task level. It cap-
tures learners’ deep understanding of the domain,
and so acts higher than the communication level.
Grounding serves to build up a model of inter-
locutors’ belief states. In tutoring this is particu-
larly important because the tutor’s model of the stu-
dent’s belief state is a parameter which affects the
adopted pedagogical strategy. The local dialogue
structure that our model describes allows the ped-
agogical model to elicit evidence of understanding
and thus reach conclusions about the student’s be-
lief state. While we do not make any claims about
how such a student model should be constructed, our
model does provide input for the construction of a
representation of the student’s knowledge.
Rickel et al. (2002) also use a general dialogue
model in a tutoring system which combines peda-
gogical expertise with collaborative discourse the-
ory and plan recognition. Their approach models
the knowledge state based on steps that the stu-
dent has been exposed to, however without consid-
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ering whether these were fully understood. Zinn et
al. (2005) present a tutorial dialogue system which
maintains common ground in the dialogue model,
however they do not make use of grounding sta-
tus to structure the dialogue locally. Baker et al.
(1999) highlight the necessity for communication
level grounding in collaborative learning, but admit
that this does not guarantee “deeper” understanding.
In general task-oriented dialogues Litman and Allen
(1987) derive the structure of clarification subdia-
logues based on task plans and the discourse struc-
ture. Our approach is conceptually similar, however
our task model is maintained externally to the di-
alogue model. Finally, our work relates to that of
Thomason et al. (2006) and Benotti (2007) in the
sense that the task level grounding model attempts
to ground objects that can be viewed as tacit actions.
Our future work will include extending the model
to allow more student initiative, for example in the
case of domain level clarification requests by the stu-
dent, as well as looking into more fine-grained struc-
tures within the common ground, for instance to sup-
port a model of the salience of task level objects.
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Abstract
Flexibility in dialogue management requires
not just the ability to understand and respond
to a greater range of user utterance types (or
moves), but also the ability to generate them
and to do so strategically in accordance with
some notion of costs and benefits. We ex-
plore this issue in the context of the Infor-
mation State Update model of dialogue. We
add costs and preferences to a simple instan-
tiation of the model and explore the added
flexibility this brings and also link the inclu-
sion of costs to other developments of the
model. We compare this work to the work in
reinforcement learning which also includes
a notion of cost and reward.
1 Introduction
The Information State Update (ISU) approach to di-
alogue modelling is a highly abstract characteriza-
tion of dialogue semantics. Contributions to a di-
alogue are treated like programs in dynamic logic:
they both update a dialogue state and are inter-
pretable in the light of a previous state.
Agents have two main roles in this abstract pic-
ture: to use state in interpreting contributions; and to
make state by generating contributions. A great deal
of research has concentrated on the former question.
What must a state look like if I am to be able to inter-
pret this sort of conversational offering? And what
will it look like once I have both interpreted and in-
corporated it? I want to ask: what must a state look
like, if I am to choose to make this sort of conver-
sational offering? And what will it look like once
I have made it? My focus will be on the role of
the dialogue state in spoken dialogue systems, partly
because this is a useful (and largely externally im-
posed) constraint on the extent of the material to
consider, partly because the results may be practi-
cally useful.
The ISU approach to dialogue modelling easily
accommodates dialogue models that are encodable
directly in a network formalism with atomic states
and transitions between them. Choices over dia-
logue moves can be encoded in a nondeterministic
network. The frame based (or slot-and-filler) ar-
chitecture, for example as instantiated in the form
interpretation algorithm in the commercially em-
ployed VoiceXML dialogue specification (Oshry et
al., 2006) is also easily implementable. An exam-
ple frame for the travel planning scenario is shown
in figure 1. The different instantiations of the frame
form the states of the system. Dialogue policy is
implemented by associating a question with each at-
tribute in the frame and by ordering the attributes.
The next question to be put is the first attribute for
which no value is currently known. The whole frame
may also be associated with a question, which is put
when a frame first comes into focus. The frame stays
in focus until all attributes have received values. The
VoiceXML question selection algorithm is: if the
frame is already in focus, ask the first question (from
top to bottom) whose value is unknown else ask the
question associated with the whole frame.
The general slot-and-filler approach has contin-
ued to underpin a large amount of research in dia-
logue systems including theoretical work that is im-
plemented in demonstration systems and in systems
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that attempt to learn dialogue strategy. In the next
section, we review this work and highlight the need
for informing machine learning approaches with in-
sights from theory as well as the need for the the-
oretical approaches to include explicit cost models.
Following this, we add a simple cost and preference
model to an Information State Update based dia-
logue manager and explore some of its implications.
With a focus on practical systems, we consider the
dialogue management of questions that are not di-
rectly answered, comparing the treatment with that
of models which add features such as “questions un-
der discussion”. We conclude that the addition of
a cost model is vital not only for future theoretical
work but also as a basis for informing future targets
for machine learning approaches.
2 Previous Work
Dialogue strategy development in the Information
State Update approach has followed two main
trends. Theoretical work has concentrated mostly
on extending the notion of dialogue state in order to
permit analysis of a greater range of dialogues and
a deeper analysis of phenomena such as grounding.
Secondly, there has been a strand directed towards
learning dialogue strategy automatically from real
or simulated dialogues. For computational reasons,
this work has tended to use a much narrower con-
ception of state. Indeed, the focus of attention has
almost entirely been devoted to learning whether and
how to confirm user utterances and whether the next
question should be more open-ended or not (“mixed
initiative”). Although the notion of state in this
work tends to be more limited, the strategy is clearly
linked to notions of costs and progress towards dia-
logue goals.
Chu-Carroll and Nickerson (2000) and Lit-
man (2002) describe experiments showing that on-
line adaptation in dialogue strategy is beneficial to
users. Litman and Pan’s TOOT systemmonitors pre-
dicted speech recognition error rates and can change
strategy twice during a dialogue. The system begins
by not confirming user utterances at all. If problems
are detected, it can start implicitly confirming utter-
ances (“I heard you say Sunday. What time would
you like to leave?”); and if problems continue, it
can move to explicit confirmation (‘On which day
of the week do you want to leave”, “Sunday”, “Do
you want to leave on Sunday?”). Simultaneously,
the open-endedness of the prompts and the range of
acceptable responses is degraded. For example, at
the middle stage (entitledmixed initiative, somewhat
bizarrely) the system will not let the user ignore
its question but insists on an answer. Chu-Carroll
and Nickerson’s MIMIC system also monitors more
general interpretation difficulties than just speech
recognition problems. A binary global switch can
be set causing the system to offer less open-ended
prompts. The switch may also be reset if sufficient
cue evidence of success can be found. One cue is
whether the user subsequently adds unsolicited in-
formation to an answer.
Reinforcement learning techniques have also
been widely explored as a means of data-driven de-
velopment of dialogue strategy. In addition to a cor-
pus of dialogues encoding dialogue states and tran-
sitions between them, a reward function is required
which enables the learning function to generate a
strategy that generally leads to higher rewards.
For example, Scheffler and Young (2002) used a
corpus of dialogues generated with a user simula-
tion to learn how to confirm what was just said (ex-
plicitly, implicitly by repeating whilst querying the
next slot or not at all) and whether to offer open-
ended questions or not. In addition to slot informa-
tion, the state contained confidence scores for the
latest recognition result. Scheffler and Young argue
that it is appropriate to restrict the learning to suit-
ably local decision making (such as confirmation of
last utterance) on the grounds that the user simula-
tion provides the data for making these choices but
not on the higher strategic questions such as which
slot to ask for next. In contrast, Henderson (2005)
explores the learning of strategies for the entire di-
alogue and also uses a much richer notion of dia-
logue state including possibly its entire history. The
learned strategies are reported to perform well when
tested against user simulations and against real users
(Lemon et al., 2006). Qualitative analysis of the di-
alogues (Frampton and Lemon, 2006) suggests that
the improved performance of the learned strategies
is actually entirely attributable to improved (local)
repair strategies when the last exchange failed to add
a value for a slot. Rather than simply repeating a
failed question the improved strategies would either
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give help or switch focus to a different slot. Giving
help is an evidently sensible strategy. The switch
of focus to another slot is interesting however not
least because the reward function only rewarded di-
alogues where all slots are filled and the learner did
learn only to query the database when all slots had
been filled. Consequently, switching focus could
only postpone acquisition of a value for a particu-
lar slot. The system apparently learned that exact
question repeats tend to be unsuccessful. In general,
question repeats may be unsuccessful if answer pro-
nunciation remains identical or indeed if the answer
becomes hyper-articulated. Possibly these proper-
ties were reproduced in the n-gram user simulations
used for testing which were trained from Commu-
nicator data. In this case, asking the same ques-
tion again later but not actually immediately might
be more likely to result in a recognizable response.
However there is clearly a danger that the learned
strategies are just responses to somewhat unnatu-
ral artifacts of the user simulation. Whether such
a strategy could actually be viable for real human
users is an open question. One obvious alternative is
simply to ask for the same information again but in a
rather different way. However, the set of possible ac-
tions in the learning experiment did not include this
particular move.
Pietquin and Renals (2002) earlier trained a slot-
filling system in which not all slots were required
for a database query and generated a strategy which
preferentially asked for slots whose values were
more likely to be recognizable - a seemingly sim-
ple and effective policy which later researchers do
not seem to have pursued.
Re-raising questions differently has also been pro-
posed from the more theoretical strand of work us-
ing the Information State Update approach. Cooper
and Larsson (2005) maintain a Qud-like stack of
questions in the Information State which have been
raised but not yet resolved. One possible use of this
is so that later question repeats could be reformu-
lated. Another is to allow interpretations of material
which are not interpretable “alone” but require the
earlier question as context. If the question remains
suitably salient even though it is not the latest utter-
ance then the material can be resolved. There is also
the possibility of an accommodation mechanism in
which material that requires a question to be salient

FROM
DEPARTURE-TIME
TO
MODE OF TRAVEL

Figure 1: Travel Frame
1. [S] When do you want to leave?
2. [U] I want to be in Gothenburg at 8.
Figure 2: Unsolicited information
in order to be interpretable at all actually causes that
question to become salient. Although demonstration
systems have been built that are capable of illustrat-
ing these principles, it is far from clear that they are
sufficiently robust to permit real dialogues to pro-
ceed smoothly and transparently to successful con-
clusions. Furthermore, discussions of these systems
tend not to be explicit about how agents cost and se-
lect their moves.
3 Non-answers to questions
The key merit in the VoiceXML form interpretation
algorithm is simply that it easily permits appropriate
future dialogue behaviour upon encountering unso-
licited relevant information, as in figure 2.
If “I want to be in Gothenburg at 8” can be un-
derstood as a possible answer to “How can I help
you?” or even as an initiating exchange utterance
on its own, then it ought also to be processable as
a response to “When do you want to leave?”. The
user response is not an answer, not a direct one at
least, but it can be used to fill in the value of a slot
nonetheless. Then, the next question to be asked can
be calculated as before on the basis of what else the
system needs to know. The default VoiceXML strat-
egy will end up repeating the very same question.
The focus switching strategy (see above) will also
repeat the very same question again only perhaps not
just yet.
What is required for an agent to select more
intelligently amongst the options it actually has
available? In what circumstances would an agent
move on to a different question. An agent rea-
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sonably requests the same information (possibly via
a re-phrasing) if the answer is either essential for
progress; or if, more mundanely, it just remains
the best bet for making progress. One advantage
in concentrating on a typical task for a spoken di-
alogue system is that reasonable measures are eas-
ier to come by. If the immediate goal is to make a
database query then an “essential” piece of knowl-
edge is one without which no query can be made.
A dialogue manager which insists on asking a par-
ticular question even though the underlying query
system does not require it is clearly deficient. If the
question is not essential, then the likelihood of mak-
ing progress through a repeat needs to be weighed.
Theoretical models stand in need of an explicit cost
model and evaluation procedure in order to meet this
demand.
Given the simplest slot-and-filler information
state (Figure 1), one very simple addition to enable
more intelligent selection is to just define a pref-
erence ordering over all the subsets of possible at-
tributes e.g. Sel : Pow(A) → Z+. The selection
algorithm then becomes: choose the attribute whose
addition to those already supplied with values maxi-
mizes the value of Sel. Such a function is very eas-
ily implemented. Depending on the particular Sel
function defined, a dialogue manager can now
1. repeat the original question
2. ask a different one
3. execute the database query straight away
If the system knows X and requests M, but re-
ceives N, then (X+N+M) might be considerably
lower than (X+N+O) for some other O, so M should
not be repeated but replaced by O. Indeed, X+N
might be better than any extension of it, in which
case no further questions should be asked: the in-
tended database query can be made now. If we fur-
ther add in a simple cost function which progres-
sively penalizes repetitions of questions, then we es-
sentially have the system of (Lewin, 2001). Another
addition to the cost penalty might be the likelihood
of receiving a recognizable answer, in the style of
(Pietquin and Renals, 2002).
The cost and evaluation model can therefore be
used to build in certain simple dialogue strategic
principles. For example, the simple cost on rep-
etitions allows repeats if the information sought is
sufficiently important. Equally, there may be many
sets of attributes which cannot be extended to a more
preferred set. That is, there may be many different
ways of achieving the goal of making some database
query. Not all travel queries will require finding out
the departure-time. Other general constraints might
be imposed on the preference ordering. In general,
more query constraints are better than fewer, be-
cause the set of satisfiers will likely be smaller and
it will be easier to discuss and evaluate a small set
of alternatives later. On the other hand, a query that
is likely to return no answers (because the query is
overly specified) might receive a very low value in-
deed.
Is this not precisely the sort of information that
might be built into a reward function for a reinforce-
ment learner? The answer of course is “yes” and
“no”. In principle, everything can be built in. In
practice, not everything can be. Furthermore, what
is built in in practice needs to be guided properly
by theory. We have seen one instance of this al-
ready in which the learner learns to repeat a question
later given that it prefers not to repeat it immediately
but does actually need the answer to progress. An-
other highly plausible scenario is this: the travel op-
tions for Gothenburg can change over time and thus
the best way to make progress in dialogues about
those travel options can change over time too. As
more travel options become available, it might be-
come sensible to ask about the travel-mode earlier
in the dialogue in order to reduce the size of the re-
sponse from the database query. It is certainly fea-
sible that a learning algorithm could learn automat-
ically the changing relative costs of different travel
queries; and these values could then function as an
input to a dialogue management algorithm such as
that sketched above. In general, the point is this:
the development of theory which has practical ambi-
tions needs to incorporate a cost model; furthermore,
these developments can usefully inform further ef-
forts at deploying machine learning. The point re-
sembles that of Scheffler and Young: one need not
attempt to model all possible dialogues but restrict
the learning to parameters that one can effectively
obtain data for.
The general analysis is not restricted to this partic-
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ular scenario in which progress is evaluated by an-
ticipated results of a database query. One might, for
example, be able to execute a query after every new
piece of information from the user and thereby have
access to the actual travel possibilities given what
the user has said so far. In this case, the next ques-
tion might be calculated using Information Theoret-
ical considerations: which question is the best next
one to ask to identify the right travel option out of
this set of possibilities? Again, values for such a pa-
rameter might be trainable from data without having
to retrain the entire dialogue manager.
3.1 Stacks and Quds
Theoretical work in the Information State Update
approach has often placed emphasis on storing ques-
tions (or issues) in stack like structures.
When the dialogue manager interprets the user’s
unsolicited offering and calculates his next move,
need it note that a question was asked but not an-
swered? Do we pop the question off a stack? The
system knows of course which goals remain unsatis-
fied so the issue here is not whether to put the ques-
tion again or not; just whether to note that there is
an outstanding question that has not been answered.
The distinction between public shared parts of dia-
logue state and private personal ones becomes im-
portant here. One intuition in the theoretical work is
that the putting of a question is a public act that alters
a shared linguistic environment; and this is indepen-
dent of any mental states that might have led to its
putting. Unfortunately the public or private status of
an “outstanding” question is far less clear. Even in
our simple extract (figure 2), the response might be
a simple rejection of the question, in which case it is
unclear if the original question remains outstanding
or not. Alternatively, perhaps the user does intend to
return to the original question at some point in the
future and has placed the issue on a mental stack.
Cooper and Larsson (2005) note how subtle a deci-
sion on this question might be.
I want to make two points about this issue. The
first is that whatever our best interpretation of the
user’s offering, our next action should not simply be
determined by that interpretation plus our own plans
and goals. A rational cost calculation must include
not only the risk of our best interpretation being in-
correct but the possible cost of the next possible ac-
tions. How much will next actions differ if we think
the user was rejecting our question or just postpon-
ing it. At best, we will only have a probability dis-
tribution over interpretations since the actual state
of the user is of course unobservable. (Williams and
Young, 2005) have recently been exploring the use
of partially observable Markov decision processes in
the settings of spoken dialogue systems.
The second, and strongly related, point is to em-
phasize that whether the dialogue “needs” to pop a
stack or not is partly a matter of what strategic cal-
culations about dialogue progress the dialogue man-
ager can make. The dialogue manager, when inter-
preting the user’s unsolicited offering, is of course
also just about to make another contribution to the
dialogue itself. If it is really only capable of ask-
ing questions at this point, then whatever the current
state, the new most salient outstanding question will
be the one it now chooses to make. Could the origi-
nal question be required as context for a subsequent
elliptical utterance? This is perhaps not impossible
although it is unlikely given that the original ques-
tion was not answered and has now been superseded
by a new one. The original question is otiose as con-
text if the question is just repeated of course.
The most important reason to record the original
question on a stack is simply if the moves avail-
able to the dialogue manager include one that explic-
itly hands the initiative to the user. It is a common
enough human strategy, if a non-answering response
is made to a question, only to acknowledge the re-
sponse. One might either signal, perhaps through in-
tonation, that more input is expected or just wait and
see what turns up next. This is not just a character-
istic of chit-chat conversations, in which it doesn’t
particularly matter what happens next. It can be
a calculated move in a strictly goal-driven inter-
change. In a chess game, one player might believe
he understands his opponent’s plan of attack, but
play an inconsequential move to allow his partner
the opportunity of making a more revealing move.
Of course, such a move is a luxury item in the cur-
rent state of spoken dialogue systems! Theoretically,
however, the point is that “only acknowledging” is
itself a particular dialogue move with consequences
that need to be weighed in a model of move selec-
tion. Furthermore these possibilities are intimately
tied to the addition of stack-like structures to the in-
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1. [S] Do you want the train or the plane?
2. [U]What time do they arrive?
Figure 3: Dependent questions
1. [S] Do you want the train or the plane?
2. [U]What time do they arrive?
3. [S] The train arrives at 3 and the plane at 4
4. [U] The train please
Figure 4: Long distance short answers
formation state. If a dialogue manager is to be ca-
pable of just acknowledging a user assertion, then it
ought also to be sensitive to the cost of doing that
versus something else. Clearly, practical dialogue
managers with this sort of capability have yet to be
built. Theoretical accounts that include acknowledg-
ments often appear to include them simply as part of
a “protocol of interaction”.
4 Questions in answer to questions
Stacks and Quds are popular also for analysis of di-
alogues that include nested questioning sequences
(figure 4). Classically, these cases are ones where
the answer to the first question somehow depends
on the answer to the second. If it is analysed as be-
ing dependent, then the first question may be put on
a stack; or perhaps a nested conversational game is
begun, or possibly an outstanding obligation to an-
swer it is recorded (Ginzburg, 1996; Lewin, 2000;
Matheson et al., 2000).
Shifting the focus of our attention onto next
move selection again urges rather the importance of
weighing the possible next moves. What should a di-
alogue manager do when it receives a question in a
response to question? Clearly, if the goal motivating
the original question is still of primary importance,
then it might be best simply to re-ask it (possibly
with a re-phrasing). Alternatively, perhaps the ques-
tion can be re-asked whilst also answering the new
question. Finally, perhaps it is best simply to move
onto another topic altogether. As we saw earlier with
acknowledgments, it would be a mistake to suppose
that the new question must simply be answered be-
cause of a protocol of interaction. In fact, the tactic
of only answering the new question is just one fur-
ther specific move with its own specific advantages
and disadvantages that need to be weighed.
Does the dialogue manager need to record the
original unanswered question? Again, the first point
to make is that the original goal is still outstanding
so the issue is one of noting an unanswered ques-
tion, rather than whether to re-ask it. In the current
case, it is clearer that the question might function as
a context for a possible later ellipsis resolution; and
this is arguably what happens in figure 4. Neverthe-
less, the matter is again intimately tied to the dia-
logue manager’s choice of move, namely only an-
swering the interjected question. The question of
what to include in the dialogue state is not indepen-
dent of what choices of action the dialogue manager
can make. Practically speaking of course, it is worth
remembering that correct ellipsis resolution is in any
case not a simple operation. It is also increasingly
hard the longer the distance grows between context
and ellipsis and that, in many situations, there may
often be other ways to achieve the right interpreta-
tion. Perhaps in most travel scenarios, “the train”
only ever means “I’d like to travel by train”.
Ginzburg, in his careful theoretical analysis
(Ginzburg, 2007), also notes that dialogue stack
structures do not arise as the results of seemingly ar-
bitrary rules of dialogue syntax but from underlying
dependencies amongst issues. That is, the answer to
“train or plane” may depend upon arrival times. He
goes further and states that “Since B can be assumed
to attempt to provide information about q1 were she
able to do so, the fact that she has not done so must
mean that B cannot do so without (attempting to) re-
solve q2”. It seems to me that this is just not true.
Certainly in educational contexts, a teacher may re-
spond to a question with another because this is just
the best way to further the underlying educational
objective even though a direct answer could have
been given. This is not uncooperative behaviour. If
a question is not answered, it does not follow that
it could not have been answered, merely that the
agent’s choice of his next best move to further his
own interests was not to answer it.
5 Cooperation and cost
A rather rich example of progress in a non-question
answering dialogue is illustrated in Figure 5, a gen-
uine extract from a travel agency dialogue conducted
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1. [S] Va¨lkommen till resebokningstja¨nsten.
Hur jan jag hja¨lpa dig?
[Welcome to the travel bureau, How can
I help you?]
2. [U] Jag vill ha en resa till Go¨teborg fra¨n
Stockholm.
[I want to travel from Stockholm to
Gothenburg.]
3. [S] Vilket datum vill du resa?
[What day will you travel on?]
4. [U] Jag vill vara framme i Go¨teborg den elfte
i a˚ttonde.
[I want to be in Gothenburg on August
11th.]
5. [S] Vill du resa med ta˚g eller flyg?
[Will you travel by plane or train?]
6. [U] Vilken tid kommer dom fram?.
[What time do they get there?]
7. [S] Vilken tid vill du resa ungefa¨r?
[What time will you leave?]
8. [U] Jag vill vara framme i Go¨teborg fo¨re
klockan a˚tta.
[I want to be in Gothenburg for eight
o’clock]
9. [S] Det finns ett flyg som avga˚r klockan sju
noll noll och ankommer klockan a˚tta noll
noll. Det a¨r det tidigaste flyget.
[There is a flight that leaves at seven zero
zero and arrives at eight zero zero. That
is the earliest flight.]
Figure 5: Progress without Answers
between a human and a human (or “wizard”) simu-
lating a computer system. The wizard used a script
to determine the next system utterance although it
did not necessarily cover all conceivable circum-
stances.
The dialogue complexity increases rapidly after
utterance 4. It is an interesting exercise to try to dis-
cern which questions remain open for discussion at
which points and which cues humans might use to
help decide. Could the behaviour be reproduced by
a wholly automatic computer system in conversation
with a human? What structures would it need to do
it? How much inference would it need to employ?
The answer is simple: it only requires the simple re-
sources we have already sketched. Let us suppose
the wizard is actually issuing a database query after
each user utterance and choosing what to say next
based partly on the size of the results of that query
(the “solution set”). Starting at 5, the wizard deter-
mines that an answer to the question of travel mode
will most likely reduce the size of the solution set
the most. The user does not answer this question.
Unfortunately, his offering, 6, also does not reduce
the solution set size at all; although had he asked
“How much do they cost?”, the story might be dif-
ferent as there may be many fewer costs than travel
options. The number of arrival times in the solution
set may similarly be too high. What should the wiz-
ard do next? Repeating the travel mode question is a
possibility; and is still presumably optimal with re-
spect to solution set size; but there is a penalty for
repeats. So, in this case, the next best question, 7,
is decided upon. The user now offers 8. Response
8 also does not answer the previous question. But 8
does in fact reduce the size of the solution set suf-
ficiently and this phase of the dialogue can success-
fully close through 9.
It is noteworthy that none of the three questions,
5,6 and 7 was actually answered. Yet the dialogue
has succeeded. Furthermore, the suggested flight in
9 is not, I think, even an answer to questions 5, 6,
and 7. Indeed, even if the user were to follow up
with “I’ll take it”, it is far from clear that that is a
response to 5, 6, and 7, as well as 8.
Why could motivate a user to follow up question
5 with his own question but then question 7 with a
non-answering statement? It appears that the user’s
motivating goal was probably all along the desire to
be in Gothenburg by eight o’clock on August 11th.
He was happy to play along with the system’s line
of questioning so long as progress was also being
made towards this goal. Question 5 put this in jeop-
ardy. An answer to this question might inadvertently
rule out the possibility of being in Gothenburg at
the desired time. By asking for arrival times, the
user planned to pick one before eight o’clock. This
tactic failed. However, the system’s next question
also could not further his objective and so he de-
cided not to play along with the system’s strategy
anymore. He decided to override the system’s ques-
tion entirely and state the hard constraint he had in
mind. That is one possible interpretation at any rate.
Does the dialogue instantiate uncooperative be-
29
haviour? Certainly questions were left unanswered;
but each agent did at all times attempt to advance his
own goals and, as the two sets of goals were indeed
related, a mutually agreeable path forwards could be
found. Co-operation is simply something that can
exist at different levels of activity and at different
times. One can answer a question in a way that does
not advance the task; just as one can advance the task
by not answering a given question. Cooperation is
not a complete package that one just buys into or not
in any given conversation. Besides, a robust system
needs to be able to cope with a mildly uncooperative
human it encounters.
6 Conclusion
Explicit cost models form an essential part of a com-
plete account of dialogue management in the Infor-
mation State Update model. The information re-
quired in order to make dialogue moves is just as
important as that required to interpret them. Fur-
thermore building in certain interpretative capabil-
ities (such as stacked questions for ellipsis resolu-
tion) actually depends on the set of moves that a di-
alogue manager can make (such as “only acknowl-
edging”). Finally, the addition of cost models and
the design of strategy is not exhausted by the possi-
bility of machine learning scenarios. Indeed, good
theory can help direct the machine learning towards
acquiring valuable parameters more effectively.
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QUESTIONS, INFERENCES, AND DIALOGUES 
 
1. Internal Question Processing  
Logical theories of questions supply formal-
isms for questions as well as characteristics of 
the question-answer relation.1 As long as ques-
tion asking and question answering are con-
cerned, they usually adopt a simple dyadic 
perspective. It is assumed that there are two 
parties: a questioner and an answerer. The 
former asks a question, whereas the role of the 
latter is to provide an answer to the question.  
Even eliciting information from Nature is 
modeled that way.2 When cooperative ques-
tioning is analyzed, an agent can play both 
roles, depending on the stage. This dyadic 
perspective, however, seems to obscure some 
important phenomenon, which may be called 
internal question processing.  
 What we mean here by internal ques-
tion processing (hereafter: IQP) is not tanta-
mount to question answering. When a question 
is internally processed, the immediate outcome 
need not be an answer to this question: an ‘in-
ference’ performed on a question can lead to 
another question, which may be ‘send’ by a 
cognitive agent either to itself or to a certain 
external source of information and then an-
swered, but can also be processed further in an 
analogous way. Usually, this results in a prob-
lem decomposition: a (difficult) problem rep-
resented by a certain question is decomposed 
into sub-problems represented by other ques-
tions. However, the decomposition is dynamic 
and comes in stages: the consecutive questions 
(which constitute the sub-goals of the next 
stage) depend on how the previous requests for 
information have been fulfilled. In other cases 
a (difficult) problem represented by a certain 
                                                 
1 For an overview see:  Harrah, D., ‘The Logic of 
Questions’, in: D. Gabbay, T. Guenthner (eds.) 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Second Edition, 
Volume 8, Kluwer, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London 
2002, pp. 1-60.  
2 Cf. Hintikka, J., Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, Kluwer, Dordrecht/ Boston/ 
London 1999. 
question is restated by formulating a new ques-
tion. The relevant transformations of questions 
usually facilitate question answering and prob-
lem-solving. But there are cases in which they 
result in a plausible answer/solution to a ques-
tion/problem.  
 In brief, our main objective will be to 
present some logical tools which are useful in a 
formal modeling of IQP.  
2. Erotetic Inferences  
In order to provide a formal account of IQP 
we need a logic which analyzes inferences 
performed on questions and proposes criteria 
of their validity. At first sight this claim may 
seem a contradiction, since questions are nei-
ther true nor false. But a moment’s reflection 
shows that there are inferential thought proc-
esses which result in questions. They are called 
erotetic inferences (from Greek ‘erotema’, 
which means ‘question’).  
 Sometimes we pass from proposi-
tion(s) to a question, as in: 
   (1) Andrew always comes in time, but now 
he is late. So what has happened to 
him? 
We also pass from a question to a question on 
the basis of some proposition(s), e.g.:  
   (2)  Where did Andrew leave for? If Andrew 
took his famous umbrella, then he left 
for London; otherwise he left for Paris 
or Rome. So did Andrew take his 
famous umbrella?       
Moreover, it happens that we pass from a ques-
tion directly to a question, as in: 
   (3) Is 112657853 a prime? So is there a 
natural number divisor of 112657853 
different from it and from 1? 
In the second and third cases inferences are 
performed on questions: they play the roles of 
‘premises’ and ‘conclusions’.  
 Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL for 
short) puts erotetic inferences in the centre of 
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its interest.3 IEL gives an account of the phe-
nomenon of question raising and defines valid-
ity of erotetic inferences.   
 As for question raising, we have two 
different types of cases here, corresponding to 
two types of erotetic inferences. A question 
can arise out of a set of propositions, and a 
question can arise from a question on the basis 
of a (possibly empty) set of propositions. The 
relevant concepts of question raising are expli-
cated in IEL by defining the semantic concepts 
of evocation of a question by a set of proposi-
tions, and erotetic implication of a question by 
a question and a set of propositions. A seman-
tic approach is then mirrored by a syntactic 
one, and question-evoking and question-
implying rules are formulated. Validity of ero-
tetic inferences is defined in terms of evocation 
and erotetic implication, respectively. Erotetic 
implication, as characterized in IEL, has a 
‘teleological’ feature: an implied question Q* 
is not only semantically grounded in the imply-
ing question Q, but Q* is also cognitively use-
ful with respect to Q in an ‘open-mined’ way: 
i.e. each direct answer to Q* potentially con-
tributes to finding, at least partial, answer to Q. 
Let us stress that the latter condition is expli-
cated in semantic terms. 
 We will concentrate upon erotetic in-
ferences which have questions as premises and 
conclusions, and thus on erotetic implication. 
This relation will be defined in terms of the so-
called Minimal Erotetic Semantics.    
3. Distributed IQP and E-Scenarios  
One can distinguish two types of IQP: ulti-
mate and distributed.  
 As long as ultimate IQP is concerned, 
no information requests are sent and the proc-
essing itself may lead to a plausible answer to 
a question. In the case of distributed IQP re-
quests for additional information are sent, and 
questions are transformed into further ques-
tions depending on how previous information 
requests have been fulfilled. These requests for 
information may be sent by a cognitive agent 
                                                 
3 Cf. Wi"niewski, A., The Posing of Questions: 
Logical Foundations of Erotetic Inferences, Klu-
wer, Dordrecht/  Boston/ London 1995, or:  
Wi"niewski, A., ’The logic of questions as a theory 
of erotetic arguments’, Synthese 109, No. 2, 1996, 
pp.1-25; Wi"niewski, A., ‘Questions and infer-
ences’, Logique et Analyse 173-175, 2001, pp. 5-
43. 
to itself (for instance, in order to activate 
his/her memory), or to a certain external source 
of stored information, or to other cognitive 
agent (e.g. in an information-seeking dia-
logue).  
 The concept of erotetic search sce-
nario (e-scenario for short) can be useful in the 
formal modeling of IQP. 4 
 An e-scenario is an abstract structure 
defined by means of tools taken from IEL. 
However, an e-scenario function is to show 
how a principal question may be answered by 
asking and answering auxiliary questions. An 
e-scenario has a tree-like structure with the 
principal question as the root and possible 
answers to this question as leaves. Other ques-
tions enter e-scenarios on the condition they 
are erotetically implied (in the sense of IEL). 
Moreover, an auxiliary question either: (a) has 
another question as the immediate successor, 
or (b) all the direct answers to the auxiliary 
question follow the question as its immediate 
successors. In the latter case an auxiliary ques-
tion is a query and the immediate successors 
represent the possible ways in which the rele-
vant request for information can be satisfied. 
The structure of an e-scenario shows what kind 
of further information requests (if any) are to 
be satisfied in order to arrive at an answer to 
the principal question.  
 Distributed IQP can be modeled in 
terms of e-scenarios in various ways. One of 
the possible lines of thought is the following.  
We attribute to a cognitive agent an initial e-
scenario for his/her principal question just 
processed. The topmost query of this e-
scenario determines the first request for infor-
mation to be sent. Now, when the query is 
answered in a given way, the e-scenario con-
tracts: consecutive queries which would follow 
the alternative answers to the query become 
inessential, and one arrives at a new e-scenario 
(again, for the principal question) with a new 
‘topmost’ query, which is processed analo-
gously. But suppose that one arrives at a query 
such that no answer to it is available by exist-
ing means. So, a revision of the current e-
scenario is needed. One possible move is a 
revision by embedding: an e-scenario for the 
                                                 
4 Cf.  Wi"niewski, A., ‘Erotetic search scenarios’, 
Synthese 134, No. 3, 2003, pp. 389-427; see also: 
Wi"niewski, A., 'Erotetic search scenarios, prob-
lem-solving, and deduction' Logique et Analyse 
185-188, 2004, pp. 139-166. 
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troublemaking query is embedded into the e-
scenario just considered. Another possible 
move is a revision by conditionalisation: an 
answer to the query is added (with an appro-
priate comment) to the initial premises and the 
current e-scenario contracts accordingly. There 
are also other moves possible. Note that it is 
the initial e-scenario that is being transformed. 
As a consequence, the following desirable 
property is retained: each path of an intermedi-
ate scenario leads to an answer to the principal 
question. The process as a whole is goal-
directed, comes in stages, and the sub-goals are 
processed/ created in a dynamic way.  
 The concept of e-scenario will be in-
troduced, some operations of e-scenarios will 
be characterized, and the issue of applicability 
of the concepts of erotetic implication and e-
scenario in the analysis of dialogues will be 
discussed.    
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Abstract
We define grounding in terms of shared public
commitments, and link public commitments
to other, private, attitudes within a decidable
dynamic logic for computing implicatures and
predicting an agent’s next dialogue move.
1 Introduction
A theory of dialogue should link discourse interpre-
tation to general principles of rationality and coop-
erativity (Grice, 1975). The so-called ‘mentalist ap-
proach’ treats dialogue as a function of the agents’
attitudes, usually formalised with BDI (belief, desire,
intention) logics (e.g., Grosz and Sidner (1990)).
Grounding a proposition p—by which we mean that
all dialogue agents mutually agree that p is true—
occurs when the BDI logic implies that p is mutually
believed.
However, there are compelling reasons to reject
the mentalist approach to dialogue modelling. Gau-
dou et al. (2006) use (1) to argue for a distinction
between grounding and mutual belief.
(1) a. A to B (C out of earshot): C is stupid.
b. B to A (C out of earshot): I agree.
c. A to B (C in earshot): C is smart.
(1a) is grounded for A and B. If B now utters That’s
right, then (1c) should be grounded for A and B
too. So if grounding is a function of mutual be-
lief, then A and B would hold contradictory beliefs,
making them irrational. But A is not irrational; he is
disingenuous. Gaudou et al. (2006) conclude that
grounding is a function of shared public commit-
ments, following Hamblin (1987). But the link to
other attitudes is also essential: B should detect that
A is lying—i.e., that he can’t believe everything that
he has publicly committed to.
Dialogue (1) contrasts with dialogue (2), where
A ‘drops’ a commitment to (2a) in favour of (2b),
making (2b) grounded:
(2) a. A: It’s raining.
b. B: No it’s not.
c. A: Oh, you’re right.
A theory of dialogue should distinguish between A’s
illocutionary act in (1c) vs. (2c), even though in both
cases A asserts the negation of his prior assertion.
In this paper, we propose a framework for
dialogue analysis that synthesises Hamblin’s
commitment-based approach with the mentalist
approach. We think both perspectives on dialogue
are needed. In Lascarides and Asher (2008),
we argue that the commitment-based framework
captures facts about grounding, making explicit
the distinction between what is said and private
attitudes. But the BDI view is essential for strategic
reasoning about dialogue moves. We draw on the
strengths of both approaches while avoiding some
of their weaknesses. For instance, we avoid the
uncomputable models of discourse that stem from
default reasoning in first-order BDI logics.
Our starting point is SDRT (Asher and Lascarides,
2003). In Section 2 we modify its representation of
dialogue content so that it tracks the public com-
mitments of each dialogue agent. In Section 3 we
reconstruct its separate, but related, cognitive logic
(CL) to include the attitude of public commitment
and axioms that relate it to other, private, attitudes.
CL will be a dynamic logic of public announcement,
extended with default axioms of rationality and co-
operativity. The result will capture the sort of prac-
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Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1 : Kpi1 ∅
2 pi1 : Kpi1 pi2B : Explanation(pi1,pi2)
Table 1: The logical form of dialogue (3).
tical reasoning that goes on in conversation, when
agents adjust their beliefs, preferences and inten-
tions in light of what’s said so far. This refines
the approach to dialogue using dialogue games (e.g.,
Amgoud (2003)) because the utilities for each pos-
sible dialogue move need not be ‘pre-defined’ or
quantified. Rather, CL will exploit the dynamics
in the logic to infer qualitative statements about the
relative utility of different moves. Furthermore, by
approximating game-theoretic principles within the
logic, we also deepen the theory by deriving some of
the cognitive axioms of rationality and cooperativity
from them: for instance, a general axiom of Coop-
erativty (that B normally intends what A intends)
will be validated this way. Our approach can also
be viewed as extending the Grounding Acts Model
(Traum, 1994), providing its update rules with a log-
ical rationale for constraining the update effects on
content vs. cognitive states.
2 Dialogue Content
Lascarides and Asher (2008) argue that relational
speech acts or rhetorical relations (e.g., Narration,
Explanation) are a crucial ingredient in a model of
grounding. One of the main motivations is implicit
grounding: representing the illocutionary contribu-
tion of an agent’s utterance via rhetorical relations
reflects his commitments to another agent’s commit-
ments, even when this is linguistically implicit. For
example, B’s utterance (3b) commits him to (3a) be-
cause the relational speech act Explanation(3a, 3b)
that he has performed entails (3a):
(3) a. A: Max fell.
b. B: John pushed him.
Accordingly, the commitments of an individual
agent are expressed as a Segmented Discourse Rep-
resentation (SDRS, Asher and Lascarides (2003)):
this is a hierarchically structured set of labelled con-
tents, as shown in each cell of Table 1—the logical
form for dialogue (3). For simplicity, we have omit-
ted the representations of the clauses (3a) and (3b)
(labelled pi1 and pi2 respectively), and we often gloss
the content labelled by pi as Kpi, and mark the root
label of the speaker i’s SDRS for turn j as piji.
The logical form of dialogue is the logical form
of each of its turns (where a turn boundary occurs
whenever the speaker changes). The logical form of
each turn is a set of SDRSs, one for each dialogue
participant. Each SDRS represents all the content
that the relevant agent is currently publicly commit-
ted to, from the beginning of the dialogue up to the
end of that turn (see Lascarides and Asher (2008) for
motivation). And each agent constructs the SDRSs
for all other agents, as well as his own—e.g., A and
B both build Table 1 for dialogue (3).
The logical form of dialogue (2) is Table 2.
Recognising that B’s utterance pi2 attaches to pi1
with Correction is based on default axioms in
SDRT’s glue logic—i.e., the logic for constructing
logical form (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). The
content of (2c) (labelled pi3) supports a glue-logic
inference that pi3 acknowledges pi2. This resolves
pi3’s underspecified content to entail Kpi2 , and so
Correction(pi1,pi3) is also inferred, as shown. In
contrast, the fact that (1c) is designed to be over-
heard by C while (1ab) is not forces a glue-logic
inference that they are not rhetorically linked at all;
see the logical form in Table 3.
The dynamic semantics for Dialogue SDRSs (DS-
DRSs) is defined in terms of SDRSs: a DSDRS con-
sists of an SDRS for each participant at each turn,
and accordingly the semantics of a dialogue turn is
the product of the dynamic semantics for each con-
stituent SDRS. Lascarides and Asher (2008) define
grounding at a given turn as the content that’s en-
tailed by each SDRS for that turn. Given that each
turn represents all an agent’s ‘current’ public com-
mitments, the interpretation of a dialogue overall is
that of its last turn. Table 2 receives a consistent in-
terpretation, but Table 3 is inconsistent because A’s
final SDRS is inconsistent. The DSDRS of (3) makes
(3a) grounded and that for (2) makes (2b) grounded.
The DSDRS of (1) makes (1a) grounded, and should
B acknowledge (1c), then anything is grounded.
3 Cognitive Modelling
With this background concerning dialogue content
in place, we turn to the interaction of commitments
with other attitudes. SDRT’s cognitive logic (CL)
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Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1 : Kpi1 ∅
2 pi1 : Kpi1 pi2B : Correction(pi1,pi2)
3 pi3A : Correction(pi1,pi3) ∧ Acknowledgement(pi2,pi3) pi2B : Correction(pi1,pi2)
Table 2: The logical form of dialogue (2).
Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1 : Kpi1 ∅
2 pi1 : Kpi1 pi2B : Acknowledgement(pi1,pi2)
3 pi3A : Kpi1 ∧Kpi3 pi2B : Acknowledgement(pi1,pi2)
Table 3: The logical form of (1).
supports reasoning about agents’ cognitive states in
virtue of what they say. Since it contributes di-
rectly to constructing the logical form of dialogue,
its complexity must be decidable: Asher and Las-
carides (2003, p78) argue that this is necessary to
explain why, as Grice (1975) claims, people by and
large agree on what was said (if not on whether it’s
true). CL must support default reasoning and hence
consistency tests, since agents never have complete
information about the dialogue context. And so
SDRT makes its CL decidable by denying it access
to a dialogue’s full, dynamic interpretation—for in-
stance, existentially-quantified SDRS-formulae lose
their structure when transferred into CL, thereby
losing the relationship between, say, the SDRS-
formulae ¬∃x¬φ and ∀xφ.
SDRT’s CL from Asher and Lascarides (2003) is
deficient in at least two ways. First, it does not sup-
port the logical forms from Section 2; CL should in-
clude public commitment and its links to other atti-
tudes. Secondly, CL is static, thereby failing to show
how attitudes change during dialogue. To overcome
these deficiencies we exploit a dynamic logic of pub-
lic announcement (Baltag et al., 1999). We extend it
to support default reasoning from public announce-
ments, including (default) inferences about cogni-
tive states. A model M of the logic consists of a
set of worlds WM and a valuation function VM for
interpreting the non-logical constants at w ∈ WM.
We write [φ]M =def {w ∈ WM : M, w |=
φ}. Public announcements are dynamic in that they
change the input model into a different output one:
any worlds from the input model which fail to sat-
isfy the monotonic consequences of the announce-
ment are eliminated from the output model; like-
wise for ceteris paribus announcements, any worlds
that fail to satisfy the nonmonotonic consequences
of the announcement are eliminated. More formally,
monotonic consequences of an announcement are
expressed by the formula [!φ]ψ, where [!φ] is a
modal operator (in words, ψ follows from announc-
ing φ). Nonmonotonic consequences are expressed
as [!φ]cpψ, which in turn is defined via a modal con-
nective: φ > ψ means that If φ then normally ψ.
The model M therefore also includes a function ∗
from worlds and propositions to propositions, which
defines normality and is used to interpret φ > ψ:
M, w |= φ > ψ iff ∗M (w, [φ]M) ⊆ [ψ]M,
In words, ψ is true in all worlds where, according
to w, φ is normal. The above description of how
announcements transform input models is then for-
malised in Figure 1.
M, w |= [!φ]ψ iff Mφ, w |= ψ
M, w |= [!φ]cpψ iff Mcp(φ), w |= ψ
where
Mφ = 〈W φ, ∗M|W φ, V |W φ〉 where
W φ = [φ]M
Mcp(φ) = 〈W cp(φ), ∗M|W cp(φ), V |W cp(φ)〉 where
W cp(φ) = {w′ ∈WM :
Th(M),φ|∼ψ →Mφ, w′ |= ψ}
Figure 1: Model transitions for announcements
To ensure that CL reflects the commitments in DS-
DRSs, we assume that agents announce to the di-
alogue participants certain commitments to SDRS-
formulae. Actually, given the way we have set things
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up, each turn commits a speaker to commitments
from earlier turns, unless he disavows one of those
commitments. Pa,Dψ means that a publicly com-
mits to group D to ψ. Thus a speaker a uttering
Kpi to D will result in CL-based reasoning with the
modality [!Pa,Dφpi]cp, where φpi is the shallow rep-
resentation of Kpi (i.e., without existentials). We
make the modality Pa,D K45 (one commits to all
the consequences of one’s commitments, and one
has total introspection on commitments, or lack of
them), and we also add axioms Ax1 (a commitment
to D is a commitment to all its subgroups), and Ax2
(there is a group commitment by x and y to D iff x
and y both make that commitment to D):
K: Pa,D(φ→ ψ) → (Pa,Dφ→ Pa,Dψ)
4: Pa,Dφ→ Pa,DPa,Dφ
5: ¬Pa,Dφ→ Pa,D¬Pa,Dφ
Ax1: For any D′ ⊆ D, Pa,Dφ→ Pa,D′φ
Ax2: P{x,y},Dφ↔ (Px,Dφ ∧ Py,Dφ)
So the modelsM have suitably constrained accessi-
bility relations RPa,D ⊆W ×W for all a and D.
Since commitment lacks axiom D,Pa,D(p∧¬p) is
satisfiable, reflecting A’s public commitments in (1).
This contrasts with the belief modality Baφ, which
is KD45 (with a transitive, euclidean and serial ac-
cessibility relation RBa in the model).
Agent a announcing something to group D will
bring about in CL a transition on models: the in-
put model will be updated by adding to a’s commit-
ments to D. Changing a model by adding φ to a’s
commitments is defined in equation (4): this stip-
ulates that one adds φ to the accessibility relation
R
Pa,D
M , so long as doing so is consistent. Equa-
tion (5) defines a similar model transition for beliefs;
we’ll use this shortly to represent Sincerity.
(4) M .→Mφ,a,D : RPa,DMφ,a,D = (?/;R
Pa,D
M ; ?φ)
(5) M .→M#aφ: RBaM"aφ = (?/;R
Ba
M; ?φ)
We can now interpret announcements about commit-
ments. In words, should an agent a say φ to D, then
the model is udpated so that all non-monotonic con-
sequences of a’s commitment to φ are satisfied (so
long as this update is consistent):
• Announcements of Commitment:
M, w |= [!Pa,Dφ]cpψ iff Mcp(φ)φ,a,D, w |= ψ
In fact, we assume that should a say Kpi to D,
then in CL the ceteris paribus consequences of
this announcement include a’s commitment to all
glue-logic inferences χ about the illocutionary
effects of Kpi (as represented via rhetorical relations
in the DSDRSs): i.e., [!Pa,Dφpi]cpPa,Dχ. This yields
[!PB,{A,B}φpi2 ]cpPA,{A,B}Explanation(pi1,pi2)
in CL from dialogue (3), for instance. Thus
the outcome in CL is a model that satisfies
PB,{A,B}Explanation(pi1,pi2), and so long as
enough of the semantics of Explanation is
transferred into CL, this entails (by axiom K)
PB,{A,B}φpi1 , where φpi1 is the shallow representa-
tion (3a). A’s announcement (3a) ensures the CL
model also satisfies PA,{A,B}φpi1 . So the CL model
reflects what’s grounded according to the DSDRS.
Table 2, the representation of dialogue (2), yields
a CL model that satisfies P{A,B},{A,B}φpi2 and
P{A,B},{A,B}¬φpi1 , where φpi1 and φpi2 represent
(2a) and (2b) respectively. And Table 1 yields a
CL model where PA,{A,B}(p ∧ ¬p), p being the
(shallow) CL representation of (1a).
An agent’s beliefs must be updated at least defea-
sibly on discovering his commitments. The follow-
ing Sincerity axiom ensures this, by default:
• Sincerity: Pa,Dφ > %aφ
We have stated Sincerity dynamically via the
action operator %a; this is the action of updating be-
liefs and has the following semantics:
• Belief Update:
M, w |= %aφ iff M#aφ, w |= Baφ
Sincerity is a default because of examples like
(1). As we saw earlier, Announcements of
Commitment yields PA,{A,B}(p∧¬p). This satis-
fies the antecedent to Sincerity, but BA(p∧¬p)
is not inferred because it’s inconsistent. PA,{A,B}p
and PA,{A,B}¬p are also true (by axiom K); they
both satisfy the antecedent of Sincerity, but
their consequences BAp and BA¬p are mutually in-
consistent, and so neither is inferred. Thus B detects
from A’s inconsistent current commitments that he’s
lying, and without further information B does not
know what A believes: p, ¬p or neither one. C, on
the other hand, who knows only PA,{A,B,C}¬p, uses
Sincerity to infer BA¬p.
As is standard, mutual belief (MBx,yφ) is defined
in terms of belief using a fixed point equation:
(6) MBx,yφ↔ (Bx(φ∧MBx,yφ)∧By(φ∧MBx,yφ))
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This definition means MBx,yφ entails an ω se-
quence of nested belief statements: Bxφ,ByBxφ, . . .
and Byφ,BxByφ, . . .. We will denote a formula that
starts with Bx, and alternates with By to a nesting of
depth n as Bn(x,y)φ; similarly for Bn(y,x)φ. Then one
can prove the following scheme is sound.
• Induction Scheme:
Assume Γ|∼By(φ ∧ Bxφ) ∧ Bx(φ ∧ Byφ)
And for any n,
Γ|∼By(φ∧Bn(x,y)φ)∧Bx(φ∧Bn(y,x)φ)
Γ|∼By(φ∧Bn+1(x,y)φ)∧Bx(φ∧Bn+1(y,x)φ)
Then: Γ|∼MBx,yφ
These axioms ensure that, as in the BDI account,
grounding and mutual belief are linked; but unlike
the BDI account they are not equivalent. Where
D = {x, y}, the proof that P{x,y},Dφ|∼MBx,yφ is
as follows:
1. P{x,y},Dφ|∼Bxφ Ax2, Sincerity
2. P{x,y},Dφ|∼Byφ Ax2, Sincerity
3. P{x,y},Dφ|∼ByBxφ 1; CL is mutually believed
4. P{x,y},Dφ|∼By(φ ∧ Bxφ) 2, 3; B is KD45
5. P{x,y},Dφ|∼BxByφ 2; CL is mutually believed
6. P{x,y},Dφ|∼Bx(φ ∧ Byφ) 1, 5; B is KD45
7. P{x,y},Dφ|∼MBx,yφ 4,6; Induction Scheme
!
Thus grounded content is normally mutually be-
lieved; e.g., it is in (2) and (3), but not in (1).
Announcements affect intentions as well as be-
liefs. For instance, an intuitively compelling axiom
is Intent to Ground: if a commits to φ, then
normally he commits that he intends (written Ia)
that his interlocutors commit to it too, if they haven’t
done so already. A version of Sincerity also ap-
plies to intentions, and like Sincerity for beliefs
requires adding an action operator 'a with a similar
interpretation to %a, to effect a model transition for
the update of intentions.
• Intent to Ground:
(b ∈ D ∧ Pa,Dφ ∧ ¬Pb,Dφ) > Pa,DIaPb,Dφ
• Sincerity on Intentions:
Pa,DIaφ > 'aφ
Together with axioms that link various speech act
types to their illocutionary purpose and an axiom of
Cooperativity (Pa,DIaφ > Ibφ; see below),
these axioms ensure that the intentions behind a’s
current announcement become by default the inten-
tions of all agents in D. Thus what one agent says
can affect another agent’s subsequent behaviour. For
instance, the axioms predict from (1a) that A intends
B to commit to C is stupid; B does this by announc-
ing (1b). The axioms also predict from (1c) that
A intends C to commit to C is not stupid, but A’s
intentions regarding B are more complex. A may
not intend that B commit to (1c), and Intent to
Ground, being defeasible, is compatible with this.
3.1 Desires
We have linked dialogue content to public commit-
ment and the latter to belief and intention. But dia-
logue influences and is influenced by desires as well,
and practical reasoning suggests that intentions are
a byproduct of desires and beliefs. More precisely,
rational agents intend those actions that maximise
expected utility—utility reflecting one’s desires or
preferences, and expectations being based on beliefs
about future outcomes. Preferences are thus distinct
from but related to intentions.1 We now address how
an agent’s preferences interact with other attitudes
and dialogue content.
Games are a powerful model of preferences and
actions among interacting agents. A game consists
of a set of players and a set of strategies. Each
strategy has a real-valued payoff or utility for each
player. Typically the payoff for an individual is a
function of each players’ strategy, and intuitively,
the payoff reflects that individual’s preferences. A
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a combination of strate-
gies that is optimal in that no player has a reason to
deviate unilaterally from it. Games thus provide a
method for computing one’s next move in the di-
alogue. We illustrate this with a simple dialogue
game in Table 4—a much simpler game than the
ones that would underly the production of dialogues
(1) to (3). In Table 4, R(ow) and C(olumn) are con-
sidering putdown moves (PR and PC) vs. praising
moves. The cells indicate the utilities for agents R
and C respectively for each combination of moves
(e.g., column 2 row 2 defines the utilities for R and
C when R praises C and C praises R). Note how
the utilities for R and for C are influenced by what
both agents do.
Since all utilities are defined, the game describes
1Preferences also have different logical properties: they can
persist even after being realised while intentions don’t; and they
can be contrary to fact (one can prefer to be skiing right now
while actually being at a meeting).
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2/1 PC ¬PC
PR 0, 0 3,−3
¬PR −3, 3 4, 4
Table 4: Simple Coordination Game
the complete preferences of each play with respect
to all strategies. The two NEs are (¬PR,¬PC) and
(PR, PC). Utilities must be real values—standard
game theory provides calculations of expected util-
ity that combine probabilities over actions with the
preferences for each player. But this sort of calcu-
lation is far too complex to be part of CL, which is
a shallow logic for rough and ready decisions about
discourse moves. To maintain a computationally ef-
fective CL, we need a simpler model of strategic rea-
soning that nevertheless approximates the types of
interactions between expected moves and utility that
game theory addresses.
Computationally efficient representations for
strategic reasoning already exist. CP-nets (Boutilier
et al., 2004) provide one such (qualitative) model for
Boolean games (Bonzon, 2007)—games where like
Table 4 each player controls propositional variables
which he or she can make true or false (think of these
as descriptions of actions that the agent performs,
or not). A CP-net is designed to exploit the inde-
pendence among the various conditions that affect
an agent’s preferences. It has two components: a
directed conditional preference graph (CPG), which
defines for each feature F its set of parent features
P (F ) that affect the agent’s preferences among the
various values of F ; and a conditional preference
table (CPT), which specifies the agent’s preferences
over F ’s values for every combination of parent val-
ues from P (F ).
For example, the CP-net for the ‘put down’ game
from Table 4 is shown in Figure 2. pc stands for
C doing a put down move; similarly for pr. The de-
pendencies among features for each agent are shown
with labelled arcs in the CPG. The CPT then dis-
tinguishes among the conditional preferences for
agents R and C; e.g., ¬pr : ¬pc 1c pc stipulates
that C prefers not to put down R rather than put him
down, if R does not put down C. The semantics of
CP-nets ensures that its conditional ceteris paribus
preferences generate a total order 2 over all possi-
ble combinations of values of all features. Roughly
pr
c
!!
pc
r
"" Preferences for C: ¬pr 1c pr
pr: pc 1c ¬pc
¬pr: ¬pc 1c pc
Preferences for R: ¬pc 1r pc
pc: pr 1r ¬pr
¬pc: ¬pr 1r pr
Figure 2: The CP-net for Table 4’s ‘Put Down’ Game.
put, the logic of CP-nets adheres to the following
two (ranked) principles when generating this total
order: first, one prefers values that violate as few
conditional preferences as possible; and second, vi-
olating a (conditional) preference on a parent feature
is worse than violating the preference on a daughter
feature. So the total preference orderings for R and
C for the CP-net in Figure 2 are as follows:
(¬pr ∧ ¬pc) 1c (¬pr ∧ pc) 1c (pr ∧ pc) 1c (pr ∧ ¬pc)
(¬pr ∧ ¬pc) 1r (pr ∧ ¬pc) 1r (pr ∧ pc) 1r (¬pr ∧ pc)
In line with the game in Table 4, these orderings
yield two NEs: (¬pr ∧ ¬pc) and (pr ∧ pc). While
there are games whose CP-net representations do not
validate all the game’s NEs, Bonzon (2007) shows
that CP-nets predict all NE when quite general con-
ditions on the games are met.
Unfortunately, it is an inescapable fact that the
preferences of other agents are hidden to us: one es-
timates them from their actions, including their ut-
terances. CL must therefore use information from
the dialogue to infer the CP-net for agents; CL
must also make use of partial or underspecified CP-
nets. For instance, what R knows about C and vice
versa will determine how they should ‘play’ the ‘Put
down’ game. If R has the preferences from Fig-
ure 2, but C is a jerk—in other words, his prefer-
ence is to play a putdown move, whatever the cir-
cumstances (so in contrast to Figure 2, his CPG con-
tains no dependencies on pc and his CPT is simply
pc 1c ¬pc)—then this revised CP-net has a different
NE; namely, pr ∧ pc. So, using the general strategy
that R should choose a future dialogue move accord-
ing to NE, he will do pr. If, on the other hand C is
not a jerk, with the CP-net from Figure 2, then R
should play ¬pr. So if R doesn’t know if C is a
jerk or a non-jerk, he can’t guarantee his next move
to be optimal. Such put-down games might there-
fore be useful for establishing what sort of person
one is dealing with. R might engage in this game to
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see how C acts (is C a jerk, or a non-jerk?), before
R makes conversational moves towards other ends
where the penalties are much higher.
3.2 Back to Cognitive Logic
As shown in Lang et al. (2003), one can translate
CP-nets into a conditional logic. We can do the same
with the weak conditional > from CL. Our represen-
tation of a conditional preference in terms of > in-
troduces a predicateOK that labels a world as being
a good outcome (Asher and Bonevac, 2005), where
OK is always strictly preferred to ¬OK . We then
adopt the following definition of agent a’s condi-
tional preference φ : ψ 1a ¬ψ:
• Preference in CL: (φ : ψ 1a ¬ψ) ⇔
φ→ (¬((φ ∧ ψ) > ¬OKa)∧
((φ ∧ ¬ψ) > ¬OKa))
In words, some normal φ ∧ ψ worlds are better than
all normal φ ∧ ¬ψ worlds. The unconditional pref-
erence ψ 1a ¬ψ is thus ¬(ψ > ¬OK a) ∧ (¬ψ >
¬OK a). In contrast to reasoning with games and
CP-nets directly, Preference in CL allows CL
to reason with partial information about the relative
preferences among all possible actions.
Let’s now investigate how preferences link to
other attitudes. First, there is a rationality constraint
linking preferences to intentions. Consider an un-
conditional preference first:
• Preferences to Intentions:
(φ 1a ¬φ ∧ Ba"Gφ) > 'aφ
In words, if an agent, all things considered, prefers φ
and believes there to be a strategy for achieving φ in
the contextually supplied game or decision problem
G (our gloss for "G), then defeasibly he forms the
intention to φ. Preferences within a game allow us
with Preferences to Intentions to spec-
ify a version of what Asher and Lascarides (2003)
call the Practical Syllogism (PS), which links be-
liefs, intentions and the choice that marks one’s pre-
ferred way of achieving goals.2 Suppose G has a
2They state PS as follows:
(Ia(ψ) ∧ Ba((φ > ψ) ∧ choicea(φ,ψ)) > Ia(φ)
In words, if a intends that ψ, and he believes that φ normally
leads to ψ and moreover φ is a’s choice for achieving ψ, then
normally a intends that φ. By treating the relation choicea as
primitive, the CL lacked the reasoning that agents engage in for
finding optimal ways of achieving goals. We remedy this here.
unique optimal solution s for agent a such that s >
φ. Then a prefers the sequence of moves leading to s
to any alternative sequence, and by Preferences
to Intentions that sequence is intended. Asher
and Lascarides (2003) used PS to infer an agent’s
beliefs and intentions from his behaviour and vice
versa. We can now do this without PS as a separate
principle.
On the other hand, when speakers publicly com-
mit to a certain intention or to a preference, then this
is an at least defeasible sign about their actual pref-
erences. So when reasoning about an agent, if he
commits to a certain intention or a certain prefer-
ence, this licenses a dynamic update of one’s model
of his preferences (♥ is the ‘preferences’ action op-
erator, where ♥aχ effects a model transition where
conditional preference χ is added to a’s preferences,
so long as it is consistent to do so):
• Commitments to Preferences:
(Pa,DIaφ ∨ [Pa,D(φ 1a ¬φ)]) >
♥a(φ 1a ¬φ)
In cooperative games, it seems reasonable to
suppose that in general if one agent prefers a
certain outcome then so does another. That
is, (φ 1a ψ) > (φ 1b ψ) for play-
ers a, b in a cooperative game. This allows us
together with Preferences to Intentions
and Commitments to Preferences to de-
rive the follow Cooperativity axiom:
• Cooperativity: Pa,DIaφ > Ibφ
Thus by using CP-nets and their translation into CL,
we can deepen the foundations of CL itself, render-
ing more transparent the axioms assumed there.
We can also now make dynamic the interaction
between information about cognitive states and di-
alogue moves. For example, let’s examine R and
C playing the putdown game in three scenarios
that vary on how partial (or complete) R’s and C’s
knowledge of each other’s preferences are. First,
suppose R and C have complete (and accurate)
knowledge of each others preferences, which are
those in Figure 2. Then by Preferences to
Intentions R will intend ¬pr (i.e., praise C),
and similarly C will intend ¬pc (i.e., praise R). By
Intent to Ground both intentions will become
also mutual intentions of R and C. And both have
a rational expectation for how the verbal exchange
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will go.
Now consider the case where R’s preferences are
those in Figure 2 but R does not know if C is a jerk
or not. On the other hand, C believes his own and
R’s preferences to be those given in Figure 2. Then
R may not yet have formed an intention with re-
spect to the goal, since he has no information on
C’s preferences or intentions. But C will act as
above and thus R will learn about C’s actual inten-
tions. That is, on observing C perform ¬pc R will
know that C intended it,3 and by Commitments
to Preferences she will update her model of
C’s preferences with ¬pc 1c pc. This now allows
her to use the CP-net so-constructed to make the
move that maximises her preferences—i.e., ¬pr.
Finally, consider the case where R and C meet for
the first time and don’t know anything about each
other’s preferences. If R is to make the first move,
then unlike the prior case R cannot use C’s actions
to influence her move. Instead, she must reason by
‘cases’, using each CP-net that is compatible with
her own preferences. Suppose that R’s preferences
are those in Figure 2, and furthermore, R knowsC to
be either a non-jerk (as in Figure 2) or a jerk (making
C’s CP-net simply pc 1c ¬pc). Then R can reason
as follows. If C is a non-jerk, then C prefers ¬pc
on condition that R performs a ¬pr (reasoning as
before), making R’s best move ¬pr. On the other
hand, if C is a jerk, then C prefers pc regardless,
making R’s best move pr. R would therefore require
further strategies for deciding which of pr vs. ¬pr to
prefer. For instance, R might ‘hope for the best’ and
perform ¬pr. In any case, where all that is involved
is an insult, R may consider it better to potentially
receive an insult and know about C’s desires than to
behave like a jerk herself. An extension of the CP-
net could model these additional preferences.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a cognitive logic for dis-
course interpretation that extends dynamic logics of
public announcement. The extensions provide de-
fault links between public announcements and cog-
nitive attitudes. It validates that grounding normally
leads to mutual belief, but not always (see (1)).
We also argued for representing preferences as >-
3See Asher and Lascarides (2003) for details.
statements, and highlighted the relationship between
this and CP-nets—a compact way of representing
Boolean games of the kind that have been used to
model dialogue strategies. We thus linked within CL
game-theoretic principles to general axioms of ra-
tionality and cooperativity. This affords a ‘generate-
and-test’ way of deciding one’s next dialogue move,
even when one has only partial information about
another agent’s preferences. In future work, we plan
to explore how to use this CL to model calculable
implicatures (Grice, 1975).
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue, contra a prevail-
ing trend to classify elliptical structures
in terms of sub-types specific to conver-
sational dialogue, that despite their diver-
sity of uses in conversational dialogue,
such fragments are analysable in terms of
structure-building mechanisms that have
motivation elsewhere in the grammar (the
framework adopted is Dynamic Syntax,
Kempson et al. (2001); Cann et al. (2005)).
Fragment types modelled include reformu-
lations, clarification requests, extensions,
corrections and acknowledgements. We
argue that incremental use of such ellipses
serves a specific role in dialogue, namely
a means of incrementally narrowing down
the range of otherwise mushrooming al-
ternative structural and interpretative op-
tions, a problem known to constitute a ma-
jor challenge to any parsing system. We
conclude that with grammar seen as a set
of parse procedures, we have a basis for
an integrated characterisation of dialogue
phenomena while nonetheless not defining
a grammar of conversational dialogue.
1 Introduction
In confronting the challenge of providing formal
models of dialogue, with its plethora of fragments
and rich variation in modes of context-dependent
construal, it might seem that linguists face two
types of methodological choice. Either (a) conver-
sational dialogue demonstrates dialogue-specific
mechanisms, for which a grammar specific to
such activity must be constructed; or (b) varia-
tion arises due to the employment of independent
parsing/production systems which are neverthe-
less based on some mode-neutral grammar. How-
ever, as dialogue research continues to develop,
there are intermediate possibilities, and in this pa-
per we discuss the approach developed within Dy-
namic Syntax (DS, Kempson et al. 2001, Cann et
al. 2005), a grammar framework within which, not
only the parser, but indeed “syntax” itself is seen
as the progressive construction of semantic repre-
sentations set in context. Here we extend the anal-
yses presented in Kempson et al. (2007) to a range
of further fragment types, in particular reformula-
tions, fragment requests and corrections accompa-
nied by extensions. From a DS perspective, such
apparently dialogue-specific constructions can be
seen to result from perfectly general structural pro-
cesses, despite being characteristic of cross-party
conversational data.
Further, we claim that the grammar itself con-
stitutes the basis for parsing strategies that facili-
tate an efficient online processing, both structural
and semantic. In this respect, the DS dialogue
model provides the means of achieving this dur-
ing the course of the sub-sentential construction
process, demonstrating that timely application of
such generally available “syntactic” mechanisms
directly contributes to the human processor’s high
degree of success in linguistic interaction. Con-
trary to conventional assumptions of the grammar-
parser feeding relation whereby the parser exclu-
sively handles disambiguation, we conclude that
grammars, as employed in dialogue, can also be
seen as restricting ambiguity provided their formal
specification can model this incremental facilitat-
ing function.
2 Background
The data we focus on are non-repetitive frag-
ment forms of acknowledgements, clarifications
and corrections (henceforth, A female, B male):
(1) A: Bob left.
B: (Yeah,) the accounts guy.
(2) A: They X-rayed me, and took
a urine sample, took a blood sample.
A: Er, the doctor
B: Chorlton?
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A: Chorlton, mhm, he examined me, erm,
he, he said now they were on about
a slight [shadow] on my heart.
[BNC: KPY 1005-1008]
(3) A: Are you left or
B: Right-handed.
(4) A: Bob left.
B: Rob?
A: (No,) (Bob,) the accounts guy.
Even though in the literature the NP fragments
in (2) - (4) might be characterised as distinct con-
structions, they all illustrate how speakers and
hearers may contribute, in some sense to be made
precise, to the joint enterprise of establishing some
shared communicative content, in what might be
loosely called split utterances. And even (1), an
acknowledgement, can be seen this way upon anal-
ysis: B’s addition is similar to an afterthought ex-
tension added to A’s fully sentential utterance. It
can be seen in (2) that such joint construction of
content can proceed incrementally: the clarifica-
tion request in the form of a reformulation is pro-
vided by B and resolved by A within the construc-
tion of a single proposition. The attested exam-
ple in (3) represents an intermediate case, in which
the respondent realising what the question is pro-
vides the answer AS the completion of the initia-
tor’s question, so that the fragment serves simul-
taneously as question and answer. In (4) the frag-
ment reply involves correction, with parties to the
conversation confronting the need for negotiation
as to whose information is more reliable before co-
ordination can be said to be achieved. Neverthe-
less such corrections can be also extensions in the
above sense, enabling a single conjoined propo-
sitional content to be derived before the requisite
coordination can be achieved.
It might seem that such illustration of diver-
sity of fragment uses is ample evidence of the
need for conversation-specific rules to be articu-
lated as part of a grammar. Indeed, Ferna´ndez
(2006) presents a thorough taxonomy, as well as
detailed formal and computational modelling of
Non-sentential Utterances (NSUs), referring to
contributions such as (1) as repeated acknowl-
edgements involving reformulation. Since such
fragments require contextual information singling
out a particular constituent of the previous utter-
ance, Ferna´ndez models such constructions via
type-specific “accommodation rules” which make
a constituent of the antecedent utterance “topical”.
The semantic effect of acknowledgement is then
derived by applying an appropriately defined ut-
terance type for such fragments to the newly con-
structed context. A distinct form of contextual
accommodation is employed to model so-called
helpful rejection fragments, as in (4) (without the
reformulation), whereby a wh-question is accom-
modated in the context by abstracting over the
content of one of the sub-constituents of the pre-
vious utterance. The content of the rejection is de-
rived by applying this wh-question in the context
to the content of the fragment (see also Schlangen
(2003) for another classification and analysis).
The alternative explored here is whether phe-
nomena such as (1)-(2), both of which are
non-repetitive appositional next-speaker contribu-
tions, can be handled uniformly using the mecha-
nisms for structure-building made available in the
core grammar, without recourse to conversation-
specific extensions of that grammar and contex-
tual accommodation rules. The range of inter-
pretations these fragments receive in actual dia-
logue seem to form continua with no well-defined
boundaries and mixing of functions (see (3)-(4)
and comments in Schlangen (2003)). Thus we
propose that the grammar itself simply provides
mechanisms for processing/integrating such frag-
ments in the current structure while their precise
contribution to the communicative interaction is
either calculated by pragmatic inferencing (as in
e.g. Schlangen (2003)) or, as seems most often to
be the case, left underspecified. The framework
within which the explanation will be provided is
Dynamic Syntax, in which the dynamics of how
information accrues in language processing is the
core of the syntactic explanation.
One bonus of the stance taken here is the
promise it offers for elucidating the grammar-
parser contribution to the disambiguation task.
Part of the challenge of modelling dialogue is the
apparent multiplicity of interpretive and structural
options opened up during processing by the recur-
rent, often overlapping fragments as seen in (2)
above. Thus, it might seem that the rich array
of elliptical fragments available in dialogue adds
to the complexity of the interpretive task, owing
to their high degree of context-dependence (hence
the need for accommodation and construction-
specific interpretation rules). However, an alterna-
tive point of view is to see such phenomena as pro-
viding a window on how interlocutors exploit the
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incrementality afforded by the grammar to manage
the explosion of interpretative/structural options
multiplying at each step. The context-dependent
interpretation of fragments, when employed incre-
mentally, enables the hearer to immediately re-
spond to a previous utterance at any relevant point
in the construction process, thereby enabling inter-
locutors to (incrementally) constrain interpretation
during the very process in which it is developed.
Modelling this kind of flexibility in processing
requires fine-grained control of how the current ut-
terance can be combined with previous contextual
information. Grammatical frameworks which take
the radical context dependency of linguistic pro-
cessing as being outside the remit of the grammar
might make it seem that these phenomena require
distinct mechanisms. Alternatively, however, the
tight coordination of parsing and generation as de-
fined in the Dynamic Syntax model of dialogue
(Purver et al. (2006)) enables a straightforward ac-
count of how the context-dependence of both tasks
allows participants to economise on processing.
3 Dynamic Syntax: A Sketch
Dynamic Syntax (DS) is a parsing-based approach
to linguistic modelling, involving strictly sequen-
tial interpretation of linguistic strings. The model
is implemented via goal-directed growth of tree
structures and their decorations formalised using
LOFT (Blackburn and Meyer-Viol (1994)), with
modal operators 〈↑〉, 〈↓〉 to define concepts of
mother and daughter, and their iterated counter-
parts, 〈↑∗〉, 〈↓∗〉, to define the notions be domi-
nated by and dominate. Underspecification and
update are core aspects of the grammar itself and
involve strictly monotonic information growth for
any dimension of tree structures and decorations.
Underspecification is employed at all levels of tree
relations (mother, daughter etc.), as well as for-
mulae and type values, each having an associated
requirement that drives the goal-directed process
of update. For example, an underspecified subject
node of a tree may have a requirement expressed
in DS with the node decoration ?Ty(e), for which
the only legitimate updates are logical expressions
of individual type (Ty(e)); but requirements may
also take a modal form, e.g. ?〈↑〉Ty(e → t), a
restriction that the mother node be decorated with
a formula of predicate type. Requirements are es-
sential to the dynamics informing the DS account:
all requirements must be satisfied if the construc-
tion process is to lead to a successful outcome.
Structure is built from lexical and general com-
putational actions. Computational actions govern
general tree constructional processes, such as in-
troducing and updating structure, as well as com-
piling interpretation for all non-terminal nodes
in the tree, once individual leaf nodes are suc-
cessfully decorated (with no outstanding require-
ments). This may include construction of only
weakly specified tree relations, characterised only
as dominated by some node from which they are
constructed (unfixed nodes), with subsequent up-
date (unlike van Leusen and Muskens (2003), par-
tial trees are part of the model). Individual lexical
items also provide procedures for building struc-
ture in the form of lexical actions, expressed in
exactly the same terms as the more general pro-
cesses, inducing both nodes and decorations. Thus
partial trees grow incrementally driven by pro-
cedures associated with particular words as they
are encountered, with a pointer, ♦, recording the
parser’s progress.
Complete individual trees are taken to corre-
spond to predicate-argument structures. More
complex structures can be obtained via a general
tree adjunction operation defined to license the
construction of a tree sharing some term with an-
other newly constructed tree, yielding so-called
Linked Trees (Kempson et al. 2001). The result-
ing combined information from the adjoined trees
is modelled as a conjunction of terms at the node
from which the link is made. Importantly, adjunc-
tion, as other forms of construction and update,
can be employed to model how subsequent speak-
ers may dynamically provide fragmentary exten-
sions in response to the previous utterance.
Structural as well as content underspecifica-
tion play important roles in facilitating success-
ful linguistic interaction. The content underspec-
ification of pronouns is represented as a place-
holding metavariable, noted as e.g. U, plus an
associated requirement for update by an appropri-
ate term value: ?∃x.Fo(x). Similarly, names are
represented as initially introducing place-holders
associated with a constraint providing the name
of the individual entity picked out. For ex-
ample, the name Bill contributes the decoration
UBill′(U), T y(e). The subscript specification is
shorthand for a transition across a LINK rela-
tion to a tree whose top node is decorated with
a formula Bill′(U), the name being taken as a
predicate or name specification of individuals thus
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restricting possible updates to the metavariable1.
Names can thus be seen as a procedure for iden-
tifying the individual being talked about, with a
logical constant (e.g. m21, m23 etc. picking out
uniquely this individual) eventually replacing the
metavariable on the emergent tree. According to
the DS account, the update of metavariables can be
accomplished if the context contains an appropri-
ate term for substitution. Context in DS involves
storage of parse states, i.e., the storing of partial
tree, word sequence to date, plus the actions used
in building up the partial tree.
A major aspect of the DS dialogue model is
that both generation and parsing are goal-directed
and INCREMENTAL, with parsing as the underly-
ing mechanism and generation parasitic on it. A
hearer builds a succession of partial parse trees in
order to achieve an interpretation of the speaker’s
message. A speaker is modelled in DS as doing
exactly the same only (s)he also has available a
goal tree representing what they wish to say. Each
possible step in generation, an utterance of a word,
is governed by whatever step is licensed by the
parsing formalism, constrained via the required
subsumption relation of the goal tree by the thus-
far constructed “parse” (partial) tree. By updating
their growing “parse” tree relative to the goal tree
(via a combination of incremental parsing and lex-
ical search), speakers produce the associated natu-
ral language string.
The DS model of dialogue requires defining and
taking into account both the speaker’s goal and
parse trees, as well as the hearer’s parse tree. For
fragment construal, we are interested in the extent
to which B has successfully parsed what A has
said, with the ability at any stage to interrupt to
ask for clarification, reformulate, or provide a cor-
rection, by either repeating the expression or pro-
ducing an alternative. As we shall see, B’s parse
tree reveals where need of clarification or miscom-
munication occurs, as it will be at that node from
which a sub-routine extending it takes place. Ac-
cording to the DS model of generation, repeating
or extending a constituent of A’s utterance is li-
censed only if B’s goal tree matches or extends a
parse tree updated with the relevant subpart of A’s
utterance. Indeed, this update is what B is seeking
to clarify, correct or acknowledge.
Notice that because of the incremental defini-
tion of DS, B can reuse the already constructed
1These linked structures are suppressed in all diagrams.
(partial) parse tree in their context, thereby start-
ing at this point, rather than having to rebuild an
entire propositional tree or subtree (e.g. of type e).
Exploiting the assumed parity of representations
in this way enables hearers to provide immediate
feedback to the previous speaker, the effect being
to narrow the focus on particular aspects of the in-
terpretive space. The advantage of this emerges
in the unified characterisation of any type of ellip-
sis construal as strictly context-dependence. Since
context in DS involves the storing of current par-
tial tree, word sequence to date, plus the actions
used to date to build the partial tree, ellipsis con-
strual can target any of those stored elements. In
particular, for split/joint utterances, this enables
switch from hearer to speaker at any arbitrary
point in the dialogue, without such fragments hav-
ing to be interpreted as propositional in type (as
is standard elsewhere, e.g. Purver (2004)).2 This
can then capture the dynamics involved in taking
what the other speaker has just uttered, with the
potential at any point to update it to accord with
one’s own emerging understanding of the inter-
action. In this way, speakers are able to guide
each other’s interpretations, and thus jointly nar-
row down as early as possible the burgeoning in-
terpretive space.
4 NSU fragments in Dynamic Syntax
4.1 Non-repetitive Acknowledgement
From a DS perspective, phenomena like reformu-
lations as in (1), or extensions to what one un-
derstands of the other speaker’s utterance, (2), can
be handled with exactly the same mechanisms as
the sentence-internal phenomenon independently
identifiable as apposition and illustrated below:
(5) A friend of my mother’s, someone very
famous, is coming to stay.
(6) Bob, the friend of Ruth’s, is coming to stay.
According to Cann et al. (2005), such structures
are analysed as involving the building of paired
terms across a tree transition, building linked
structures defined to share a term. Reflecting this
constraint, the update rule for such structures then
takes the pair of type e terms so formed and yields
2Given the DS concept of linked trees projecting proposi-
tional content, we anticipate that this mechanism will be ex-
tendable to fragment construal involving inference (see e.g.
Schlangen (2003), Schlangen and Lascarides (2003))
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a term whose compound restrictor is made up of
the predicative content from each.
We now have the basis for analysing extensions
and non-repetitive acknowledgements which build
on what has been previously said by way of con-
firming the previous utterance. Recall examples
(1) and (2). There are two ways for the processing
of fragments which reformulate an interlocutor A’s
utterance: either (a) as interruptions of her, A’s, ut-
terance in which case immediate confirmation of
identification of the individual concerned is pro-
vided, see (2), or (b) as confirmations/extensions
of A’s utterance after the whole of her utterance
has been integrated, see (1). Both are modelled by
DS as incremental additions.
Turning to (1), B’s response (Yeah,) the ac-
counts guy constitutes both a reformulation of A’s
utterance, as well as an extension of A’s referring
expression, having the same effect as processing
the appositive expression Bob, the accounts guy.
This means that B has processed A’s original utter-
ance, according to some identification of the indi-
vidual associated with the name Bob: that is to say,
they have constructed a full content representation
for this utterance. B’s reformulation has the effect
of acknowledgement because it signals to A that
he has processed/understood her asserted content,
and, moreover, has no objection to the content, un-
less mistaken in that identification.
In DS terms, B’s context consists of the follow-
ing tree after processing A’s utterance:
(7) B’s Context for Yeah3
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)),♦
(m21Bob′(m21)) Leave
′
It is now open to B to re-use this representation,
stored in his context, as the point of departure for
generating the expression the accounts guy. In this
case his own goal tree will now be decorated with
a composite term made up both from the term re-
covered from parsing A’s utterance and the new
addition. Simplistically, all this requires is attach-
ing a linked tree to the correct node, and then pro-
cessing the content of the apposition in order to
produce the words required. The defined steps in-
clude shifting the pointer to the appropriate node,
projection of a linked tree from that node and pro-
3Words like yeah and no are analysed as discourse mark-
ers which do not contribute truth conditional content, hence
are not represented on the trees
cessing the words the accounts guy (the linked tree
is simplified below):
(8) B’s “parse” tree licensing production of the
accounts guy: LINK adjunction
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)) Leave
′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21)),♦
Updating this representation according to the DS
processing protocol involves adding the acquired
restrictions at the node from which the linked tree
is projected (individual stages here suppressed):
(9) Updating B’s “parse” tree licensing
production of the accounts guy
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)), ♦ Leave′〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Finally, the information is passed up to the top
node of the main tree, completing the parse tree
to match B’s goal tree in uttering the expression
the accounts guy :
(10) Completing B’s “parse” tree licensing
production of the accounts guy
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)),♦
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
4.2 Non-repetitive Clarification
In the acknowledgement case above, the term rel-
ative to which the linked structure is built is fixed;
but the very same mechanism can be used when
the interlocutor needs clarification. In (2), B
again takes as his goal tree a tree decorated with
an expansion of the term constructed from pars-
ing A’s utterance but nevertheless picking out the
same individual. Using the very same mecha-
nism as in (1) of building a linked structure con-
strained to induce shared terms, B provides a dis-
tinct expression, the name Chorlton, this time be-
fore he has completed the parse tree for A’s ut-
terance. This name, contributing a metavariable
plus the constraint that the individual picked out
must be named Chorlton, is used to decorate the
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A’s goal tree A’s construction tree
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)) Leave
′
?Ty(t)
m21Bob′(m21),♦
Figure 1: Licensing production of a correction by *ADJUNCTION
linked node so that it makes explicit the addi-
tional predicative constraint on the individual be-
ing described. The outcome of this process, when
the linked structure is evaluated, is a composite
term m21Doctor′(m21)∧Chorlton′(m21). This pro-
cess, therefore, is identical to that employed in
B’s utterance in (1), though to rather different ef-
fect at this intermediate stage in the interpretation
process. This extension of the term is confirmed
by A, this time trivially replicating the compos-
ite term which processing B’s utterance has led to
(see Kempson et al 2007 for such trivial goal tree-
parse tree matches). The eventual effect of the
process of inducing linked structures to be deco-
rated by coreferential type e terms may thus vary
across monologue and different dialogue appli-
cations, yielding different interpretations, but the
mechanism is the same.
4.3 Correction
It might be argued nonetheless that correction is
intrinsically a dialogue phenomenon. In (4) for
example, reproduced below:
(4) A: Bob left.
B: Rob?
A: (No,) (Bob,) the accounts guy.
As one alternative, we assume here that B has mis-
heard and requests confirmation of what he has
perceived A as saying. A in turn rejects B’s ut-
terance and provides more information. Presum-
ing rejection as simple disagreement (i.e. the ut-
terance has been understood, but judged as incor-
rect), in DS terms, this means that A has in mind
a goal tree that licensed what she had produced,
which is distinct from the one derived by process-
ing B’s clarification. As shown in Kempson et al.
(2007), this means that A has been unable to pro-
cess B’s clarification request as an extension of
her own context. Instead she can parse the clari-
fication by exploiting the potential for introducing
an initially structurally underspecified tree-node to
accommodate the contribution of the word Rob.
Subsequently, by re-running the actions stored in
context previously by processing her own utter-
ance of the word left, she is able to complete the
integration of the fragment.
In order to produce the following correction, A
is required to establish as the current most recent
representation in context her original goal tree.
This can be monotonically achieved by recovering
and copying this original goal tree to serve as the
current most immediate context4. Under these cir-
cumstances, given the DS grammar-as-parser per-
spective, several strategies are now available. A is
licensed to repeat the name Bob by locally extend-
ing the node in the context tree where the repre-
sentation of the individual referred to is located by
using the rule of LATE*ADJUNCTION, a process
which involves building a node of type e from a
dominating node of that type (illustrated in Kemp-
son et al. 2007). An alternative way of licens-
ing repetition of the word Bob is to employ one of
the strategies generally available for the parsing of
long distance dependencies i.e. constructing initial
tree nodes as unfixed (*ADJUNCTION).
Starting with Fig 1 above, illustrating the intro-
duction of the unfixed node, we show here how
the latter strategy can be exploited to license the
production of the fragment. An option available to
A at this point is to introduce, in addition or ex-
clusively, a reformulation of her original utterance
in order to facilitate identification of the named
individual which proved problematic for B previ-
ously. She can answer B’s utterance of Rob with
(No,) (Bob,) the accounts guy, as in (4) or sim-
ply with (No,) the accounts guy. Both are licensed
by the DS parsing mechanism without more ado.
The structure5 derived by processing such an ex-
tension is exactly that of (1) above (compare goal
tree in Fig 2 and tree in (10)). As mentioned be-
fore, context, as defined in DS, keeps track not
only of tree representations and words but also of
actions contributed by the words and utilised in
building up the tree representations. Production of
4Corrected representations must be maintained in the con-
text as they can provide antecedents for subsequent anaphora.
5Note that DS trees represent derived content rather than
structure over natural language strings.
48
A’s goal tree A’s construction tree
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
?Ty(t)
m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21),♦
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Figure 2: LINK ADJUNCTION and checking goal tree subsumption
A’s goal tree A’s construction tree
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
?Ty(t)
m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21) ?Ty(e),♦ Leave’
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Figure 3: Retrieving and rerunning the actions for left, pointer return to subject node and checking goal
tree subsumption
A’s goal tree A’s construction tree
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
?Ty(t)
?Ty(e),♦
m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)
Leave’
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Figure 4: Preparation for UNIFICATION and checking goal tree subsumption
A’s goal tree A’s construction tree
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21))
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Ty(t), Leave′(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)),♦
(m21Bob′(m21)∧acc.guy′(m21)) Leave′
〈
L−1
〉
(acc.guy′(m21))
Figure 5: Licensing the production of correction and extension: completed tree matching the goal tree
the correction in (4) is licensed to be fragmental
because the original actions for parsing/producing
the word left are available in the context and can
be recalled to complete the structure initiated by
processing/producing the name Bob (see Fig 3-5).
4.4 Structure and Dialogue Function
In the examples considered so far, we have seen
how a single type of mechanism can serve distinct
functions. A more striking case is (3), where the
hearer, B, is able to leap to a hypothesis as to how
A’s question is going to be completed, and pro-
vides that completion by way of answer. Here we
have the case where more than one function can be
fulfilled even by a single utterance. As in (1)-(2),
license for such a use turns on taking the context
that was constructed by parsing input from the in-
terlocutor as the point of departure. That B is ex-
tending the structure set up by A’s utterance is self-
evident; but in addition, both A’s utterance, if she
had completed it, and B’s utterance, as presented,
are elliptical as to the second disjunct. The success
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of this particular form of split utterance turns on
the fact that what A is presenting is a duplex yes-
no question with both possible answers provided
by the two disjuncts. So in completing it by pro-
viding just the second disjunct, B can succeed in
answering the question while simultaneously com-
pleting it. Though there is more to say here, the
significance of (3) lies in the use of the single ex-
pression right-handed to fulfil two functions, both
the completion of a question and the provision of
an answer. In DS this can be modelled, reflecting
the phenomenon itself, without having to assume
the superimposition of two distinct structures, one
upon the other. Incidentally, this is a case contra-
dicting what is supposedly unique to such inter-
rupting completions, namely, that they require ac-
knowledgement by the hearer before proceeding.
5 Conclusion
As these fragments and their construal show, de-
spite serving distinct functions in dialogue, the
mechanisms which make such diversity possible
are general strategies for tree growth. In all cases,
the advantage which use of fragments provides
is a “least effort” means of re-employing previ-
ous content/structure/actions which constitute the
context. As modelled in DS, it is more econom-
ical to reuse information from context rather than
constructing representations afresh (via costly pro-
cesses of lexical retrieval, choice of alternative
parsing strategies, etc.).
A further quandary in dialogue construal is that,
despite such avenues for economising their efforts,
interlocutors are nevertheless faced with an in-
creasing set of interpretative options at any point
during the construction of representations. One
option available to hearers is to delay a disam-
biguating move until further input potentially re-
solves the uncertainty. However, as further in-
put is processed and parsing/interpretive options
increase potentially rapidly, maintenance of these
open options becomes difficult for a human pro-
cessor. The incremental definition of the DS for-
malism allows for the modelling of an alternative
available to hearers: at any point they could opt to
intervene immediately and make a direct appeal to
the speaker for more information at the maximally
relevant point during construction. It seems clear
that the latter would be a preferable strategy and
this is what clause-medial fragment interruptions,
(2), illustrate.
The phenomena examined here are also cases
where speaker’s and hearer’s representations, de-
spite attempts at coordination, may nevertheless
separate sufficiently for them to have to seek to
explicitly “repair” the communication (see espe-
cially (4)). In the model presented here, the dy-
namics of interaction allow fully incremental gen-
eration and integration of fragmental utterances so
that interlocutors can be taken to constantly pro-
vide optimal evidence of each other’s represen-
tations with necessary adjuncts being able to be
incrementally introduced. Thus, fragment con-
strual is here modelled sub-sententially with no
lifting devices to yield a propositional unit as part
of some putative discourse grammar. Indeed, no
structures/strategies are posited specific to individ-
ual discourse functions to which a fragment is put.
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Abstract 
We study the problem of alignment be-
tween dialogue participants, using the prac-
tical example of “troubleshooting” dialogue 
systems. Recent work on troubleshooting 
concerns automated spoken dialogue sys-
tems which support users who need to re-
pair their internet connection. We address 
the problem that different users have differ-
ent types of knowledge of problem do-
mains, so that automated dialogue systems 
need to adapt online to the different know-
ledge of these users as it encounters them. 
We approach this problem using policy 
learning in a Markov Decision Process 
(MDP). In contrast to related work we pro-
pose a new user model which incorporates 
the different conceptual knowledge of dif-
ferent users, together with an environment 
simulation. We show that this model allows 
us to learn dialogue policies that automati-
cally adapt online to new users, and that 
these policies are significantly better than 
threshold-based adaptive hand-coded poli-
cies for this problem.   
1 Introduction 
Adapting between conversation partners was first 
studied by Issacs & Clark (1987), where the part-
ners identify each other's domain knowledge levels 
during conversation and share their knowledge, 
leading to task success. More recently, Larsson 
(2007) gives a formal account of how the meanings 
of NL expressions are adapted during conversa-
tions. These important aspects of dialogue are not 
addressed in current automated systems. Here, and 
in Lemon (2008), we propose a model that allows 
such decisions to be automatically optimized. 
  There has been much recent interest in automated 
dialogue systems for “troubleshooting” or “self-
help”. These cooperative systems are particularly 
interesting because they contain aspects of know-
ledge alignment and tutorial dialogue – for in-
stance, some users may not know certain technical 
terms, so that systems must be able to “align” with 
their users, at least at a knowledge/concept-level.  
For example, some users may be happy with the 
term “ADSL filter”, while others may need this 
explained to them before their problem can be 
solved. On the other hand, some users may be fru-
strated by unnecessary explanations. There is there-
fore an important tradeoff to be explored regarding 
how much additional explanation to provide to a 
particular user. Note that in general we will not 
know the knowledge profile of a user when they 
call the system, so our dialogue policies must be 
able to estimate the user type online, and conti-
nuously adapt their behavior based on the estima-
tion.  
All of this places additional requirements on our 
user models and user simulations for training these 
more complex systems. We provide a new user 
model for such purposes and show that it allows us 
to learn these types of adaptive dialogue policies. 
2 Related work 
     Several user simulation models to support MDP 
-learning of dialogue management policies have 
been developed over recent years (Eckert et al 
1997, Scheffler & Young 2001, Pietquin et al 2004, 
Georgila et al 2005, Cuayahuitl et al 2005, Schatz-
mann et al 2007). These simulations simulate users 
in travel planning and town-information domains.  
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They produce user responses based on various fac-
tors such as the system’s action, user’s 
goal/agenda, user’s record of the dialogue, etc. 
Crucially, they only simulate a homogenous group 
of users, who always understand the system’s ac-
tions completely and never ask for clarifications. 
The models also do not simulate the user’s envi-
ronment. In contrast, in this work we have focused 
on the user’s domain knowledge and an environ-
ment simulation concerning troubleshooting sys-
tems. 
Troubleshooting dialogue systems have been de-
signed by Boye et al (2007), who presents a hand-
coded system and Williams (2007) who uses ma-
chine learning. In Boye (2007) the task of fixing a 
broadband connection is hierarchically decom-
posed in to simpler tasks. When the user fails to 
respond, the system chooses alternative ways to 
solve the tasks. However, it always tries the stan-
dard procedure before choosing the alternatives. 
The dynamic tree structure that drives the conver-
sation is interleaved with an “adapting-to-user” 
feature and is likely to become more complex to 
manually author in the case of realistic systems.  
Williams (2007) presents a POMDP-based di-
alogue system for troubleshooting broadband con-
nections. The system is trained to handle the uncer-
tainty in user’s observations and responses and 
provide the next appropriate instruction. Here the 
system learns what to ask or present rather than 
how to ask for information from the user. The sys-
tem assumes a homogenous user population in 
terms of domain knowledge. However, in this 
work, we present an MDP system that learns to 
adapt to a user population where different users 
have different conceptual knowledge of the troub-
leshooting environment. 
3 The Troubleshooting Domain & Dialogue 
Management 
In this setup, the dialogue manager always directs 
the conversation, because (besides fixing their 
problem) the user does not have any other goal or 
agenda in order to direct the conversation. During 
the course of conversation, the dialogue manager 
asks the user to describe their troubleshooting 
environment (e.g. Modem lights etc). The 
information to be asked is handled using a hand-
coded decision tree.  The tree encodes what 
information to ask next based on the user's report 
on the environment so far. Previous work has 
shown that such trees can be learned from data 
(Williams 2007). While the decision tree decides 
what to ask next, the dialogue manager still has to 
decide how to ask for information and present 
instructions to users with different domain 
knowledge. Table 3.1 lists the dialogue manager 
actions related to the task at hand.  
 
Table 3.1. Dialogue manager action set 
1. Greet 
2. Request_info 
3. Extended_request_info 
4. Request_action 
5. Extended_request_action 
6. Close_dialogue 
 
In general, the dialogue manager must decide 
between a simple “request” act and an “extended 
request” act in order to request information from 
the user or to ask that they perform a manipulate 
action. An “extended request”, although presented 
as a single turn in this dialogue act representation, 
is actually a sequence of system utterances that the 
system uses to educate the user about the concept 
that the system is querying/instructing about. For 
instance, a novice user may not know where the 
ADSL light is. In this case the system spends some 
time to inform the user where to look for this light. 
These extra utterances make an extended request 
more costly than a simple request (and this is later 
reflected in the reward function for learning this 
task).  
The dialogue manager is also equipped with a 
user estimation feature that allows it to dynamical-
ly estimate the expertise of a user based on their 
responses and frustration. At the start of the ses-
sion, it is assigned a default intermediate value of 
5. This is later incremented or decremented based 
on evidence (e.g. whether the user answers the 
asked question). For an expert user, it increases 
from 5 and can reach 9 by the end of the dialogue. 
For a novice user, it can decrease to 0. However 
there is also uncertainty in user responses, since 
sometimes a novice user may be able to answer a 
question without extra help and hence may be mis-
judged as an expert. Similarly an expert user may 
fail to answer a question and be judged temporarily 
as a novice. But in the course of the conversation, 
the estimation function will usually correct itself as 
evidence about the user accumulates. 
The dialogue manager's information state is 
composed of the following fields (table 3.2). There 
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are 8 binary slots and one 10-value integer slot in 
the dialogue information state, giving rise to a state 
space of 2560 (=28 * 10) states. 
 
Table 3.2. Dialogue state features 
More_slots_to_ask                    (binary) 
Solution_found                          (binary) 
User_expertise_index                (0-9) 
User_said_dont_know               (binary) 
Modem_power_light_filled       (binary) 
Adsl_light_filled                        (binary) 
Modem_filter_filled                   (binary) 
Phone_filter_filled                     (binary) 
Phone_line_working_filled        (binary) 
4 Environment Simulation 
This model simulates the troubleshooting environ-
ment around the user. The environment simulation 
represents all the objects connected to the trouble-
shooting problem. This simulation consists of a 
modem, computers, telephone, fax, adsl filters, etc. 
In addition, parts of these objects that will be of 
interest in the troubleshooting process have also 
been simulated. For instance, the powerlight, adsl 
light on the modem, the usb ports on the computer, 
modem software, etc are represented. Since connec-
tions between these objects cause problems in the 
real world, they are also simulated. In addition to 
representing the objects in the environment, the 
simulation allows the user to access the objects. 
Just like in the real world, users are able to manipu-
late the objects and therefore change the state of 
the environment as a whole. For instance, reboot-
ing the modem might set the internet connection 
correctly. In the current model, the user will be 
able to observe and manipulate the objects in the 
environment in a principled way. In real world 
troubleshooting practice, the experts will be able to 
ping the user's modem remotely. This calls for a 
manipulative interface between the expert and the 
environment. This feature is not available in the 
current environment model.  
The environment simulation is represented using 
Prolog facts and rules. The state of the environment 
Se is represented using dynamic facts and is set 
initially using Environment-setting rules. The state 
of the environment can be observed using observa-
tion rules and the environment can be manipulated 
using manipulation rules. Example rules are shown 
in table 4.1. The environment-setting rule shown 
sets the environment initially to one of the faulty 
scenarios (faulty phone filter) that the current mod-
el is able to simulate. The adsl filter a2 that con-
nects the phone_socket to the telephone t1 is speci-
fied as faulty in the definition. This causes interfe-
rence and is the source of the problem. Using ob-
servation actions, the user is able to observe that 
the adsl filter is present. As per the system's in-
structions, the user can use manipulative actions to 
fix this problem. In this case, he replaces the phone 
adsl filter and sets the connection correctly. 
 
Table 4.1 Environment Simulation 
Environment Setting rule 
set_env1(faulty_phone_filter) :- 
    assert(equipment(comp1, desktop, working)), 
    assert(equipment(t1, phone, working)), 
    assert(equipment(m1, modem, working)), 
    assert(equipment(a1, adsl_filter, working)), 
    assert(equipment(a2, adsl_filter, not_working)), 
    assert(connected(phone_socket, a1, rj11, firm)), 
    assert(connected(phone_socket, a2, rj11, firm)), 
    assert(connected(a1, m1, rj11, firm)), 
    assert(connected(a2, t1, rj11, firm)), 
    assert(connected(m1, comp1, usb, working)), 
    assert(phone_line(live)), 
    assert(modem_software(installed, working)), 
    assert(authentication(correct)), 
    !. 
Observe Environment :  Is there a phone filter? 
pact(adsl_filter_for_phone, present) :- 
    equipment(P, phone, _), 
    equipment(A, adsl_filter, _), 
        connected(A, P, rj11, firm), 
        !. 
Manipulate Environment : Replace the phone filter 
mact(replace_phone_filter) :- 
    equipment(a2, adsl_filter, not_working), 
    !, 
    retract(connected(phone_socket, a2, rj11, firm)), 
    retract(connected(a2, t1, rj11, _)), 
    assert(equipment(a4, adsl_filter, working)), 
    assert(connected(phone_socket, a4, rj11, firm)), 
    assert(connected(a4, t1, rj11, firm)), 
    update_env, 
    !. 
 
The current environment simulation is capable 
of simulating 6 error configurations - faulty mod-
em, faulty phone/modem filter, missing 
phone/modem filter, faulty phone line, authentica-
tion failure, faulty modem USB port. 
5 User Simulation 
The user simulation model stochastically simulates 
environment-sensitive and concept-knowledge-
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sensitive user behavior, as shown schematically in 
figure 5.1 and described below. 
 
Figure 5.1. The Model & Experimental setup 
  
     Besides being faithful to the environment, it 
also simulates the domain concept knowledge of 
the user DKu. Therefore, when the user is con-
fronted with concepts he barely knows, he is more 
likely to request clarification. The model is capable 
of updating its domain knowledge, when the sys-
tem provides clarification. By initially selecting 
different knowledge profiles, the current simulation 
can simulate a continuum of users from novices to 
experts. We attach a probability to every concept 
that the users must know in order to co-operate 
with the system to fix the problem. This probability 
determines whether the user follows the system’s 
instruction or requests clarification. The knowledge 
profiles of three types of users are given in table 
5.1. These values would be set by an analysis of 
data collected for the specific troubleshooting do-
main – for this proof of concept we select illustra-
tive values. 
 
Table 5.1. User knowledge profiles: P(DK) 
Concept\User Expert Intermediate Novice 
Phone_line 0.99 0.85 0.5 
ADSL filter 0.8 0.6 0.2 
ADSL light 0.9 0.6 0.2 
USB slot 0.8 0.55 0.3 
Powerlight 0.95 0.85 0.5 
 
An expert user has the highest probability to an-
swer queries and perform manipulative actions 
without requesting clarification. However these 
values are not static profile thresholds but initial 
values during the start of a dialogue session. These 
values increase when the system clarifies the con-
cept by issuing an extended request. In this case, 
for the particular concept c under discussion: 
 
P(DKu,c,t+1)= P(DKu,c,t +boost_c) 
 
    For these experiments we set boost_c = 0.5 for 
each c. Again, this average probability boost could 
be determined from real data for each c. In an ex-
tended request the system spends a few utterances 
to educate the user and therefore update the user’s 
domain knowledge. As their knowledge profile 
gets boosted, their chances of answering the query 
increase. For instance, in response to the DM's ac-
tion 'request_info: adsl_light', a novice user is 
more likely to say 'request_clarification: 
adsl_light', initially.  But if the system clarifies the 
concept, they are more likely to say 'provide_info: 
on’. However an expert user is more likely to re-
turn 'provide_info: on' without requesting clarifica-
tion (given that the ADSL light is on as per the en-
vironment state). 
 
Table 5.2 User’s Action set Au 
1. Provide_info 
2. Acknowledge 
3. Manipulate_and_acknowledge 
4. Request_clarification 
5. Hang_up 
 
When the system requests information, the user 
simulation observes the environment by issuing an 
observation action Ou, updates its observations 
OEu, and reports back to the system. Similarly, 
when the system requests that the user manipulate 
the environment, the user manipulates the envi-
ronment using a manipulate action Mu, observes its 
effects, updates the observations OEu, and reports it 
back to the system. A manipulate action also 
changes the state of the environment Se. The inte-
raction between the user, environment and the sys-
tem is shown in fig 5.1. 
In addition to the user's verbal response, we also 
simulate the user's frustration. A user gets fru-
strated when the dialogue manager does not ex-
plain unknown terms or unnecessarily explains 
well- known terms. We use a frustration index FIu 
to capture this behavior. This index affects the 
probability of the user hanging up the call before 
the dialogue ends.  The probability of hang-up is 
twice their frustration index, as a probability. The 
                                                          

 However, weighing of under-informativeness and 
over-informativeness on the same scale may be re-
vised in our future work. 
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user's frustration is also conveyed to the system on 
a turn by turn basis Fu,t (as a boolean value) along 
with the user's action Au,t. We assume that the di-
alogue manager can detect the user's frustration 
from the user’s utterance. It has been shown that 
frustration can be determined from prosodic (Lee et 
al 2002) features in the user’s utterance. 
The user state Su, contributing to the action se-
lection process contains the user’s domain know-
ledge DKu, his observations of the environment 
OEu, frustration index FIu and the number of dialo-
gue turns T. Each of these components is updated 
at different times during the action selection 
process. 
Su = <DKu , OEu , FIu , T> 
 
Based on the updated user and environment 
states and the system action, the user action Au is 
selected as described in the following algorithm, 
where return_action P(A|X) returns a user action A 
with probability P(A|X): 
 



 

 
 
 
Figure 5.3 User simulation algorithm 
 
Thus, by conditioning the user’s action Au on 
various factors like the user’s domain knowledge 
DKu, user’s observations OEu, frustration FIu and 
the environment state Se, the simulation provides a 
context-consistent and diverse user behavior. In 
future, we also plan to validate the simulation 
against real user datasets using well established 
metrics (Schatzmann et al 2005). 
6 Reward Function 
Every dialogue session is rewarded at its comple-
tion. A task completion reward (TCR) of 500 is 
given for successful completion and -500 for un-
successful dialogues. A dialogue is considered to 
be successful if the dialogue partners are able to fix 
the problem and close the dialogue. On the other 
hand, it is considered unsuccessful if the user gets 
frustrated and hangs up before the dialogue ends. 
                                                          

 Depending whether the system has requested an ob-
serve or manipulate action. 
The following costs are associated with the number 
of dialogue turns (T) and extended turns (ET). 
 
      Turn cost per turn: TC = 10.0 
      Extended cost per turn: EC = 30.0 
    
    This extended turn cost encodes that idea that 
extended turns cost 3 times as much as normal 
turns, on average. Again, this parameter would be 
set by a PARADISE-style (Walker et al 1997) re-
gression analysis on real user data. 
    The final reward for a dialogue session is calcu-
lated based on: 
 
      Total Turn cost: TTC = T * TC 
      Total Extension cost: TEC = ET * EC 
 
      Final reward = TCR - TTC – TNC 
 
The reward function is designed to penalize 
longer dialogues and unnecessary extensions. The 
task of the learning agent (dialogue manager) is to 
learn an optimal policy to minimize the costs and 
increase the chances of successful dialogue of for 
all kinds of users. 
7 Training 
The system was trained for 15000 cycles producing 
approximately 1500 dialogues using the SARSA 
reinforcement learning algorithm (Sutton & Barto 
1998). Our objective was to learn a single policy 
that can adapt online to any type of user (novice, 
expert, or intermediate). Hence the user simulation 
was calibrated to produce an equal number of no-
vice and expert users. Recall that these types of 
user behave stochastically, so that no two expert 
users are guaranteed to behave in the same way, for 
example. The users were allowed to hang up only 
after the sixth turn. This is manually chosen to 
avoid early hang ups. After the sixth turn, the prob-
ability of the user hanging up is directly propor-
tional to the user's frustration index (as described 
above). The main learning task here is to decide 
between using extended- request and request acts. 
After the training runs, the system learned to 
adapt online to both expert and novice users and in 
each case to maximize the final reward. It learned 
to effectively make use of the user expertise index, 
which is a part of the dialogue state, in order to 
tune its behavior towards the users. It learned to 
use extended-request acts when the expertise index 
indicates that the user is a novice and to use request 
acts when it indicates an expert user. It also learns 
not to use extended-request acts for information 
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that does not depend on the user's conceptual 
knowledge. For instance, both novice and expert 
users are equally able to answer if their internet 
connection is working. Hence an extended-request 
act simply adds to the cost without reducing any 
risks or costs and so is avoided for such slots. The 
system learned to reduce the dialogue length during 
training (shown in fig 7.1) by choosing the appro-
priate action the very first time an instruction is 
given to a user. This behavior avoids repeating the 
instruction and therefore the costly repairs. 
  
 
Figure 7.1. Optimization of dialogue length 
 
    Similarly, during training, the dialogue manager 
learned to optimize the user frustration index 
(shown in fig 7.2).  
 
Figure 7.2. Optimization of frustration index 
8 Evaluation 
We tested the learned policy by comparing its per-
formance with three hand-coded policies - Expert 
Only, Novice Only, and Adaptive.  
 
1. The Hand-coded Expert Only policy treats 
all users as experts. Hence it always uses 
request acts.  
2. The Hand-coded Novice Only policy treats 
all users as novices and always uses ex-
tended-request acts.  
3. The Hand-coded Adaptive policy adapts to 
the user based on the estimated expertise 
index. It uses extended-request acts when 
the index is less than 5 and request acts 
otherwise. This therefore encodes a classic 
threshold-based approach to adaptation. 
(see e.g. Varges 2003) 
 
All four policies were run against three groups 
of users – experts, novices and intermediate users. 
Each such run produced approximately 800 test 
dialogues each. Task success rate and average final 
reward for each policy run on different user groups 
were calculated. The results for an equal mix of 
experts, novices, and intermediate users are pre-
sented under “Mixed”. Statistical significance was 
calculated using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Table 8.1 compares the task success rates of dif-
ferent policies on the user populations. Note that 
the most important column in the following tables 
is “Mixed”, since this indicates the performance of 
the policies when they encounter a mixed popula-
tion of users (i.e. as would happen in a real dep-
loyed system). 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Task success rate 
 
Table 8.1. Task success rate 
Policy\Users Expert Inter Novice Mixed 
HC Expert 97.7 87.9 19.5 65.1 
HC Novice 90.8 92.8 92.6 92.1 
HC Adaptive 96.9 85.2 88.3 90.1 
Learned 97.6 88.2 86.2 90.6 
 
                                                          

 Difference in average final rewards between the pol-
icies were not normally distributed as per Kolmogo-
nrov-Smirnov test. 
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Here we can see that the learned policy has good 
task completion across the range of user types. 
However, the task success metric does not take into 
account the important cost of different types of sys-
tem turns.  Table 8.2 compares the average final 
reward (combing task completion and turn cost) of 
the different policies on three different user popula-
tions.  All improvements made by the learned poli-
cy are statistically significant at p<0.001. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Average final reward 
 
Table 8.2:  Average final reward 
Policy\Users Expert Inter Novice Mixed 
HC Expert 393.5 177.5 -430.2 46.9 
HC Novice 206.6 230.7 210.1 215.8 
HC Adaptive 379.6 221.7 177.2 259.4 
Learned 385.9 252.6 175.2 271.2 
 
 
The HC Expert Only and HC Novice Only poli-
cies were best for their respective populations, but 
they did not perform well against other popula-
tions. The HC Expert Only policy beats all the oth-
er policies with the highest average final reward 
393.5 for the expert users. It also has the highest 
task success rate at 97.7, but it performs badly on 
novice and intermediate users, scoring the lowest 
average final reward among other policies. The HC 
Novice policy performed well with both novice and 
intermediate users, but with expert users it scored 
the lowest average final reward among all the poli-
cies. It also has the highest task success rate for all 
users combined. This is because it always gives the 
user an extended request, thereby reducing the 
number of turns. But this also results in a reduction 
in average final reward on all user types combined 
(Mixed). The HC Adaptive policy performs consis-
tently among all the user groups. It scores a very 
good average final reward and task success rate. 
But it scores lower than the learned policy in both 
average final reward and task completion scores in 
expert and intermediate user groups. However, in 
the novice user group, its scores are slightly better 
than the learned policy. The learned policy also 
performs consistently on all the groups. It scores 
the best average final reward for intermediate us-
ers, although the policy was not trained on inter-
mediate users. Its average final rewards on novice 
and expert groups are not very far behind the best 
rewards. However, the key point here is that for the 
“mixed” user group, the learned policy beats all the 
other policies with the highest average final reward 
of 271.2. This result shows that when we do not 
know the user population in advance, as is the case 
in real applications, the learned policy is able to 
handle the range of users encountered by adapting 
online. This is consistent with the results of Lemon 
& Liu (2007), who considered dialogue policies for 
different noise conditions. 
The above results are promising because the 
learned policy has been able to perform better than 
carefully handcrafted adaptive policy for the same 
task. While it was easy to hand-code a policy for 
this task, it would not be so when more parameters 
are added to the dialogue manager’s information 
state. The policy learning paradigm allows us to 
learn optimal policies for these types of trade-off 
without an expensive “implement, test, deploy, re-
fine, redeploy,...” iterative development cycle. The 
parameters for the model presented above can all 
be estimated from data, for example collected in a 
small Wizard-of-Oz experiment (Rieser and Lemon 
2008).  
9 Conclusion 
We addressed the general problem that different 
dialogue participants have different types of con-
ceptual knowledge of the domain under discussion, 
so that work must be done to align or coordinate 
their understanding (see e.g. Issacs & Clark 1987). 
We studied this problem in the practical case of 
“troubleshooting”, where automated dialogue sys-
tems need to adapt online to the different know-
ledge of different users as it encounters them. We 
proposed a new user model which incorporates dif-
ferent conceptual knowledge of different users, 
together with an environment simulation. We show 
that this model allows us to learn dialogue policies 
that automatically adapt online to new users, and 
that these policies are significantly better than thre-
shold-based adaptive hand-coded policies for this 
problem.  Future work in this area would be to ex-
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tend the approach, and in particular increase the 
complexity of the user simulations, to handle other 
aspects of alignment in dialogue, such as semantic 
plasticity (Larsson 2007) and lexical and syntactic 
alignment (Pickering and Garrod 2006) in task-
based dialogues. 
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Abstract
The JAST dialogue system allows a human
and a robot to jointly assemble construction
toys on a common work area. Supporting this
type of dialogue requires that the system have
a representation of assembly plans that per-
mits it both to discuss the details of the plan
and to monitor its execution. We present a
conceptual representation of assembly plans
based on AND/OR graphs, and then describe
how the dialogue manager uses these plans as
the basis for a range of strategies for jointly
carrying out the plans with the user.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of interactive systems are ad-
dressing the task of supporting intelligent coopera-
tion with a human partner, where both partners work
together to achieve a mutual task. This type of
task-based collaboration is particularly relevant for
robots, which are able to sense and perform actions
in the physical world and can often be treated as full
team members (Breazeal et al., 2004; Fong et al.,
2005). For an artificial system to be able to work to-
gether with a human on such a task, the details of the
task must be represented in such a way that the sys-
tem can both follow the task progress and participate
in discussing the details of the task execution.
In this paper, we present the JAST human-robot
dialogue system, which allows the user to cooperate
with the robot in assembling wooden construction
toys. Assembly plans are represented as AND/OR
graphs (Homem de Mello and Sanderson, 1990),
which is the standard mechanism for representing
such plans in autonomous robot assembly. This rep-
resentation allows the dialogue manager to access
the current steps in the plan and to update the state of
the world following user actions. The dialogue man-
ager implements two strategies for explaining a plan
to the user, one that traverses the plan in a depth-first
way, naming objects after they are complete, and an-
other that names and describes the objects top-down.
The interactions supported by the JAST system
is quite similar to the ‘Max’ virtual communica-
tor system developed at the University of Biele-
feld (Kopp et al., 2003; Rickheit and Wachsmuth,
2006). However, the mechanisms underlying the in-
teractions are different: while the core of Max is a
cognitively-motivated agent architecture, JAST uses
a dialogue manager based on the information-state
update paradigm. Our implementation also shares
some features with Blaylock and Allen (2005)’s
collaborative problem-solving (CPS) model of dia-
logue. That model divides the problem-solving pro-
cess into three general phases: determining objec-
tives, determining and instantiating recipes, and ex-
ecuting recipes and monitoring success. While we
do not employ the full formal structure of the CPS
model, the JAST system views collaborative dia-
logue in a similar way. A similar link between do-
main plans and dialogue strategies is also used in the
LeActiveMath mathematics tutorial dialogue system
(Callaway et al., 2006) to allow the system to de-
scribe and cooperatively follow plans drawn from a
domain reasoner and to give context-specific hints to
guide a learner through the graph of a solution.
2 The JAST human-robot dialogue system
The overall goal of the JAST project (‘Joint Action
Science and Technology’) is to investigate the cog-
nitive and communicative aspects of jointly-acting
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Figure 1: The JAST dialogue robot
agents, both human and artificial. The JAST human-
robot dialogue system (Rickert et al., 2007) is de-
signed as a platform to integrate the project’s empir-
ical findings on cognition and dialogue with its work
on autonomous robots, by supporting multimodal
human-robot collaboration on a joint construction
task. The user and the robot jointly assemble
wooden construction toys on a common workspace,
coordinating their actions through speech, gestures,
and facial displays.
The robot (Figure 1) consists of a pair of mechan-
ical arms with grippers, mounted in a position to
resemble human arms, and an animatronic talking
head able to produce facial expressions, rigid head
motion, and lip-synchronised synthesised speech.
The input channels consist of speech recognition,
object recognition, robot sensors, and face tracking;
the outputs include synthesised speech, head mo-
tions, and manipulator actions.
In the current version of the system, the robot is
able to manipulate objects in the workspace and to
perform simple assembly tasks. The primary form of
interaction with the current system is one in which
the robot instructs the user on building a particular
compound object, explaining the necessary assem-
bly steps and retrieving pieces as required; at the
end of the paper, we discuss extensions to this sce-
nario. To make joint action essential to the assembly
task, the workspace is divided into two areas: one
belonging to the robot and one to the human. The
pieces necessary for building a desired assembly are
distributed across these areas so that neither of the
agents is able to reach all of the required compo-
nents and must rely on the partner to retrieve them.
3 Representing assembly plans
Like several previous interactive systems designed
to support (physical or virtual) joint assembly (e.g.,
Knoll, 2003; Rickheit and Wachsmuth, 2006), dia-
logues in JAST are based around assembling Baufix
wooden construction toys. The following are the ba-
sic components that are available:
• Threaded Bolts of varying lengths and colours;
• Cubes of varying colours, with four threaded
holes and two unthreaded holes;
• Nuts with a single threaded hole; and
• Slats with three, five, or seven unthreaded holes
For the remainder of this paper, we will consider
the sample object shown in Figure 2, which we will
call a ‘bridge’. This object consists of two small
(three-hole) slats, connected end-to-end using a blue
bolt and a nut, with a cube connected to the other
end of each slat. Some of the sub-components also
have names: the slat+cube combination on the left of
Figure 2 is called the ‘front’, while the combination
on the right is called the ‘back’.
Even for this fairly simple object, there are a num-
ber of different possible assembly sequences: the
slats may be joined together at any point, and the
two cubes can also be attached in any order. There
is some symmetry in the plan: for example, the
two slats are interchangeable, and it is not impor-
tant which end of a slat or which hole in a cube is
used. However, there are also geometric relation-
ships among the pieces that must be respected, such
as the fact that the bolts all go through the slats in
the same direction.
In this section, we present the assembly-plan rep-
resentation used in JAST, which captures all of these
features. We begin by describing the representa-
tion of individual assembly steps and then show how
those steps are combined to describe the full plan.
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Figure 2: Assembled object (‘bridge’)
3.1 Assembly steps
The first step in representing an assembly plan is
to represent the individual assembly steps. In our
system, assembly steps are represented in a domain-
specific way, tailored to the types of objects that can
be constructed from Baufix components. Following
Sagerer et al. (2002)—who also represented Bau-
fix assemblies for use in interactive assembly—we
define an assembly step to consist of the following
components:
• Exactly one bolt;
• Any number of unthreaded pieces to insert the
bolt through (cubes, slats, or composite objects
containing cubes or slats); and
• Exactly one threaded fastener to screw onto the
bolt (a nut, a cube, or a composite object con-
taining a cube).
In addition to the above features, an assembly-step
description also includes details to ensure that the
step is performed correctly. These details fall into
three main classes:
• For any component that is a composite object,
which piece of that object should be used;
• Which of the several holes in a slat should be
used; and
• The direction of insertion or fastening.
Note that not all of these details are necessary for
a single step: it does not matter which of the four
threaded holes in a cube is used for an attachment
operation, for instance, and the two end holes of a
slat are also interchangeable, as are the two faces.
However, when the same component is used in more
than one assembly step—as in the sample object,
Figure 3: Single assembly step
Bolt b1(bolt,small, red)
Insert list [i1(slat, three-hole)]
Fastener f1(cube,green)
Details [hole(i1) = Middle,direction( f1) = South,
direction(i1) = South]
Figure 4: Symbolic description of the assembly step
where each of the two slats is used twice—it is im-
portant that all of those steps are performed based on
the same frame of reference to ensure that the rela-
tive positions of the objects are correct. We there-
fore define a canonical orientation of an assembled
object (as in Figure 2(b)).
Figure 3 illustrates the assembly step that creates
the ‘front’ of the sample object: a red bolt is inserted
from above through the end of a three-hole slat and
is then screwed into a threaded hole of a green cube.
Figure 4 gives a symbolic description of this step.
3.2 Assembly plans
Each possible assembly plan for an object is made
up of a sequence of assembly steps, where a sin-
gle object may have a number of such sequences.
In autonomous assembly, the standard solution for
representing such a set of assembly sequences is the
AND/OR graph: a directed acyclic graph that de-
composes a problem into two sets of nodes, AND
nodes and OR nodes. An AND node is satisfied
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Figure 5: AND/OR graph structure for the sample object
only if all of its children are satisfied, while an OR
node is satisfied when exactly one of its children is.
This provides a natural representation for any prob-
lem that can be represented by decomposing a goal
into subgoals, and was first proposed for robot as-
sembly by Homem de Mello and Sanderson (1990).
In an assembly plan, an AND node corresponds
to a single assembly step in which all of the children
are combined to produce a more complex compo-
nent. An OR node, on the other hand, corresponds to
situations in which an assembly may be produced by
different sequences of assembly operations; in this
case, each child of the node corresponds to a dif-
ferent assembly sequence. An AND/OR graph pro-
vides a compact representation of all of the possi-
ble assembly sequences for an object; each individ-
ual sequence can be extracted by traversing the tree
top-down, including all of the children of each AND
node and exactly one child of each OR node.
Figure 5 shows the structure of the AND/OR
graph for the sample object in Figure 2. Nodes
with outgoing edges represent AND nodes, while
nodes highlighted with a grey background are OR
nodes. The leaf nodes in the tree correspond to the
individual pieces required to build the sample ob-
ject, while each internal node corresponds to a sub-
assembly. For example, the subtree rooted at the OR
node marked A indicates that there are two different
assembly sequences that can result in that compo-
nent. The first, corresponding to the left child of A,
involves first attaching the green cube to one end of
the slat to make the ‘front’ and then attaching the
other slat to the other end. The second sequence,
corresponding to the right child of A, first creates the
(unnamed) centre piece and then attaches the cube to
the end.
Each internal node has a unique ID—for exam-
ple, the node corresponding to the assembly opera-
tion from Figure 3 has ID csb1. Three of the nodes
also have labels indicating that the corresponding
sub-assembly has a name: the ‘bridge’, the ‘front’
and the ‘back’.
Previous systems have also addressed the task
of representing assemblies of Baufix-style objects.
Brock (1993) represented components by their geo-
metric properties and described assemblies in terms
of hierarchical planning operators. This system
had the goal of creating plans for a robot to au-
tonomously assemble the components, with no user
interaction. Sagerer et al. (2002) used a similar
representation for assembly actions to the one de-
scribed here, with the goal of recognising complex
objects in an interactive human-robot scenario. This
system did not represent full assembly plans, but
rather structural descriptions sufficient for recogni-
tion. The representation for Baufix assemblies in
for the Max virtual communicator Jung (2003) de-
scribed them in terms of ports and connections of
CAD-based parts with the goal of supporting assem-
bly in virtual environments.
The JAST representation described in this section
is most similar to that used by Sagerer et al. (2002),
although they do not use AND/OR graphs to rep-
resent the assembly plans; the other representations
concentrate more on detailed geometric features that
are less relevant to the current scenario where the
user is the primary agent for assembly operations.
4 Following an assembly plan in dialogue
Interactions in JAST are based around coopera-
tively carrying out assembly plans represented as de-
scribed in the preceding section. As mentioned ear-
lier, in the current scenario, the robot is aware of the
target object and the full plan and instructs the user
on carrying out the assembly, and the user learns to
make particular sub-components along the way. In
Section 5, we discuss possible extended interactions,
but in this section we concentrate on the robot-as-
instructor scenario. Excerpts from typical interac-
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Depth-first
SYSTEM[1]: First we need to build a bridge. Okay?
USER[1]: Okay
SYSTEM[2]: [picking up green cube] Insert the red
bolt into the end of a slat and fasten it
with this cube.
USER[2]: Okay
SYSTEM[3]: Well done. You have completed the
front. Now insert ....
Top-down
SYSTEM[1]: First we need to build a bridge. Okay?
USER[1]: Okay
SYSTEM[2]: To build a bridge we need to make a
front and a back. To make a front, insert
the red bolt ...
Figure 6: Example depth-first and top-down interactions
tions using two different explanation strategies are
shown in Figure 6. In the remainder of this section,
we describe how the components of the system work
together to support such interactions.
The required knowledge is distributed across
three main components of the system. The task
planner stores and maintains the AND/OR graph
corresponding to the current plan, updating it as ap-
propriate based on information from other modules.
The object inventory tracks the properties and lo-
cations of Baufix objects in the world, using infor-
mation from the object-recognition system as well
as the task planner. Finally, the dialogue man-
ager (DM) receives a unified representation of user
speech and actions from the input-processing com-
ponents and selects appropriate system output based
on the current state of the interaction and of the plan,
along with the user’s assumed knowledge. It also
updates the state of other components based on the
events in the dialogue.
The DM is based on the TrindiKit dialogue-
management toolkit, which uses the information-
state update approach to dialogue management
(Traum and Larsson, 2003). The JAST information
state (IS) includes data about the user’s knowledge,
the current step in the plan that is being executed,
the history of steps that have been described to the
user, and the history of the interaction. Figure 7 in
Section 4.2 below contains an example IS and some
further discussion.
Table 1: Initial object inventory
ID Type Properties Location
1 Bolt Color=Red Table(User)
2 Bolt Color=Orange Table(Robot)
3 Bolt Color=Blue Table(Robot)
4 Cube Color=Yellow Table(Robot)
5 Cube Color=Green Table(Robot)
6 Cube Color=Green Table(User)
7 Nut Color=Orange Table(Robot)
8 Slat Size=3-hole Table(User)
9 Slat Size=3-hole Table(User)
10 Slat Size=5-hole Table(User)
4.1 Loading the plan
Before the first utterance in the dialogue excerpt, the
system must select a target object to assemble. In
our scenario, where the robot knows the plan and
must instruct the user, the choice of target object
is fixed, so the DM simply instructs the task plan-
ner to load the AND/OR graph for the target object
from its library of fully-specified plans. At the mo-
ment, the task planner also selects a specific assem-
bly sequence from the AND/OR graph at the point
that the plan is loaded, favouring sequences that in-
clude more named sub-components (e.g., the ‘front’)
to ensure that the user learns to build them.
4.2 Describing assembly steps to the user
Once the AND/OR graph has been loaded and a se-
quence selected, the DM must describe the assem-
bly process to the user. The DM can proceed depth-
first, describing plan steps and naming objects when
they are complete, or it can work top-down and de-
scribe and name each step in advance; both of these
strategies are illustrated in Figure 6. In both cases
the actual path through the plan is the same, and the
‘current state’ of the dialogue as represented in the
IS is a crucial component. A truncated example of
an IS (relevant to either strategy) is contained in Fig-
ure 7 and shows the basic plan information and typi-
cal dialogue history (DH) and user knowledge (UK)
representations. The names of the plan nodes (e.g.,
‘front’ or ‘bridge’) are associated inside the plan-
ner with (language independent) concepts which the
language generation system turns into lexical items
in English or German; the DM only needs to know
the plan node identifier. The DH contains an ordered
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
IS:

PLAN:
NAME: bridgeSTEPSTACK: [csb2, csb1+csb2]
DESCRIBED: [csb1]

DH: [act(sys,describe step),act(usr,accept), . . . ]
UK: {front}


Figure 7: Part of the IS Structure
list of completed acts, and the user knowledge is rep-
resented as a set of ‘known’ object types. This set
is maintained throughout the dialogue, so if we are
constructing an object for the second time we can
ask the user if they remember how to build it.
In operation, the DM first requests the children
of the tree node corresponding to the step to be de-
scribed. A check is carried out to determine whether
all the objects mentioned in the step are either ba-
sic components (bolts, cubes) or known to the user;
if not, the system picks the left corner child and it-
erates until such a node is found. If the depth-first
strategy is being pursued, the DM proceeds without
producing linguistic output until it reaches a node
where everything necessary to build the object ex-
ists. In the top-down approach the system names
each node and describes the general structure as it
proceeds, whereas the depth-first strategy assumes
that objects are built before they are named. The
‘delayed naming’ aspect of the depth-first approach
is not, of course, necessary; it is perfectly possible
to tell the user what is being constructed before it is
described. However, the naming strategy is an as-
pect of dialogue that we would like to experiment
with, and it seems less natural to combine top-down
description with delayed naming.1 As each step is
completed, the DM sends the planner a ‘step exe-
cuted’ message with the relevant node name, which
updates the system state as described in Section 4.5.
When the whole plan is complete, the system loads
the next assembly plan or terminates.
1Top-down with delayed naming would suggest system ut-
terances such as:
Let’s build a bridge. Insert a blue bolt through a
green slat and fasten it with a yellow cube. This is
a front. Now insert ...
From the perspective of Centering Theory (Grosz et al.,
1995), the focus shifts are non-optimal.
<rst>
<consequence id="id1">
<item idref="id2" />
<item idref="id3" />
</consequence>
<item id="id2" type="impersonal">
<pred action="build" result="front" />
</item>
<join id="id3">
<item idref="id4" />
<item idref="id5" />
</join>
<item id="id4" type="imperative">
<pred action="insert">
.... contents of insert ....
</pred>
</item>
<item id="id5" type="imperative">
<pred action="fasten">
.... contents of fasten ....
</pred>
</item>
</rst>
Figure 8: An RST ‘Consequence’ Structure in XML
4.3 System Output
The DM builds XML structures containing RST-
style representations (Mann and Thompson, 1988)
to be passed on to the output planner and ultimately
the language generator. The top-down strategy uses
‘consequence’ relations to link the actions being
described and their results, as illustrated in Figure
8. The ‘insert’ and ‘fasten’ elements in the figure,
which describe the objects, have been removed for
brevity. The type attribute on item elements speci-
fies the basic clause class; impersonal clauses such
as ‘to build a bridge’, imperatives such as ‘insert the
bolt’, and declaratives as in ‘the bridge is complete’.
An important aspect of describing a step to the
user is selecting an appropriate means of referring
to the required objects, which is performed by the
output planner and depends on the information in
the object inventory. The initial object inventory for
the sample interaction is shown in Table 1. When
the system generates the SYSTEM[2] utterance in
the second (top-down) extract, the back and the front
do not yet exist, so they are referred to indefinitely.
However, there is one red bolt on the user’s table,
so a definite is used, while there are 3 relevant slats,
so again an indefinite is appropriate. The robot has
selected a cube to pick up (if more than one avail-
able object matches the description the choice is ran-
dom), so in this case a demonstrative is used.
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4.4 Responding to user actions
Currently the user may respond in a restricted num-
ber ways to a system utterance; the range will be ex-
tended in the near future, but for now we allow ver-
bal acknowledgements of various kinds, indications
of misunderstandings, and yes-no answers. The
sample dialogues in Figure 6 contain examples of
acknowledgements which are interpreted in different
ways. Following SYSTEM[1], ‘okay’ is interpreted
mainly as indicating understanding, while following
SYSTEM[2] ‘okay’ is assumed to indicate that the
user has performed the actions described. Depend-
ing on the confirmation strategy used by the system,
such interpretations might be queried explicitly; the
balance between verbal confirmation and the cur-
rent optimistic grounding approach is another area
for experimentation.
The user can indicate that something is misunder-
stood, in which case previous output is typically re-
peated. The user may also be asked yes-no ques-
tions, which are again interpreted differently de-
pending on the dialogue context. The most obvious
example is in cases where the DM reaches a plan
step whose result is already listed in the user knowl-
edge set. In this situation the system has the op-
tion of asking the user whether or not they remember
how to build the object in question.
4.5 Updating the state
Once an assembly step has been completed, the state
of the task planner must be updated. As noted above,
the DM informs the rest of the system that the step
has been executed. This message includes the IDs of
the objects that were used, and in response the task
planner performs two actions: it updates the set of
world objects in the inventory, and it marks the step
as completed in its internal AND/OR graph.
Completing an assembly step has two effects on
the object inventory. First, all of the components
that were involved in the assembly are no longer
available for use, so their location is adjusted to in-
dicate that they are part of a larger component. Sec-
ond, a new object is introduced into the world cor-
responding to the sub-assembly that was created by
the completed step. The updated object inventory
after USER[2] in Figure 6 is shown in Table 2, with
objects changed by the action indicated by italics.
Table 2: Updated object inventory
ID Type Properties Location
1 Bolt Color=Red Assembled(11)
2 Bolt Color=Orange Table(Robot)
3 Bolt Color=Blue Table(Robot)
4 Cube Color=Yellow Table(Robot)
5 Cube Color=Green Assembled(11)
6 Cube Color=Green Table(User)
7 Nut Color=Orange Table(Robot)
8 Slat Size=3-hole Assembled(11)
9 Slat Size=3-hole Table(User)
10 Slat Size=5-hole Table(User)
11 Comp(front) Parts=(1,5,8) UserHand
Completing a step also affects the information
state. In this case, the user has just built a compo-
nent called a ‘front’, so we can update the model of
the user’s knowledge to indicate that this is likely to
be a ‘known’ object. If a subsequent assembly task
also requires a ‘front’, we can ask the user to build it
without needing to explain it in detail, or we can ask
the user if they remember the procedure.
5 Discussion
We have described the issues involved in represent-
ing assembly plans for use in a task-based dialogue
system and shown how we use AND/OR graphs to
represent Baufix assembly plans within the JAST
human-robot dialogue system. We have then shown
how the dialogue manager uses information from the
task planner and the object inventory to describe the
task plan and the required steps, to respond to ac-
tions and requests of the user, and to update the sys-
tem state following assembly operations.
The dialogue manager has two distinct strategies
available for describing a plan. With the top-down
strategy, the structure of the plan is described be-
fore it is executed; with the depth-first strategy, the
dialogue manager proceeds directly to concrete as-
sembly operations and names sub-components only
after they are completed. The current JAST system
will shortly undergo a user evaluation in which naı¨ve
users interact with the system in the current robot-
as-instructor scenario. Among other questions, this
evaluation will compare these two strategies using
measures such as user satisfaction and enjoyment
and the success and efficiency of the assembly task.
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The system is still under development, and sev-
eral enhancements are planned for the next version.
First, we aim to extend the system to support inter-
actions in which both the robot and the user know
the assembly plan. In such scenarios, it is likely
that there would be much less verbal interaction be-
tween the participants. To support this, we will in-
tegrate components from another system (Erlhagen
et al., 2007) that addresses a similar human-robot
joint assembly task, but that uses dynamic neural
fields to infer the user’s goals from their non-verbal
behaviour and to select complementary actions.
We would like to to move beyond the current
small set of simple assembly plans, which are at the
moment stored as hard-coded ‘recipes’ and loaded
on request. It would increase the system’s flexibility
if an AND/OR graph could be created automatically
or semi-automatically from a symbolic description
of the assembled object; this would also enable the
system to learn assembly plans interactively in co-
operation with the user. More complex plans could
also require different interaction strategies and a dif-
ferent, more flexible connection between the task
planner and the dialogue manager in which a single
assembly sequence is not selected at the start.
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Abstract
Situated dialogue is usually tightly integrated with be-
havior planning, physical action and perception. This
paper presents an algorithmic framework, Continual
Collaborative Planning (CCP), for modeling this kind
of integrated behavior and shows how CCP agents nat-
urally blend physical and communicative actions. For
experiments with conversational CCP agents we have
developed MAPSIM, a software environment that can
generate multiagent simulations from formal multia-
gent planning problems automatically. MAPSIM
permits comparison of CCP-based dialogue strategies
on a wide range of domains and problems without
domain-specific programming. Despite their linguis-
tic capabilities being limited MAPSIM agents can al-
ready engage in fairly realistic situated dialogues. Our
ongoing work is taking this approach from simulation
to real human-robot interaction.
1 Introduction
When several agents are situated in a common envi-
ronment they usually interact physically as well as
verbally. Verbal interactions in such environments,
i. e. situated dialogues, both reflect the past and influ-
ence the future physical behavior of the agents. As
a result, situated dialogue is continually interleaved
with behavior planning, physical action and sensing.
But when and why do agents switch between these
rather distinct activities? In particular, how is dia-
logue triggered by physical events and how, in turn,
does it constrain them?
In this paper, we approach these questions from
the perspective of multiagent planning. Specifically,
we describe situated dialogue as Distributed Contin-
ual Planning (DCP) (DesJardins et al., 1999), i. e. as
a process that integrates planning, acting and per-
ception with communication. We present a novel
DCP algorithm called Continual Collaborative Plan-
(1) Anne: ”Please give me the coffee, R2D2.”
(2) R2D2: ”Okay.”
(3) R2D2: ”Where is the coffee, Anne?”
(4) Anne: ”The coffee is in the kitchen.”
(5) R2D2: ”Thanks, Anne.”
(6) R2D2: ”Please open the kitchen door, Anne.”
(7) Anne: ”Okay.”
(8) Anne opens the kitchen door.
(9) R2D2: ”Thanks for opening the kitchen door, Anne.”
(10) R2D2 moves to the kitchen.
(11) R2D2 takes the coffee.
(12) R2D2 moves to the living room.
(13) R2D2 brings Anne the coffee.
(14) Anne: ”Thanks for bringing me the coffee, R2D2.”
Figure 1: Mixed-initiative dialogue between two ar-
tificial agents in MAPSIM (Household domain).
ning (CCP) and show how it can be used for situated
dialogue modeling. Interestingly, the role of com-
munication in CCP is twofold: A dialogue move
can be part of the collaborative planning process;
however, it is also the execution of a communica-
tive action and, just like the execution of a physical
action, it changes the “world” in ways that may lead
to previously unforeseen changes in plans and, con-
sequently, additional interactions. Since goals and
plans of agents are continually revised, CCP mod-
els very dynamic interactions that naturally include
mixed-initiative subdialogues and interleaved phys-
ical and communicative actions.
Approaches to situated dialogue can only be eval-
uated in environments where agents are actually
situated, i. e. where they can not only communi-
cate, but also perceive and act. Because we want
to evaluate CCP (and related approaches) over a
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wide range of application domains we have devel-
oped MAPSIM, a simulation environment that turns
formal multiagent planning problems into multia-
gent simulations. Crucially, MAPSIM creates the
simulation as well as a domain-specific lexicon for
natural-language dialogue automatically when an-
alyzing the planning domain. Since no domain-
specific programming is needed MAPSIM can be
used to quickly evaluate dialogue strategies on a
wide range of domains and problems.
The paper is structured as follows: We first in-
troduce our multiagent planning formalism and dis-
cuss its suitability for dialogue planning. Then we
present the CCP algorithm. In the subsequent sec-
tions we describe MAPSIM and analyze CCP dia-
logues in several domains. In the final sections we
discuss related work and indicate our ongoing ef-
forts.
2 Multiagent Planning Formalism
Planning in dynamic multiagent environments
means reasoning about the environment, about (mu-
tual) beliefs, perceptual capabilities and the possible
physical and communicative actions of oneself and
of others. All of these elements can be modeled in
the multiagent planning language MAPL (Brenner,
2008). In this section we introduce MAPL infor-
mally and discuss its suitability for dialogue plan-
ning; formal definitions can be found in (Brenner,
2008).
MAPL is a multiagent variant of PDDL (Plan-
ning Domain Definition Language), the de facto
standard language for classical planning (Fox and
Long, 2003). One important extension in MAPL
is the use of multi-valued state variables (MVSVs)
instead of propositions. For example, a state vari-
able color(ball) would have exactly one of its possi-
ble domain values red, yellow, or blue compared to
the three semantically unrelated propositions (color
ball red), (color ball yellow), (color ball blue), all
or none of which could be true in a given STRIPS
state. MVSVs have successfully been used in clas-
sical planning in recent years (Helmert, 2006), but
they also provide distinctive benefits when used for
dialogue planning.
Firstly, we can use MVSVs to model knowledge
and ignorance of agents: if no value is known for
a state variable it is unknown (contrast this with
(1) Bill goes home.
(2) Bill: ”Please bake the pizza, Oven.”
(3) Oven: ”Okay.”
(4) Oven bakes the pizza.
(5) Oven: ”I have finished baking the pizza, Bill.”
(6) Bill: ”Thanks for baking the pizza, Oven.”
(7) Bill: ”Please bring me the pizza, R2D2.”
(8) R2D2: ”Okay.”
(9) R2D2 brings Bill the pizza.
(10) Bill: ”Thanks for bringing me the pizza, R2D2.”
(11) Bill eats the pizza.
Figure 2: Dialogue between three artificial agents in
MAPSIM (Pizza domain).
the closed world assumption of classical planning:
what is not known to be true is false). This concept
can also be extended to beliefs about other agents’
beliefs and mutual beliefs which are modeled by
so-called belief state variables. Secondly, wh-
questions can be modeled as queries about MVSVs
in our model (see below). Thirdly, algorithms for
generating referring expressions, such as the full
brevity algorithm of (Dale, 1992), can be directly
implemented using a MVSV representation.
MAPL actions are similar to those of PDDL. In
MAPL, every action has a controlling agent who
executes the action and controls when it is done.
Agents are fully autonomous when executing ac-
tions, i. e. there is no external synchronization or
scheduling component. As a consequence an action
will only be executed if, in addition to its precon-
ditions being satisfied, the controlling agent knows
that they hold. Implicitly, all MAPL actions are
extended with such knowledge preconditions (cf.
also (Lochbaum, 1998)). Similarly, there are im-
plicit commitment preconditions, intuitively de-
scribing the fact that an agent will only execute ac-
tions if he has agreed to do so.
A MAPL domain can define three different ways
to affect the beliefs of agents (necessary, e. g., in
order to satisfy knowledge preconditions): sensing,
copresence (joint sensing), and communication. All
three are MAPL actions that have knowledge ef-
fects. Sensor models describe the circumstances
in which the current value of a state variable can
be perceived. Copresence models are multiagent
sensor models that induce mutual belief about the
perceived state variable (Clark and Marshall, 1981).
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Informally, agents are copresent when they are in
a common situation where they can not only per-
ceive the same things but also each other. Individ-
ual and joint sensing are important for dialogue be-
cause they help avoiding it: an agent does not need
to ask for what he senses himself, and he does not
need to verbalize what he assumes to be perceived
by the other agents as well. Communicative acts
currently come in two forms: (i) Declarative state-
ments are actions that, similarly to sensory actions,
can change the belief state of another agent in spe-
cific circumstances. Line 5 of Fig. 2 shows an exam-
ple of an agent explicitly providing another one with
factual information. (ii) Questions, commands and
acknowledgments are not explicitly modeled in a
MAPL domain, but generated during CCP (as dis-
cussed in Sect. 3). These communicative acts po-
tentially cover a broad range of speech acts, whose
differentiation requires further refinement of the cor-
responding preconditions and effects.
MAPL goals correspond to PDDL goal formulae.
However, MAPL has two additional goal-like con-
structs: Temporary subgoals (TSGs) are manda-
tory, but not necessarily permanent goals, i. e. they
must be satisfied by the plan at some point, but
may be violated in the final state. Assertions, on
the other hand, describe optional “landmarks”, i. e.
TSGs that may helpful in achieving specific ef-
fects in later phases of the continual planning pro-
cesses, which cannot be fully planned for yet be-
cause of missing information (Brenner and Nebel,
2006; Brenner, 2008). For example, the MAPL do-
main used to create the simulation in Fig. 1 contains
an assertion stating that, informally speaking, to get
something one must first know where it is.
MAPL plans differ from PDDL plans in being
only partially ordered. This is inevitable since we
assume that there is no central executive which could
guarantee a totally ordered execution. We use the
term asynchronous plans since MAPL plans also
allow for concurrent occurrence of actions. Fig. 3
shows an example. An asynchronous plan that guar-
antees that the implied knowledge preconditions will
be satisfied during execution (e. g. by explicitly nam-
ing the perceptions to be made and speech acts to be
used) is called self-synchronizing plan because it
“explains” how the agents can coordinate their be-
havior during execution.
It is often impossible for a group of situated
agents to jointly commit to a self-synchronizing plan
prior to beginning its execution. As an example, line
1 of Fig. 2 shows how an agent must start executing
its individual multiagent plan (i. e. a plan for a group
of agents but to which no other agent has commit-
ted yet) in order to even get the chance to negotiate
the plan with the others: In this scenario, Bill must
physically move first because he can only communi-
cate with his household appliances “at home”. This
is modeled explicitly in theMAPL domain by means
of a so-called communication precondition that the
planner has to satisfy if agents should engage in di-
alogue. In future work, we will also use communi-
cation preconditions to model dialogue-specific re-
quirements like attention (Grosz and Sidner, 1986)
and engagement (Sidner et al., 2005).
3 Continual Collaborative Planning
Continual Collaborative Planning (CCP) agents
switch between planning, partial plan execution,
monitoring, plan adaptation and communication.
Alg. 1 gives a high-level description of the CCP al-
gorithm. Since the current state of the algorithm not
only depends on what the agent has been doing, but
also on the messages received from others, CCP is
specified as a Distributed Algorithm (Lynch, 1996).
Algorithm 1 CCP AGENT(S,G)
P = ∅
Received no message:
if S satisfies G do
return “goal reached”
else
P = MONITORINGANDREPLANNING(S,G, P )
if P = ∅ then
return “cannot achieve goal G”
else
(S, P ) = EXECUTIONANDSTATEESTIMATION(S, P )
Received (tell-val vx) from agent a:
add v .=x to S
Received request(e) from agent a:
sg = TRANSLATEREQUESTTOGOAL(e)
P = MONITORINGANDREPLANNING(S,G ∪ sg, ∅)
if P = ∅ then
send “cannot execute request e” to a
else
add sg to G as temporary subgoal
We will first discuss the base case when no com-
munication has taken place yet, i. e. the CCP agent
has neither sent nor received any messages yet.
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Roughly speaking, the agent alternates between (re-
)planning and acting in this case. The two phases
are detailed in Algs. 2 and 3. Alg. 2 shows how a
new planning phase is triggered: the agent monitors
whether his current plan has become invalid due to
unexpected (external) events or changes in his goals.
If this is the case, the agent adapts its plan by replan-
ning those parts that are no longer executable. In or-
der to exploit the power of state-of-the-art planning
systems, Alg. 2 uses an unspecified classical planner
PLANNER to (re-)plan for the obsolete or missing
parts of the old plan. The details of this process are
irrelevant for the purpose of this paper; it results in
an asynchronous plan that specifies actions for (pos-
sibly) several agents and the causal and temporal re-
lation between them that is necessary to achieve the
planning agent’s goal.
Algorithm 2 MONITORINGANDREPLANNING(S,G, P )
if res(S, P ) #⊇ G
REMOVEOBSOLETESUFFIXGRAPH(P)
P ′ = PLANNER(A, res(S, P ), G)
P = CONCAT(P, P ′)
return P
Fig. 3 shows such an asynchronous plan for the
pizza scenario of Fig. 2, created with Alg. 2. Note
that this plan contains special negotiation actions;
they will be the triggers for task-orientated subdi-
alogues in a later phase of CCP. The planning al-
gorithm enforces such negotiation actions to be in-
cluded in a plan whenever this plan includes actions
or subplans to be executed not by the planning agent,
but by another agent who is not yet committed to
this plan. Thus CCP ensures that a (sub-)dialogue
will take place that either secures the other agent’s
commitment or triggers replanning. Note how, in
turn, the need for negotiation has forced the planner
to include a physical action (Bill’s moving home)
into the plan in order to satisfy the abovementioned
communication precondition.
As soon as a CCP agent has found (or repaired)
a valid plan it enters the execution phase, described
in Alg. 3. First, an action, e, on the first level of the
plan, i. e. one whose preconditions are satisfied in
the current state, is chosen non-deterministically. If
the action is controlled by the CCP agent himself, it
is executed. If not, the planning agent tries to deter-
mine whether the action was executed by its control-
oven: bake pizza
robot: bring bill pizza
position(pizza)=oven
bill: eat pizza
temperature(pizza)=hot
position(pizza)=bill
bill: go home
position(bill)=home
negotiate_plan bill oven
position(bill)=home
negotiate_plan bill robot
position(bill)=home
committed(oven)=true
committed(robot)=true
Figure 3: Bill’s plan for getting pizza.
ling agent. In both cases, the CCP agent will try to
update its knowledge about the world state based on
the expected effects and the actual perceptions made
(FUSE function).
Algorithm 3 EXECUTIONANDSTATEESTIMATION(S, P )
e = choose a first-level event from P
if e =’negotiate plan with agent a’
r = SELECTBESTREQUEST(P, a)
send request(r) to a
else if agt(e) = self then
EXECUTE(e)
S′ = app(S, e)
exp = EXPECTEDPERCEPTIONS(S′, As)
perc = GETSENSORDATA()
if perc ⊇ exp or exp = ∅ then
remove e from P
S = FUSE(S′, perc)
return (S,P)
The most interesting case for this paper is the one
where the action chosen to be executed is negoti-
ate plan. This means that a CCP agent (A) is now in
a situation where he is able communicate with an-
other agent (B) that he intends to collaborate with,
i. e. A’s plan includes at least one action controlled
by B, that B has not yet committed to. In this case, A
will send a request to B. However, if a plan contains
several actions by another agent, i. e. a whole sub-
plan, it is often best not to request execution of the
actions individually, but to ask for the end result or,
respectively, the final action in the subplan. In other
situations it may even be reasonable to request the
achievement of subplans that include more than one
agent. CCP does not stipulate a specific implemen-
tation of SELECTBESTREQUEST; we will describe
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one version in Sect. 5.
When an agent receives a request, Alg. 1 enters
into a new phase. First the request is translated
into a goal formula (Brenner, 2007) and tested for
achievability. This is a simplification for the sake of
processing efficiency, based on the assumption that
what matters to the other agent is not the exact ac-
tion, but its result, i. e. the achievement of a goal
or precondition for a subsequent action by the re-
questing agent. Additionally, constraints on the ar-
guments of requests (e. g. intended referents of nat-
ural language expressions) are easier to model as
goal constraints than as actions (Brenner, 2007). Ac-
cepted requests are adopted as temporary subgoals
(TSGs). This means that they must only be achieved
temporarily and do not have to hold any more when
the agent’s main goal is achieved.
The adoption of requests as TSGs is a crucial ele-
ment of CCP that, to the best of our knowledge, has
not been described in other Continual Planning ap-
proaches: in addition to repeatedly revising their be-
liefs about the world, CCP agents also perform con-
tinual goal revision. In the simplest case, this leads
to information-seeking subdialogues, as in lines 3–5
of Fig. 1. But newly adopted TSGs also explain why
agents engage in subdialogues that mix communica-
tive and physical actions (as in lines 6–9 of the same
example).
4 MAPSIM
Continual Planning approaches can only be tested
in environments where agents can actually execute,
monitor and revise their plans. This is all the
more true for our DCP approach to situated dialogue
where agents need to interact collaboratively. To this
end we have developed MAPSIM, a software en-
vironment that automatically generates multiagent
simulations from MAPL domains. In other words,
MAPSIM interprets the planning domain as an exe-
cutable model of the environment. Thus, MAPSIM
allows designers of DCP algorithms to evaluate their
approaches on various domains with minimal effort.
In this section, we give an overview of MAPSIM
and describe how it is used for generating situated
dialogues.
The MAPL domain description is parsed, ana-
lyzed and turned into perception, action, and com-
munication models for CCP agents. During the sim-
(1) Anne: request R2D2 ’give R2D2 coffee Anne’.
(2) R2D2: accept request ’give R2D2 coffee Anne’.
(3) R2D2: request Anne ’tell val Anne R2D2 pos(coffee)’.
(4) Anne: execute ’tell val Anne R2D2 pos(coffee)’.
(5) R2D2: ack achieved ’tell val Anne R2D2 pos(coffee)’.
(6) ...
Figure 4: The MAPSIM run of Fig. 1 without NL
verbalization.
ulation, MAPSIM maintains and updates the global
world state and it uses the sensor models to com-
pute individual and joint perceptions of agents. The
agents interact with the simulation by sending com-
mands in the form of plain MAPL actions. The
simulator then executes the action, i. e. it checks the
preconditions and applies effects as specified in the
MAPL domain. If the controlling agent of a com-
mand is not identical to the agent who sent it to the
simulator this is interpreted as a request which is not
directly executed but passed on to the corresponding
agent. MAPSIM also accepts specific commands
for acknowledging subgoal acceptance and subgoal
achievement.
Agents do not need to know anything about how
their actions are executed. Thus, they can implement
arbitrary deliberative or reactive methods to deter-
mine their behaviour and their reactions to requests.
We believe that this can make MAPSIM a valuable
evaluation tool even when the DCP and dialogue
strategies investigated differ significantly from CCP.
For example, the simulated dialogues produced by
MAPSIM using different strategies could be evalu-
ated using objective measures such as task success
or dialogue costs from the PARADISE framework
(Walker et al., 1997).
MAPSIM and the CCP agents described in this
paper have been implemented in Python, using state-
of-the-art planning technology as subsolvers.The
generic planner currently used for CCP is a slightly
modified version of Axioms-FF (Thiebaux et al.,
2003). This enables MAPSIM to generate dialogues
between artificial agents very fast.1
The main goal of this work is to show how a
generic multiagent planning algorithm can be used
1For example, during the dialogue of Fig. 1 CCP called the
PLANNER function 13 times with a total planning time less than
half a second on a 1.6 GHz AMD Athlon.
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for situated dialogue in natural language, e. g. in
human-robot interaction (HRI). It is therefore im-
portant to investigate the efforts needed for mapping
between the MAPL-based representation used by
CCP agents and natural language. To that end MAP-
SIM includes a verbalization module, called the re-
porter agent. The reporter observes all physical and
communicative events in the simulation and verbal-
izes them in English. All dialogues shown through-
out the paper are unaltered outputs of the reporter.
Fig. 4 shows the beginning of the MAPSIM run of
Fig. 1 with reporting turned off.
The reporter is a simple template engine that first
determines an appropriate pattern depending on the
command type currently executed, then recursively
replaces templates with concrete arguments until a
template-free sentence is generated. Base values for
arguments are generated directly from analyzing the
MAPL domain. For example, operator names are
assumed to directly correspond to verbs. Standard
templates can be overridden by domain-specific pat-
terns. However, the only general need for this we
have experienced is the definition of verb comple-
ments. For example, the Household domain de-
fines the complement of “move” as “to the $arg0”
where $arg0 is instantiated with the first argument of
the respective command. Apart from verb comple-
ments, the only domain-specific template that was
necessary to generate Fig. 1 states that the inter-
rogative (wh-word) for state variables position(x)
is “where”. While, compared to “real” natural-
language processing systems, this is a simplistic
approach with obvious limits, the minimal effort
needed to achieve fairly realistic surface generation
is noteworthy and will be exploited in future work.
5 Detailed Analysis of MAPSIM runs
This section provides a detailed analysis of several
CCP runs in MAPSIM. It is important to realize that
none of the sample runs in this paper is based on
just one multiagent plan, but on a series of plans,
devised, partly executed and revised several times
according to Alg. 1.
All dialogue in CCP is driven by individual de-
sires, i. e. agents engage in dialogue only if they
need help in satisfying their individual goals. In the
household scenario (Fig. 1) the necessity for collab-
oration stems from the fact that only R2D2 can move
to the kitchen to get coffee, but only Anne can open
the kitchen door. In the pizza scenario (Fig. 2) Bill
needs the collaboration of his intelligent household
appliances to be able to eat pizza.
As we have already seen, Bill’s initial individ-
ual planning process resulted in the multiagent plan
shown in Fig. 3. In this situation, Alg. 3 can only
choose a physical action for Bill to execute, namely
go home. Note that only the execution of this ac-
tion enables Bill to subsequently communicate with
Oven and R2D2 at all. Thus, Bill’s problem can
only be solved by a DCP approach that is able to in-
terleave planning, physical execution and dialogue
whenever necessary.
When at home, Bill can (and must) negoti-
ate his plan with the two other agents he wants
to involve. Alg. 3 uses the black-box function
SELECTBESTREQUEST to determine an appropri-
ate temporary subgoal whose achievement will be
requested from another agent.
The currently used REQUESTSUBPLAN strategy
works as follows: the agent first determines the
longest possible subplan involving only one agent,
then chooses an action on the final level of this plan
as the best request. In other words, a CCP agent
posing a request does not specify details about how
he wants a temporary subgoal to be achieved. In
the household example, Anne thus does not request
R2D2 to go to the kitchen and get the coffee there,
but just requests the last action in her multiagent
plan, namely the robot giving her the coffee.
Admittedly, the straightforward verbalization of
this action by the reporting agent using the verb
“give” results in an unnatural dialogue contribution.
Anne’s request would be more appropriately formu-
lated using “bring”, “fetch” or “get”, which unlike
“give” do not presuppose that R2D2 already has the
coffee. This reveals the need to take more of the
subplan into account when verbalizing the request, a
topic we are taking up in further work.
Anne thus leaves it to R2D2 to find its own so-
lution to achieve the TSG. This “lazy” strategy mir-
rors on the dialogue level the idea of the Continual
Planning approach, where an individual CCP agent
postpones the solution of some subproblems to later
phases in the planning-execution-monitoring cycle.
R2D2’s previous plan was to do nothing (which
satisfied his “empty” goal). After adopting the new
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TSG, this plan is no longer valid and Alg. 2 triggers
a new planning phase. Since R2D2 does not know
where the coffee is this plan includes an appropri-
ate information-gathering action and postpones de-
tailed planning for getting the coffee until this infor-
mation is known (by means of an assertion (Brenner
and Nebel, 2006)). In our example, the information-
gathering action is a request for information to
Anne (cf. line 3 of Fig. 1). This request is generated
as follows: R2D2’s plan contains the action (tell-val
Anne R2D2 pos coffee), i. e. a speech act to be exe-
cuted by Anne. According to Alg. 3, this action to
be performed by another agent (from R2D2’s point
of view) must be requested first. Line 3 of Fig. 4
shows this request when executed without the re-
porter agent. Its verbalization results in R2D2 ask-
ing the question “Where is the coffee, Anne?”.
MAPSIM provides several options for generating
acknowledgments. In the dialogues presented here,
agents provide acknowledgments when they accept
a request (e. g. lines 2 and 7 of Fig. 1) and also when
they realize that a request of theirs has been satisfied
(e. g. lines 5, 9 and 14 of Fig. 1). Note that answers
to questions are acknowledged only briefly, but sat-
isfaction of physical subgoals is acknowledged more
explicitly. While this is not necessarily the best ac-
knowledgment strategy, it shows how the multiagent
plan and the CCP history provide context as well as
focus (Grosz and Sidner, 1986)) that can easily be
exploited for surface generation and, in the future,
also for interpretation (cf. Sect. 7).
For lack of space, we cannot discuss the rest
of the dialogues in detail. Note, however, how
the agents switch seamlessly between communica-
tive and physical actions whenever necessary. Not
shown by the reports are the perceptions made by
the agents during the runs. Nevertheless, they are
important for the dialogue, too, since agents also
reason about their mutual perceptions and thus can
avoid unnecessary verbalizations.
6 Related Work
This work shares many characteristics with previ-
ous approaches modeling dialogue as collaborative
planning, most notably those based on the Shared-
Plans formalism (Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Grosz and
Kraus, 1996; Lochbaum, 1998). SharedPlans use
much more elaborate mental attitudes than MAPL
and CCP, mainly because CCP agents rely on them
only implicitly – until a violation of their assump-
tions prompts plan adaptation or new dialogue. In
this respect, the commitments made by CCP agents
more resemble the joint persistent goals of (Cohen
and Levesque, 1991). Nevertheless, SharedPlans
can be regarded as a “specification” of the kind of
collaboration CCP intends to model computation-
ally.
(Blaylock et al., 2003) note that SharedPlans do
not model the cooperation that occurs during execu-
tion. They propose a high-level model of dialogue as
collaborative problem solving (CPS); our approach
can be regarded as an instantiation of that model.
However, our work complements both SharedPlans
and CPS by describing how knowledge precondi-
tions prompt active sensing and information gather-
ing during situated dialogue.
Distributed Continual Planning has been advo-
cated as a new paradigm for planning in dynamic
multiagent environment (DesJardins et al., 1999).
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first princi-
pled attempt to apply DCP to dialogue planning and
also the first DCP approach describing deliberative
goal revision as part of a DCP algorithm.
Collagen (Rich et al., 2001) is a system for build-
ing collaborative interface agents that is based on
(Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Grosz and Sidner, 1990),
which is domain-independent and has been used for
various applications. Collagen’s methods for rep-
resenting the discourse state and doing plan recog-
nition are much more sophisticated than CCP cur-
rently. However, Collagen does not (yet) include a
first-principles planner, but relies on plan libraries
and domain-specific code plug-ins (Rich and Sidner,
2007). It would be interesting to investigate whether
CCP can be integrated with Collagen.
Similarly, the most prominent representative of
the information-state-update approach to dialogue
modeling, GoDiS (Traum and Larsson, 2003),
has complementary rather than competing main
strengths: GoDiS has a more elaborate repertoire of
dialogue moves and can produce more sophisticated
dialogue behavior than CCP and MAPSIM, but it
uses static plans, and it is not clear how it would
combine communication with physical action.
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7 Conclusion and Outlook
We have presented a new algorithmic framework
in which situated dialogue is modeled as Contin-
ual Collaborative Planning (CCP). We have shown
how mixed-initiative dialogue that interleaves phys-
ical actions, sensing, and communication between
agents occurs naturally during CCP. As a practical
contribution, we have developed MAPSIM, a soft-
ware tool that automatically generates multiagent
simulations from formal planning domains, thus per-
mitting the evaluation of CCP and other dialogue
strategies on a wide range of applications.
The questions raised in the introduction about
when and why agents switch between planning, act-
ing, and execution have, intuitively, been answered
as follows by CCP: Agents (re)start planning as soon
as their plan becomes obsolete, possibly not be-
cause the world, but because their goals changed.
They act whenever they have a valid plan contain-
ing executable physical actions. And they engage
in dialogue whenever they want others to share sub-
goals or are requested to do this themselves. Since
situated communication may have (physical) pre-
conditions that must be satisfied first (e. g. being
in the same room, having the other agent’s atten-
tion/engagement, etc.) CCP explains how the need
for dialogue may also trigger additional planning
and acting.
From simulation to human-robot interaction
The work presented in this paper provides a starting
point for developing agents, e. g. robots, that can en-
gage in situated dialogue with humans. Indeed, we
are currently implementing CCP on a robotic system
in the CoSy project. To that end, we are extending
our approach in the following respects: (1) To allow
for imperfect communication, we need to improve
the handling of acknowledgments to include posi-
tive as well as negative feedback and clarifications.
(2) To support the full range of plan-negotiation be-
tween dialogue participants, we need to allow agents
to reject requests and accept rejections from others.
This will enable us to handle situations with, e. g.,
conflicting goals, discrepancies in beliefs and exe-
cution failures.
Doing this amounts to refining and extending the
repertoire of speech acts. Since the planning tech-
nology underlying CCP is known to scale very well
(Thiebaux et al., 2003), we expect our dialogue ap-
proach to also scale up well to a larger repertoire of
speech acts, more complex interactions and higher
numbers of interacting parties.
We are also investigating how to better expose the
purpose that an individual dialogue move serves in
achieving an agent’s overall goals, e. g. by deriving
an explicit dialogue plan during CCP. Such a plan, in
combination with the current state of the CCP pro-
cess, will provide rich context information to the lin-
guistic components of our robot, e. g. for the task of
utterance interpretation and contextually appropriate
surface generation.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to use insights
from the theory of accommodation to
study in a uniform way different kinds of
acts involved in situated dialogue. When
interlocutors are engaged in situated di-
alogue, their informational states evolve
through dialogue acts, physical acts and
sensing acts. We model this evolution in a
non-traditional conversational system us-
ing tools from mature branches of artificial
intelligence. In particular, we use a plan-
ner that is able to find plans in the pres-
ence of incomplete knowledge and sens-
ing: PKS (Petrick and Bacchus, 2002).
In the resulting model, we study the in-
teractions among dialogue acts, physical
acts and sensing acts, and their relation-
ship with accommodation.
1 Introduction
The phenomena of accommodation has been
widely studied from philosophical and linguis-
tic perspectives, ranging from classical pa-
pers like (Lewis, 1979) to recent contributions
like (Beaver and Zeevat, 2007). We view accom-
modation theory as a schema in which to study, in
a uniform way, the different kinds of acts that oc-
cur in situated dialogue. We not only believe that
such an approach can help us obtain better models
of dialogue, but also that dialogue is an essential
setting in which to test such theories, theories that
are too frequently divorced from the commonest
setting of language use: situated conversation.
When interlocutors are engaged in situated di-
alogue, it is evident that their informational states
evolve as a result of the dialogue acts performed
during the task, and through the physical acts that
interlocutors perform on their environment. But
their states are also updated with the information
that the participants sense from their environment;
embedded agents do not have complete informa-
tion about the world but they can sense it.
The approach presented here uses insights (and
tools) from mature branches of artificial intelli-
gence, such as planning with incomplete knowl-
edge and sensing, in order to build a model for
non-traditional conversational systems. In gen-
eral, traditional conversational systems assume
that conversational partners share common goals
and collaborate in order to perform the task at hand
as efficiently as possible. Our setup explores a
case where conversational partners do not share a
common goal and they are not as cooperative as
partners involved in task-oriented dialogue. Our
setup is a text-adventure game, where one of the
participants is the player and the other participant
is the game. The game has all the information
needed to solve the game task but this is not its
goal; its goal is to make the interaction engaging
and challenging, encouraging the player to explore
and discover the game world.
This work is part of a larger project on reconcil-
ing linguistic reasoning and collaborative reason-
ing in conversation (Benotti, 2007; Benotti, 2008).
We advance this program here by adding to our
model the treatment of sensing actions. To this
end, we have integrated in a conversational system
a planner that is able to find plans in the presence
of incomplete knowledge and sensing: PKS (Pet-
rick and Bacchus, 2002). In the resulting model,
we study the interactions among dialogue acts,
physical acts and sensing acts. We believe that
this issue relates in relevant ways with the theo-
retical question: “In which contexts can sentences
that have particular implicatures felicitously oc-
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cur?” Following (Beaver, 1994) we believe this
to be a better formulation of the problem of ac-
commodation than the traditional question: “What
inferences do people draw from sentences?”
2 Accommodating when talking, acting
and sensing: everyday examples
Accommodation and grounding of dialogue and
physical acts are topics that have been widely stud-
ied. But the study of accommodation and ground-
ing of sensing acts is also essential when agents
are embedded. Moreover, even when interlocu-
tors are co-situated, sensing acts are usually less
evident than physical and dialogue acts. Hence,
an important question to study is “When is the
common ground of the dialogue updated with the
sensed information?” Or in other words, “When is
there in the state of the activity enough evidence
that a piece of information has been sensed?”
Let us address these questions with an example:
In kindergarden, the teacher showed a green
square to a boy and, offering a piece of paper, told
him: “Paint a circle that has this same color”.
This simple example illustrates the interaction
of a dialogue act performed by the teacher (re-
quest) with a sensing action (sense color) and a
physical action (paint) that the teacher expects
from the boy. When giving this instruction the
teacher relied on the ability of the boy to sense
the colors, but the sensing action is left tacit in the
teacher request. She could have make it explicit
saying “Look at the color of the square and paint
a circle that has the same color”. However in con-
versation, sensing actions are more naturally left
tacit than made explicit. Why? Because they are
so natural for sensing agents (indeed, sometimes
they are unavoidable) that it is extremely easy to
take them for granted.
Now we are going to look at this example as an
instance of the general rule of accommodation in-
troduced by Lewis in the article in which he coins
the word accommodation:
If at time t something is said that requires compo-
nent sn of conversational score to have a value
in the range r if what is said is to be true, or
otherwise acceptable; and if sn does not have a
value in the range r just before t; and if such and
such further conditions hold; then at t the score-
component sn takes some value in the range r.
(Lewis, 1979, p.347)
This rule will help us perform a detailed analy-
sis of our example in order to address the questions
raised in the beginning of this section. Bearing this
schema in mind, let us analyze step by step the dif-
ferent values that the variables of the rule take for
our simple example. First of all, what’s t? This is
what Stalnaker has to say here:
The prior context that is relevant to the interpreta-
tion of a speech act is the context as it is changed
by the fact that the speech act was made, but prior
to the acceptance or rejection of the speech act.
(Stalnaker, 1998, p.8)
So in our example t is the time right after the
teacher said “Paint a circle that has this same
color” but before the acceptance or rejection of
this request.
Now, let us determine what the relevant compo-
nents sn are. Suppose that the boy is color blind
and the teacher knows it. Then her request does
not make much sense and any side participant and
the boy himself will start asking what the goal of
the request is, because clearly it cannot be the lit-
eral one: to obtain a green circle. Therefore, the
color referred to by the teacher is the s1 of our
example. And if what the teacher said is to be ac-
ceptable, s1 is required to have a particular value
r1; the same color than the square has in the real
world (or in fact, a representation of it). Further-
more, there is no evidence that s1 already has the
value r1 before the teacher began to speak (that
is, there is no evidence that the color has been un-
der discussion before), so we can assume that it
doesn’t.
Now, what are the further conditions that need
to hold so that, at t, the score-component s1 takes
some value r1? The teacher and the boy both know
(at least intuitively) that people can sense their en-
vironment, that members of the same culture usu-
ally assign the same name to the same parts of
the spectrum of colors, that humans can remember
facts that they sense, that the sensed object is ac-
cessible, that a person will actually sense the color
of an object if he is required to know this fact; the
teacher and the boy rely on these and many other
things that are usually taken for granted. All this
knowledge is necessary for the boy to come up
with the right sequence of actions in order to re-
spond to the teacher’s request; that is, in order to
sense the color of the square and paint the circle.
Following Lewis, we would finish our instanti-
ation of the rule of accommodation with the fact
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that at the time t the score-component s1 takes
value r1. Two last comments are in order here.
First, it is worth pointing out that at the moment
t the request has not yet been accepted or rejected
but the addressee has already taken it in and ad-
justed himself to the fact that the dialogue act has
been performed. The acceptance or rejection can
be seen as a second change to the conversational
record that ocurrs after the rule of accommoda-
tion applies. It’s very important to distinguish be-
tween these two changes. Why? Because even if
the request is rejected, the update of the conver-
sational record that resulted from the accommoda-
tion may remain. Even if the boy answers “I don’t
like green. I won’t do it”, we know that the boy
sensed the color of the square.
Second, how does the score-component s1 takes
value r1? This is a question that is not directly ad-
dressed by Lewis but he seems to suggest is that s1
takes value r1 and nothing else changes. However,
we agree with (Thomason et al., 2006; Hobbs et
al., 1993; Kreutel and Matheson, 2003) that what
is accommodated in order for s1 to take value r1
could be much more than just this fact. If we
claimed that only s1 changes, how can we explain
the fact that the boy may take off a blindfold (he
was playing “Blind man’s bluff”) after hearing the
teacher? The required updates can also have their
requirements (or preconditions) and side-effects,
and we think that a natural way to model the ac-
commodation updates is through tacit acts.
We adhere then to the view that explains
Lewis’ broad notion of accommodation (not lim-
ited to classical cases of presupposition accom-
modation) as tacit acts. Physical acts can be left
tacit (Benotti, 2007), dialogue acts can be left
tacit (Kreutel and Matheson, 2003; Thomason et
al., 2006), but also sensing acts can be left tacit
(this paper, Section 4). This is not a new idea then,
but it’s a promising approach and needs to be fur-
ther developed.
The analysis of our example so far has given us
some insight on the questions that were raised in
the beginning of this section. We have seen that
tacit sensing can be grounded even if the dialogue
act that required the sensing is directly rejected
(the “boy doesn’t like green” example). And it can
also be the case that the tacit sensing is grounded
even if it cannot be directly executed because, for
instance, it requires the execution of some physi-
cal act first (the “Blind man’s bluff” example). The
interactions among sensing acts, dialogue acts and
physical acts can be extremely subtle; modelling
them (putting sensing, physical and dialogue acts
in a common schema) and, in particular making
explicit the information at play, is the topic of the
rest of this paper.
But first, let us have a look at a few more ev-
eryday examples; the aim of these instances is to
show how frequent and pervasive are the interac-
tions among different kinds of acts.
2.1 Tacit sensing and referring
If referring is treated as a dialogue act on its own,
as many current dialogue systems do (DeVault and
Stone, 2006), then the interaction between tacit
physical action, tacit sensing action and referring
acts need to be controlled. Consider this example:
Suppose that you are told that the hidden treasure
you are seeking is behind the blue door. Painting
a door blue does not satisfy the goal of finding the
blue door — it merely obscures the entity of the
appropriate door. (Etzioni et al., 1992, p.116)
This is an example of the incorrect interpreta-
tion (painting a door blue) that a conversational
system can assign to a command when the system
does not have complete information about the en-
vironment and has no restrictions on the order in
which it can execute actions.
A first conclusion given this observation would
be that only sensing actions (and not physical ac-
tions) should be allowed before referring actions
are resolved. However, it might be the case, for ex-
ample, that the blue door is in a different room, so
the physical action of moving should be allowed
before resolving the reference. A more refined ap-
proach would be then to leave the relevant prop-
erties of the definite description unchanged until
the referred object is found. Current off-the-shelf
planners provide ways in which to represent prop-
erties that must not change (usually called hands-
off properties). Using this it is possible to model
the fact that searching for a blue door is legitimate,
whereas painting some door blue is not.
2.2 Tacit grounding and sensing
During dialogue, grounding acts are frequently
left tacit. Consider the following example:
A[1]: Helen did not come to the party.
B[2]: How do you know that?
A[3]: Her car wasn’t there.
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B[4]: She could have come by bicycle.
(Kreutel and Matheson, 2003, p.6)
In this example, [4] tacitly grounds the asser-
tion [3] (Helen’s car wasn’t there) but [4] also re-
jects the fact that [3] is a reason for [1]. In other
words, [4] performs two dialogue acts that can be
made explicit with “[4’]: Ok, her car wasn’t there.
She could have come by bicycle”. Notice that [4]
cannot tacitly reject the assertion [3], something
is wrong with: “??I saw her car there. She could
have come by bicycle”.
Sensing actions offer a whole new world for
tacit grounding in situated interaction. After giv-
ing an instruction, for example, just sensing the
results of the required acts is often the best way
to know whether the addressee understood (and
hence, grounded) the instruction. If you tell your
daughter “Turn off the light of your room” and,
when you come back, the light is off then you are
pretty sure that she heard you.
2.3 Sensing and tacit exogenous events
Unobserved exogenous events can change the
value of properties that have already been sensed.
So we may well be faced with the treatment of
not only incomplete but also incorrect informa-
tion. But if we assume that the state of the world
evolves via the effects of actions and events, then
there is a intuitive approach for updating sensed
values. Whenever a sensed property needs to be
updated in order to make sense of the evolution
of the interaction, a tacit exogenous event that up-
dates this property can be inferred. In the follow-
ing example, Andrew might have sensed that the
contents of the pot were raw, but after a while he
observe Bess’s actions and update his knowledge.
Perhaps only Bess will see when the contents of
her boiling pot have cooked. Andrew might still
infer that this event has taken place from observing
Bess’s actions — say, by watching Bess turn off
the heat or empty the pot. (Thomason et al., 2006,
p.16)
In this three subsections we have shown every-
day examples of the interaction of sensing acts,
physical acts and dialogue acts. But these are only
the tip of the iceberg. We believe that research on
such interactions will be fundamental to deepen-
ing our understanding of situated dialogue. But
how can we model these interactions? This is the
topic of the next two sections.
3 A technical framework for tacit sensing
In this section we will introduce the two systems
used to implement the ideas discussed in the pre-
vious section. We first briefly present our conver-
sational application (the text adventure game), and
then describe the main features of the planner that
we use for our formalization and case-studies.
3.1 Situated interaction in a text-adventure
We have implemented a text-adventure game
which can interpret commands that require tacit
sensing. In this game-engine, the player can be
embedded in different simulated game environ-
ments. The player can issue natural language re-
quests to the game in order to manipulate and
change the game environment. She can request
to sense the game objects through special actions
such as read; or directly perceive the environment
(for example, every time the player enters a new
room the game describes it). The situated per-
spective, and the answers generated by the game
as a result of the player requests, allow the player
to discover the rules by which her environment
is governed and to extend her knowledge accord-
ingly.
A game scenario is represented by several in-
formational components: a database that specifies
STRIPS-like actions (Fikes et al., 1972), a gram-
mar, a lexicon, and two description logic knowl-
edge bases (Baader et al., 2003) that share a set of
definitions (one knowledge base models the player
knowledge and the other the game scenario). The
natural language processing module receives the
player command and outputs a flat semantic repre-
sentation that is used by the action handling mod-
ule to modify the game scenario. The natural
language generation module verbalizes the results
of the player actions. (Benotti, 2007) describes
how classical planning capabilities can be inte-
grated into the architecture of the game-engine.
Such planning abilities allow the game to infer
physical actions left tacit by the player using the
off-the-shelf planner Blackbox (Kautz and Sel-
man, 1999). Blackbox implements classical plan-
ning techniques and assumes complete knowledge
about the planning domain. In this paper, the plan-
ner PKS (Planning with Knowledge and Sensing)
is used in order to investigate the case in which
sensing actions are tacit.
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3.2 Planning with knowledge and sensing
PKS (Petrick and Bacchus, 2002) is a knowledge-
based planner that is able to construct conditional
plans in the presence of incomplete knowledge.
PKS builds plans by reasoning about the effects of
actions on an agent’s knowledge state, as opposed
to other approaches based on possible-world rea-
soning. By reasoning at the knowledge level,
PKS can avoid some of the irrelevant distinctions
that occur at the world level, improving efficiency
and producing natural plans. The PKS specifica-
tion language offers features such as functions and
variables, allowing it to solve problems that can
be difficult for traditional planners (and making it
ideal for non-traditional dialogue systems).
PKS is based on a generalization of STRIPS. In
STRIPS, the world state is modelled by a single
database. In PKS, the planners knowledge state,
rather than the world state, is represented by a
tuple 〈Kf ,Kw,Kv,Kx〉 of databases whose con-
tents have a fixed, formal interpretation in epis-
temic logic. Actions are specified as updates
to these databases using the knowledge primi-
tives know fact which modifies the database Kf ,
know value which modifies the database Kv, know
whether which modifies the database Kw, and
know which which modifies the database Kx.
We briefly describe these four databases here.
Kf is like a standard STRIPS database except that
both positive and negative facts are stored and
the closed world assumption does not apply. Kv
stores information about function values that will
become known at execution time, such as the plan-
time effects of sensing actions that return numeric
values. Kw models the plan-time effects of bi-
nary sensing actions that sense the truth value of a
proposition. Kx models the agent’s exclusive dis-
junctive knowledge of literals (that is, the agent
knows that exactly one literal from a set is true).
PKS performance has been tested for the com-
position of web services with promising re-
sults (Martinez and Lesperance, 2004). More-
over, in the prototype we have implemented us-
ing PKS inside our text-adventure game, PKS re-
sponse time was acceptable (less than 2 seconds)
for the kind of planning problems that the text ad-
venture typically gives rise to. We tested it using
the breadth first search strategy, rather than depth
first because we require optimal length plans.
4 Tacit sensing: 2 case-studies
In this section we are going to explain in detail
how a command issued by the player that includes
tacit sensing actions is interpreted using PKS, and
then executed by the game. We first classify sens-
ing actions as either disjunctive or existential. We
then present a case-study of disjunctive knowledge
that makes use of conditional plans. Finally, we
describe a case-study of existential knowledge that
makes use of parametric plans.
4.1 Incomplete knowledge and sensing
There are two sorts of sensing actions, correspond-
ing to the two ways an agent can gather informa-
tion about the world at run-time. On the one hand,
a sensing action can observe the truth value of a
proposition P (c), resulting in a conditional plan.
The kind of incomplete knowledge sensed by this
kind of action can be described as binary because
it represents the fact that the agent knows which
of the two disjuncts in P (c) ∨ ¬P (c) is true. In
PKS, binary sensing actions are those that mod-
ify the Kw knowledge base. On the other hand,
a sensing action can identify an object that has a
particular property, resulting in a plan that con-
tains run-time variables. The kind of incomplete
knowledge sensed by these kind of action can be
described as existential because it represents the
fact that the agent knows a witness for ∃x.P (x).
In PKS, existential sensing actions are those that
modify the Kv database.
We will now explain in detail how these two
kinds of sensing actions can be left tacit by the
player in our text-adventure game.
We said that our model can handle incomplete
knowledge about the interaction in which a di-
alogue is situated. But how incomplete is the
knowledge the model can handle? There are sev-
eral levels at which knowledge can be incomplete.
The most studied scenario is one in which not all
the properties and relations of the objects involved
in the task are known, but the set of objects is fi-
nite and all objects are named (that is all objects
are associated with a constant). If this simplifying
assumption is made, existential and disjunctive in-
complete knowledge collapse; one can be defined
in terms of the other. If all objects are named, the
fact that there exists an object that satisfies a par-
ticular property can be expressed as the disjunc-
tion of that property applied to all the objects in
the domain. However, we cannot make this sim-
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plifying assumption because we are dealing with
an environment where not all objects are known
at plan time. Thus we not only need to study the
use of disjunctive plans, we also need plans with
run-time variables.
4.2 Tacit actions in conditional plans
We are going to analyze commands issued by the
player that involve the execution of binary sensing
actions that result in conditional plans.
In order to motivate conditional plans, let us
consider an example. Suppose that the player is
in a room with a locked door. She is looking
around searching for a way to open the door, when
the game says that there are two keys (one silver
and one golden) lying on a table in front of her.
Then she inputs the command “Open the door”.
Correctly executing this command in the state of
the game described amounts to executing the fol-
lowing conditional plan. The plan involves taking
both keys, trying the silver one in the door, and (if
it fits) unlocking and opening the door; otherwise
the golden key is used.
<init>
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
trykey(silver_key,door)
<branch,fits_in(silver_key,door)>
<k+>:
unlock(door,silver_key)
open(door)
<k->:
unlock(door,golden_key)
open(door)
But should the game execute this plan for the
player? There is no definitive answer to this ques-
tion unless we refine it further; we need to con-
sider what the goal of such a text-adventure game
is. For a start, it certainly shares a number of sim-
ilarities with task-oriented dialogue systems (such
as (Ferguson et al., 1996)). In particular, like
task-oriented dialogue systems, our text-adventure
has knowledge of the task; it models the steps in-
volved in the task and how to talk about them. But
task-oriented dialogue systems typically strive to
solve the task as efficiently as possible, even if this
leads to unnatural dialogue. On the other hand,
for games (and indeed for tutoring systems too)
efficiency in task performance and brevity is not
necessarily an advantage; the longer the interac-
tion the greater the opportunity of having a useful
interactive experience (and more opportunity for
learning). If we take this perspective, then a nat-
ural answer to our question would be: the game
should not open the door for the player; rather it
must force the player to perform all the steps on
her own so that she will learn the task.
However, in order for a game to be engaging it
cannot force the player to do repetitive tasks over
and over again. In games, rules are not stated in
advance; games require the skills of rule discovery
through observation, trial and error, and hypothe-
sis testing. Figuring out the rules governing the
behavior of a dynamic representation is basically
the cognitive process of inductive discovery, and
this is challenging and motivating. But once a rule
is learned, the player will no longer find it motivat-
ing to automatically apply it again and again. How
to best use facts and rules that the player learned
is an issue that needs to be carefully considered
when deciding how a system should behave.
So, what’s the answer to our question? What
should the game do? Or in more general terms,
when can this command (which gives rise to par-
ticular implicatures) felicitously occur? This de-
pends on what has already happened in the game.
Has the player already been through enough expe-
riences to have the knowledge that is necessary in
order to “open the door”? If yes, don’t force the
player to repeat the boring steps.
But how can we represent the knowledge that
is necessary in order to find the conditional plan
involved by this command, in order to leave the
necessary actions tacit? To illustrate our explana-
tion, let us go back to the concrete input “Open the
door” and its conditional plan and analyze how it
is handled by the system. The sensing action in-
volved in the conditional plan is trykey defined
in PKS as follows:
<action name="trykey">
<params>?x, ?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(accessible(?x)) ˆ
Kf(locked(?x)) ˆ
Kf(key(?y)) ˆ
Kf(inventory_object(?y))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kw, fits_in(?y,?x));
</effects>
</action>
Intuitively, after executing the action
trykey(?x,?y) the agent knows whether a
particular key ?x fits in a locked object ?y or not.
Is this knowledge enough to find the conditional
plan above? No, because it could be the case that
none of the two keys fit into the door. If this is
a possibility, then the conditional plan may not
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achieve the goal Kf(open(door)). In order to rule
out this possibility the following facts have to the
added to the initial state of the planning problem:
add(Kx, fits_in(k1,c1)|fits_in(k2,c1))
Given this information, PKS is able to come up
with the conditional plan above.
In its current version, PKS only returns disjunc-
tive plans that will always be successful given the
specification of the planning problem. It doesn’t
matter what the actual configuration of the world
is, PKS guaranties that there will be a branch in
the plan that achieves the goal. If this cannot be
achieved then PKS will say that there is no plan.
However, it might be the case that there is some
conditional plan that is successful for most but not
all configurations of the world. It would be inter-
esting to have a planner that could provide plans
for these cases, even when some of the branches
will not achieve the goal.
Implementation details
Conditional plans are executed by decomposing
them in disjunctive plans. For example, the con-
ditional plan shown above can be decomposed in
two disjunctive plans, namely:
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
unlock(door,silver_key)
open(door)
and
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
unlock(door,golden_key)
open(door)
These two disjunctive plans can be directly in-
serted in the game flow. In the game, the seman-
tic representation of a command is in disjunctive
normal form (that is, it is a disjunction of conjunc-
tion of actions). Each disjunct corresponds to a
different reading of the command, hence a com-
mand’s semantic representation will contain more
than one disjunct if the command is ambiguous.
Here, each branch of the plan can be reinserted
into the game flow as a disjunct in the semantic
representation of the command. Only one of the
branches will be successfully executed since the
sensed information is known to be exclusive (only
one of the keys fits).
4.3 Run-time variables in tacit actions
In this section we are going to analyze commands
issued by the player that involve the execution
of existential sensing actions. Existential sensing
actions result in parametric plans, that is, plans
that include actions with run-time variables, val-
ues that will only be known at run time.
In order to motivate parametric plans, let us con-
sider an example in a multiplayer game scenario.
There is a player called Beatrix who has found a
room with a panel where the location of all other
players can be checked. Beatrix knows that in this
game scenario, a player can drive herself to any
other location if she knows the destination, and
that in order to kill someone you have to be in
the same place. Beatrix wants Bill dead and so
she utters the command “Kill Bill”. How do we
have to represent this information so that the plan-
ner will be able to come up with a successful plan?
The goal of the command can be represented with
Kf(dead(bill)) and the information about how
the game world works that is already available to
Beatrix can be represented with the following ac-
tion schemas:
<action name="checklocation">
<params>?x</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kv, haslocation(?x));
</effects>
</action>
<action name="drive">
<params>?x,?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x)) ˆ
Kv(?y) ˆ
Kf(haslocation(?x)!=?y)
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kf, haslocation(?x)=?y);
</effects>
</action>
<action name="kill">
<params>?x, ?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x)) ˆ
Kf(player(?y)) ˆ
Kf(haslocation(?x)=haslocation(?y))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kf, dead(?y));
</effects>
</action>
With this information and a factual representa-
tion of the initial state the planner should return
the following parametric plan. The plan involves
checking Bill’s location in the panel, driving to
that location and killing Bill. The plan is not fully
instantiated, as the actual location of Bill will only
become known when the command is executed.
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checklocation(bill)
drive(beatrix,haslocation(bill))
kill(beatrix,bill)
When the action drive is actually executed in
the game, Bill’s location can be obtained from
the player knowledge base because the action
checklocation will already have been executed.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied Lewis’s broad notion of
accommodation as a natural schema for treating
tacit dialogue acts, tacit physical acts and tacit
sensing acts in a uniform way, and we analyzed ex-
amples of the interaction among these three types
of acts. In particular, we looked at sensing acts and
two widely studied dialogue acts: grounding and
referring. We also investigated phenomena usu-
ally studied in collaborative models of reasoning,
such as exogenous events, using this same schema.
Following this agenda, our final aim is to reconcile
linguistic reasoning and collaborative reasoning in
situated conversation.
We then turn to the question of how to model
these interactions. For this purpose we integrated
the planner PKS in a text-adventure game. PKS
is a knowledge-based planner that is able to con-
struct conditional and parametric plans. Such
planning abilities allow the game to infer phys-
ical and sensing actions left tacit by the player.
We believe that the non-traditional setup offered
by the game is particularly suited to the study of
the differences between collaborative task solving
and other (less collaborative) types of interaction.
The work presented in this paper is in its early
stages, and it is crucial to carry out an empirical
test of our claims. But we believe that we have
started to define a path which is worth following
for two main reasons. On the theoretical side, we
believe that the use of different kinds of tacit ac-
tions is omnipresent in human interaction and will
help generalize the theory of accommodation. On
the practical side, sensing actions are an essential
component if we want to build situated dialogue
systems that are able to interact in a realistic way.
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Abstract
We can only share information because of how much 
we share already. Conversation is supported by the 
common ground between us, such as the beliefs and 
the visual context that we have in common. It has 
been shown that both of these components determine 
how we communicate, yet it is not clear how they 
interact. In a new paradigm, we separated the fact 
that a visual scene was shared or not and the belief 
that a visual scene was shared or not. We quantified 
the effects of these factors upon joint attention by 
measuring the coordination between conversants’ eye 
movements. Participants had a conversation about a 
controversial topic, such as the Iraq war. The 
discussion was first framed by four short videos of 
actors espousing tendentious views. Participants 
discussed their own views while they looked at either 
a blank screen or pictures of the four actors. Each 
believed (correctly or not) that their partner was 
either looking at a blank screen or the same images. 
We found that both the presence of the visual scene 
and beliefs about its presence for another influenced 
participants’ discussion and the coordination of their 
joint attention.
Introduction
“Can you pass me the thingy for the whatsit?” 
Penny asked John. It is hard to imagine a more 
vacuous sentence. Yet to John, it was a precise 
instruction. He replied, “Not too much”. The 
content of this communication came not from 
the words spoken as much as the rich body of 
knowledge that John and Penny shared. This is 
termed their common ground (Clark, 1996). A 
conversation that morning (about the guests 
coming to dinner), specific knowledge that they 
shared (concerning one guest’s tastes) and their 
current visual context (Penny standing in front 
of the stove and John in front of a particular 
drawer) restricted her reference to a tool that 
was within John’s reach that would allow Penny 
to crush some garlic into a casserole, although 
not too much.
In this paper, we examine one aspect of 
common ground: the shared visual context. 
What role does this information play in the 
production and comprehension of spontaneous 
dialog? Would Penny have spoken the same 
oblique phrase, and would John have 
understood it, if he had been facing the other 
way? Clark and Marshall (1981) argued that we 
interpret ambiguous references using the co-
presence heuristic. Only items seen by both 
conversants are considered as possible referents. 
This claim has been tested in various ‘reference 
game’ studies with mixed results. A speaker 
refers to an object which is in one or both of the 
participants’ sight, and as a consequence there 
are sometimes changes in the listener’s eye 
movements (Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 
2003) and the speaker’s manner of reference 
(Haywood, Pickering & Branigan, 2005), and 
sometimes not (Keysar, Barr & Brauner, 2000; 
Horton & Keysar, 1996).  Language does more 
than lead people to objects, however. It can 
describe people, ideas and opinions that are 
abstract or simply absent (Spivey & Richardson, 
in press). In contrast to reference game studies 
that have a speaker, a listener and a reference to 
an object, our experiment examined the role of 
visual context when two people have an 
extended conversation. The situation was 
analogous to John and Penny discussing the 
political views of their dinner guests for that 
evening, while looking at the meal they are to 
serve. Objects in the shared visual scene were 
not the content the utterances, but, in a more 
germane sense, provided a visual context for the 
discussion. Whether or not conversants chose to 
incorporate this shared visual information 
becomes a more interesting question, since the 
constraints of a referencing task do not demand 
that they do so.
There are two ways that visual context 
could play a part in a conversation (Keysar 
1997). First, it provides information. The sight 
of certain objects or people may relieve the 
burden of memory or lexical access for a 
speaker, and help disambiguate language sounds 
or structure for a listener. Certainly, in speech 
production (Griffin & Bock, 2000; Meyer, 
Sleiderink, & Levelt, 1998) and comprehension 
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(Cooper, 1974; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 
2003; Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006; Richardson 
& Matlock, 2007; Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995) eye 
movements to a visual scene are closely linked, 
moment by moment, to linguistic processes. 
Second, if a conversant believes that her 
conversational partner can see certain things, 
then she can interpret utterances in relation to 
the common ground, and make remarks relying 
on the fact that this information will be 
available to help her listener. Beliefs about 
shared knowledge influence speech. Speakers 
change their descriptions of locations in New 
York (Isaacs & Clark, 1987) or famous faces 
(Fussell & Kraus, 1992) depending upon their 
estimation of how much relevant knowledge the 
listener might have.  But what of beliefs about 
shared visual context? 
All reference game studies of visual 
common ground and conversation have 
confounded the belief that visual information is 
shared with the fact of it being shared. Our 
experiment separated these factors for the first 
time. A visual image was either present or 
absent for both conversants, and both believed 
that it was either present or absent for their 
partner.  We hypothesized that both the presence 
of the visual context for an individual and the 
belief in its presence for another would 
influence their conversation. We captured the 
success of this joint activity by measuring the 
coordination between conversants’ eye 
movements as they talked and looked at a 
shared display.
Gaze coordination and conversation
The temporal dynamics of gaze coordination are 
intertwined with discourse.  In the first 
quantification of gaze coordination, Richardson 
and Dale (2005) recorded the eye movements of 
speakers talking spontaneously about a TV 
show while looking at pictures of its cast 
members. These speeches were played back to 
listeners who were looking at the same display. 
Cross-recurrence analysis (Zbilut, Giuliani, & 
Webber, 1998), measured the degree to which 
speaker and listener’s eye positions overlapped 
at successive time lags (see below for an 
explanation). From the moment a speaker 
looked at a picture, and for the following six 
seconds, a listener was more likely than chance 
to be looking at that same picture. The overlap 
between speaker and listener eye movements 
peaked at about 2000ms. In other words, two 
seconds after the speaker looked at a cast 
member, the listener was most likely to be 
looking at there too.  The same eye movement 
coupling when two participants had a live 
spontaneous dialog and looked at the same 
images (Richardson, Dale & Kirkham, 2007). 
On this occasion, gaze recurrence peaked at 
0ms, presumably representing the average of 
each conversant acting as speaker and then 
listener. This coordination was achieved in 
virtue of the knowledge conversants shared. 
Gaze recurrence was increased when 
conversants heard the same (rather than 
different) encyclopedia passages about Salvador 
Dali prior to discussing one of his paintings. 
Closer gaze recurrence appears to facilitate 
communication. When pictures in a display 
flashed in time with the speakers’ fixations, it 
caused listeners’ eye movements to follow the 
speakers’ more closely. Consequently, listeners 
answered comprehension questions faster than 
those who had seen a randomized sequence of 
flashes (Richardson & Dale, 2005). Since gaze 
recurrence is causally connected to what 
conversants know and remember, we predicted 
that it would reveal effects of what they see and 
what they believe each other can see.
Visual context for self and for others
Our conversants watched four actors give their 
views on a contentious topic and then discussed 
the topic between themselves. We manipulated 
two factors. First, the actors could either be 
present on the screen for each conversant, or 
absent, replaced by an empty two by two grid. 
We termed this as the visual context for self. 
Second, each participant was told prior to the 
discussion that the actors were either present or 
absent on the screen of their conversational 
partner. We termed this the visual context 
believed for other. We refer to the combinations 
of these conditions by stating the visual context 
for self followed by believed for other. For 
example, present - absent refers to the condition 
in which both participants could see a visual 
scene, but believed that their partner could not. 
To be clear: the two conversants were in a 
symmetrical situation, always looking at the 
same thing as each other and always believing 
the same thing as each other. 
Conversants had beliefs that were factually 
incorrect in the present-absent and absent-
present conditions. We inculcated these beliefs 
by a slight deception. At the start of each 
conversation, both participants read the words 
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‘You are participant B’. They were then shown, 
for example, a blank screen and told, 
‘Participant A is looking at a blank screen. 
Participant B should still be looking at the 
pictures. Please say, ‘yes’ if this is true’. Both 
participants, seeing a blank screen and believing 
themselves to be participant B, said ‘yes’. They 
also heard each other saying yes, and interpreted 
this as their partner, participant A, confirming 
that looked at a blank screen.
Our first, straightforward prediction was 
that the presence of a visual context for self 
would increase gaze recurrence, since during 
speech production and comprehension relevant 
visual objects are fixated.  We did expect some 
recurrence between gaze patterns even when the 
screen was empty, however. During language 
comprehension and memory tasks, empty 
locations of a screen can be systematically 
fixated when a reference is made to items or 
events that were previously there (Altmann, 
2004; Hoover & Richardson, in press; 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Richardson & 
Kirkham, 2004; Spivey & Geng, 2001).  The 
more contentious question is what will be the 
effect of the visual context that is believed for 
others. We put forward three possibilities: (1) 
visual context is ignored, and so there will be no 
effect of beliefs about it, (2) visual context is 
exploited, and so the belief that more of it is 
shared will increase gaze coordination (3) visual 
context is compensated for, and so the belief 
that it differs between conversants will increase 
gaze coordination. These possibilities are not 
exhaustive, but there is support for each in the 
literature.
(1)  Ignoring visual context. Listeners can 
seem strikingly egocentric. They ignore, in the 
first instance at least, the fact that a speaker’s 
visual perspective differs from their own 
(Keysar, Barr & Horton, 1998). In a reference 
game, an array of objects was placed between 
the participant and a confederate (Keysar, et al, 
2000). Some of the objects were occluded so 
that only the participant could see them. For 
example, the participant could see three candles 
of different sizes, but the confederate could only 
see the larger two. When the participants were 
asked for ‘the smallest candle’, they were more 
likely to look at the very smallest candle. Since 
it could not be seen by the confederate, it could 
not have been the intended referent. Therefore, 
mutual knowledge is a non-existent or partial 
constraint upon speech comprehension. In our 
case, conversants are not even directing each 
other to pick up objects but discussing current 
affairs. The prediction from these results is that 
when we manipulate the visual context that is 
believed for others it will have no effect on 
behaviour.
(2)  Exploiting visual context.  Subsequent 
work has suggested that the ‘partial constraint’ 
of mutual knowledge can become dominant 
with slightly different participants or 
circumstances. Native speakers of Mandarin 
come from a culture that has a greater focus on 
other people during social interactions (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). In the same reference 
game, they almost never failed to take into 
account the speaker’s visual perspective (Wu & 
Keysar, 2007a).  However, even English 
speaking participants are not insensitive to 
common ground constraints. When two possible 
candidates for ‘the smallest candle’ were on 
display, listeners immediately fixated the candle 
that was in the visual common ground, and 
ignored the one that was blocked from the 
speaker’s view (Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 
2003). When a speaker begins to ask a question 
about an object, a listener is more likely to 
fixate those that are hidden from the speaker’s 
view (Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson & 
Tanenhaus, in press). Speakers will use names 
for objects that they believe to be known to the 
listener (Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003), though they sometimes 
overestimate the degree that the knowledge is 
shared (Wu & Keysar, 2007b). These results 
suggest that common ground will be used if it is 
available. This hypothesis predicts a main effect 
of the belief condition: whether or not the visual 
context is present for self, gaze coordination 
will increase if it is believed to be present for 
others.     
(3)  Compensating for visual context. Our 
third hypothesis is that there will be an 
interaction between the visual context for self 
and the visual context that is believed for others. 
When conversants believe there is a difference 
between what they see and what their partners 
can see, they will seek to redress the imbalance. 
Speakers use more gestures when they are 
describing a toy that listeners have not played 
with before (Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004) or a 
location within a picture that they have not seen 
(Holler & Stevens, 2007). Speakers produce 
better explanations when they believe their 
listeners do not have access to a diagram 
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(Bromme, Jucks & Runde 2005), and provide 
disambiguating information when it is not 
present in the visual common ground 
(Haywood, Pickering & Branigan, 2005). This 
suggests that when conversants believe there is 
a mismatch between their visual context and 
their partners’ in our task, they will boost their 
efforts to establish common ground, leading to 
better gaze coordination. This hypothesis 
predicts that gaze coordination will be highest in 
the present-absent and absent-present 
conditions.
Methods
Participants
112 undergraduates from the University of 
California, Santa Cruz took part in exchange for 
course credit. The data from 19 participants was 
discarded due to failures in calibration, resulting 
in 37 dyads with two usable data series. 
Apparatus
Each participant sat in a cubicle in a reclining 
chair, looking up at an arm-mounted 19”  LCD 
60cm away with a Bobax3000  remote eye 
tracker mounted at the base. They wore a 
headset with a boom mic. The experimenter 
controlled when the participants could hear the 
stimuli, each other’s voices, or the 
experimenters voice. For each participant, an 
iMac calculated gaze position approximately 30 
times a second, presented stimuli and recorded 
data. A third Apple Mac computer synchronized 
the trials and data streams from the iMacs and 
saved an audio-video record of what was seen, 
heard and said during the experiment, 
superimposed with gaze positions.
Design
Four different opinion pieces were written for 
each of eight contentious topics (the iraq war, 
vegetarianism, drugs in sport, UCSC professors, 
UCSC campus expansion, violence in video 
games, online social networks, and gay 
marriage). The opinion pieces were delivered 
straight to camera by sixty four different actors, 
producing movies that varied from 8 to 20 
seconds in length. For each pair of participants, 
the topics were randomly allocated across the 
four experimental conditions.
Procedure
Participants were introduced to each other in the 
laboratory waiting room. They then sat in 
adjacent cubicles and underwent a brief 
calibration routine of roughly a minute. The trial 
design is shown in Figure 1A. First the movies 
were shown, one at a time, in each of the 
quadrants of a 2 x 2 grid. Location and order of 
presentation were randomized, but were 
identical for each participant. Each movie ended 
with a freeze frame which remained on screen. 
In the two absent for self conditions, pictures of 
the four actors faded from view at the end of 
presentations, leaving an empty grid. In the 
present for self conditions, the pictures 
remained in view. The words ‘You are 
participant B’ appeared on the screen for both 
participants. The participants then heard a 
prerecorded voice saying, “Please discuss these 
issues,”  and the experimenter activated the 
audio link between cubicles. 
Figure 1B represents the different 
experimental manipulations that were 
introduced at this stage of the trial. In the 
absent-absent and present - present condition, 
participants heard “You should both now [be 
looking at a blank screen / be able to still see the 
speakers on screen]”. In the absent-present and 
present-absent conditions they heard 
“Participant A should [be looking at a blank 
screen / still be able to see the speakers]. 
Participant B should  [still be able to see the 
speakers / be looking at a blank screen]”. 
Across all conditions, they were then asked, 
“Please say ‘yes’ if this is the case”. Once they 
had affirmed, the experimenter initiated the 
conversation. Participants typically talked for 
between one and three minutes before the 
experimenter decided that the topic had been 
exhausted, and the trial was terminated. 
Data analysis
We quantified the gaze coordination between 
conversants by generating categorical cross-
recurrence plots. This technique depicts the 
temporal structure between time series (Zbilut, 
Giuliani, & Webber, 1998), and has been used to 
capture the subtle entrainment of body sway 
during conversation (Shockley, Santana & 
Fowler, 2003) and the interrelationships 
between a child and care givers’ language use 
(Dale & Spivey, 2006). In our case, points of 
recurrence are defined as the times at  which 
both conversants are fixating the same screen 
quadrant. For each trial, we took the first  minute 
of eye movement data, added up all the points 
of recurrence and then divided by the total 
number of possible points to get a recurrence 
percentage (for a detailed explanation, see 
Richardson & Dale, 2005). Here, the possible 
points of recurrence were defined as the times at 
which at least one of the conversants had their 
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eyes on the screen. The next 
step was to lag one of the 
data streams by 10ms, so 
that 0ms on one data stream 
was aligned with 10ms on 
the other. Again, all the 
points of recurrence were 
calculated. This represents 
the degree to which one 
conversant is looking at the 
same thing as the other 
conversant 10ms later. Since 
in our experiment the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d 
symmetrical roles, we 
averaged the recurrence for 
a lag of 10ms and -10ms. A 
full cross-recurrence 
analysis consisted of 
calculating the recurrence 
for all possible alignments, 
or lag times, of the two data 
series. 
Differences in gaze 
coordination would be 
produced by differences in 
how conversants spoke to 
each other. Therefore, our 
gaze analysis was supported 
by a secondary analysis of 
the speech of a subset of ten 
pairs of participants. We 
c o d e d a l l e i g h t 
conversations for each dyad 
and focused on utterances 
which made any reference 
at all to the views or 
appearance of the actors, as gaze coordination 
has been found to increase during moments of 
direct reference to a visual scene (Richardson & 
Dale, 2005). We counted the number of such 
references in each conversation and analysed 
three properties. Firstly, each reference was 
termed either ‘visual’ if it made any mention of 
visual properties of the actor, or ‘factual’ if it 
contained only (non-visual) information relating 
the actors’ viewpoint. Secondly, all references 
that occurred at the end of phrases were coded 
for intonational contours called boundary tones. 
Of interest were rising boundary tones, in which 
the intonation goes up in pitch at the end of a 
sentence from either the lower or higher part of 
a speaker’s pitch range (Pierrehumbert & 
Hirschberg, 1990). They are thought to serve as 
implicit requests for confirmation from the 
listen, and hence play a role in establishing 
information in the common ground (Allen, 
1984; Fletcher, Stirling, Mushin & Wales, 
2002). Lastly, we calculated the proportion of 
speakers’ references that elicited a back-channel 
response from the the listener such as ok, uh-
huh, right. Back-channels had to be directly 
following or overlapping the speakers’ reference 
and consist of one word. These responses are 
thought to serve the function of coordinating 
dialogue and signaling to the speaker that she 
has been understood  (Schegloff, Jefferson & 
Sacks, 1977), and hence, like the rising 
contours, their frequency serves as a indicator of 
conversants’ efforts to establish common 
ground. 
B
You are 
participant 
B
Well I think 
that Bush...
uhuh
You are 
participant 
B
yes yes
Participant A is 
looking at a blank screen.  
Participant B should still 
be looking at the 
speakers. Is this correct?
The Iraq war was all about oil and money….
Saddam was a threat to the US and his people...
1. Conversants 
listen to four 
points of view 
from different 
actors
…
}
2. A pre-recorded 
voice confirms 
what they and their 
partner can see on 
this trial 
(present - absent)
4. They discuss 
their own views on 
the issue
3. Conversants 
always see the 
same thing and 
believe the same 
thing about each 
other
A
present - present
absent - absentabsent - present
present - absent
for self                for other for self              for other
for self               for other for self              for other
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Results
Gaze coordination was increased by the 
presence of a visual context for the self, and 
modulated by a belief in the presence of a visual 
context for the other. When the visual context 
was absent for conversants, recurrence was 
higher if they believed their partners could see 
it. Conversely, when the visual context was 
present, recurrence was higher if they believed 
that that their partners could not. Figure 2A 
shows how gaze recurrence changed across 
conditions at different time lags. With the 
exception of the absent-absent condition, 
recurrence peaked at or around 0ms and trailed 
off as the distance between conversants’ gaze 
patterns increased, replicating the pattern 
produced by spontaneous conversation that was 
observed by Richardson, Dale & Kirkham 
(2007). Following their analysis, differences 
between conditions were analyzed by averaging 
recurrence within a window of +/- 3000ms, to 
capture the typical periods in which both 
conversants were acting as speakers and 
listeners. A 2 (for self: present/absent) x 2 
(believed for other: present/absent) 
ANOVA showed an significant 
interaction between theses effect 
(F(1,36)=4.5, p<.05), as well as the 
expected main effect of visual context 
(F(1,36)=12.4, p<.001). Recurrence in 
each of the conditions was compared 
to randomized baselines. Within the 
critical window, recurrence was higher 
than chance for the present-present 
(t(36)=3.3, p<.001), present-absent 
(t(36)=3.7, p<.001) and absent-present 
(t(36)=2.8, p<.01) conditions, but not 
for the absent-absent (t(36)=1.6).
Conversants’ speech was also 
influenced by an interaction between 
the presence of a visual context for the 
self and a belief in the presence of a 
visual context for the other (see figure 
2B). Whilst conversants simply made 
more references overall to the actors 
when they were on the screen in front 
of them, our other measures revealed 
interactions between conditions. In the 
present-absent and absent-present 
conditions, references were more 
likely to employ factual (non-visual) 
properties (for example, ‘the guy who 
said that Iraq was about oil’ rather than 
‘the guy in the red shirt who was 
against the war’). In these conditions, references 
that came at the end of phrases were more likely 
to end in a rising contour (as an implicit request 
for confirmation), and references were more 
likely to receive a back-channel response from 
the listener. Our gaze analyses show that these 
efforts to boost common ground in those 
conditions did indeed correspond to an increase 
in gaze recurrence.
Our measures of conversants’ references 
were analysed by a 2 (for self: present/absent) x 
2 (believed for other: present/absent) ANOVAs. 
There was a main effect of the presence of the 
visual context for self (F(1,9)=8.3, p<.05) on the 
number of references made. There were 
significant interactions between the visual 
context for self and believed for other on the 
proportion of references that mentioned factual 
properties (F(1,9)=6.8, p<.05), the proportion of 
references using rising contours (F(1,9)=5.3, 
p<.05), and the proportion of references that 
received back channel responses (F(1,9)=6.35, 
p<.05). No other main effects or interactions 
were significant across our four measures. 
Figure 2. Results of (a) gaze analysis and (b) speech analysis
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Conclusion
Reference game studies have given a mixed 
view of the role of visual common ground in 
conversation. Sometimes the visual perspective 
of a speaker has little effect on a listener 
(Keysar et al 2000), and sometimes it has an 
immediate constraint on an ambiguous reference 
to an object (Hanna et al, 2003). For a number 
of reasons, our experiment might have found no 
influence of visual common ground. The 
conversations were not about the actors on 
display, but concerned politics, sports and 
campus life.  The effect of believing that a 
conversational partner could see the actors was 
deconfounded from the fact of them being seen 
by each conversant. Lastly, the particular 
circumstances of who saw or was believed to 
see what changed on a trial by trial basis, 
demanding that conversants keep track of 
shifting visual common ground constraints. 
Under these conditions, conversants could 
have ignored the whole issue of what they 
believed each other could see, but they did not. 
They could have employed a quick and 
expedient technique of exploiting visual 
information when it was believed to be present, 
and ignoring it otherwise. Instead,  they 
maintained an awareness of what each other 
could see on each particular trial, when they 
believed there to be an imbalance between their 
own view and their partners’ they sought to 
compensate for that difference. They tended to 
refer to actors’ viewpoints via a non-visual 
route, ask for confirmation that their messages 
had been understood, and signal understanding 
to each other via back channel responses. As a 
result, when they looked at the pictures their eye 
movements were more tightly coordinated if 
they believed they were talking to someone who 
was looking at nothing. Conversely, while 
looking at an empty screen their eye movements 
were more closely coordinated if they believed 
that each other could still the actors. 
Coordinating joint attention is essential for 
successful communication (Clark, 1996; Clark 
& Brennan, 1991; Schober, 1993). It may even 
be the basis for pre-linguistic learning (Baldwin, 
1995). In spontaneous conversation, people are 
able to couple their gaze despite ambiguities and 
disfluencies in the speech stream. This 
remarkable coordination is achieved in virtue of 
the background knowledge they share 
(Richardson, et al., 2007), their sensitivity to 
each others’ pragmatic constraints (Hanna & 
Tanenhaus, 2004) and moment-by-moment 
domains of reference (Brown-Schmidt & 
Tanenhaus, in press). Here we have shown that 
conversants are also attuned to both their own 
visual context and what they believe each other 
can see. They will even coordinate their gaze 
around an empty screen in the mistaken belief 
that each other can see something.  It is the net 
effect of these multiple constraints that restrict 
the referent of “the thingy for the whatsit”  from 
a universe of objects to a garlic press. 
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Abstract 
Speakers use referring expressions to 
identify an object in the environment. To 
generate a referring expression, features 
of the intended referent have to be se-
lected that distinguish the object from the 
other potential referents. Current ac-
counts of referring expressions consider a 
number of factors that influence the 
choice of features but ignore the influ-
ences of the task environment. In particu-
lar, they do not address how these influ-
ences change the generation of referring 
expressions over an extended period of 
time. We present results of how colour 
terms are used to describe landmarks in a 
task oriented dialogue (a route communi-
cation task) and describe a computational 
cognitive model of the observed adapta-
tions over time. 
1 Introduction 
Much attention in recent computational as well 
as psychological research on language has been 
given to the linguistic problem of the use and 
generation of referring expressions. Referring 
expressions are linguistic expressions that iden-
tify either a referent entity in the real world or a 
discourse entity in the form of an antecedent. 
Referring expressions serve the purpose of dis-
tinguishing the target or referent from the set of 
other possible referents in the given context, 
called the distractor set. For example, in the set 
of objects in Figure 1, the black cup and the 
small, black cup would both succeed in distin-
guishing the cup at the lower left (the referent) 
from the other two objects (the distractor set). 
A speaker wanting to pick out that small, 
black, cup at the lower left of the array could use 
any of the attributes in the expressions just given. 
Computational approaches to generating refer-
ring expressions often produce expressions that, 
if possible, uniquely and minimally select the 
target object. But such algorithms are computa-
tionally costly and may not be helpful in model-
ling human behaviour: People (1) produce non-
minimal expressions, which contain redundant 
information (e.g., Pechmann 1989) and (2) inter-
pret such expressions more easily (e.g., Paraboni, 
van Deemter and Masthoff 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A simple domain of reference: for 
each object, the other are distractors 
 
A prominent account of how human-like, non-
minimal referring expression can be generated is 
the algorithm by Dale and Reiter (1995), which 
by now has many extensions (see van der Sluis 
(2005) for a recent overview). This algorithm 
incrementally tests whether using an attribute in 
a referring expression will rule out distractor ob-
jects. The attributes are tested according to a 
preference list that is fixed beforehand. For the 
domain used in Figure 1, for example, this pref-
erence list could be <type, colour, size>. Identi-
fying the object to the right would then produce 
the non-minimal expression large, white cup by 
first adding the type attribute (which has a spe-
cial status and is always added), then by adding 
white (because it removes the object in the lower 
left from the distractor set), finally by adding 
large (because it removes the object in the top 
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left). Non-minimal expressions arise simply be-
cause a selected attribute is never de-selected, 
even if a subsequently selected attribute makes it 
redundant. 
While these approaches deal with which of the 
available possibilities to describe the target ob-
ject is chosen, they do not account for the adapta-
tions that a speaker makes over time to the de-
mands of the current task environment. The 
computational as well as the psycholinguistic 
paradigms typically lack history: On each trial a 
participant (or algorithm) is presented with a pic-
ture like Figure 1 and instructed to produce a 
suitably distinguishing expression. The trial ter-
minates without feedback and is followed by 
others, presenting different objects and distin-
guishing features. How the fourth target is dis-
tinguished from its distractors might actually 
owe something to the participant’s experience 
with the first three, and our work attempts to dis-
cover and model such effects of experience. 
We examine referring expressions in an unre-
stricted, task-oriented dialogue in which the in-
terlocutors get natural feedback on failures of 
reference and refer to many different objects. We 
use a variant of the HCRC Map Task (Anderson 
et al. 1991) in which a player who can see the 
route on a schematic map describes it to a fellow 
player who must reproduce it. Each map is popu-
lated with cartoon landmarks, distinguished by 
several different features. We have shown that 
the use of features changes across first mentions 
as players pursue their task (Guhe and Bard 
2008). In the present paper we ask how and why 
the changes take place. Colour is a perceptually 
salient property, usually one of the first tested in 
the incremental Dale and Reiter type algorithms. 
In our experiment, however, we set unreliability 
against salience: Colour is an unreliable distin-
guisher. In contrast, each map allows for use of a 
reliable attribute, too, (shape, number, kind or 
pattern). Thus, our participants need to use the 
adaptive attributes but waste time and can cause 
misunderstandings using the unreliable one. 
In this paper, we report how the use of colour 
terms changes over the course of the experiment 
and present a simple computational cognitive 
model of this change. More precisely, we de-
scribe how the utility of the colour feature influ-
ences the Instruction Giver’s choice of whether 
to use colour in introductory referring expres-
sions. The model offers an explanation of this 
change in terms of Anderson’s rational analysis 
(Anderson 1990; Anderson and Schooler 1991). 
Rational analysis is the core mechanism in ACT-
R’s utility-based production selection (Anderson 
2007) and is a variant of utility learning mecha-
nisms found in reinforcement learning or the 
delta rule (Sutton and Barto 1998). In brief, ra-
tional analysis says that human memory reflects 
the frequency of events in the environment, mak-
ing more frequent experiences easier to retrieve 
and corresponding behaviours more likely to be 
used. By using rational analysis our model goes 
beyond existing accounts of use and generation 
of referring expressions in that it reveals the en-
vironmental influences on these processes. 
2 Comparison to existing research 
The problem of whether the use of features 
changes with the demands of the task environ-
ment has scarcely been addressed in the litera-
ture. Although Brennan and Clark’s (1996) con-
ceptual pacts address changes in referring ex-
pressions, these changes are about how speakers 
refer to objects after they have been introduced. 
However, our questions here address the overall 
use of features in referring expressions over the 
course of many interactions. To exclude effects 
of conceptual pacts we are only analysing the use 
of introductory (first) mentions of landmarks. 
Garrod and Doherty (1994) describe how a 
community of speakers establishes a sub-
language in referring to entities. We are con-
cerned with the internal structure of the referring 
expressions themselves and propose a utility-
based explanation instead of one based on prece-
dence and salience. 
There is some evidence that extra-linguistic 
factors play a role in generating referring expres-
sions. For example, Arnold and Griffin (2007) 
show that the presence of a second character in-
fluences the choice of whether to use a pronoun 
or the character’s name for references following 
the introductory mention. This is true even if the 
characters differ in gender, so that the name does 
not disambiguate any more than the pronoun. 
Arnold and Griffin argue that the reasons for this 
behaviour lie in the speakers’ cognitive load 
when they generate the referring expression. 
This is part of another strand of findings in 
which the cooperative view on dialogue (e.g. 
Clark 1996) is changed towards a speaker-
oriented view (e.g. Bard et al. 2000). In this 
view, the speaker makes the general assumption 
that what he/she knows is shared knowledge. 
Only if problems arise in the dialogue, e.g. by 
explicit feedback from the listener, might the 
speaker adapt to the listener’s needs. In fact, 
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even if overspecified referring expressions (Dale 
and Reiter 1995; Paraboni, van Deemter and 
Masthoff 2007; Pechmann 1989) help the listener 
to identify the target object, the speaker also 
profits in terms of a generation process of greatly 
reduced complexity. Since both – speaker and 
listener – benefit from using such referring ex-
pressions, the communicative strategy cannot be 
attributed uniquely to concerns for the listener’s 
needs. In our task, however, the colour feature is 
counterproductive in the majority of cases, be-
cause it does not match between the two maps. 
So the speaker’s assumption about the usefulness 
of the salient feature colour are mistaken. 
Another related line of research is the use of 
machine learning techniques to extract the way 
attributes are selected for modified versions of 
the Dale and Reiter algorithm (Jordan and 
Walker 2005). Although these algorithms already 
incorporate psychological findings, e.g., concep-
tual pacts, they only provide global adaptations 
to properties of linguistic corpora and do not ac-
count for changes over time and for adaptations 
to the properties of the task environment. 
3 Experiment 
3.1 Task 
The experiment is a modified Map Task (Ander-
son et al. 1991). The Map Task is an unscripted 
route-communication task in which an Instruc-
tion Giver and an Instruction Follower each have 
a map of the same fictional location. The Giver’s 
map contains a route that is missing on the Fol-
lower’s map. The dyad’s goal is to recreate the 
Giver’s route on the Follower’s map. 
The dialogue partners use the landmarks on 
the maps to navigate from START (shared) to 
FINISH (only on the Instruction Giver’s map). 
3.2 Materials, procedure, data collection 
Materials. Some landmarks differ between the 
two maps. In our experiment they can differ by: 
 
1. Being absent on one of the maps or present 
on both; 
2. Mismatching in a feature between the two 
maps (most notably colour); 
3. Being affected by ‘ink damage’ that obscures 
the colour of some landmarks on the Instruc-
tion Follower’s map. 
 
There are four attributes which also distinguish 
landmarks. Each serves for two different kinds of 
landmarks: 
 
1. Number (bugs, trees), 
2. Pattern (fish, cars), 
3. Kind (birds, houses/buildings), 
4. Shape (aliens, traffic signs). 
 
Three crossed independent variables determine 
the nature of Giver–Follower map pairs: 
 
1. Homogeneity: whether the landmarks on a 
map are of just one kind (single) or of differ-
ent kinds (mixed). 
2. Orderliness: whether the ink blot on the In-
struction Follower’s map obscures a con-
tiguous stretch of the route (orderly) or a 
non-contiguous stretch (disorderly). The 
number of obscured landmarks is constant. 
3. Animacy: whether the landmarks on a map 
are animate or inanimate (thus, on the mixed 
maps there are only landmarks from the 4 in-
animate or the 4 animate kinds of land-
marks). 
 
The maps in Figure 2 are a pair of Giver and Fol-
lower maps for the disorderly, mixed tree condi-
tion. Thus, the maps contain mainly trees but 
also other inanimate objects (mixed), and the 
Follower’s map shows multiple, non-contiguous 
ink blots (disorderly). 
 
Procedure. Participants are told that the maps 
are ‘of the same location but drawn by different 
explorers’. They thus know that the maps can 
differ but not where or how. They are instructed 
to recreate the route on the Follower’s map as 
accurately as possible. 
Each dyad did 2 simple training maps and then 
completed a set of 8 maps, one for each kind of 
landmark. The maps were counterbalanced with 
respect to the experimental conditions. After the 
fourth map, the role of Instruction Giver and In-
struction Follower were exchanged. 
To reduce the variability of words and con-
cepts used in the unrestricted dialogues, each 
participant was prompted textually to provide 
standard type names for a few landmarks that 
would occur on the following map. 
 
Setup and data collection. Participants sat in 
front of individual computers, facing each other, 
but separated by a visual barrier. 
This research is part of a larger multimodal 
project. The communication was recorded using 
5 camcorders. The Giver was eye tracked using a 
remote eye tracker. Speech was recorded using a 
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Marantz PMD670 recorder whereby Giver and 
Follower were recorded on two separate channels 
using two AKG C420 headset microphones. The 
speech was transcribed manually. The routes 
drawn by the Follower were recorded by the 
computer. 
As the participants were in the same room, 
they could hear each other’s speech. They could 
also see each other in the left half of their moni-
tor, which showed the dialogue partner’s upper 
torso video stream. The right half of the monitor 
showed the map. 
 
Participants. In exchange for course credit, 64 
undergraduates of the University of Memphis 
participated in pairs. In 4 dyads the participants 
knew each other previously. 
3.3 Analysis and results 
The recorded dialogues were coded for referring 
expressions. We present results for the first men-
tions of landmarks by the Instruction Giver. In-
troductory mentions should be both maximally 
independent of one another (as repeated men-
tions reflect precedence in naming a given ob-
ject) and maximally detailed (as reductions in 
form characterise anaphora). Mentions of colour 
in landmark introductions were calculated as a 
proportion of opportunities 
 
1. Over the course of single dialogues (by quar-
tiles),  
2. Across successive maps (1–8) and  
3. Between those where the Instruction Giver 
lacked or already had experience as Instruc-
tion Follower. 
 
The changes in the ratio of colour term use is 
depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Change of the use of colour terms over 
quartiles of the eight maps 
      
 
Figure 2: A pair of example maps; Instruction Giver left, Instruction Follower right 
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The use of colour terms significantly de-
creased over an average dialogue (effect of quar-
tile within experience (2) x map encountered as 
Instruction Giver (4) x quartile (4) ANOVA on 
the arcsine transformed proportion of colour 
terms: F1(2, 54.8) = 15.57, p < 0.001). Although 
there was no significant reduction across dia-
logues with the same Instruction Giver, the Giv-
ers used significantly fewer colour terms when 
they had served earlier as Follower (0.267 colour 
terms on average in the first four maps vs. 0.175 
in the second four). This is a significant effect of 
experience (F1(1, 28) = 7.90, p < 0.01). 
Note that the orderliness of the ink blots on the 
Instruction Follower’s maps did not have a sig-
nificant effect. In contrast to colour, distinguish-
ing features (number, kind, shape, pattern) are 
significantly more common in the maps where 
they are critical (used in more than 80%) and 
significantly increase within a dialogue. Thus, 
the decrease and low overall use of colour terms 
is not due to a general decrease in use of feature 
terms. There is also no effect of prior experience 
as Giver for useful features. The detailed results 
are presented in Guhe and Bard (2008). 
3.4 Discussion 
The participants adapted their use of colour to its 
low utility in the given task environment. The 
adaptation was distributed between speaker and 
listener. The use of colour terms does not fall 
significantly over the 4 dialogues a participant 
has the role of Instruction Giver, but there is a 
significant drop when the participants exchange 
roles: experience trying to match colour terms to 
grey-scale objects as Instruction Follower dis-
courages to mention colour as Instruction Giver. 
Any listener-centric effect is outweighed or 
fuelled by a speaker-centric appreciation of util-
ity. 
4 Utility and task environment 
4.1 Utility and selection probability 
This is not the place to delve into the depths of 
the ACT-R theory, see Anderson (2007) for the 
most recent account. For the model described 
below it is only relevant that in ACT-R proce-
dural knowledge (such as to decide whether to 
use colour or not) is encoded as production rules, 
or productions for short. A production is basi-
cally an if–then rule: if a certain set of conditions 
are given then execute a specified action. 
In ACT-R, each production has a utility value. 
The utility is an estimate of how likely the use of 
the production results in achieving the current 
goal (here: successfully describing the landmark 
to the interlocutor). 
Productions’ utilities are important in the 
cases in which more than one production is ap-
plicable for a given set of conditions. Then, the 
utilities serve to compute the probabilities with 
which a production is selected. This selection 
probability is computed as: 
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with: 
Pi: selection probability for production i 
Ui: utility of production i 
s: noise in the utilities (defaults: s = 1) 
j: set of all applicable productions (including i) 
 
Utility values are learnt over time. After a pro-
duction has been used, its utility is updated de-
pending on whether it was successful according 
to the following equation: 
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with: 
Ui: utility of production i 
n: number of applications of the production 
!: learning rate 
R: reward 
 
If the production is applied successfully, the util-
ity is updated with a positive reward, if it is un-
successful, it receives a negative reward. 
Anderson (2007, p 161) points out that this is 
basically the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule 
(Rescorla and Wagner 1972) or the delta rule by 
Widrow and Hoff (1960). So there is nothing 
special ‘ACT-R-ish’ about this rule; it is a gen-
eral learning rule. 
4.2 Structure of the task environment 
In the maps about half of the landmarks on the 
Instruction Follower’s map are obscured by ink 
blots, and, therefore, don’t have colour. Addi-
tionally, some of the route critical landmarks 
mismatch in colour. Overall this means that us-
ing colour to describe a landmark is successful in 
only about 40% of cases. By comparison, using 
the distinguishing feature of a map is successful 
in about 92% of cases. 
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5 Model 
5.1 Introduction 
The following analyses compare the model’s per-
formance to the introduction of the first 33 land-
marks of each map by the Instruction Giver. The 
33
rd
 landmark is still mentioned in 206 of the 
possible 256 cases (32 dyads with 8 maps each). 
The 34
th
 landmark is introduced only 186 times. 
There are three main patterns in the data. 
Firstly, map 1 behaves differently than the other 
maps in that the number of colour terms shows a 
pronounced drop from 0.6 to 0.25 (taken from 
the means of the first and last three values). Sec-
ondly, maps 2 to 4 each show a decrease of col-
our rate from 0.3 to 0.2. Thirdly, in maps 5 to 8 – 
after the role change – the colour rate drops in 
each map from 0.2 to 0.15. (This lower colour 
rate is the basis for the effect of role change.) 
Thus, between maps the colour rate is going 
up again. Explanations may be that the longer-
term utility of colour (learnt over a lifetime) or 
the textual prompting between dialogues exert 
some influence. The fact that the colour rate in 
maps 5 to 8 starts at the same rate as it ends in 
maps 2 to 4 may be due to the utility learning 
during the time as Instruction Follower. But a 
more detailed model is needed to explain this. 
5.2 The model 
The model is not a fully implemented ACT-R 
model, but just uses the two equations for updat-
ing production utility and probability of produc-
tion selection introduced above.  The model con-
tains two competing ‘productions’ one for using 
colour, one for not using colour. Because the In-
struction Giver always has colour available to 
describe a landmark, the model assumes that 
both productions are applicable for each land-
mark. Thus, the model is similar to the ACT-R 
model for an experiment by Friedman et al. 
(1964), described by Anderson (2007, p. 165–
169; in this experiment participants have to pre-
dict which one of two lights will be lit.) Using 
the other features would be modelled as analo-
gous sets of productions. 
For each decision, the model selects one of the 
productions according to their utilities and corre-
sponding selection probabilities at that time. Af-
ter the decision has been made, the usefulness of 
colour is determined according to the structure of 
the task environment (thus, using colour is suc-
cessful in 40% of cases) and the utility of the 
selected production is updated accordingly. For a 
successful application the production receives a 
reward of R = 14; if it is unsuccessful it receives 
a reward of R = 0 (cf. Anderson 2007, p. 162). 
The results reported in the remainder of this 
section were obtained by 500 runs of the model. 
However, just 32 runs – matching the number of 
dyads in the experiment – suffice to get signifi-
cant results; more runs of the model just produce 
a smoother curve. 
5.3 Map 1 
For the first map the model starts with the fol-
lowing estimated utilities: 
 
Ucolour(1) = 5.5 
Uno-colour(1) = 5 
 
These values mean that the colour-production 
has a probability of being selected of 0.622, 
which is close enough to the mean of the first 
three values of 0.594. (Using Ucolour(1) = 5.4 
would give an initial probability of 0.599, but 
one can be too fussy.) 
The final average utilities are: 
 
Ucolour(33) = 4.6 
Uno-colour(33) = 7.7 
 
Choosing these initial utilities gives an excellent 
fit to the data, see Figure 4. A regression using 
the model as predictor for the data shows a sig-
nificant correlation (!1 = 0.90, p < 0.001) that 
accounts for 72% of the variance (R
2
 = 72%, 
F(1, 31) = 79.5, p < 0.001). 
However, the initial values are not that impor-
tant, and the model matches the data significantly 
for a wide range of start values, as long as Ucol-
our(1) > Uno-colour(1) and the values are not close to 
the extremes of 0 and 14. The same holds for the 
following simulations. 
5.4 Maps 2 to 4 
For maps 2 to 4 (see Figure 5) the initial utilities 
were set to: 
 
Ucolour(1) = 5.5 
Uno-colour(1) = 6.5 
 
resulting in final average utilities of: 
 
Ucolour(33) = 4.5 
Uno-colour(33) = 7.5 
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The regression shows that 
the model accounts for 
66% of the variance (R
2
 = 
66.3%, F(1, 31) = 61.0, 
p < 0.001) with !1 = 2.44 
(p < 0.001). 
5.5 Maps 5 to 8 
Finally, for maps 5 to 8 
(see Figure 6) the initial 
utilities were set to: 
 
Ucolour(1) = 3 
Uno-colour(1) = 4 
 
resulting in the final aver-
age utilities 
 
Ucolour(33) = 3.3 
Uno-colour(33) = 7.7 
 
The model accounts for 
52.7% of the variance 
(R
2
 = 52.7%, F(1, 31) = 
34.6, p < 0.001) with 
!1 = 0.84 (p < 0.001). 
6 Conclusions 
There are two main con-
clusions from the research 
presented here. Firstly, the 
dialogue partners indeed 
adapt their naming behav-
iour to the task environ-
ment. More specifically, 
they adapt to the fact that 
colour is an unreliable 
distinguisher for the land-
marks on the maps. (This 
is amplified by the fact 
that the participants do 
not make a substantial 
effort to identify the parts 
of the maps that are ob-
scured by ink, which 
shows in the absence of 
an orderliness effect.) 
Secondly, the simple 
computational cognitive 
model accounts for this 
change. In particular, the 
model shows that the 
change in behaviour is 
indeed an adaptation to the structure of the task 
environment, because the rate of the probabilities 
and the changes in the probabilities with which 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of data and model for the first 33 landmarks in 
map 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Data and model for maps 2 to 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Data and model for maps 5 to 8. 
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colour is used as a descriptor is a direct result of 
the fact that colour can be successfully used for 
about 40% of the landmarks on the maps. Thus, 
rational analysis (the fact that memory reflects 
the probabilities encountered in the environment) 
explains the observed phenomenon. 
Although – after the fact – it may not be too 
surprising that rational analysis explains the ob-
served phenomenon, the result is more far-
reaching, because the influences of the task envi-
ronment on naming behaviour (the generation of 
referring expressions) has not yet been reported. 
7 Future work 
Our future research will address a number of di-
rect follow-up issues. Firstly, the model will be 
extended to account for the changes in the men-
tions of the distinguishing features (number, pat-
tern, kind, shape). Secondly, after a more de-
tailed analysis of the data we will extend the 
model to account for individual adaptation pat-
terns in the sense that the model can account for 
groups of dyads showing similar dialogue histo-
ries. For this, we will model the landmark intro-
ductions made by the Instruction Follower as 
well. This model serves as starting point for a 
comprehensive ACT-R model of how referring 
expressions (including repeated mentioned of 
landmarks) are generated in the given task. 
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Cultural Differences in Computer-Mediated Communication
Susan Fussell
Carnegie Mellon University
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) tech-
nologies provide new opportunities for people to con-
verse across space and time. Today, people connect
with others from around the world by participating in
chatrooms and discussion lists, by joining global game
communities and virtual worlds, by authoring and read-
ing blogs with an international scope, and by a variety
of other means. In the work domain, firms are estab-
lishing global teams with members from a diverse set
of nations who meet via an array of media including
audio, video and text. Bridging nations via technol-
ogy does not, however, guarantee that the cultures of
the nations involved are similarly bridged. Mismatches
in social conventions, work styles, power relationships
and conversational norms can lead to misunderstandings
that negatively affect the interaction. For the past few
years, my students and I have been exploring the ways
in which culture influences computer-mediated commu-
nication. Our goal is to develop a theoretical under-
standing of how culture influences computer-mediated
communication and to inform the design of new tools to
enhance cross-cultural communication.
In this talk, I will first provide an overview of the the-
oretical framework guiding our work. Then, Ill present
three examples of cultural differences that we predict
will influence CMCcommunication styles, individual-
ism vs. collectivism, and peripheral awarenessand de-
scribe the laboratory, field and survey studies we have
conducted to test these predictions. Ill then discuss sev-
eral projects we are doing that aim to improve cross-
cultural communication through training cultural sensi-
tivity and by intervening in dialogues when problems
arise. Ill conclude with some thoughts about how re-
search on culture and CMC can be extended into new
domains, such as support for communication in devel-
oping regions.
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Abstract
In-vehicle dialogue systems are gaining an
increased interest in the automotive indus-
try. Dialogue systems allow the driver to
use her voice, instead of her eyes and hands,
to control devices in the car and thereby in-
crease safety. Although speech is a natu-
ral way of communicating, the dialogue it-
self might increase the cognitive load of the
driver. In this paper we suggest a rhetorical
perspective of dialogue management, using
Aristotelian enthymemes to provide a model
for analysing Information Redundant Utter-
ances and discuss the implications this may
have for in-vehicle dialogue systems.
1 Introduction
One principle according to which dialogue is man-
aged is Grice’s maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), do
not make your contribution more informative than
required. This has often been interpreted as “make
your contribution as short as possible”, resulting in
all utterances that may be deduced from the context
or co-text being considered Information Redundant
Utterances (IRUs). Walker (1996) points out that
IRUs are often not redundant at all (thus actually ad-
hering to the maxim of quantity rather than violating
it) but instead serves to help lower the listener’s cog-
nitive load.
Using IRUs might be a way of releasing the user
of a dialogue system from some of the cognitive load
of the interaction itself. This can be of great impor-
tance, especially in some environments. In-vehicle
spoken dialogue systems are gaining increasing in-
terest since they enable the driver to perform sec-
ondary tasks (i.e. tasks not related to driving the ve-
hicle) without having to take her eyes off the road
or her hands from the steering wheel. Dialogue sys-
tems, unlike command based systems, also enable
the driver to speak in a natural way, without having
to memorise commands. The possibility of speak-
ing freely and not having to navigate through a fixed
menu structure is however not enough. Driving is a
safety critical task where the driver has to concen-
trate on the driving (primary task) rather than the
dialogue system (secondary task). Therefore it is
crucial to minimise the cognitive load of the driver
caused by the dialogue itself. A difficult question in
this context is how to decide when to add an IRUs
and when not to. Some redundancy may help re-
lieve the working memory of the user of a dialogue
system or an agent in a human-human interaction,
while too much information will only increase the
cognitive load. In this paper we will discuss how a
rhetorical perspective may be of use in this balanc-
ing act, and suggest that enthymemes, as presented in
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Kennedy, 2007), may provide a
model for analysing these utterances.
The outline of the paper is as follows: First,
we will discuss the notion of IRU, as presented by
Walker (1996). We then suggest an approach to un-
derstanding IRUs inspired by Aristotelian rhetoric,
especially the concept of enthymeme. In section
5 some empirical examples of arguments collected
from a corpus of car-navigation instructions are pre-
sented and discussed. In section 6 we discuss the
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relation between the enthymeme and cognitive load.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn and an attempt
is made to formulate an agenda for further research
and name some possible application areas.
2 Information Redundant Utterances
A significant feature of natural dialogue is economy.
This has been noted by many scholars in the fields
of pragmatics and discourse studies, and given rise
to such well known and generally accepted theories
as that of implicature (Grice, 1975). Walker (1996)
mentions Grice’s maxim of quantity as an example
of a generally assumed redundancy constraint. Ut-
terances that violate the redundancy constraint are
referred to by Walker as IRUs. An utterance is con-
sidered an IRU if it expresses a proposition that the
listener can retrieve from memory or infer. Walker
argues that the redundancy constraint is based on
four assumptions about dialogue:
1. Unlimited working-memory: everything an
agent knows is always available for reasoning;
2. Logical omniscience: agents are capable of ap-
plying all inference rules, so any entailment
will be added to the discourse model;
3. Fewest utterances: utterance production is the
only process that should be minimised;
4. No autonomy: assertions and proposals by
agent A are accepted by default by agent B.
According to Walker the principle of avoiding re-
dundancy has often taken precedence in work on
dialogue modelling and overshadowed other fac-
tors that affect communicative choice. Walker
presents corpus data in which agents frequently vio-
late the redundancy constraint, which indicates that
the fewest utterance assumption is not correct -
sometimes other aspects of communication are more
important than economy.
Walker’s analysis of corpus data leads her to for-
mulate three main functions of IRUs:
• To provide evidence supporting beliefs about
mutual understanding and acceptance.
• To manipulate the locus of attention of the dis-
course participants by making a proposition
salient.
• To augment the evidence supporting beliefs
that certain inferences are licenced.
Let us now take a look at one of Walker’s exam-
ples of IRUs. An utterance is produced by A to B
while walking to work (Walker, 1996):
(1) A: i) Let’s walk along Walnut Street
ii) It’s shorter.
It is known to A that B knows that Walnut Street
is shorter, so by the redundancy constraint A should
only have said i). Walker claims that ii) is consid-
ered an IRU based on the assumption of ‘unlimited
working memory’, i.e. that all knowledge and infor-
mation an agent has access to is equally available at
all times. Walker hypothesises that the mentioning
of the well-known fact that Walnut Street is shorter
is a way for A to ease Bs cognitive load.
Let us take a look at another of Walker’s exam-
ples. The following exchange is taken from an dis-
cussion about individual retirement accounts.
(2) A: i) Oh no, individual retirement ac-
counts are available as long as you are
not a participant in an existing pension.
B: ii) Oh I see. Well [...] I do work for
a company that has a pension.
A: iii) Ahh. Then you’re not eligible
for [the tax year of] eighty one.
Walker’s analysis of this example is that iii) is
considered an IRU based on the assumption that
agents are logically omniscient, since B would have
to apply an inference rule to conclude iii). The func-
tion of A’s stating iii) is, according to Walker, to
“augment the evidence supporting beliefs that cer-
tain inferences are licenced”.
3 A Rhetorical Approach to IRUs
Much work on language usage in general and dia-
logue systems in particular has taken rhetoric into
account. Two recent examples are Miller (2003),
who discusses how the notion of rhetorical ethos is
central in creating an agent that is capable of passing
the Turing test, and Andrews et al. (2006) who focus
on how social cues and emotion can make dialogue
systems behave more naturally. A fruitful way of
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incorporating the logos-part of rhetoric in linguistic
theory is as starting point for frameworks for struc-
tural analysis. Hobbs (1985), Asher and Lascarides
(2003), Mann and Thompson (1986) et al. have
presented theories for understanding textual struc-
ture (Mann and Thompson) and utterance relations
(Lascarides, Asher, Hobbs). However, in much of
the literature on rhetorical relations, little attention
is paid, as far as we know, to the way supposedly
information redundant utterances serve to add new
information to the discourse situation by pointing to
a specific argument.
We would like to suggest a way of looking at IRUs
that elucidates Walker’s ideas about the functions of
IRUs, and offers an alternative to the four assump-
tions of the redundancy constraint. The three func-
tions of IRUs in Walker’s study have in common that
they aim to lead the listener to a certain conclusion,
either by supporting a belief the listener already has,
or by directing, or even redirecting, the attention of
the listener. In other words - IRUs are rhetorical. Ex-
amples (1) and (2) are both illustrations of this. The
fact that (1ii) is considered redundant according to
the redundancy constraint seems to reflect not only
the unlimited working memory assumption, but also
the assumption that agents are non-autonomous and
by default accept assertions and proposals by other
agents. The relative autonomy of B makes it possi-
ble for B not to accept A’s proposition. By provid-
ing a reason for choosing Walnut Street, A performs
a rhetorical act that potentially increases the likeli-
hood that the suggestion will be accepted by B. Ex-
ample (2) also indicates that A wants to make sure
that B draws a specific conclusion. It seems likely
that A, if she did not find it of some importance
that B draws the conclusion iii), might not bother
to make the inference explicit - B could still be ex-
pected to make the inference. However, for B to do
that would not necessarily make her “logically om-
niscient” – the assumption Walker (1996) claims to
be the reason for considering (2ii) an IRU – just ca-
pable of making some inferences.
Interestingly, many of Walker’s examples of IRUs
and their respective antecedents constitute structures
similar to that of an Aristotelian enthymeme. An
enthymeme can be described as a logic-like deduc-
tive argument. In the Rhetoric (Kennedy, 2007),
Aristotle claims that learned, scientific argumenta-
tion differs from practical, hands-on argumentation
concerning every day matters: when you speak to
people that are not experts in the area you are deal-
ing with, and who do not have much experience with
logical reasoning, it is, according to Aristotle, ineffi-
cient to present long chains of logical arguments. In
persuasion he therefore recommends shortening the
arguments, which results in them not being strictly
logical. However, Aristotle still emphasises the
logos-based, deductive nature of the enthymeme,
and calls it "a sort of syllogism" (Kennedy, 2007).
The premises needed to make an argument a "real"
syllogism, is added by the listener from her knowl-
edge of culture, situation and co-text (what has been
said earlier in the speech or conversation), according
to a “pattern” known as the topos of the enthymeme.
This pattern can be very general assumptions based
on physical parameters such as space (the small can
be contained in the big), or more specific assump-
tions such as prejudice about people belonging to a
certain group. The mentioning of one carefully cho-
sen premise directs the attention of the listener in the
direction that the speaker wants, and makes the lis-
tener a bit more likely to accept the proposition pre-
sented in the conclusion. The enthymeme might of
course serve to persuade or even mislead a listener,
but the same mechanism can also make it easier for
an agent A to accept an honest and constructive pro-
posal made by another agent, which would be help-
ful when quick decisions need to be made, or when
A has to focus on some demanding parallel activity.
Let us go back to the colleagues walking to work.
Example (1) above could easily be analysed within
a rhetorical framework. Mentioning (1ii) could be
a way for A to point to the argument about the
shortest route, perhaps because they are running
late. There could be other reasons to walk along
Walnut Street, perhaps that it is more quiet. A
might know that B usually prefers a busy street, but
that she does not particularly like to walk, which
would make the short-argument more persuasive.
If they were not in a hurry, and A wanted them
to walk along Walnut Street because it is nicer to
walk along a quiet street than a busy one, A would
probably say ‘Let’s walk along Walnut Street. It’s
more quiet’ thus validating her suggestion. But it
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is also possible that A would want to walk along
Walnut Street for some reason that she does not
want B to know about - for example because
someone cute always walks his dog there at that
time. So, even though she knows that B knows it
is the shortest way to work, A still mentions it to
point out the getting-to-work-on-time argument.
The enthymematic argument looks something like
this:
It’s shorter
We want to go get to work on time
∴ Let’s walk along Walnut Street
The “hidden premise”, i.e. the premise that B
adds to the argument, would be something that
makes sense in the context, having to do with for
example time (as above) or effort (we don’t want to
walk longer than necessary).The additional premise
is necessary in order to make the enthymeme fit
with the relevant topos. This is also true in the
case of (2), where two premises are expressed, but
the expressed premises do not logically entail the
conclusion.
Individual retirement accounts are available
as long as you are not a participant in
an existing pension
I do work for a company that has a
pension
∴ (Then) you’re not eligible for
eighty one
A rhetorical perspective that uses enthymematic
arguments as an explanation model for how infor-
mation is given and withheld, would be based on
a different set of assumptions about dialogue than
those Walker formulates as the basis of the redun-
dancy constraint. Thus we propose the following
rhetorical principles
1. Limited working-memory: suggestions help
agents to reach a certain decision
2. Logical capacity: agents are capable of apply-
ing some inference rules, some entailments will
be added to the discourse model;
3. Utterance production: should be balanced so as
to maximise persuasion
4. Autonomy: assertions and proposals by agent
A are not accepted by default by agent B, and
different agents may or may not share goals and
intentions.
4 Enthymemes in Car Navigation
Instructions
In a data collection carried out within the DICO
project (http://www.dicoproject.org)1, a driver is
given navigation instructions by a passenger, in be-
tween the instructions the passenger interviews the
driver about personal matters such as favourite food,
number of siblings, favourite holiday resort, etc. The
aim was to study human-human in-vehicle conver-
sation with respect to how humans adapt the way
they speak to the cognitive load of the other dia-
logue partner. The data includes examples of en-
thymematic arguments, of which some are also IRUs
according to Walker’s definition.
(3) A: i) Vi håller höger här på (Let’s keep to the right
here)
ii) Så vi kan...byta (fil) (So we can...change
(lanes))
Example (3) is uttered by a passenger (who
provides the driving instructions) in a situation
where both driver and passenger know that it is time
to keep to the right in order to be able to change
lanes. The passenger has stated a minute or so
earlier that they should change to the right lane.
Considering the information the driver has about the
traffic situation and the previous instructions given
by the passenger, (3ii) should not be necessary
according to the redundancy constraint. (3) can also
be seen as an enthymeme:
So we can...change (lanes)
In order to change lanes we have to
keep to the right
∴ Let’s keep to the right here
(3i), the proposition that they should keep right,
is the conclusion of the enthymeme and the ex-
plicit premise (3ii) (they want to change lanes). The
1DICO is a project that aims to demonstrate how state-of-
the-art spoken language technology can enable access to com-
munication, entertainment and information services as well as
to environment control in vehicles. A priority in the project is
cognitive load management for safe in-vehicle dialogue.
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non-explicit premise is something like ‘if we are to
change lanes we have to keep to the right’, which is
a fairly general assumption about spatial relations -
the topos of the enthymeme.
(4) A: i) Rosengatan ja det måste vara nästa (Rose
Street yes it has to be the next)
ii) för vi kommer inte så mycket längre (cause
we don’t get much further).
In example (4) it is clear to the driver that the
street is ending. By supplying the premise (4ii)
he points to an enthymematic argument based on a
number of premises, most of which have been stated
earlier (for example that Rosestreet crosses the street
they are driving down), and one that has to be in-
ferred (if you know that a street crosses the one you
are driving down, and you haven’t yet past it, and
there is only one street left, this has to be the street
you are looking for).
We have also looked at data recorded for the pur-
pose of a master thesis about car navigation instruc-
tions (Caroline Bergman, work in progress). In this
case the instructions are given over the telephone by
a person with access to maps and driving instruc-
tions on the internet.
(5) A: i) Ta till vänster vid Redbergsplatsen
ii) står det här ja. (turn left at Red-
bergsplatsen it says here.)
Example (5) demonstrates the need to motivate
for rhetorical purposes rather than to provide new
information about one’s reasons. The driver is well
aware that the instructor is using a map and writ-
ten driving instructions to be able to help the driver
navigate. Still the instructor repeatedly validates her
instructions by stating that the map or other instruc-
tions ‘says so’. It seems probable that the driver has
reason to be suspicious of the instructions, since the
person giving them is somewhere else and does not
have access to any information about the traffic situ-
ation that the driver does not provide.
5 Cognitive Load and Efficiency
As humans we need reasons to validate propositions
we are presented with. We know this intuitively – it
is difficult to complete a task if we are just presented
with single pieces of information that do not seem
to be connected. The same conclusion can be made
based on different premises, and we often want to
know which argument the speaker is referring to be-
fore we accept a proposition. There are situations
where the standard way to instruct is by single utter-
ances (or orders), such as in the military, or in other
contexts where the roles are very well defined, and
the modus operandi of the activity well rehearsed,
such as in surgery. We agree with Walker’s conclu-
sion that IRUs serve to ease cognitive load in differ-
ent ways. Our hypothesis is that the reason why they
do this is often because the enthymematic structure
helps the recipient of the IRU to make up her mind
- if the provided premise fits into an argument she
finds acceptable she will agree with the proposition,
if not she will disagree. Neys and Schaeken (2007)
show that the tendency to make logical rather than
pragmatic inferences increases when under heavy
cognitive load, which indicates that pragmatic infer-
ences use more working memory. This supports the
idea that it would be good to present arguments in a
form resembling a logical argument rather than just
presenting the proposition - even if the recipient is
aware of the information in the premise (IRU) pro-
vided.
6 Concluding Remarks
Studying in-vehicle conversations reveals that inter-
acting with someone while driving is always dis-
tracting (see e.g. Patten et al. (2003)), and some-
times dangerously so. Conversation increases the
cognitive load of the driver and thus prevents her
from fully focusing on the primary task of driving.
Studies of cell phone conversations have revealed
that the major reason why cell phone conversation
is dangerous is not the handling of the cell phone
(i.e. the use of hands free cell phone is not safer
than a manual cell phone), but the conversation it-
self increases the cognitive load of the driver to such
an extent that the risk of an accident increases (Re-
delmeier and Tibshirani, 1997). Most user stud-
ies carried out to measure cell phone conversations
impact on driving behaviour are carried out in car
simulators, and the parallel task is to perform men-
tal processing tasks such as arithmetic operations.
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These studies point at a significantly decreased driv-
ing performance. Esbjörnsson et al. (2006) on
the other hand, studied real cell phone conversa-
tions in cars driving in real traffic. They found that
in human-human conversation the dialogue partners
have strategies for dealing with distraction and in-
creased cognitive load. Humans tend to 1) sense
when a particularly stressful situation is coming up
and adjust by, for example, pausing the conversation
and 2) generally use the conversational "rules" that
keep verbal interaction running smoothly – after all,
keeping a conversation going in any situation adds to
the cognitive load of the speakers. However, in the
context of in-vehicle conversation with a dialogue
system we can normally not expect this kind of ad-
justment. The system can be compared to a remote
caller (Schneider and Kiesler, 2005), i.e. a dialogue
partner not sitting in the passenger seat but speaking
to the driver over the phone and thus does not have
access to the traffic situation. Problem 1), that of
detecting and managing particularly stressful situa-
tions, is not addressed in this paper. Instead we have
focused on a way to potentially minimise the cogni-
tive load that is caused by the conversation itself.
A rhetorical perspective provides a model for in-
teraction that works for interactions in a context
where the agents do not necessarily have a common
goal or intention. The mechanisms that enables per-
suasion, can also be used in order to explain some-
thing in an easily comprehensible way. A skilled
rhetorician is often also a skilled teacher, since it is
easier to understand something if one understands
the argument behind it. In the context of a dialogue
system that is advanced enough to be able to han-
dle conversation that is to a certain degree “free”,
a rhetorical perspective would be beneficial. This
would be the case for contexts when the system has
an agenda distinct from that of the user, e. g. to make
the user buy something or convince the user about
the importance of a healthy lifestyle. In a domain
such as car navigation, where user and dialogue sys-
tem have a common goal, it might still be benefi-
cial for the system to be able to provide a premise
that points to an argument that would explain its
reasons for giving a certain answer or instruction.
Such premises would be helpful not only in situa-
tions where the system adds new information, such
as if the user has asked for the quickest route and
the dialogue system proposes a route that does not
seem to be the shortest possible, and the system ex-
plains that some roadwork is going on or there is
a one-way street along the shortest route, but also
in situations where the contribution serves a rhetor-
ical purpose rather than an informational one. The
system’s pointing to an enthymeme relevant to the
situation may make it easier for the driver to decide
whether to accept the instruction or not. This poten-
tially minimises the cognitive load since the driver
has to make fewer inferences, but still is not over-
loaded with all the evident premises of strictly logi-
cal reasoning.
7 Future work
In future work, we plan to further analyse data col-
lections carried out in the DICO project, and investi-
gate how enthymemes and IRUs are used in human-
human dialogues. In addition to this we would like
to perform an experiment where subjects are in-
structed to solve an ethical problem online. Based
on the results a repetition of the experiment could
be performed where subjects are divided into two
groups. In this second part of the experiment the
conversations will be manipulated. One group will
be provided premises such as were given by subjects
in part one, the second group will get premises that
do not make sense. This kind of experiment would
allow us to compare the decision making capacity in
the two cases. Hopefully it would also give informa-
tion about when it is beneficial to motivate a propo-
sition and what kind of information should be sup-
plied. The results of DICO data analysis and exper-
iments will possibly show some regularities similar
to the notion of topoi, and might give an idea about
which enthymemes a car navigation system should
be able to point to.
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Abstract
In face-to-face meetings, assigning and
agreeing to carry out future actions is a fre-
quent subject of conversation. Work thus far
on identifying these action item discussions
has focused on extracting them from entire
transcripts of meetings. Here we investi-
gate a human-initiative targeting approach
by simulating a scenario where meeting par-
ticipants provide low-load input (pressing
a button during the dialogue) to indicate
that an action item is being discussed. We
compare the performance of categorical and
sequential machine learning methods and
their robustness when the point of user input
varies. We also consider automatic summa-
rization of action items in cases where indi-
vidual utterances contain more than one type
of relevant information.
1 Introduction
Regrettably, people do not always pay attention to
everything you say. In fact, research on lexical
change blindness suggests they miss more than you
might imagine (Sanford et al., 2006). But such
attention-constraining strategies can prove adaptive
in the face of so-called “information overload,” and
the myriad pressures on attention that arise from liv-
ing in the modern era (or, perhaps, any era). For ex-
ample, an effective attention strategy during a busi-
ness meeting might be to pay close attention to e-
mail on your laptop while processing the ongoing
meeting dialogue in a shallow way that picks up on
segments of interest to you, or in which it seems you
are about to be assigned some task. When those pat-
terns of dialogue arise, you then pay closer attention
to the dialogue, or even participate yourself. Such
strategies come second nature to us.
But this strategy of targeted listening can be em-
ployed in machine interpretation of meeting dia-
logue as well, using an approach to dialogue pro-
cessing we call targeted understanding. While a ma-
chine’s interpretation of semantics in multi-human
dialogue faces different obstacles from those faced
by a human—lacking the facility with context and
intentionality that we take for granted—the general
approach to interpretation can be similar: Only seg-
ments that contain certain patterns of dialogue are
identified as deserving close attention, followed by
a deeper semantic analysis of those segments for the
most relevant bits of information.
In this paper we briefly discuss how we use tar-
geted understanding to identify the tasks people
agree to in meetings (their action items) from multi-
party meeting dialogue. Work thus far on this en-
deavor has focused on extracting action items from
entire records of meetings (Purver et al., 2007; Ehlen
et al., 2008), relying on a machine-initiative ap-
proach that extracts all possible action item discus-
sions and then asks meeting participants to cull them
after the meeting is finished. Here we will steer
a slightly different tack, investigating the potential
of “human-initiative targeting” that allows partici-
pants in a meeting to give some indication of an area
of interest—by, say, pressing a button when an ac-
tion item is being discussed. We then use automatic
methods to extract the semantic properties of utter-
ances that are salient to that segment of dialogue,
and generate a readable summary.
In the next Section we describe previous work on
extracting action items. After that, in Section 3,
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we present our approach and methodology for this
study. Sections 4 and 5 present our experiments
and results: First with respect to the task of detect-
ing those utterances that contain semantic informa-
tion related to action items; and second with respect
to extracting different kinds of properties from sin-
gle utterances that contain more than one type of
action item-related semantic information. We con-
clude with directions for future work in Section 6.
2 Targeted Understanding of Action Items
The process of assigning and agreeing to carry out
future actions frequently arises through some chan-
nel of communication, such as e-mails or dialogue.
They are often called action items or next actions
and arise as public commitments to undertake a task.
Several recent efforts have sought to utilize this
communicative channel to extract them automati-
cally, and to mine and summarize useful information
from them.
2.1 Action Items in Dialogue
How do people in meetings discuss action items?
Because the process of deciding what tasks will be
done and who will do them is a common and sig-
nificant interaction during meetings, their discussion
approximates an exemplary structure, adhering to
a recognizable pattern—even if that pattern comes
spread over several persons and multiple utterances.
(1) A: We should have a rerun of the three
of us sitting together
B: Sure
A: Some time this week again
C: OK
A: And finish up the values of this
B: Yeah
In the first place, there is usually some discussion
of the task that needs to be performed. In the ex-
ample above the sub-utterances “have a rerun of the
three of us sitting together” and “finish up the val-
ues” contribute to a task description. The first utter-
ance also includes a second component that is com-
monly found in action items, which is discussion
of who will be responsible for—or take ownership
of—the task to be performed (in this case, all partic-
ipants, or “we”). A third component is some desig-
nation of the timeframe in which the task should be
completed, in this case “some time this week”. Fi-
nally, because this is a public, joint commitment and
not a solitary one, one often hears some indication
of agreement from the participants agreeing to the
commitment (“Sure”, “OK”, “Yeah”) Because ac-
knowledgments like these help to glue together ver-
bal acts of coordination, agreement is an important
fourth component in such discussions.
Thus, a dialogue that discusses an action item
tends toward some approximation of this exemplary
structure, and includes utterances that play one or
more of these four roles at a time. Granted, the
structure is exemplary, so sometimes one of these el-
ements (such as the timeframe) may not be present.
But in general, the closer a round of dialogue comes
to representing these four types of dialogue moves—
task description, ownership, timeframe, and agree-
ment—the more likely we find that some future task
or action item is being discussed.
2.2 Structural Extraction Approach
This structural insight was fleshed out in Purver
et al. (2006; 2007). Others (Morgan et al., 2006;
Hsueh and Moore, 2007) had attempted a flat ap-
proach to action item detection in dialogue where
utterances were simply marked as either being rele-
vant to an action item discussion or not. Purver et
al. (2007) replaced this flat classification approach
with a structured, hierarchical one. They trained
four linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classi-
fiers to detect utterances that correspond to each of
the four Action Item-related Dialogue Acts (AIDAs)
in Table 1. Then they used a super-classifier trained
with the hypothesized labels and confidence scores
of the four independent classifiers to detect clusters
of those sub-classes, which indicate probable discus-
sions of action items. On the task of detecting action
item discussions, this approach achieved an F-score
of 0.45, (using a criterion of at least 50% overlap be-
tween hypothesized and oracle action item discus-
sion), compared to 0.35 using a flat approach with
the same feature and data sets.
The strategy of attending to and targeting a spe-
cific dialogic structure exhibits a clear benefit over a
flat approach. But note that this approach to hierar-
chical classification does not presume any sequen-
tial dependencies in the utterances, since they are
classified separately and aggregated by window, thus
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D description discussion of the task to be
performed
T timeframe discussion of the required
timeframe
O owner assignment of responsibility
(to self or other)
A agreement explicit agreement or com-
mitment
Table 1: Action item dialogue act (AIDA) classes.
ignoring any temporal organization that might exist
in the exemplary pattern of action item discussions.
This is one possibility we intend to investigate here.
2.3 Exploiting User Feedback
Another way to improve detection of action item dis-
cussions and their associated AIDAs is to involve a
person in the loop who can provide some feedback
about whether or not the detected utterances really
do correspond to discussion of an action item.
This possibility was explored by Ehlen et
al. (2007; 2008), who used a post-meeting browser
tool to present detected action items to meeting par-
ticipants taken from the DARPA CALO 2007 CLP
evaluation. After each meeting, participants could
review their action items, changing the task descrip-
tion (D), timeframe (T), and owner (O) entries in
ways that allowed feedback to three of the four cor-
responding AIDA sub-classifiers. When users added
action items to their to-do lists or rejected them,
feedback for the super-classifier was also harvested.
These data from human feedback were used to
re-train each of the targeted classifiers, allowing an
assessment of whether implicit user feedback could
help improve the models. Indeed, this type of feed-
back yielded F-score error reductions between 20
and 40% for different meeting sequences, indicating
that human feedback could be useful.
Results such as these bring up the question of
whether some other types of human input might
yield similar improvements. Instead of requiring
meeting participants to review action items after a
meeting is finished, perhaps they could “mark” rel-
evant segments of a meeting as they happen, by, for
example, pushing a button when something occurs
that corresponds to information they wish to recall
or have extracted. Our first experiment in Section 4
simulates just such a scenario.
2.4 Summarizing Action Items
There is a growing interest in dialogue summariza-
tion, with most approaches attempting to summarize
the content of entire dialogues (Zechner, 2002; Mur-
ray et al., 2005; Murray and Renals, 2007). The
most obvious application of identifying action item
discussions and their corresponding dialogue acts is
to produce a more structured and targeted meeting
summary by providing a descriptive record of the
tasks assigned, perhaps presented as an automati-
cally generated to-do list.
Purver et al. (2007) made a preliminary attempt
at generating extractive summaries of action items,
focusing on utterances tagged as performing one of
two AIDAs: either the task description (D) or the
timeframe (T) during which the task is to be per-
formed. Their approach involved parsing the word
confusion network (WCN) for each relevant utter-
ance using a general rule-based parser (Dowding et
al., 1993), which produced multiple short fragments
rather than one full utterance parse. An SVM classi-
fier was then trained to learn a model which ranked
these phrases according to their likelihood of ap-
pearing in a gold-standard extractive summary. Var-
ious features were used including WCN, parse, lex-
ical and temporal expression tags.
This approach produced mixed results. While
precision was higher than that of a baseline that
used the entire 1-best utterance transcription, only
the F-scores obtained for timeframe outperformed
the baseline. Besides yielding mixed results, this
prior work did not consider summarisation of ac-
tion items where utterances are tagged with multiple
AIDA classes. In such cases, it is necessary to deter-
mine which bits of information are related to which
dialogue act, and as a result the summarization task
becomes more complicated. Our second experiment
in Section 5 addresses this issue.
3 Approach & Methodology
The work of Purver et al. (2007) has shown that au-
tomatically identifying AIDAs in transcripts of full
meetings is a difficult task—achieving F-scores be-
low 0.25 (see Table 2). One reason is that AIDAs are
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very sparse, making up only around 1.4% of utter-
ances in a meeting transcript. In the first of two ex-
periments, we want to investigate how on-line input
given by meeting participants can reduce the sparse-
ness problem and thus help in automatic identifica-
tion. If participants could indicate where an action
item is being discussed by, for instance, pressing a
button during the ongoing dialogue, such “human-
initiative targeting” could help the system to bypass
large sections of dialogue in favor of specific, rele-
vant regions.
We simulate participants’ input by selecting sec-
tions of dialogue that include discussion of action
items, and then use machine learning on the targeted
sections to identify the AIDAs. In doing so we ad-
dress a number of issues.
First, we investigate the degree to which human-
initiative targeting can improve classifier perfor-
mance by training only on windows of utterances
instead of full meetings. The average length of an
action item discussion is 7.8 utterances, and 92% of
action items are at most 15 utterances long. Hence
we allow the system to have access only to 15 utter-
ance windows.
Secondly, we compare the performance of a Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) categorical classifier,
as used by Purver et al. (2007), against a Hidden
Markov model (HMM). The HMM is a sequential
model, and so assuming that action item discussions
exhibit regularities in sequences of utterance types,
it may perform better.
Thirdly, we also investigate how robust classifier
performance is with regard to when the human input
is given. We first consider a case in which partici-
pants always press a button right at the end of an ac-
tion item discussion, and then look at a presumably
more realistic case in which participants may press
the button at different times in relation to the end of
an action item discussion. This allows us to inves-
tigate the extent to which performance degrades in
less systematic and more realistic situations.
Our second experiment is concerned with extract-
ing words from AIDAs that can be used to generate a
useful descriptive summary of an action item discus-
sion. As mentioned in the previous section, the fact
that utterances can be tagged with multiple AIDAs
complicates the task of extracting information for
summarization purposes, since we need to distin-
guish between bits of information related to different
AIDAs but contained within a single utterance. We
address this issue in Section 5, focusing on those ut-
terances that have been simultaneously tagged with
classes D and O. Again, we compare performance
of categorical (SVM) and sequential (HMM) classi-
fiers.
For our two experiments, we used the ICSI Meet-
ing Corpus (Janin et al., 2004), which contains
recordings and manual transcriptions of naturally
occurring research group meetings. In particu-
lar, we used the annotated sub-corpus of Purver et
al. (2007), which consists of 18 ICSI meeting tran-
scripts annotated using the AIDA classes shown in
Table 1. The annotations also include a summary
description for every instance of an AIDA class, cre-
ated by manual selection of words and phrases from
the gold-standard transcripts.
4 Experiment I: Targeted AIDA Detection
In this section we present our experiment on detect-
ing AIDAs from targeted regions of meeting tran-
scripts.
4.1 Data
The 18 ICSI meetings in our subcorpus have been
annotated with 190 action item discussions in total
(10.6 action items per meeting on average). To sim-
ulate user input, we generated two different data-sets
from this corpus: a systematic input data-set and a
non-systematic input data-set. The systematic input
data-set was generated by extracting 190 sections of
15 utterances, and for each the last utterance corre-
sponded to the last AIDA of an action item. This
data-set simulates a scenario where participants al-
ways press a button right at the end of an action item
discussion. The non-systematic data-set simulates
a more realistic situation where user input is given
at random points towards the end of an action item
discussion. Here we allow the system to look 10
utterances backwards and 5 forward from the point
when the input is given. The data-set was generated
by extracting 190 sections of 15 utterances, where
the input is assumed to be randomly given either im-
mediately after the last AIDA of an action item dis-
cussion, or 1, 2, 3 or 4 utterances earlier.
Targeting sections of dialogue that contain action
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item discussions obviously reduces AIDA sparse-
ness considerably. Averaging over the systematic
and non-systematic input data-sets (which are very
similar in this respect), 13.7% of utterances (around
2 on average per window) are tagged with class D,
4.4% (around 0.6 per window) are tagged with class
T, 9.5% (around 1.4 per window) are tagged with
class O, and 14.6% (around 2.2 per window) are
tagged with class A.
4.2 Classifiers & Features
We use the linear-kernel support vector machine
classifier SVMlight (Joachims, 1999) and the struc-
tural support vector machine classifier SVMhmm
(Altun et al., 2003), which trains models that are iso-
morphic to hidden Markov models.
We train four individual SVM classifiers—one for
each AIDA class—and compare their performance
to that of one single HMM classifier that uses six
different labels for the model states: labels D, T, O,
and A for each of the AIDA classes, plus a label X
for utterances outside the action item discussion and
an insertion-class label I for those utterances inside
an action item discussion that do not belong to any
AIDA class. In all cases, we evaluate performance
using 18-fold cross-validation, with each fold con-
taining those 15-utterance windows that belong to
the same meeting.
To train the classifiers, we use similar features
to those of Purver et al. (2007), derived from the
properties of the utterances in context: lexical uni-
grams, durational features from the transcriptions,
dialogue act tags from the ICSI-MRDA annotations
(Shriberg et al., 2004), temporal expression tags us-
ing the MITRE TIMEX tool, as well as contextual
features consisting of the same features for the im-
mediately preceding and following 5 utterances.
4.3 Results
The results reported in Purver et al. (2007) for the
task of identifying AIDAs from whole meetings are
shown in Table 2. Using simulated participant input
to target regions of dialogue that contain action item
discussions, we are able to improve these baseline
results by more than 30% (see Table 3).
Table 3 shows the scores we obtained when simu-
lated participant input was provided, systematically
at the end of an action item discussion and non-
D T O A
Recall .19 .15 .21 .18
Precision .18 .46 .27 .16
F-score .19 .22 .24 .17
Table 2: SVMs trained on whole meeting transcripts
D T O A
Recall .66 .57 .66 .78
Precision .51 .45 .51 .49
F-score .57 .51 .57 .60
Recall .56 .52 .62 .82
Precision .45 .45 .50 .44
F-score .50 .48 .55 .57
Table 3: SVMs trained on targeted regions; system-
atic input (top) vs. non-systematic input (bottom)
systematically at any point in the second half of the
discussion. In this case the results for these two dif-
ferent data-sets are very similar. The non-systematic
input data-set yields slightly lower F-scores, but the
drop is only statistically significant for classes D and
A (p < 0.05 on a paired t-test). The slightly lower
results may be due to the fact that some AIDAs may
not fall into the 15 utterance window the classifier
is looking at (for instance, if the input is given at
the end of the action item and the discussion is more
than 10 utterance long, then since the classifier is
only looking 10 utterances back, the AIDA(s) at the
beginning of the action item discussion are not con-
sidered), which reduces the number of available pos-
itive examples.1
Table 4 shows the results we obtained when we
used a single HMM instead of four independent
SVM classifiers. While recall is significantly lower
for all classes (p < 0.05) leading to a drop of F-
scores, the sequential model is able to achieve good
precision results. In contrast to the SVMs, how-
ever, using the non-systematic input data-set with
the HMM classifier leads to a statistically significant
drop in performance, especially for classes A and D,
where both recall and precision decrease (p < 0.01).
This is perhaps not surprising, since the variability
of the non-systematic data-set disrupts the sequen-
1A possible way of compensating for this would be to in-
crease the size of the window. This however is not an optimal
solution since the bigger the window the sparser the AIDAs.
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D T O A
Recall .48 .33 .45 .54
Precision .53 .52 .50 .53
F-score .50 .40 .48 .53
Recall .32 .22 .32 .38
Precision .45 .41 .46 .40
F-score .37 .29 .38 .39
Table 4: HMM trained on targeted regions; system-
atic input (top) vs. non-systematic input (bottom)
tial organization that drives this kind of model.
While lexical features were the most useful in all
cases, we observed that using the MRDA dialogue
act tags commitment and suggestion im-
proved precision significantly, especially for classes
O and D. TIMEX tags boost scores for class T, al-
though using targeted regions does not improve pre-
cision for this class.
In summary, using online input to target regions
of dialogue where an action item is being discussed
can improve AIDA detection substantially when
compared to a no-input approach, even if the input
is given randomly towards the end of the action item
discussion. Although the sequential model yielded
good precision scores, its performance was less ro-
bust to non-systematic user input. A possible reason
for its lower recall even with the systematic data-set
is that HMMs may not be so well suited when target
classes are sparse:2 if the model fails to hypothe-
size one AIDA where it should, it may then fail to
hypothesize subsequent AIDAs. SVMs do not have
this problem because each utterance is assessed in-
dependently.
5 Experiment II: Summarization of
Utterances Tagged with Multiple AIDAs
Having indentified the constituent utterances in an
action item, the next task is to summarize their ac-
tion item-related semantic content so that it can be
presented in a to-do list for the user. Here, we use
a different methodology from Purver et al. (2007)
that does not require a parser, and concentrate on
extracting summary-worthy words from utterances
that have been tagged with multiple AIDAs. While
2As mentioned in Section 4.1, AIDA classes in targeted re-
gions make up between 4.4% and 14/6% of utterances.
in general there is a large degree of independence be-
tween class distributions (with most cosine distances
below 0.3), classes D and O often overlap, yielding a
between-class cosine distance of 0.55 (where 1 rep-
resents exact correlation and 0 total independence).
Hence we concentrate on those utterances that have
been tagged as both ownership (O) and task descrip-
tion (D).
5.1 Methodology
In our 18 meeting corpus there are 162 utterances
that have been tagged as both D and O. These ut-
terances contain a total of 2697 words, 409 of which
have been annotated as summary-worthy for class O,
and 1015 as summary-worthy for class D. Example
(2) shows a D + O utterance with the gold-standard
summary-worthy phrases indicated in square brack-
ets.
(2) It would be great if [you]O could um not tran-
scribe it all but uh [pick out some stuff ]D
We use gold-standard extractive summaries as tar-
gets and train a classifier to decide whether or not
each word in the manual transcription of a D + O ut-
terance is summary-worthy for classes O and D, re-
spectively. This approach exploits the fact that crit-
ical phrases that contain summary-worthy informa-
tion for different AIDAs display characteristic syn-
tactic, semantic, and lexical features.
To train our classifiers we used lexical trigrams
(including the current word, and the immediately
preceding and following words) and Part-of-Speech
(PoS) tags generated by the Stanford PoS tagger
(Toutanova and Manning, 2000). In all cases, testing
was performed using 10-fold cross-validation. We
experimented with the following types of classifiers:
– SVM: Two independent classifiers each trained
to distinguish O and D words, respectively,
from other words.
– SVM (O/D): One classifier trained to distin-
guish between O, D, and other words.
– HMM (B/I): One classifier trained to distin-
guish between O words (beginning and inside
of sequence), D words (beginning and inside of
sequence), and other words.3
3The end of the sequence is labelled with the inside (I) tag.
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5.2 Evaluation
We evaluated each classifier’s performance against
the manually-annotated summary descriptions. Re-
call was therefore the proportion of words in the
gold-standard summaries which overlapped with the
words extracted by the classifiers; precision was
the proportion of words extracted by the classifiers
which also appear in the gold-standard summaries.
The O and D classes are compared to different
baselines. Since the role of the O class is to assign
responsibilty for a task, a large number of utterances
tagged with O contain names or pronouns identify-
ing the responsible party. Hence it is reasonable to
use a baseline which tags all instances of first and
second person personal pronouns (I, you, we) as pos-
itive. For class D, there was no clear majority POS
class, so we settled on a baseline that tagged half of
all words in D utterances as positive, where this half
was selected randomly.
5.3 Results
Table 5 shows results for the different classifiers.
All of the classifiers achieved substantially higher F-
scores than the baseline for both ownership (O) and
task description (D).
Ownership Description
Model Re Pr F1 Re Pr F1
Baseline .39 .59 .47 .53 .38 .44
SVM .76 .56 .64 .80 .64 .71
SVM (O/D) .61 .67 .64 .74 .68 .71
HMM (B/I) .61 .69 .65 .74 .71 .73
Table 5: Extraction of summary-worthy O/D words
For O, all of the classifiers achieved very similar
F-scores. However a t-test shows that the HMM’s
score is significantly higher than the SVM(O/D)
(p < 0.005). For D, the HMM performed signifi-
cantly better than both the SVM(O/D) and SVM(D)
classifiers in terms of precision and F-score (p <
0.01). Its F-score of .73 is much higher than that
achieved by the best model of Purver et al. (2007):
.38, lower even than their baseline which was the en-
tire 1-best utterance transcription (see Section 2.4).
Although those results are not directly comparable
to ours, (since we used gold-standard transcriptions
rather than WCNs, and focused on utterances that
had been tagged with 2 rather than 1 AIDA class),
we believe they show that the general approach has
promise, and that the sequential model is well-suited
to this task.
6 Conclusions & Future work
We have simulated a “human-initiative targeting”
approach to action item detection where participants
provide input—e.g. by pressing a button—to indi-
cate that an action item is being discussed, which
allows a system to concentrate on relevant dialogue
regions. As a result we were able to improve the de-
tection of action item-related dialogue acts (AIDAs)
very substantially, obtaining F-scores that are twice
as high as when using whole meetings.
Categorical models (SVM) proved to be more
useful than sequential ones (HMM) for this task.
The HMM yielded good precision scores but signif-
icantly lower recall, and so the overall performance
was lower for this type of classifier. When we com-
pared systematic user input given at the end of an ac-
tion item discussion with less systematic input given
randomly at different points towards the end of the
action item, we found that the SVMs were more ro-
bust than the sequential model. This is not surpris-
ing since such unsystematic behavior disrupts the se-
quential organization which the HMM relies on.
We also addressed the task of extracting
summary-worthy information from utterances that
had been tagged with two AIDAs—ownership and
task description—and found sequential models to be
useful for this task, achieving F-scores of .65 and
.73, respectively.
In the future we plan to experiment with a two-
stage classification approach. This would involve
first using SVMs to make classifications and pro-
vide confidence scores independent of sequence, and
then second, giving this information to a sequential
model that makes the final classifcations. Combin-
ing the two different types of classifier in this way
may produce better results for both AIDA classifica-
tion and summarization.
Our findings with respect to targeted understand-
ing are useful, but of course, real user behavior dur-
ing actual meetings will differ in many respects,
and will surely prove more variable than what we
have simulated here. Bearing this in mind, fu-
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ture work will involve conducting an experiment in
which we ask actual meeting participants to provide
live button-pushing input during meetings when it
occurs to them that an action item is being discussed.
Only then can we know whether the approach de-
scribed in this paper will be robust enough to handle
the vagaries of real human behavior.
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Abstract 
This study investigated whether young chil-
dren form ‘referential pacts’ (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003) such 
that they expect people to refer to objects 
with the same terms over time unless there is 
a good reason to switch to using a new ex-
pression. 128 children aged 3 and 5 years 
participated in a study where they co-
operated with an experimenter (E1) to move 
toys around to new locations on a shelf. E1 
established referential terms for all the toys 
in a warm up game.  Then, either E1 (origi-
nal partner condition) or a new experi-
menter, E2 (new partner condition), played 
a second game with the same toys. In the 
second game, two critical toys were referred 
to with their original terms and two with 
new terms.  Children were significantly 
slower to pick up a toy if it was referred to 
with a new term than with an old term. Cru-
cially, this difference in reaction times was 
significantly greater in the original partner 
condition. This suggests that children found 
it harder to process a new term when it was 
produced by someone who had previously 
referred to the same toy with a different ex-
pression. That is, children as young a 3 years 
of age show adult-like sensitivity to referen-
tial pacts. 
1 Introduction 
According to Grice’s Maxim of Manner, speakers 
should not abandon a perspective without good 
reason. So, if we are engaged in moving some toys 
around on a set of shelves and I refer to a toy con-
sistently as ‘the bush’, then you will come to ex-
pect me to continue to use that term to refer to the 
same object in the future. If I suddenly abandon 
our ‘referential pact’ and call the toy ‘the tree’ you 
will be momentarily confused. However, if a new 
person (with no prior experience of our pact) enters 
the room and uses the alternative referring expres-
sion (‘the tree’), you would not find it confusing, 
as long as it is an acceptable description of the toy 
in the absence of a prior pact (Brennan & Clark, 
1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003).   
 In an experimental investigation of adult 
sensitivity to referential pacts, Metzing and Bren-
nan (2003) had participants play a cooperative 
game of the type described above with an experi-
menter who established shared terms for objects 
(e.g., ‘‘the shiny cylinder’’) during repeated refer-
ences to them. After this warm up phase, either the 
original experimenter or a new experimenter (who 
had not observed the warm up) continued the game 
and used either the original expressions or a new 
ones (e.g., ‘‘the silver pipe’’) to refer to the previ-
ously discussed objects. In this test phase, adults 
were equally quick to comprehend original expres-
sions regardless of which experimenter produced 
them. However, when objects were referred to with 
new expressions, there was partner specific inter-
ference: adults were 12 milliseconds slower to 
touch the target object when the new expression 
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was uttered by the original experimenter than when 
the new expression was uttered by the new ex-
perimenter.  This difference in reaction times was 
also reflected in the adults’ eye movements to tar-
get objects and was argued to reflect adult sensitiv-
ity to referential pacts – if someone suddenly 
switches from using one term to using another for 
no apparent reason, it slows you down. 
Metzing and Brennan’s (2003) finding that 
comprehension of referential terms is subject to 
partner-specific effects is now generally accepted. 
However, debate continues as to how early this 
effect of referential pacts is in adult processing 
(Brown-Schmidt, 2008; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007). 
There is also controversy concerning whether ref-
erential pacts rest on a principle of co-
cooperativeness that is mutually assumed to hold 
between two conversational partners or whether 
pacts are a reflection of a more simple expectation 
that people will be consistent in their use of ex-
pressions across time (Shintel & Keysar, 2007).  
Whatever the outcome of the above debates, it 
is unclear when we would expect children to show 
sensitivity to referential pacts. It is plausible that 
before the age of four, children would expect eve-
ryone to use the same term for an object regardless 
of whether they were present when a pact was es-
tablished. Indeed, studies on the development of 
synonyms suggest that three-year-olds will not ac-
cept that a given toy can be called, for example, 
both ‘a rabbit’ and  ‘a bunny’ (Doherty, 2000; Do-
herty & Perner, 1998; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & 
Doherty, 2002). In these alternative naming stud-
ies, children aged between three and five years 
were instructed that if a puppet calls an item, e.g., 
‘a rabbit’ the child has to call it something else, 
e.g., ‘a bunny’ or, in a judgment version of the 
task, the child has to name a toy and then, when 
the puppet refers to it with an alternative term, the 
child has to say whether the term is acceptable or 
not. The synonyms used in this task were: bunny–
rabbit, lady–woman, television–TV, coat-jacket.  
In control games, the children were asked to name 
a colour of the item (e.g. Puppet: “bunny”, Child: 
“white”) or part of the item (Puppet: “bunny”, 
Child: “tail”). Three-year-olds tended to fail the 
alternative name task (insist that a bunny cannot 
also be called a rabbit) despite passing the control 
task, whereas older children tended to pass the al-
ternative naming task at around the same time they 
began to pass false belief tasks.  The explanation of 
these results was thus that before four years of age 
children cannot reconcile conflicting perspectives 
in order to understand that what one person might 
call a bunny another might call a rabbit. Although 
not adult like, this kind of mutual exclusivity con-
straint has been argued to convey certain advan-
tages in early language learning (c.f. Sabbagh & 
Henderson, 2007). 
 Given the above findings we were inter-
ested to investigate whether young children are 
sensitive to referential pacts and whether this sen-
sitivity only emerges after 4 years. We thus 
adapted Metzing & Brennan’s (2003) task for use 
with children. In a within-subjects design, children 
played with two sets of toys. With one set, experi-
menter 1 (E1) established names for the toys in a 
warm up phase and then continued to play in the 
test phase. With the other set of toys, E1 played the 
warm up phase and then a new person, E2, played 
the test phase. Each test phase had four critical 
toys: toys 1 and 3 were referred to with an original 
expression established in the warm up phase and 
toys 2 and 4 were referred to with an entirely new 
expression. We recorded how long it took children 
to pick up each toy. Thus for each test phase we 
were able to make two comparisons: whether chil-
dren were quicker to pick up toy 1 than toy 2 (trial 
1) and whether they were quicker to pick up toy 3 
than toy 4 (trial 2). Of greatest interest is whether 
any differences in reaction times vary as a function 
of the identity of the experimenter. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
126 normally developing, monolingual, 
English-speaking children were included in the 
study (51 boys, 75 girls).  There were 62 three-
year-olds (range 3;0-3;11, mean age 3;5) and 64 
five-year-olds (range 5;0-5;11, mean age 5;6). The 
children were tested in a university laboratory in 
the U.K.. Full parental consent was obtained for 
each child.  
2.2 Materials and Design 
Fourteen toys were selected on the basis 
that they could be described felicitously by two 
different, well-known nouns that occur frequently 
in the speech directed to 3-year-old children (as 
verified by a search of the CHILDES database, 
MacWhinney, 2000). Of these fourteen, eight were 
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selected as stimuli on the basis that a group of 16 
3-year-olds (not tested in any of the subsequent 
procedures) used at least two different well-known 
words to spontaneously refer to the toys when 
asked ‘What’s this?’. These preferred terms were 
then used as the referring expressions for the study. 
The pairs of terms used to describe the 8 critical 
toys are presented in table 1. One set of toys was 
used for the ‘same partner’ condition and another 
set for the ‘new partner’ condition (counterbal-
anced). 
 
Table 1. Pairs of referring expressions used to refer to 
critical toys. 
Set A Set B 
car / truck girl / lady 
book / story pillow / cushion 
horse / pony turtle / tortoise 
tree / bush nose / apple 
 
To be confident that most 3-year-olds 
would be able to identify each toy upon hearing 
either of the above terms, we first conducted a 
comprehension test with two groups each made up 
of seven 2-year-olds and 12 3-year-olds.  Again, 
none of these children took part in the main study. 
Both groups saw all the toys at the same time and 
were asked to ‘find the [toy name]’. The first group 
heard the first of the alternative terms (car, nose, 
book etc.) and the second group heard the second 
of the terms (bush, cushion, nose etc.).  In all cases 
at least five 2-year-olds and 11 3-year-olds were 
able to identify each toy on the basis of the terms 
they heard.  
For each partner condition in the main 
study, we put one set of test toys along with 8 
‘filler’ toys into a 5 x 3 block of Perspex pigeon-
holes (see figure 1). The arrangement of the toys 
was fixed such that an experimenter could instruct 
the child to rearrange them following a script. Pho-
tographs of each set of toys in differing arrange-
ments were taken and used as props, as explained 
below. Figure 1 a and b present example arrange-
ment for both of the set of toys. A video camera 
was set up at the edge of the Perspex boxes such 
that it was possible to code at precisely which 
frame the child’s hand entered a box to retrieve a 
toy (see figure 2). Two other video cameras re-
corded the child and the experimenter as they in-
teracted.  
2.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival, the child and their care-
giver(s) entered the test room and the child was 
allowed to play freely with E1 while E2 obtained 
parental consent for the study. This ensured the 
child had seen both experimenters before the test 
began.  
 
 
Figure 1. Toy sets A and B 
 
After a period of free play, E2 left the 
room and the child sat with E1 at a table in front of 
the Perspex boxes that were covered over with a 
piece of cloth to prevent the child from spontane-
ously naming the objects. E1 explained that under 
the cover there were lots of toys and that she had a 
photo of where the toys should go. E1 showed the 
child the first photograph briefly at this point. She 
then suggested that she could look at the picture to 
see what needed moving round and the child could 
find the toys and put them in the right places. She 
asked the child if s/he would like to help and when 
the child agreed E1 said that they would manage to 
do it together. E1 then lifted the cover to reveal the 
toys for the first game.  
Each child played four ‘games’, two per 
condition. Each game consisted of rearranging the 
toys so that they matched a photograph.  The first 
game of each condition served as a warm-up in 
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which all the key referring expressions were intro-
duced and entrained upon. This first game was al-
ways played with E1.  It consisted of a sequence of 
16 instructions of the basic form ‘Get the X, put it 
next to/under/above the Y’.  Hesitations and hedges 
(e.g. ‘Now get…I think it’s Lego….can you see 
any? Yes,  put it under the…er…man’ ) were writ-
ten into the script to reinforce the impression that 
the experimenter didn’t have a fixed conceptualiza-
tion of all of the toys from the outset. Each of the 4 
critical test objects was referred to 4 times.  
For accuracy of coding, it was important to 
ensure that children’s hands were always in the 
same position on the table before they took an ob-
ject out of a box. To achieve this, after 12 warm up 
instructions E1 showed the child a pair of red 
hands that had been drawn on the table and asked 
the child to put his/her hands on the red hands be-
fore they began each turn. From this point on, E1 
ensured that the child returned their hands to the 
red hands on the table before each new instruction 
‘ to show they were ready’.  
Once all the warm-up instructions had 
been carried out, E1 announced that the toys 
looked the same as in the photo. She showed the 
child the photo to see if s/he agreed and remarked 
on what a great job they had done. E1 let the child 
chose a sticker as a reward and asked if s/he’d like 
to play another game. E1 then left the room on the 
pretext of needing to get another photo to make. 
She returned after a minute and suggested that they 
make the next photo. At this point E2 entered the 
room and explained that the secretary needed E1, 
asking if she could come and help her for a minute. 
E1 protested that she was just needed to play a 
game quickly and asked if she could come in a 
minute. What happened next varied according to 
the two experimental conditions. 
 In the same speaker condition, E2 acqui-
esced and said she would explain to the secretary 
that E1 would come in a minute.  E1 then played 
the second game of that condition with the child. In 
the new speaker condition, E2 told E1 that the 
secretary really needed her help now. E1 agreed to 
go, asking E2 if she could quickly play the game 
with the child. E2 said she was not sure what to do 
but E1 reassured her it was easy and said ‘You just 
need to make this look the same as my picture so 
you need to move the toys around. Like you might 
say “get the [filler item] and put it next to the 
[filler item]”. . CHILD’S NAME will help you. We 
always put our hands on the red hands before we 
start to show we are ready.  I’ll be back in a min-
ute.’. E1 left the room and E2 played the second 
game with the child remarking that it didn’t look 
too difficult and that she hadn’t seen the toys be-
fore. 
 The second game consisted of 7 scripted 
instructions and was played in the same manner as 
the first, ensuring the child’s hands were always on 
the red hand markers before beginning the next 
instruction. Instructions 1, 2 and 7 referred only to 
filler toys. Instructions 3 and 5 referred to two of 
the critical toys with the same expressions as had 
been previously used in the warm-up game. In-
structions 4 and 6 referred to the other two toys 
with different expressions to the ones used in the 
warm up. Instructions 3,4,5, and 6 are henceforth 
referred to as critical trials with instructions 3 and 
4 being referred to as trial 1 and instructions 5 and 
6 being referred to as trial 2.  
 Half the children took part in the same 
speaker condition followed by the different speaker 
condition. The other half had the opposite order. 
Whichever condition came first always used toy 
set 1 and the second condition always used toy set 
2. Scripts were fully counterbalanced so that, for 
each pair of referring expressions both terms were 
heard equally often as a) the same expression used 
twice (e.g. warm-up game: ‘Tree’, test game 
‘Tree’), b) the first expression before a switch (e.g. 
warm-up game: ‘Tree’, test game ‘Bush’), c) the 
new expression after a switch (e.g. warm-up game: 
‘Bush’, test game ‘Tree’). All the scripts were writ-
ten so that the critical toys would be on the middle 
row before the test game began. This ensured the 
children would have the same distance to reach 
each toy. Furthermore, the scripts and accompany-
ing photographs were counterbalanced so that the 
critical toys appeared on the shelf in two different 
orders from left to right. This ensured that if any of 
the boxes was in a privileged position on the shelf 
(i.e. that was quicker to reach) it would not affect 
the reaction times for a given condition. Finally, 
the identity of experimenter 1 and 2 was fully 
counterbalanced. The same full-time research as-
sistant performed the role of experimenter 1 for 
half the children in each age group and experi-
menter 2 for the other half. The other experimenter 
role was performed by one of three other assis-
tants.   
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2.4 Coding 
The videos of the children’s hand movements 
when retrieving toys were coded using Adobe 
Premier software. A research assistant coded the 
length of time it took from the onset of the critical 
referring expression (as located on the audio wave) 
for the child to reach into the relevant box (the first 
frame where the fingertips were inside the box). 
Very rarely, children retrieved and object that was 
not the target. These cases were excluded from 
analysis. 
3 Results 
Table 2 reports the reaction times for both ages and 
trials as a function of partner identity and referen-
tial term.  
 
Table 2. Reaction times in seconds.  
 
  Trial 1  Trial 2        
  
Same 
Term 
New 
Term 
Same 
Term 
New 
Term       
3yrs Same Partner 2.7 4.4 2.8 3.8       
 New Partner 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.6       
5yrs Same Partner 1.8 2.9 2.3 3.1       
 New Partner 1.8 2.3 2.1 2.7       
 
To facilitate statistical analysis we converted these 
raw reaction times to difference scores (RT to New 
term – RT to Original term).  These difference 
scores are presented in figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Difference in reaction time (new expres-
sions minus original expressions) 
 
Wilcoxon tests confirmed that on the first trial 
children were slowed down by the use of a new 
referring expression significantly more if the ex-
pression was produced by the original partner than 
if by a new partner (Z = 2.561,  p = .01). This ef-
fect was more pronounced in the younger children 
and indeed when each age is considered separately 
only the effect of partner identity is only signifi-
cant for the three-year-olds, (Z = 2.068,  p = .039). 
There were no significant effects for trial 2, which 
would suggest that once a pact has been broken ‘all 
bets are off’: children are not surprised if subse-
quently other pacts are also not adhered to.  
To investigate whether the effects observed in 
trial 1 were carried by particular items, we fitted a 
mixed effect regression model to the data with 
child, new term and original term (for each object) 
as random variables, age, partner identity and the 
interaction between these two factors as fixed ef-
fects and difference in reaction times on trial 1 as 
the outcome variable (Baayen, 2008). Partner iden-
tity was a significant predictor (B = 1.9931, p = 
0.0344) such that difference scores were greater in 
the original partner condition. Age and the interac-
tion between age and partner identity were not sig-
nificant predictors.  
4 Discussion 
These results suggest that children show sensitivity 
to referential pacts from a young age. Like adults, 
children found it harder to process a new term for 
an object if it was produced by someone who had 
previously referred to the same object with a dif-
ferent expression. Interestingly this effect was only 
observed for the first trial of each test phase. This 
suggests that once someone has broken their ‘ref-
erential history’ children no longer expected them 
to adhere to it for subsequent reference to other 
objects.  
From a developmental point of view, the 
current findings are surprising given that the three-
year-olds we tested would not be expected to pass 
other tasks that require an understanding that 
whereas one person might call an object ‘a tree’ 
another might quite legitimately call it ‘a bush’.  
Children were generally capable of processing two 
different terms for an object and were only slowed 
down in the comprehension of alternative terms by 
about 1 second - so long as their conversational 
partner was not breaking a referential pact. This 
would suggest that, at least in some circumstances, 
children are relatively flexible in understanding 
that an object may be referred to in different ways 
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by different people (Deák & Maratsos, 1998). Oc-
casionally, some children were incapable of identi-
fying an object given the new term of reference 
(and were accordingly given a maximum RT of 10 
seconds, after which time the experimenter pointed 
to the target object). Thus on occasion, children 
were truly incapable of accepting two descriptions 
for one object. What the current results indicate, 
however, is that these cases are the exception 
rather than the rule.  
Despite their ability to comprehend two 
different terms for one object, many children indi-
cated that they were not happy with the use of the 
new term. They would often protest, saying, for 
example, ‘It’s not a tree, it’s a bush!’. These pro-
tests were commonplace and indicate on the one 
hand that children detect a difference in perspec-
tives about the same object, but on the other that 
they do not approve of it. Thus is would appear 
that children are ‘hyper-conventional’ at an early 
age. At the same time as understanding that the 
alternative terms where intended for the same ob-
ject, they are very keen to pass normative judg-
ment on their use. Children always preferred that 
the original term be maintained.  Given the coun-
terbalanced design, this suggests that children’s 
protests were not based on their general preference 
for one term over another but rather based on a 
preference they created during the warm up trial.  
 With respect to the debates in the adult lit-
erature, the current results are informative to the 
extent that they demonstrate that referential pacts 
are not a highly controlled phenomenon that only 
adults would be capable of displaying. Whatever 
the preferred explanation of referential pacts - be 
they truly co-operative in nature or more expecta-
tion based – it is clear that they have an effect from 
early on in development and indeed are more pro-
nounced for younger children. Apparently the 
older children were able to recover from a ‘broken 
pact’ faster than their younger counterparts.  It 
would therefore not be surprising if such effects 
went undetected in adults at least some of the time, 
given how quickly they can be resolved in highly 
constrained contexts.  
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Abstract
Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001) has proposed that
the grammatical form of an anaphor can be
predicted from the ‘deemed’ accessibility of
its antecedent. The element of judgment in
the term ‘deemed’ is critical: it allows the
speaker to reflect an egocentric perspective
and frees choice of expression from the ac-
tual contingencies of the situation in which it
is uttered. Using a screen-based joint tan-
gram construction task (Carletta et al., under
revision), we examine the accessibility of
1775 introductory mentions for effects of
situation (communication modalities and ac-
tions involving the named entity) and of re-
sponsibilities assigned to the participants. We
find statistically significant effects of three
kinds: circumstances readily available to the
listener (concurrent movement of the named
object); circumstances private to the speaker
(hovering the mouse over the object, when
the listener cannot see the mouse), and the
speaker’s role in the joint task. Since ego-
centrically selected forms may be under-
specified, we make a preliminary attempt to
discover whether referring expression usage
is disabling or irrelevant.
1 Introduction
The question of what a thing shall be called has
engaged psychologists and linguists as much as it
engages anyone attempting automatic interpreta-
tion or generation of referring expressions
(Brown, 1958; Dale & Reiter, 1995; Gundel,
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Kranstedt, Lück-
ing, Pfeiffer, Rieser, & Wachsmuth, 2006; Ly-
ons, 1977; Prince, 1981; Van der Sluis & Krah-
mer, 2007; Walker & Prince, 1996). One very
wide-ranging approach, (Ariel, 1988, 1990,
2001), attempts to key elaboration of the form of
referring expressions to the ‘deemed’ accessibil-
ity of the referent, that is, to how difficult the
producer of the expression estimates it will be to
access the referent concept, discourse entity, or
extra-linguistic object. Expressions introducing
entities deemed completely unfamiliar to the
audience should be maximally detailed indefinite
NPs including modifiers of various kinds, as in
(1). Expressions of intermediate accessibility
might be marked by definite articles, deictic ex-
pressions, or personal pronouns in that order.
Expressions making reference to a single most
immediately mentioned entity in focus can be as
minimal as so-called clitics (2), unstressed and
all but deleted pronouns, or even zero forms (3).
(1) A Republican governor of a strongly De-
mocratic state.
(2) A: Where’s Arthur?
B: /z/ in the garage.
(3) A. And your younger son?
B. {-} playing Internet poker.
Accessibility theory provides a unified frame-
work for predicting how forms of referring ex-
pressions will respond to givenness, discourse
focus, inferrability from local scenarios and the
like. As a general notion, accessibility ought to
include effects of any available conditions which
might draw attention to the correct referent,
whatever modality delivers them and whether
they are internal or external to the discourse.
This paper discusses the accessibility of referring
expressions produced during a joint construction
task and examines two factors which might draw
attention to the correct referent, task related
movements and the roles of the participants.
The origins of our questions about these fac-
tors lie in the information which human inter-
locutors might use in determining how to refer.
Ariel’s notion of accessibility appears to depend
on what the speaker supposes is the case, not on
what is genuinely easier or more difficult for the
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listener. While some approaches to dialogue as-
sume that speakers carefully model their inter-
locutors, so that initial forms of expression could
arise from the interlocutors’ needs (Brennan &
Clark, 1996; Clark & Krych, 2004; Schober,
1993), there is increasing evidence that we have
limited ability to construct, recall, or deploy any
such model in a timely fashion (Bard, Anderson
et al., 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 2005a,
2005b; Horton & Keysar, 1996). Interlocutors
may behave egocentrically (Bard et al., 2000;
Bard & Aylett, 2004; Horton & Keysar, 1996),
adopt a global account of affordances of a situa-
tion, (Anderson, Bard, Sotillo, Newlands, & Do-
herty-Sneddon, 1997; Brennan, Chen, Dickinson,
Neider, & Zelinsky, In press), or observe infor-
mation indicative of the listener’s knowledge,
but fail to act on it (Bard, Anderson et al., 2007;
Brennan et al., In press).
The situation for form of referring expressions
is mixed. While accessibility of referring expres-
sions is more sensitive to the knowledge of the
listener than is clarity of articulation (Bard &
Aylett, 2004), other studies show that tendencies
to match nomenclature to listener’s history or
current situation are quite variable (Brennan &
Clark, 1996; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 2005a;
Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Lin, & Barr,
2003). So-called conceptual pacts are actually
lexical pacts (Brennan & Clark, 1996), agree-
ments to call objects by certain names, and are
the result of negotiation over time, across which
accessibility of the referring expression naturally
rises. If speakers do track one another’s internal
states, the accessibility of even introductory
mentions will suit the interlocutor’s current
needs, rather than the speaker’s.
The evidence may be inconclusive because the
typical paradigms for dialogue studies restrict
cooperation to disjointed episodes. Often one
participant instructs another to act on or select
from an array of potential referents, while the
other follows instructions relative to an identical
or partially overlapping array. Both responsibili-
ties and activities are clearly distinct. Even when
players ultimately exchange roles, the roles are
inherently asymmetrical: one has more informa-
tion and more power to design the communica-
tion than the other. Channels for communication
are purposely limited; and the knowledge shared
between instructor and listener is altered trial by
trial in an unpredictable way. To discover
whether more robustly cooperative behaviour
appears in more cooperative tasks, we have cre-
ated a corpus of dialogues centred around a
shared task which demands joint attention but
makes it possible to vary the participants roles.
To study joint action as a model for human-
robot cooperation in quasi-industrial settings, the
JAST project has developed the Joint Construc-
tion Task (Carletta et al., under revision) in
which two human players cooperate to construct
a  two-dimensional tangram on their yoked
screens (Figure 1). Each player can manipulate
the component parts by mouse actions. Each
dyad is assigned to work either with roles (one
player managing the task and the other assisting)
or without. Mouse actions draw attention not just
because they are integral to the construction
process, but because, to mimic industrial risks,
they are dangerous. If both mice touch the same
object, or if two objects overlap, both break. Be-
cause each player can act on the tangram parts
and sub-constructions, the activity of grasping or
moving the named object adds a haptic or praxic
modality to spoken forms. Even ‘hovering’ the
mouse over a part without grasping it offers a
chance to make a part accessible. The paradigm
suggests how accessible initial mentions should
be: because tangram parts come in identical
pairs, a felicitous first mention should in theory
be an indefinite expression like (4) or (5)
(4) Let’s get a red square
(5) We could try one pink triangle first.
To discover how well keyed any change in
form of referring expression is to the perceptions
of the interlocutor, the design contrasts situations
in which each player’s mouse cursor is projected
onto the other’s screen with situations in which
each player can see only the resulting movement
of the object which the other’s mouse ‘grasps’.
Only in the first case can a player see the mouse
‘hovering’ over a tangram part which is not actu-
ally moving.
Figure 1. Joint Construction Task shared screen.
Viewer’s mouse
Collaborator’s mouse
target
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If moving a part draws attention, it should also
give rise to referring expressions of greater ac-
cessibility. Since pointing is associated with
shorter, less detailed referring expressions and
pointing to closer targets has an even stronger
effect (Kranstedt et al., 2006), touching and
moving should have a very marked effect on the
form of expression. Like Kranstedt et al., and
exactly as the definition of deixis would predict
(Lyons, 1977), we note the association of the
‘hand’ location and verbal deixis: in our case a
larger proportion of verbal deictics (this square;
these, mine) than of other forms of expression
coincide with mouse-referent overlap (Foster et
al., 2008).
To go further, we need to divide overlaps into
those where the mouse is moving a part and
those where it is merely hovering over it. If the
listener’s knowledge is of concern, a speaker
moving parts and a speaker hovering over them
should sometimes make different selections of
accessibility level. Since movements of objects
will always be visible to the listener in this para-
digm, a speaker adjusting to listener knowledge
could certainly use deictic forms to refer to parts
she is currently moving. In contrast, visibility of
the mouse cursor should determine whether a
hovering mouse makes an object more accessi-
ble: Only when the hovering mouse cursor is
visible to the listener can a speaker use it to point
to the named object and select a more accessible
referring expression. In fact, a speaker might
even increase the accessibility of an expression
referring to a part which the listener is visibly
touching or moving. When the hovering mouse is
not cross-projected, a listener-sensitive speaker
cannot use it to point. If the listener’s knowledge
is less important than the speaker’s, however, the
speaker’s own hovering movements should at-
tract higher accessibility forms regardless of
what the listener can see.
The players’ roles suggest further questions.
Managers have a primary role in setting the
dyad’s agenda. They should have more power to
designate discourse focus and to change it, for
example. If the choice of accessibility level is an
overt designation on the speaker’s part, then
managers should have special powers of desig-
nation. Moreover, as we suggested earlier, man-
agers might have less reason to track or adjust to
the needs of their partners than role-less players
do. Conversely, assistants should have more rea-
son to adjust to the manager’s precedents.
In all cases, the answers to our questions
should be reflected in distributions of referring
expressions across ordered levels of accessibility.
Though accessibility bears on the relationships
between earlier and later mentions of an entity, it
ought to be important to determining the form of
introductory mentions, too. By restricting our
investigation in this way, and by controlling the
objects available for naming, we can test our hy-
potheses about how a thing shall first be called.
2 Corpus Collection and Coding
2.1 Task
The Joint Construction Task or JCT (Carletta et
al., under revision) offers to two collaborating
players a target tangram (Figure 1, top right),
geometrical shapes for reproducing it (centre
right), a work area (centre screen), a counter for
breakages (top left), a set of replacement parts
(bottom of the screen), and a clock measuring
elapsed time (top centre). The players’ task is
always to construct a replica of the target tan-
gram as quickly, as accurately, and as cheaply in
terms of breakages as possible. An accuracy
score (top left) appears at the end of each trial.
Participants manipulate objects by left-clicking
the mouse and dragging them or by right-
clicking and rotating them. Carefully timed col-
laboration is required. Any part or partially con-
structed tangram ‘held’ by both players will
break and must be replaced from the spare parts
store to complete the trial. Moving an object
across another breaks both. Objects can be joined
only if each is held by a different player. Objects
join permanently wherever they first meet. In-
adequate constructions can be purposely broken
and rebuilt from spare parts, incurring a cost in
both parts and time.
Players’ mouse cursors differ in colour and
each changes colour when it has grabbed an ob-
ject, distinguishing grabbing from mere superim-
position (hovering).
2.2 Apparatus
Each participant sat approximately 40cm from a
separate CRT display in the same sound-
attenuated room. Participants faced each other,
but direct eye contact was blocked by the moni-
tors between them. Participants were eye-tracked
monocularly via two SR-Research EyeLink II
head-mounted eye-trackers. Head worn micro-
phones captured speech on individual channels.
Continuous audio and video records included a
full account of locations and movements of indi-
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vidual parts, constructed objects, and cursors.
Composite videos recorded all movements and
audio.
2.3 Participants, design and materials
Sixty-four Edinburgh University students, paid to
participate, were paired into 32 same-sex dyads
who had never met before. Four further dyads
were discarded because of technical failures.
Each dyad participated in 8 experimental condi-
tions produced by the factorial manipulation of
three communication modalities: speech, gaze
(each player’s current eye-track cross-projected
onto the other’s screen), and mouse cursor (also
cross-projected). Participants could always see
their own mouse cursor. Without no additional
communicative modalities, they saw only the
moving parts. Gaze and mouse conditions were
pseudo-randomised following a latin square.
Speech and non-speech conditions were counter-
balanced. Only conditions with speech are ana-
lyzed here.
In 16 dyads, one participant was designated
manager and the other assistant. The manager
was instructed to maintain speed, accuracy, and
cost, and to signal the completion of each trial.
The assistant was to help. The remaining dyads
were assigned no roles but otherwise had the
same working instructions. Trials ended when
one player declared the construction complete by
pressing the spacebar and the other confirmed.
An accuracy score reflecting similarity between
the built and the target tangrams then appeared
across the built exemplar.
Each dyad reproduced 16 different tangrams, 2
per condition. No tangram resembled a nameable
object. Each contained 11 parts. All trials used
the same set of 13 parts, comprising 2 copies of
each of 6 shape-colour combinations (squares or
right-angle isosceles triangles differing in size
and colour) and a single yellow parallelogram.
These initially appeared in 4 different layouts
counterbalanced across experimental items. The
extra pieces differed from trial to trial.
2.4 Coding referring expressions
Dialogues were transcribed orthographically.
Each referring expression was time-stamped for
start and end points. Then each expression refer-
ring to any on-screen object was coded with a
referent identifier linking it to the object. Coders
had access to the video and audio track and were
allowed to use any material within a dialogue to
determine the referent of any expression. All re-
ferring expressions were coded for accessibility
on the scale given in Table 1. This system repre-
sents a modest expansion of a system applied to
an earlier corpus of task-related dialogues (Bard
& Aylett, 2004) and yielding negligible dis-
agreement between coders.
Table 1 Accessibility Coding Scheme
Level Definition Examples
Indefinite NP a purple one
one of the near-
est  blue piecesMin
Bare nominal pink one
triangles
Definite NP the red bit
the other purple
one
Deictic NP those two little
kids.
Deictic
Possessive
!
"Pron
#
these
mine
Other Pronouns  it
Max
Clitic/inaudible.  -/z/
3 Results
3.1 Overall outcome
Figure 2 presents the overall distribution of first
mentions across the accessibility scale. Despite
the fact that most original parts would be ex-
pected to demand an indefinite referring expres-
sion to distinguish them from an identical part,
only 16% of first mentions were indefinite NPs.
The remaining 84% were of higher accessibility.
Our question now is whether mouse actions or
speaker roles are responsible for this profile.
Figure 2. Accessibility of first mentions in the
Joint Construction Task
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Figure 3. Accessibility of first mentions: Effects
of moving the referent object
3.2 Modalities, roles, and accessibility
Method. The conditions critical to our predic-
tions were coded for a multinomial logistic re-
gression which modelled the distribution of first
mentions across accessibility categories. This
statistic tests the capacity of category variables
(like Mouse v No Mouse) to influence ordinal
variables (like Accessibility). It constructs re-
gression equations both for the whole ordinal
series and for the comparison of each level to
some reference level. We use it to ask which ac-
tions and modalities change the tendency to pro-
duce indefinite referring expressions (the usually
expected format) relative to each more accessible
category.
The calculations are done on log odds, but for
interpretability, we display simple proportions of
cases. To reduce the number of empty cells, ac-
cessibility categories were collapsed into four
levels: Indefinite NPs (including bare nominals),
Definite NPs, deictics (including deictic NPs,
deictic pronouns and possessive pronouns) and
other pronouns (including clitics).
Separate equations were prepared for the
Mouse Cursor Cross-Projected (n = 836) and No
Mouse Cursor conditions (n = 939). The predic-
tors included the experimental variable Roles
Assigned, the participants’ mouse actions (the
speaker/listener moving part being mentioned, or
‘hovering’ the mouse over it), and the interac-
tions of Roles Assigned with each movement
variable. Gaze cross-projection was not included,
as it had proved an ineffective predictor in earlier
exploratory regressions. Table 2 shows the sig-
nificant outcomes. Each effect listed is essen-
tially independent of any effect from any concur-
rent predictor.
No effect of listener behaviour reached signifi-
cance. There were effects of the speaker’s ac-
tions and of Role Assignment.
Table 2. Significant predictors of accessibility. For individual levels of accessibility, df = 1.
* = p < .05; ‡ = p < .01; § = p < .001 .
No Mouse Cursor Cross-Projection
-2 Log Likelihood $2 df Cox & Snell
268.07 105.00§ 27 0.106
Speaker Move Speaker Hover
Speaker Hover x Roles As-
signed
$2 276.00 7.42*
B Wald B Wald B Wald
Definites -1.137 10.85§ 1.075 4.99*
Deictics -0.814 4.78* 1.275 6.17*
Mouse Cursor Cross-Projected
-2 Log Likelihood $2 df Cox & Snell
258.00 61.34§ 27 0.071
Speaker Move Speaker Hover
Speaker Hover x Roles As-
signed
$2 266.00 7.77*
B Wald B Wald B Wald
Deictics -0.722 5.05*
Pronouns 1.264 6.95‡
0.0
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As predicted, actions available to speaker and
listener were important: visibly moving the refer-
ent (Figure 3) coincided with increased deictic
expressions (31% without v 46% with movement
overall) at the expense of indefinites (18% v 12%
overall) whether or not the speaker’s mouse cur-
sor itself was visible. Also, visibly hovering the
mouse cursor over the referent (Figure 4) accom-
panied a significant fall in pronouns (15% v 6%)
relative to indefinites (17% v 16%), with deictics
the dominant category in both cases (39%, 51%).
Strikingly, actions unavailable to the listener
were also important. An invisibly hovering
mouse accompanied a shift from indefinites (17%
v 10%) towards definites (42% v 50%), with the
latter as the most common category.
Role assignment influenced the effects of in-
visible mouse gestures: Only in Manager-
Assistant dialogues did introductory mentions
shift markedly away from indefinites (22% v 8%)
toward deictics (25% v 40%) as well as definites
(36% v 48%). Figure 4 shows that in Manager-
Assistant dialogues private hovering gestures
gave profiles somewhere between their No Roles
counterparts (where definite NPs predominate)
and dialogues with projected cursors (where de-
ictics rise with public gestures).
Figure 4. Effects on accessibility of hovering
mouse over referent, by cursor visibility and as-
signed roles.
4 Discussion
This paper asked whether the association be-
tween handling a thing and using an accessible
format to name it was linked to the speaker’s own
knowledge or to the knowledge expected to re-
side with the listener. There are two reasons to be-
lieve that the listener is not in charge. First, we found
no significant effects of the listener’s manipulation of
tangram parts on the speaker’s form of referring ex-
pression, even when the listener’s movements were
fully visible to the speaker. Second, we did find ef-
fects of speakers’ mouse gestures which were invisible
to the listener.
At the same time, we suggested that if accessi-
bility is an expression of opinion, it should be
manipulated by Managers in particular. In the
event, Manager-Assistant dialogues showed more
egocentric use of accessibility than no-role dia-
logues: in these dialogues the presence of a ges-
ture invisible to interlocutor all but eliminated
indefinite introductory mentions, in favour of
definites and deictics.
While the effect of movement is a praxic or
haptic form of deixis, the effects of private ges-
tures and of role ought to be counterproductive.
Though all the conditions examined here yield
tangrams of equal similarity to their models, the
costs do follow this prediction. Trials without
mouse cross-projection took longer than those
with it (205 v 187sec; F1 = 11.45, df = 1, 30, p =
.002) and incurred more breakages (1.8 v 2.3: F1
= 4.52, df = 1, 30, p = .008) to achieve equal ac-
curacy (92.1 v 91.9). Manager-Assistant trials
took longer than No Role trials (216 v 175sec: F1
= 10.67, df = 1, 30, p = .003) to give similar per-
formance (Accuracy: 93.8 v 91.2; Breakages: 2.0
v 2.1). The latter finding is the stronger argu-
ment, because additional breakages require addi-
tional time to fix.
Nonetheless, the picture is far from complete.
We see three major issues.
First, the results fall some way short of a clear
case for managerial insensitivity. The Role As-
signment results were based on expressions pro-
duced by both participants. Analyses comparing
managers with assistants are made difficult by
small or empty cells. Both players show the pat-
tern found in Figure 4. Accordingly, we have no
particular evidence contrasting managers with
their assistants, though we can distinguish man-
ager-assistant dyads from the dyads who had no
assigned roles.
As we suggested earlier, however, one result of
role differences is to give precedence to one indi-
vidual. The manager decided what should happen
next. To cooperate, the assistant had to conform
to the manager’s choices. Conforming to the
manager’s referential habits, for social reasons,
or through structural priming, could make the
assistant appear to designate with invisible ges-
tures, too. In essence, the assistant can achieve a
tendency toward use of definites or deictics
where they might not otherwise appear to be un-
warranted and then employ private gestures to
0.0
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accompany these instances. In contrast, No Role
dyads might follow a mixture of styles or com-
pete to control the task plan or the naming habits.
If so, manager and assistant should have more
similar profiles in than No Role players. Quanti-
tatively, this seems to be the case.
Second, though it is clear that speakers’ private
and public actions associate with particular levels
of accessibility, it is not clear that their effects are
all increases in accessibility. For example, Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show a tendency, significant only
with hovering, for speaker actions not to collo-
cate with the highest levels of accessibility in
first mentions: pronominal or clitic introductory
mentions are used less often when the mouse
overlaps the referent part than when it does not.
Thus, the haptic or ostensive functions of mouse
movements are specific to definite and deictic
usage: they literally turn a triangle into this but
they do not turn this into it. For this reason, the
single accessibility continuum might be viewed
as the result of a set of different referential phe-
nomena, for example, demonstration or givenness
in context, bearing on speakers’ choices with dif-
ferent degrees of force.
Finally, there is the issue of the discourse his-
tory within which the introductory mentions are
set. Clearly, some first mentions do not refer to
totally discourse-new or completely unpredict-
able entities (Prince, 1981). There is no doubt
that other forces work on the choice of referring
expressions.
We do not yet know how the sequence of ex-
ternal events – construction of the tangram, for
example, affects the forms of introductory refer-
ring expressions. In theory, it is possible that cor-
pus dialogues went well because speakers were
attending to the same objects regardless of the
form of referring expressions. Our eye-tracking
results from this corpus suggest, however, that
alignment between players was far from perfect.
If players were already attending to the same ob-
jects, whatever either said, we should find very
high levels of overlapping gaze. To study the re-
lationship between interlocutors’ gaze patterns,
we have used a cross-recurrence analysis
(Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007), which
shows how behaviours can be entrained even if
they are not synchronized to the extremely fine
levels that eyetrackers detect. This technique
shows what percentage of interlocutors’ gaze
fixations are on the same objects but separated by
various lags in one direction or another. Almost
without exception ((Bard, Hill, Nicol, & Carletta,
2007), maximal shared view was simultaneous,
but it was far from complete: participants showed
a maximum of 36% gaze at the same objects in
conditions with speech (as against 40% without).
It would seem that referring expressions still have
some work to do when joint attention is required.
We began by discussing referring expressions
in the light of speakers’ ability to maintain mod-
els of their listeners’ knowledge that update
quickly enough to be the basis of initial mentions.
Our speakers did not appear to use such models.
Ultimately, of course, they could have had ample
opportunity to produce adequate reference by
subsequent joint adjustment. The additional time
taken for dialogues in the more egocentric condi-
tions suggests that this could be the case.
If so, the speakers’ behaviour is another exam-
ple of joint responsibility for dialogue being ef-
fectively shared rather than duplicated across in-
terlocutors (Bard, Anderson et al., 2007). In this
kind of responsibility structure, rather than a fully
articulated model of common ground, a simple
and risky egocentric process guides production.
Speakers were free to designate invisibly just
because their partners were under an obligation to
object to inadequate expressions.
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Abstract 
We examined how communicators can 
switch between speaker and listener role with 
such accurate timing. During conversations, 
the majority of role transitions happens with 
a gap or overlap of only a few hundred 
milliseconds. This suggests that listeners can 
predict when the turn of the current speaker 
is going to end. Our hypothesis is that 
listeners know when a turn ends because they 
know how it ends. Anticipating the last 
words of a turn can help the next speaker in 
predicting when the turn will end, and also in 
anticipating the content of the turn, so that an 
appropriate response can be prepared in 
advance. We used the stimuli material of an 
earlier experiment (De Ruiter, Mitterer & 
Enfield, 2006), in which subjects were 
listening to turns from natural conversations 
and had to press a button exactly when the 
turn they were listening to ended. In the 
present experiment, we investigated if the 
subjects can complete those turns when only 
an initial fragment of the turn is presented to 
them. We found that the subjects made better 
predictions about the last words of those 
turns that had more accurate responses in the 
earlier button press experiment.   
1 Introduction 
 
During conversations, a turn not only has to be 
relevant to the course of social interaction, but it 
also has to be appropriately timed. Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) assume that 
transitions from one speaker to the next are 
accurately timed, so that gaps (silences between 
turns) and overlaps (i.e. when the interlocutors 
speak at the same time) are small. It is a 
normative rule of conversation that requires the 
participants to respond to the current speaker as 
soon as he/she has finished. When there are 
departures from this rule, the gaps or overlaps are 
interpreted communicatively. For example, a 
short silence before a response can indicate that 
the response is a disagreement when 
disagreement is a dispreferred action (Pomerantz, 
1984).  
Sacks et al.'s normative rule has been recently 
supported by measurement of floor transfer offset 
(FTO) in a data-set from Dutch two-party 
telephone conversations (De Ruiter et al., 2006). 
The FTO is defined as the difference between the 
time that a turn starts and the moment the 
previous turn ends. In the Dutch conversations, 
45% of all speaker transitions had an FTO of 
between -250 and +250 ms, and 85% of them 
were between -750 and 750 ms. (Negative values 
indicate an overlap between the consecutive 
turns, positive values indicate a gap.) The FTO 
values were centered around 0. This pattern 
supports Sacks et al.'s (1974) assumption that 
gaps and overlaps are small. However, it also 
raises the question of how these accurately timed 
transitions are possible. 
Such accurate temporal alignment of 
conversational turns suggests that a potential next 
speaker can anticipate the moment when the 
current turn is going to end. If the next speaker 
detects the end of the current turn (but she does 
not anticipates it), she will have a little delay 
before her turn because preparation for 
articulation requires some time. However, many 
turn transitions happen without temporal gaps. 
Sacks et al. have already assumed that the 
potential next speakers can plan to align their turn 
accurately in time only if they are able to 
accurately predict the end of the current speakers 
turn. However, they left open the question of 
exactly how the anticipation of end of turns is 
carried out. 
Many sources of information (semantic, 
syntactic, pragmatic and prosodic) have been 
proposed to be used in the prediction of turn 
endings. The few experimental studies which 
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have investigated this issue, mainly concentrated 
on the role of intonation in end-of-turn 
predictions. Groesjean and Hirt's study (1996) 
investigated if people can use prosodic 
information to predict end of French and English 
sentences. Subjects were listening to sentences 
that were presented in segments of increasing 
duration. They had to guess with how many 
words the fragments would continue. The 
sentences of which the initial fragment was 
presented to the subjects were either short or they 
were expanded by optional noun-phrases. The 
subjects had to guess using a multiple choice 
response task if the presented fragment was part 
of a short sentence or an expanded, longer 
sentence. The predictions did not improve with 
increasing duration of the fragments (sentence 
beginnings). Only when the first potentially last 
word was presented (i.e. the first point in the 
sentence where the sentence could end if it would 
be a short sentence) could the subjects predict if 
the sentence would be finished after the 
potentially last word or it would continue with 3 
or 6 more words. According to Grosjean and Hirt 
the results indicate that in English prosodic 
information is made available for the prediction 
of sentence length only when the semantic and 
syntactic information can not help. Their similar 
experiment on French showed that subjects could 
tell if a sentence has ended or not. But they could 
not predict with how many words the sentences 
(3, 6 or 9 more words) would continue.  
Grosjean and Hirt's study used recordings of 
sentences read aloud. The prosodic pattern may 
differ from the prosody occurring in natural 
conversations. Therefore, it is questionable how 
their results can be generalized to account for 
processing of spontaneous speech.  
De Ruiter et al. (2006) investigated the 
contribution of the lexico-syntactic content and 
intonation in end-of-turn predictions. They 
manipulated recordings of natural conversations. 
Subjects listened to individual turns taken out 
from Dutch telephone conversations. They were 
asked to press a button exactly at the moment the 
turn ended. The duration between the end of the 
turn and the button-presses (called bias) was 
measured. In the different experimental 
conditions, the turns were presented naturally (as 
recorded) or a modified version was played. In 
one of the conditions, the intonational contour 
was removed, in another condition the lexico-
syntactic content was removed by applying low-
pass filtering. When subjects were listening to the 
original turns, their button-presses coincided with 
the turn-ends accurately; the distribution of the 
button-presses was similar to the distribution of 
FTO values for the same turns in the original 
conversations. There was no change in accuracy 
when the intonational contour was removed, but 
the performance got worse when the words could 
not be understood (note that the intonational 
information was still present in those stimuli). De 
Ruiter et al. concluded that the intonational 
contour is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
prediction of turn-ends. These results suggest the 
lexico-syntactic information plays a major role in 
timing of turns.  
Listeners have to perform many simultaneous 
tasks before they start their turn. They have to 
perceive and comprehend the current turn, and 
also formulate and time their subsequent 
utterance appropriately. The fine temporal 
alignment of conversational turns shows that 
these tasks have to be done simultaneously. 
Response preparation has to start before the 
previous turn ends in order to avoid gaps. 
Response preparation, however, can be initiated 
only if the speaker knows roughly what to 
respond. Therefore, the next speaker has to 
anticipate not only the end of the turns but also 
their content. When the last words of a turn can 
be anticipated they give information about the 
content and about the duration in advance. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that lexico-syntactic 
information helps in the prediction of the time 
when a turn will end through the anticipation of 
the last words of a turn. In other words: People 
know when a turn ends by knowing how it ends. 
In order to test this hypothesis we conducted 
an experiment using the experimental stimuli of 
De Ruiter et al.’s study. Our prediction was that 
the more accurate the button-presses to the end of 
a given turn were in the earlier experiment, the 
more accurately the last words of that turn can be 
predicted. Therefore, we examined if there was 
any correlation between the accuracy of button 
presses in the earlier experiment and the off-line 
prediction of last words of the turn in a gating 
study. The end of selected turns were cut off at 
several points and fragments or the entire turn 
were presented to subjects who then had to guess 
how the turn would continue.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
 
Fifty native speakers of Dutch (forty-two women 
and eight men, aged between eighteen and 
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twenty-nine) participated in the experiment. The 
data of one subject was excluded because the 
results showed that he did not understand the task 
correctly. The subjects were paid for their 
participation. 
2.2 Stimulus material 
 
The experimental materials were selected from 
stimuli used by De Ruiter et al. These stimuli 
were turns from natural conversations in Dutch. 
In the De Ruiter et al. experiment, it had been 
measured for each turn how accurately subjects 
could predict the end of turns by button-press. 
The temporal offset (bias) between the end of the 
turn and the button-presses was measured. The 
averaged bias of a turn indicates how accurately 
subjects could on average predict the time point 
of the end of that turn. A turn with a highly 
positive bias means that subjects pressed the 
button too late. A low bias (small positive value 
or with a small negative value) shows that 
subjects pressed the button on time or a bit 
earlier, just before the turn ended. 
For the purposes of the present study, turns 
with high and low biases from the De Ruiter et al. 
study were selected. It was observed that turns 
with longer duration tend to have a lower bias. In 
order to avoid effects caused by the duration of 
the turns, ten turn-pairs were selected, where both 
members of the pairs had the same duration. The 
members of each pair were from different 
conversations produced by different speakers. 
The members of each pair had the same duration 
(max. difference between the members of the 
pairs was 16 ms), but they differed in their 
average bias. One of the members of every pair 
had higher average bias (between 237 and 123 
ms), while the other member had a lower average 
bias (between -18 and 122 ms) relative to the 
other member of the pair. The durations of the 10 
stimuli pairs were varying between 1.13 s and 
2.05 s.  
For each turn pair, four versions were made by 
cutting off the speech at four different temporal 
locations. The cut-off locations within each pair 
were at same points in time measured from the 
end of the recordings, but they were different 
across stimuli pairs. The cut-off locations were 
determined in a pair according to the boundaries 
of the two last words of each of the pairs. Each 
stimulus was cut at four points which were just at 
word boundaries at one of the members of a 
stimuli pair. The cut-off location varied across the 
pairs (the first points were on average at 0.76s 
from the end, the second points at 0.52s; the third 
points at 0.40 s; the fourth points at 0.25 s). Table 
1. shows an example of gating points of one of 
the turn pairs that was used in the experiment. 
Turn A and B have almost the same duration 
(1.78 and 1.79 s), while A is a low bias turn (40 
ms) and B is a high bias turn (226 ms). The 
vertical lines shows the points where both turns 
were cut in order to create the fragments. The 
vertical lines that are aligned with each other 
between the two turns indicate that the cut-off 
was made at the same points in time measured 
from the end of the recordings. 
 
A. 
maar dat hoor ik wel via                              |de| 
  mi|crof |oon 
B. 
ja maar daar moeten we maar een keer met|    | 
zijn|allen| heen 
Table 1. Example of a turn-pair and the cut-off 
locations (shown by the vertical lines in the text) 
2.3 Experimental design 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five 
experimental lists. The stimuli in the lists were 
presented in random order to each subject. Their 
task was to type in if the presented segment 
constituted a complete turn. If the subjects 
decided that the turn was not complete, they were 
asked to guess and type in how they thought it 
would continue. If they did not have any guess 
about the continuation, they were asked to guess 
with how many words the turn would continue. 
They had to make a forced choice between A. one 
word, B. two words, or C. three or more words. 
Subjects were also asked how certain they were 
of their responses on a four point scale.  
2.4 Procedure 
 
The subjects were requested to sit in front of a 
computer screen and a keyboard with 
headphones. The instructions were visually 
presented on the screen. Before each stimulus a 
sentence was presented on the screen in Dutch, 
saying: "When you press the space bar you can 
listen to the next sound fragment two times.". 500 
ms after pressing the space bar, a stimulus was 
presented two times, with a 1500 ms pause 
between the two presentations. After the stimulus 
presentation, the subjects saw a prompt (>: ) on 
the screen where they had to type their guess 
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about the continuation of the fragment. If they 
thought the turn that they were listening to was 
complete, they had to type: ‘.’. If they did not 
have any guess about the continuation, but they 
did not think that the turn had finished, they were 
asked to type a ‘-‘. After reading the instructions, 
the participants did a training session during 
which four stimuli were presented that were not 
part of the experimental list. After the training 
session, and possibly providing verbal 
clarifications, the experimenter left the room and 
the participants could continue the experiment 
alone. 
2.5 Data-coding 
 
Two variables with categories were created  
based on the responses. The variable PREDEND 
(prediction of the rest of the turn) was 0 when the 
continuation of the turn was entirely correct. It 
was 0 also if it was indicated correctly that the 
turn has ended. PREDEND could get 0 only if the 
guess was entirely correct regardless how many 
words had to be guessed. PREDEND was 1 when 
it was incorrect: when different words were used, 
when the end was indicated wrongly or when the 
participants did not have any guess. 
PREDNUM (prediction of the number of 
words) variable had three categories: 1, when the 
predicted number of words was the same 
compared to the original version of the sentence 
even if the words were not the same, or when the 
participant did not have any idea about the 
continuation (but the prediction of the number of  
words in the continuation was correct); 2, when 
the predicted number of words was less than the 
number of words in the turn, and 3, when more 
words were predicted.   
Responses which were not clear (e.g. words 
that do not exist) were excluded from the 
analysis. Only 3% of the data points were 
excluded. 
3 Results 
3. 1 Statistical analysis 
 
The results were analyzed using a generalized 
linear mixed effects model (GLMM) (Baayen, 
2008, Pinherio & Bates, 2000). We used this 
statistical analysis because of two main reasons. 
On one hand, it has been shown that mixed-
effects models provide a better method for 
statistical analysis with repeated measurement 
data (see for example, Baayen, Davidson & 
Bates, 2008). Among other advantages, the mixed 
effect regression model can simultaneously 
handle all factors that potentially can contribute 
to explaining the variance in the data. The model 
can include random effects, such as variations 
caused by individual differences among the 
subjects and variations caused by differences in 
the properties of the items. It is also possible to fit 
the model to unbalanced data. 
GLMM also has many advantages over the 
widely used repeated-measurement analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for categorical datasets. In 
this experiment, the proportions of correct and 
non-correct responses were analyzed that do not 
follow normal distribution that can be 
problematic for the ANOVA analysis. When 
ANOVA is used for categorical outcomes, it can 
yield spurious results that GLMM can avoid 
(Jaeger, 2008).  
3.2 Recognition of turn-ends 
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of correct 
responses when subjects were listening to the 
entire turn. The responses are highly accurate. 
96% of the participants give correct responses at 
high-bias turns, and 90% of the participants at 
low bias turns.  
The PREDEND variable was binary (correct 
or not correct), therefore a binomial distribution 
was specified for the model.  
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high bias (N = 98) low bias (N = 98)
 
Figure 1. The proportion of correct responses 
('the turn has ended') when the entire turn was 
presented 
 
The linear model had Bias (if the turn 
belonged to the high or low bias turns) as a fixed 
effect, and Subjects and Utterance-pairs as 
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random effects. The GLMM analysis did not 
show any effect of Bias (z = 1.498, p>0.1, N = 
196). 
3.3 Prediction of the continuations 
 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of the correct 
continuations at each cut-off location for both 
turn types. From the first cut-off location (I) to 
the fourth (IV) increasing proportion of the turns 
were presented to the subjects. The proportion of 
correct answers is increasing as the presented 
fragments get longer.  
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Figure 2. Proportion of the correct continuations 
at each cut-off locations. The x-axis shows the 
proportion (between 0 and 1), the y-axis shows 
the cut-off locations (from I. to IV. the duration 
of fragments from each turn are increasing). The 
white columns show the proportion of correct 
continuations when a fragment from a low bias 
turn was presented, the grey columns show the 
proportion of correct answers that belong to the 
high bias turns. 
 
However, it is possible that differences 
between the two turn types may arise from the 
properties of the stimuli material. Some 
fragments were cut so close to the end of the last 
word that it sounded as the end. Therefore, the 
correct response was that the turn has ended and 
not a free guess about the continuation. It is 
probably easier to decide if a turn continues or 
not than it is to predict its continuation. 
Therefore, those turns where despite of the cut 
off, there was no more reliable auditory 
information coming, were excluded from our 
analysis (11%). Figure 3 shows the proportion of 
the correct responses at the four consecutive cut- 
off locations after the exclusion.  
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Figure 3. Proportion of correct continuations after 
excluding some of the fragments. For explanation 
of the figure, see Figure 2. 
 
The differences between the turn types got 
reduced at the last cut-off location (IV). Table 2 
shows the number of items at each cut-off 
location for both turn types and the proportion of 
the correct responses. 
 
bias I. II. III. IV. 
high 0.00 
(N=96) 
0.08 
(N=98) 
0.13 
(N=98) 
0.32 
(N=68) 
low 0.03 
(N=98) 
0.06 
(N=98) 
0.27 
(N=78) 
0.33 
(N=60) 
Table 2. The proportion of the correct 
continuations (1 = all are correct) and the number 
of items at each cut-off locations for both turn-
types 
 
At the last two cut off locations (III and IV) at 
20% and at 31.5% of the cases subject were able 
to guess the correct continuations.  
The GLMM had Bias and Cut-off location as 
fixed effects, and Subjects and Utterance-pairs as 
random effects. Table 3. shows the !-coefficients 
of the fixed effects in the model.  
 
Predictor Coeff SE z value p 
Intercept 6.578 0.774 8.503 <0.001 
Cutoff -1.318 0.166 -7.962 <0.001 
Bias -0.674 0.302 -2.235 <0.05 
Table 3. The summary of the fixed effects in the 
GLMM of correct continuations at the four cut-
off locations. (Coeff = Coefficient) 
 
Both the cut-off locations (z -7.962, p<0.001, 
N=694) and the bias (z=-2.235, p<0.05, N=694) 
had a significant effect on the correct responses. 
It is possible, however, that low bias turns were 
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easier to complete because they always ended in a 
longer word than high bias turns. It means for 
example, that at the last cut-off location (IV) the 
fragments ended during the last word at the low 
bias turns, while the fragments ended before the 
last word at the high bias turns. In this case, 
maybe it is easier to recognize a word that was 
partially played than to guess for a not-heard at 
all word. In order to explore if this explanation is 
valid, the proportion of fragments that ended 
during the last word and before the last word at 
the fourth cut-off location was calculated for both 
types of turns (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Proportion of stimuli that was cut 
during the last word (LW) or before the last word 
at the last cut-off location 
 
The cut-off locations occurred during the last 
word in a smaller percentage at the low bias turns 
than at the high bias turns. The GLMM shows a 
significant effect (z=2.5375, p<0.05, N=128) of 
the position of the cut-off location (WB, during or 
before the last word) on the correct continuations. 
However, the direction of the effect is in the 
opposite direction. The guesses get better when 
the cut-off location is before the last word and not 
during it. Therefore, the observed differences 
between the turn types can not have been caused 
by the earlier recognition of the last words. 
3.4 Prediction of the number of words 
 
Our question was also if the difference 
between the high and low bias turns is not only 
caused by anticipation of the correct turn endings 
but also by the prediction of the correct number 
of words, irrespective of their form or meaning. 
We examined if there is a correlation between the 
turn types and the expectations about the length 
of the turn even if the continuations are wrong. 
Therefore, the number of the predicted words 
(PREDNUM) was analyzed for the cases where 
the prediction of the actual continuation was not 
correct.  We again excluded those turns that has 
already finished at the two last cut-off locations. 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of correct 
guesses about the number of words. We expected 
to find a higher proportion of correct responses at 
the low bias turns because that could lead to 
accurate button-presses. But Figure 5 shows the 
opposite direction of the differences.  
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Figure 5. Proportion of correct guesses of the 
number of the coming words among the wrong 
continuations. For more explanation of the figure, 
see Figure 2. 
 
Bias and the Cut-off locations were included 
as fixed effects, while Subjects and Utterance-
pairs were included as random effects in the 
linear mixed effects regression analysis of the 
correct number of words estimates among the 
wrong guesses. The analysis showed a main 
effect of Bias (z=2.56, p<0.05, N=601) (Table 4). 
 
Predictor Coefficient SE z value p 
Intercept 0.611 0.265 2.307 p<0.05 
Bias 0.476 0.186 2.56 p<0.05 
Cutoff 0.035 0.088 0.399 p>0.05
Table 4. The summary of the fixed effects in the 
GLMM of correct estimates of the number of 
words among the wrong guesses  
 
Figure 6 shows the proportion of the responses 
that predicted less number of words than the 
number of words that were still coming but not 
played.  
The GLMM analysis (Table 5) showed that 
there is a significant effect of the Cut-off 
locations (z=5.029, p<0.001, N=601), and that 
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there is an interaction between Bias and Cut-off 
locations (z=-5.071, p<0.001, N=601). The 
difference between turn types in the less number 
of words predictions are increasing towards the 
end of the turn. The low bias turns tend to have a 
higher proportion of less number of words 
guesses. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of guesses predicting less 
number of coming words among the wrong 
continuations. For more explanation of the figure, 
see Figure 2. 
 
Predictor Coeff SE z value p 
Intercept -
0.394 
0.402 -0.98 p>0.05 
Bias 0.588 0.445 1.322 p>0.05 
Cutoff 0.828 0.165 5.029 p<0.001
Interaction: 
Bias&Cutoff 
-1.06 0.209 -5.071 p<0.001
Table 5. The summary of the fixed effects in the 
GLMM of estimates of less number of words 
among the wrong guesses. (Coeff = Coefficient) 
 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of the responses 
that predicted more number of words than the 
number of words that were still coming but not 
presented. The regression analysis showed an 
effect of Bias (z=-2.154, p<0.05, N=601) and 
Cut-off locations (z=-4.895, p<0.001, N=601), 
and also their interaction (z=4.836, p<0.001, 
N=601). More number of words were predicted at 
the high bias turns than at the low bias turns 
(Table 6). 
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Figure 7. Proportion of guesses predicting more 
number of coming words among the wrong 
continuations. For more explanation of the figure, 
see Figure 2. 
 
Predictor Coeff SE z value p 
Intercept 1.655 0.316 5.242 p<0.001
Bias -0.987 0.458 -2.154 p<0.05 
Cutoff -0.582 0.119 -4.895 p<0.001
Interaction: 
Bias&Cutoff
0.983 0.203 4.836 p<0.001
Table 6. The summary of the fixed effects in the 
GLMM of estimates of more number of words 
among the wrong guesses. (Coeff = Coefficient) 
 
In order to see how early the differences in the 
number of words predictions are present, an 
additional analysis was done for the first two cut-
off locations (I and II). Fragments with these cut-
off locations ended before the last word in all 
cases. A mixed effect regression model was fitted 
for the cut-off location I and II separately with 
Bias as main effect, and Utterance pairs and 
Subjects as random effects. Bias had an effect at 
both cut-off locations when less number of words 
were predicted: At location I, z=-2.187, p<0.05, 
N=191 and at location II, z=-3.647, p<0.01, 
N=182. Bias did not have an effect at the first cut-
off location (z=0.298, p>0.05, N=191), but it had 
an effect at the second cut-off location (z=2.35, 
p<0.05, N=182) when more number of words 
were predicted. This means that the subject 
predicted in a higher proportion less number of 
words at the low bias turns, and more number of 
words at the high bias turns by listening to 
fragments that did not contain the last word of the 
turns. 
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4 Discussion 
 
We investigated the hypothesis that people 
know when a turn ends because they know how it 
ends. Gating paradigm was used to examine if it 
is possible to predict the last words of 
conversational turns. The turns were extracted 
from natural conversations and the original 
context was not presented to the subjects. Even so 
the subjects could guess the not presented or only 
partially presented last words of the turns 
correctly in around 20 - 30% of the cases. We 
found differences also among the turn-types. The 
continuation of turns whose ends were indicated 
too late by the button-pressing task in an earlier 
experiment were less often predicted correctly 
than the continuations of those turns whose ends 
were indicated on time (low bias turns). We have 
shown that these differences between turn-types 
could not have been caused by earlier or later 
recognition of the last word of that turn.  
We also found that when the continuations 
were not correct subjects predicted less numbers 
of words at the low bias turns, and more numbers 
of words at the high bias turns before the last 
word of a turn. This shows that probably when 
the subjects thought that more words were 
coming, they pressed the button too late in the 
button-press experiment. These results support 
the hypothesis that the prediction of turn endings 
is based on the predictions made about the 
content and word forms of the turn.  
This study emphasis the role of anticipation in 
order to explain the alignment of turns during 
conversations. This is in line with studies that 
show that people use the linguistic context for 
anticipating the upcoming words (DeLong, 
Urbach & Kutas, 2005). Pickering and Garrod 
(2007) argue that comprehenders use the 
production system for making predictions in 
order to achieve a faster and easier 
comprehension. However, investigation of 
conversational turn alignments shows that it is 
very likely that preparation of responses occurs in 
temporal overlap with the comprehension or 
prediction of the current turn. If the production 
system is used for predicting the upcoming 
words, then the same system is used also for 
preparation of the coming turn. We doubt 
whether the same system can fulfill two tasks at 
the same time. We think it is more plausible to 
assume that the comprehension system is used for 
anticipation of the content and word forms of the 
current turn, while the production system is used 
for preparation of the next turn. 
This off-line study has some limitations in 
generalizing its results to on-line processing. 
However, the study shows that people can make 
accurate predictions about the final word forms of 
turns from natural conversations. The results also 
suggest that anticipation about the number of 
words of a turn can explain the accurate 
performance in turn-end predictions. 
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Abstract
This paper presents a new model for adap-
tive Natural Language Generation (NLG)
in dialogue, showing how NLG problems
can be approached as statistical planning
problems using Reinforcement Learning.
This approach brings a number of theo-
retical and practical benefits such as fine-
grained adaptation, generalization, and au-
tomatic (global) optimization. We present
the model and related work in statisti-
cal/trainable NLG, discuss its applications,
and provide a demonstration of the ap-
proach, showing policy learning for adaptive
information presentation decisions (Con-
trast, Cluster, or List items). An adap-
tive NLG policy learned in our framework
shows a statistically significant 27% relative
increase in reward over an “RL-majority”
baseline policy for the same task. We
thereby also show that that such NLG prob-
lems should be approached in combination
with dialogue management decisions, and
we show how to jointly optimize NLG and
dialogue management plans.
1 Introduction
Natural Language Generation (NLG) in dialogue is
often characterised as choosing “how” to say some-
thing once “what to say” has been determined. In
principle, NLG in dialogue thus comprises a wide
variety of decisions, ranging over content structur-
ing, choice of referring expressions, use of ellip-
sis, aggregation, and choice of syntactic structure,
to choice of intonation markers. In computational
dialogue systems, “what to say” is usually deter-
mined by a dialogue manager (DM) component, via
planning, hand-coded rules, finite state machines, or
learned policies, and “how to say it” is then very of-
ten defined by simple templates or hand-coded rules
which define appropriate word strings to be sent to a
speech synthesizer or screen.
Previous statistical approaches to NLG are re-
viewed in section 2, but none of them have ex-
plored NLG as statistical planning. Some aspects
of NLG have been treated as planning (Koller and
Stone, 2007; Stone et al., 2003), but not statistically.
Prior dialogue-related work in statistical planning
(e.g. Reinforcement Learning) has dealt only with
policies for planning dialogue acts in an information
gathering phase, and has not been applied to NLG
decisions themselves (though see Rieser and Lemon
(2008) for work in multimodal generation).
Learning approaches have several key potential
advantages over template-based and rule-based ap-
proaches to NLG (we discuss “trainable” NLG in
section 2.1) in dialogue systems:
• ability to adapt to fine-grained changes in dia-
logue context
• data-driven development cycle, with reduced
development costs for industry.
• provably optimal action policies with a precise
mathematical model for action selection
• ability to generalize to unseen dialogue states
We aim to illustrate these advantages in the
demonstration system described in this paper.
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2 Prior work
There are 3 main approaches to generating sys-
tem utterances in dialogue systems: template-based
NLG, conventional NLG as developed in the text
generation literature (Reiter and Dale, 2000), and
more recently, trainable generation (Barzilay and
Lapata, 2005; Duboue and McKeown, 2003; Stent
et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2001; Walker et al., 2007).
Template-based generation is typically used in in-
dustrial dialogue systems, and even in most state-
of-the-art research systems. However, this approach
requires that new templates be created by hand for
each application, and severely limits that system’s
ability to adapt to dialogue context or user prefer-
ences, due to the practical constraints of having to
write different templates for each possible combina-
tion of feature values.
Conventional NLG typically follows a pipeline ar-
chitecture consisting of three main modules (Reiter
and Dale, 2000):
• (i) a text planner which performs content selec-
tion and discourse structuring,
• (ii) a sentence planner which selects attributes
for referring expressions, aggregates content
into sentence-size units, and selects lexical
items, and
• (iii) a surface realizer which converts sentence
plans into natural language.
This approach has been successfully applied in
systems that tailor their presentations to the user’s
preferences (Carenini and Moore, 2006; Demberg
and Moore, 2006; Moore et al., 2004; Walker et al.,
2004) and to the dialogue context (Isard et al., 2003),
but these systems generally use rules that are specif-
ically hand-crafted for a particular domain. A ma-
jor problem with these standard NLG approaches is
that hand-coded rules, manually-set thresholds, and
templates all severely limit the adaptivity that can
be achieved in NLG, both in the amount of adaptiv-
ity possible and the ability to adapt to fine-grained
changes in the dialogue context, user behaviour, or
environment (e.g. noise levels). The standard ap-
proaches are limited by the expertise of the system
designer, and the adaptivity that they can encode
in their rules or templates. Statistical approaches
in general promise a more practical, effective, and
theoretically well-founded approach to adaptivity in
NLG, because they are not limited by human design
capacities, and can be trained from data. Conven-
tional NLG approaches can also be too slow for real-
time dialogue applications (Stent et al., 2004). There
has therefore been recent interest in statistical meth-
ods in the area of “trainable” NLG.
2.1 Trainable NLG
Trainable NLG is a more recent approach, where au-
tomatic techniques are used to train NLG modules,
or to adapt them to specific domains and/or types
of user. However, this work has focussed on local
optimization through supervised learning, and has
not explored global decision-theoretic planning ap-
proaches such as Reinforcement Learning.
Early work here focused on supervised learning of
how to produce surface forms from sentence plans,
using overgeneration and ranking, using either bi-
gram language models (Oh and Rudnicky, 2002),
or ranking rules learned from a corpus of manu-
ally ranked training examples (Walker et al., 2001).
More recent work has extended this approach to
sentence-planning (Stent et al., 2004).
In this work, given a content plan (the propo-
sitions to express and discourse relations among
them), a generator first produces a set of text-plan
trees, consisting of speech acts to be communi-
cated, and the rhetorical relations between them. For
each of these, a set of candidate sentence plans are
generated by a heuristically ordered set of clause-
combining operations. The sentence plan ranker is
then trained by using the RankBoost algorithm to
learn a set of ranking rules from a manually labelled
set of examples.
For content selection, recent research has shown
that given a corpus of texts and the database of facts
or events it describes, content selection rules can
be learned (Barzilay and Lapata, 2005; Duboue and
McKeown, 2003). In this work, content selection
has been treated as a binary classification task. Here,
semantic units in the database are first aligned with
sentences in the corpus, and then classification is
used to learn whether or not a semantic unit should
be included in the text.
However, as explained above, these types of su-
pervised learning used for NLG do not model the
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required optimization and planning of sequences of
actions-in-context which we propose to capture with
RL techniques. An interesting issue for future work
is how these types of classifier-based learning can be
integrated with the MDP approach propsosed here.
3 The model: NLG as statistical planning
This paper treats NLG as a statistical planning and
optimization problem using decision theory in the
framework of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs),
similar to (Rieser and Lemon, 2008). The main ad-
vance here is to treat aspects of NLG within the
sameMDP-based planning and learning frameworks
as have been successfully applied in speech recogni-
tion and dialogue management, for example (Levin
and Pieraccini, 1997; Walker et al., 1998; Singh et
al., 2002; Young, 2000).
We now propose to model the NLG problem as a
Markov Decision Process (MDP). Here a stochastic
system interacting with its environment (in our case,
the user of the dialogue system) through its actions
is described by a number of states {si} in which a
given number of actions {aj} can be performed. In
a dialogue system, the states represent the possible
dialogue contexts (e.g. how much information we
have so far obtained from the user) and the actions
are now system dialogue and NLG actions.
Each state-action pair is associated with a transi-
tion probability Tss′: the probability of moving from
state s at time t to state s′ at time t + 1 after having
performed action a when in state s. This transition
is also associated with a reinforcement signal (or re-
ward) rt+1 describing how good the result of action
a was when performed in state s. In dialogue these
reward signals are most often associated with task
completion and dialogue length, but we will also as-
sociate them with NLG decisions.
To control a system described in this way, one
then needs a strategy or policy pi mapping all states
to actions: pi(s) = P (a|s) In this framework, a Re-
inforcement Learning agent is a system aiming at
optimally mapping states to actions, i.e. finding the
best strategy so as to maximize an overall reward R
which is a function (most often a weighted sum) of
all the immediate rewards. In dialogue (and many
other problems) the reward for an action is often not
immediate, but is delayed until successful comple-
tion of a task. In the most challenging cases, actions
may affect not only immediate reward, but also the
next situation and, via that, all subsequent rewards.
In general, then, we are trying to find an action
policy pi which maximises the value Qpi(s, a) of
choosing action a in state s, which is given by the
Bellman equation:
Qpi(s, a) =
∑
s′
Tss′[Rss′ + γV pi(s′)] (1)
(Here we denote the expected immediate reward
by Rss′ , γ is a discount factor between 0 and 1,
V pi(s) is the value of state s′ according to pi, see
(Sutton and Barto, 1998)).
If the transition probabilities are known, an ana-
lytic solution can be computed by dynamic program-
ming. Otherwise the system has to learn the opti-
mal strategy by a trial-and-error process, for exam-
ple using Reinforcement Learning methods (Sutton
and Barto, 1998) as we do in this paper. Trial-and-
error search and delayed rewards are the two main
features of Reinforcement Learning.
In prior work on dialogue strategy learning, only
dialogue acts (e.g. greet, ask slot, explicit confirm)
chosen by the system have been optimized. Here we
go beneath the level of dialogue acts to plan NLG ac-
tions such as content structuring. Several key ques-
tions thus arise – how to represent different NLG
actions for planning, what context features and state
representations are important in the MDP, and what
reward signals can be used to optimize NLG?
We now present a fully worked example to show
the model in use.
4 Learning for Adaptive Information
Presentation
One of the classic problems in NLG is how to
present one or more items to a user, for example by
simply listing them, contrasting them in respect of
some attributes, or clustering similar items together
(e.g. (Moore et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2007)). For
example the system may present items like so:
• LIST: “There are four hotels meeting your cri-
teria. The first is the Royal, the second is . . .”
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• CONTRAST: “The Oak is an expensive central
hotel. The Royal is cheap but is not central.
. . .”
• CLUSTER: “There are 7 expensive hotels and
11 cheap ones, . . .”.
We will model these decisions in an MDP, and
solve it using trial-and-error exploration, using Re-
inforcement Learning methods. First, we model the
states of the system.
4.1 State space
In this example we will have 3 search con-
straint slots that the user can fill (for instance
food type, location, price range for
a restaurant search application, or artist,
album, genre for music browsing). These slots
can be either filled or confirmed. Confirmed slots
have 100% chance of being correct, and filled slots
only 80% chance, thereby modeling noise in the
speech recognition environment (see also Lemon
and Liu (2007), Rieser and Lemon (2008)). In ad-
dition we will model the number of “hits” or search
results returned by the system after every user turn –
this will be a number from 0 to 100.
4.2 Action set
See figure 1 for the hierarchical structure of the ac-
tions available to the system, representing the com-
bined dialogue management (DM) and NLG task as
an inter-related planning problem.
Figure 1: A Hierarchical Plan for NLG and DM
Here we see a top-level “skill” (ConductDia-
logue) responsible for dialogue management choices
in the MDP, and a second level skill (PresentInfo)
which is reponsible for the NLG choices. Con-
ductDialogue governs the standard dialogue man-
agement options, and decomposes into the 4 possi-
ble action choices (or “Means”) AskASlot, Implic-
itConfirm and AskASlot, ExplicitConfirm, and Pre-
sentInfo. This allows the system to choose between
these 4 types of dialogue act at any time. More
interestingly, for the NLG component of the sys-
tem we have implemented possible 3 action choices
(or “Means”) for information presentation under
PresentInfo: ContrastItems, ListItems, and Clus-
terItems. ListItems is just the standard list content
structuring operator, while ContrastItems and Clus-
terItems are actions which structure the items pre-
sented to the users by contrasting them and cluster-
ing them respectively, as shown above.
4.3 Reward function
Now that we have our states and actions, we need
to define a Reward signal (or “Objective function”)
for the learning system. This directs the learner in
terms of its overall goals (e.g. short dialogues where
users rate information presentation highly), while it
is up to the learner to find an action policy which
meets these goals. What makes the learning prob-
lem interesting is that these goals contain conflict-
ing “trade-offs” that the system must learn to bal-
ance, based on the state that it is in. For exam-
ple, the goal to have short dialogues conflicts with
the goal to get reliable (i.e. confirmed) search con-
straints from the user and to present small numbers
of items. The learning problem here is then for the
system to decide at each turn whether to ask for more
information/constraints, confirm (explicitly or im-
plicitly) the exisiting information/constraints, or to
List, Contrast, or Cluster the current items returned
from the DB. Note that the system can decide to im-
mediately present information in some way to the
user even if not all slots are filled or confirmed. This
leaves open the option for the system to exploit a
“good” information presentation situation (such as
having only 2 database items to tell the user about
via a Contrast) even if the DM situation (e.g. hav-
ing only 2 filled slots) is not in itself very rewarding.
In this way the NLG and DM decisions are jointly
optimised in this setup.
For training a system to be deployed with real
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users, this reward/objective function would be de-
veloped based on a PARADISE-style (Walker et al.,
2000) analysis of a small amount of Wizard-of-Oz
data (Walker et al., 1998; Rieser and Lemon, 2008).
Here, to prove the concept of statistical planning for
NLG, we simply show that the learner can jointly
optimize the NLG and dialogue management deci-
sions based on a complex reward signal. Nothing
depends on the particular values chosen here – they
are for illustration only and can be estimated from
suitable data.
The overall reward for each dialogue conducted
by the system has 3 components: completion re-
ward, turn penalty, and presentation reward/penalty.
Turn penalty is simply -1 per system turn. The com-
pletion reward is the % probability that the items
presented to the user correctly meet their actual
search constraints, and is therefore a function of
the number of filled or confirmed slots. For exam-
ple, if all 3 slots are confirmed, then (in this noise
model) we have 100% chance of having the search
constraints correct. The number of filled/confirmed
slots stochastically determines the number of items
that the system can present to the user if it decides to
enter the presentation phase. For example if 3 slots
are filled, then 0-10 items will be presented to the
user, if 2 slots are filled 0-20 items are retrieved, if 1
slot, 0-100 items. Again, in a real application, these
distributions would be estimated from data.
The presentation reward (PR) for each informa-
tion presentation action is defined as follows, for i =
number of items to be presented:
• ListItems: 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 : PR = 100; 4 ≤ i ≤ 8 :
PR = 0; 9 ≤ i : PR = −100
• ContrastItems: i ≤ 1 : PR = −100; 2 ≤ i ≤
6 : PR = 300; 7 ≤ i : PR = −100
• ClusterItems: 0 ≤ i ≤ 5 : PR = −100; 5 ≤
i ≤ 8 : PR = 0; 9 ≤ i : PR = 300
This range of rewards/penalties, together with those
for filled and confirmed slots and dialogue length
provides a complex environment within which the
learner must explore different trade-offs.
4.4 Environment and User simulation
For training a policy given this definition of states,
actions, and rewards, we also need an environment
simulation that responds appropriately to system ac-
tions. Here the environment is not only the user,
but also the database from which items are retrieved
for presentation to the user. For policy exploration
we use a simple bigram stochastic user simulation
with probabilities estimated from COMMUNICA-
TOR data, similar to (Georgila et al., 2006). At each
system turn, a number of database hits is randomly
determined as a function of the number of filled
search constraint slots, as described above. Note
that this user simulation does not need to respond
directly to the NLG decisions of the system, since
the dialogue closes as soon as the system decides
to present information (in whatever manner) to the
user. A central open question for this type of MDP
model of NLG is how to develop “good” user simu-
lations that are sensitive to system NLG choices (Ja-
narthanam and Lemon, 2008).
4.5 The “RL-majority” Baseline policy
In contrast to other work on policy learning, which
only uses hand-coded systems for comparison, we
choose a more challenging baseline. This is because
hand-coded policies have been shown to be inferior
to learned policies in numerous studies, e.g. (Levin
and Pieraccini, 1997; Singh et al., 2002; Lemon and
Liu, 2007; Walker et al., 1998), and also, because
our task here is a combination of dialogue manage-
ment and NLG, we do not want the NLG results to
be contaminated by an inferior hand-coded dialogue
management policy. We therefore choose to com-
pare against a baseline policy learned for the same
problem domain, but where the learner uses the av-
erage most rewarding action for the NLG compo-
nent (in this case, Cluster items). We call this the
“RL-majority” baseline, because it is the RL ana-
logue of a majority class baseline. This baseline pol-
icy does not have access to the “DB hits” feature for
decisions under PresentInfo (it does have this fea-
ture for the top level decisions though), so it learns
the average best NLG action rather than attempting
to learn the best NLG action for each possible num-
ber of DB hits.
4.6 Training the policies
We use a hierarchical SARSAReinforcement Learn-
ing algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998) with linear
function approximation to train the policies. Figure
Figure 2: Training the adaptive NLG policy (red line = average dialogue reward)1
2 shows learning for the adaptive NLG problem1.
Here we see that after 1250 training dialogues the
system has learned to find a high average reward for
the combined NLG and DM problem. At the start
of training the system explores bad actions in some
states, for example the minimum reward gained in
early training is -153, obtained by contrasting more
than 7 items (-100) when only 1 slot is filled (-50)
after 3 system turns (-3). However, by the end of
this training run, the system is able to consistently
obtain the best possible rewards given the dialogue
situation, for example gaining a top reward of 396
for either Contrast or Cluster of appropriate numbers
of items (+300), when all slots are confirmed (+100)
in system 4 turns (-4). Where no +300 presentation
reward is possible (i.e. i = 1, 7, or 8) the system has
learned to Cluster or List (when i=1) the items after
filling and confirming all slots. A similar graph can
be shown for training the Baseline policy.
4.7 Testing
We trained both policies multiple times until conver-
gence (approx. 10K cycles), selected the best policy
in each case, and tested them (with stochastic sim-
ulated users) for 550 test dialogues each. Table 1
1In the training/testing graphs red lines show average reward
over windows of 50 dialogues, and for each dialogue blue dots
show total reward (including NLG reward), black dots show
length penalty, and green show completion reward per dialogue.
Table 1: Testing the Baseline (top, av. =224.5) and
Adaptive (bottom, av. =286.9) NLG policies
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Policy Av. Reward Av. length
Baseline Learned 224.5 4.0
Adaptive NLG Learned 286.9* 4.98
Table 2: Results: learned baseline vs. adaptive NLG
policies. (∗ = p < 0.001)
shows the performance of the 2 policies during test-
ing (top= baseline NLG, bottom = adaptive NLG),
and the results are presented in table 2.
These results demonstrate a relative increase in re-
ward of 27.8% for the adaptive NLG system. The
adaptive NLG system has learned fine-grained local
trade-offs for its NLG decisions, which are not avail-
able to the baseline system.
So what has been learned? Here is an example di-
alogue with the adaptive NLG system:
System: How can I help you? (greet)
User: I want a cheap chinese restaurant. (2 slots
filled, 2 database items returned)
System: Ok. The Golden Wok is cheap and cen-
tral, and the Noodle bar is cheap but in the south of
the city (Contrast)
Here we can see that the adaptive NLG policy can
decide to present information when it is particularly
advantageous, even when the information gathering
part of the system is not complete. The Baseline
learns a similar policy, but is not sensitive to DB hits
when choosing how to present the information.
5 Summary and Future Directions
This paper demonstrates a new data-driven method
where the NLG components of dialogue systems can
be automatically trained and globally optimized be-
fore deployment.
We surveyed standard approaches to NLG, and
described general advantages offered by statistical
planning models together with solution methods
such as Reinforcement Learning. We gave a brief
description of MDP models. In section 4 we cast
a standard NLG problem as an MDP, defining the
state space, action set, and reward function. We saw
how Reinforcement Learning can be used to solve
this NLG problem at the same time as optimizing
dialogue management. We then evaluated the adap-
tive NLG policy versus a learned RL-majority base-
line. The results showed a significant relative in-
crease in reward of 27.8% for the adaptive NLG sys-
tem. When given a reward signal that provides feed-
back on content structuring choices (List, Contrast,
Cluster) the system learns to avoid bad decisions
(e.g. listing lots of items, clustering small numbers
of items, contrasting too few or too many items) and
to choose the best NLG option available depending
on the number of database items returned by the sys-
tem at any time.
This demonstrates that our approach brings a
number of theoretical and practical benefits such as
fine-grained adaptation, and automatic optimization.
Future challenges include modelling the hierarchi-
cal structure of NLG problems using additional hi-
erarchical MDPs, and modelling complex effects of
NLG choices on dialogue context using larger fea-
ture sets.
Many other NLG decisions could be approached
in this way. By using MDPs to represent other NLG
problems we can move to a situation where deter-
mination of the best lexical items and referring ex-
pressions to use in a system utterance, as well as
the best syntactic structure and intonation pattern,
are all determined by learned strategies, developed
by reward-driven learning based on real data. Re-
inforcement Learning could also be applied to deci-
sions of when and how to use anaphora and ellipsis.
Overall, this leads us to propose a new develop-
ment cycle for NLG, whereby the more adaptive
NLG components of new dialogue systems can be
automatically trained and optimized before deploy-
ment, and can then be allowed to adapt online to
user feedback (through continued monitoring of re-
wards). Moreover, due to the use of state general-
ization techniques such as function approximation,
NLG will even be possible in previously unseen and
unplanned-for situations.
An open question for this type of model is how
to develop “good” user simulations that are sen-
sitive to system NLG choices (Janarthanam and
Lemon, 2008). Another important topic is how
the classifier-based learning techniques of “train-
able” NLG (Barzilay and Lapata, 2005; Duboue and
McKeown, 2003; Stent et al., 2004; Walker et al.,
2007) can be integrated with the MDP approach pro-
posed here. Other avenues to explore are how inter-
active alignment (Garrod and Pickering, 2001) and
semantic coordination in dialogue (Larsson, 2007)
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can be modelled in this framework.
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Abstract
Co-occurring speech and gestures of natu-
ral language dialogues composes into mean-
ing units, that is, they jointly describe dis-
course referents. We start from the idea that
interlocutors tend to re-use this cross-modal
information units if the discourse referent
is referred to again: co-occurring speech
and gesture are assumed to “align into” bi-
modal ensembles (BMEs). We further hy-
pothesize that due to principles of dialogical
economy interlocutors will exploit the im-
pact of a BME’s gesture to shorten its lin-
guistic part of that BME. If this hypothesis
is right, we expect that the words in mul-
timodal communication exhibit a different
frequency distribution from words in writ-
ten texts, whose frequency distribution is
known to obey Zipf’s law. This hypothe-
sis is tested for 24 direction-giving dialogues
using two different frequency fits, rank fre-
quency distribution and complementary cu-
mulative distribution. According to the first
fit, the hypothesis can be confirmed, accord-
ing to the second one, it has to be rejected.
In addition, we also propose a way to mea-
sure the strength of cross-modal informa-
tional association.
1 Introduction and Reasoning
This article presents some ideas about how to com-
bine text-technological tools and linguistic research
∗Authors’ names are given in alphabetical order.
in the study of multi-modal dialogue, that is dialogue
comprising speech and gesture. The term ‘gesture’
refers to gesticulations according to Kendon’s con-
tinuum (Kendon, 1988), that is, ‘gesture’ is un-
derstood as a spontaneous co-verbal hand and arm
movement which is linguistically significant and
contributes to the narrative. McNeill (1992), allud-
ing to a Peircean trichotomy, distinguishes different
types of gesture, namely deictic gestures, iconic ges-
tures, and beats. Beats are rhythmic stresses, de-
ictic gestures are pointings. According to Peirce,
icons are representations (“signs”), “whose relation
to their objects is a mere community in some qual-
ity” (Peirce, 1867). That is, icons signify due to a
certain resemblance between signifier and signified.
However, ‘icon’ is an “umbrella term” (cf. (Eco,
1976)) that covers a variety of different signifying
methods. (Mu¨ller, 1998), drawing on the work of
(Wundt, 1911), sets up a more fine-grained classi-
fication of gestures according to the distinction of
four modes of representation on the ground of what
the hands do: Agieren (Acting), Modellieren (Mod-
elling), Zeichnen (Drawing), and Repra¨sentieren
(Representing).
Ancient rhetoric already emphasizes the rhetoric
connection between speech and gesture (Quintilian,
1st century; Maier-Eichhorn, 1989). In modern
times, most notable Kendon (1980) claims that ver-
bal utterances together with simultaneous accompa-
nying deictic and iconic gestures coheres into sin-
gle meaning units. However, it is not yet clear how
the mechanism that binds together the two commu-
nication channels should be modelled – is it func-
tional application (Rieser, 2004), rhetorical relation
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(Lu¨cking et al., 2006; Lascarides and Stone, 2006)
or something else? For the time being the pair of
gesture and affiliated speech should be construed as
an informational wholeness tied together by some
kind of synchronicity principle (Jung, 1971). Take
for instance an example from the study described in
Section 2, where a subject is talking about one of
two churches on a square which are, amongst oth-
ers, distinguished by the type of their roofs:
(1) rechts
the one to the right
die
it
hat
has
so’n
such a
[Giebel]
[gable]
∧-shaped gesture synchronous to bracketed
speech
The gesture from (1), which is displayed as Fig-
ure 1(a), is a Posturing gesture according to the
modes of representation scheme introduced below.
We assume that for the period of the dialogue
the gesture gets associated with its accompanying
speech,1 or, as we will call it hereafter: The brack-
eted portion of the linguistic utterance together with
the accompanying speech constitutes a bimodal en-
semble (BME).
The linguistic part of a BME may comprise more
than single words, as is illustrated in (2), where the
subject talks about a chapel that is located within
the “punch” of a surrounding “unionsq”-shaped hedge, as
indicated by a Shaping gesture (see Figure 1(b)).
(2) die
it
hat
has
[’ne
[a
gru¨ne
green
Hecke
hedgerow
drumherum]
around it]
unionsq-shaped gesture synchronous to bracketed
speech
There is some discussion about the informational
relation between speech and gesture: Is it redun-
dancy or complementarity? (Cassell and Prevost,
1996; Bergmann and Kopp, 2006) We will, how-
ever, bypass this issue since our concern is purely
quantitative: The linguistic part of BMEs is the in-
put for the frequency distribution analysis given in
Section 3.
On a more abstract level, a BME is an assem-
blage comprising a set of parts of speech (classes
of words) and a representation technique (class of
1Most presumably, the association is established by some
grounding mechanism (see for instance (Clark and Schaefer,
1989)), but we will not pursue this issue further here.
(a) Gable (b) Hedgerow
Figure 1: Two sample gestures.
gesture, e.g. Shaping). BMEs conceived this way
enter into the determination of the Hartley informa-
tion (Klir and Folger, 1988) (see Section 3).
The fusion of speech and gesture into a BME in
dialogue is a precondition to the investigation pur-
sued in this article. We investigate a hypothesis con-
cerning bimodal ensembles: The use of gesture fa-
cilitates a merely partial recurrence or a paraphrase
of the linguistic material of a BME. Since there is
not yet data directed to and annotated for speech-
and-gesture coupling over the time-course or a dia-
logue, we approach this issue by means of an indi-
rect measuring. Think, for example, of an ensemble
e = (xy,g) manifested by some linguistic material xy
in conjunction with a gesture g. The interlocutors of
D may manifest e later on by the parts x,y of xy (or
maybe even by some unit z which is sense-related
to x, y or xy). The reason is that the simultaneously
produced gesture g allows for correctly disambiguat-
ing the shortened or otherwise modified linguistic
manifestation of the ensemble e.2 For an illustration
take the sample utterance (2). The BME (’ne gru¨ne
Hecke drumherum, unionsq) might get shortened to:
(3) die
it
hat
has
[’ne
[a
Hecke]
hedgerow]
unionsq-shaped gesture
To give an example for sense related substitution:
The word Giebel/gable from (1) might be replaced
by the hyponym Pediment:
(4) die
it
hat
has
so’n
such a
[Pediment]
[gable]
2It may also be the case that interlocutors reduce motor ef-
fort and produce simplified gestures. But this is a different story.
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∧-shaped gesture
The described mechanisms leave an option to ex-
press the same concept in dialogical communication.
Thus, any frequent usage of this method of reduc-
ing communication effort has an impact on the fre-
quency distribution of lexical units within D: the
same concept denoted by e is alternatively mani-
fested by xy, x, y, z, z′, z′′, . . . (Remember that z,
z′, z′′ are sense related to x, y, or xy.) As this method
of lexical choice is out of reach in written communi-
cation we expect an impact of using gestures on the
frequency distributions of lexical units in dialogues.
Note that this argumentation presupposes that
there is a usage-chain in dialogue D from the BME
e to its shortening later on in D.
Note further that we do not expect this effect
on the level of highly frequent words which, as
expected, consist of function words and therefore
rarely count as linguistic manifestations of bimodal
ensembles.
The next section gives a brief overview of the
study that underlies the data our investigation is
based on. It also introduces the gestural represen-
tation techniques that enter into the determination of
the Hartley information. The measuring procedures
and its results are given in Section 3.
2 Experimental Study
Iconic gesturing is inherently spatial (Alibali, 2005).
A kind of setting that has proved to elicit spatial
discourse is the description of routes (Denis, 1997).
Accordingly, the empirical data of our research con-
sists of direction giving dialogues. The dialogues are
about city tours one of the interlocutors has made in
a town presented in a Virtual Reality environment
(Kopp et al., 2008). Thus, our empirical study com-
prises two phases: At first, a participant undertakes
a “bus ride” in a virtual town, see Figure 2(a) for an
illustration. The sight-seeing tour passes five objects
of interest, namely an abstract sculpture, a city hall,
a church square with two churches, a chapel and a
fountain. Subsequently, the first participant, called
Router (R), has to explain to a second participant
who does not know the virtual town which route he
has driven and what landmarks he has seen. In or-
der to elicit an elaborate spatial discourse the sec-
ond participant, Follower (F), was made to believe
that he will have to find the route through the virtual
town and to identify all landmarks. Splitting up the
virtual sight-seeing tour in a route and a landmark
part, different types of spatial communication will
come up, namely giving directions and describing
shapes. Both are good candidates for iconic depic-
tion.
In view of the frequency analysis to come, the em-
ployment of a virtual stimulus is a precondition for
the inter-participant comparability of linguistic and
non-verbal data, since it assures that all participants
talk about the same thing.
2.1 Annotation
Annotation layers divide naturally into two differ-
ent partitions, the one relating to speech the other
relating to gestures. Speech transcription has been
made using Praat3 and has been done orthographi-
cally, i.e., on the level of words. Part of speech in-
formation is added automatically by means of POS-
tagging (Gleim et al., 2007).
For gesture annotation, we delimit the gesture’s
semantic phase known as stroke (McNeill, 1992).
Each stroke has been assigned a mode of representa-
tion. We have extended and terminologically modi-
fied Mu¨ller’s set of representation modes in order to
adjust it to the specific needs of route descriptions.
Gesture has been annotated using the multimedia an-
notation software Elan4. The representation tech-
niques we recognize are itemized and briefly com-
mented upon in the following list.
Shaping The hands are sliding on the surface of
a virtual object in gesture space, a shape
emerges.
Sizing A configuration of hands or fingers that indi-
cate a certain distance or size is called Sizing.
Posturing The hand (or both hands) represent an
object involved in the described situation.
Drawing A single finger or the hand is used as a
drawing tool to sketch an outline in the gesture
space.
Pantomime The usage of an object or an action is
displayed by imitation. Note that Pantomime,
3www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat
4www.lat-mpi.eu/tools/elan
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(a) Virtual bus ride (b) Route description (c) Ariadne system
Figure 2: Virtual environment stimulus and subsequent dialogue: the Data are managed in the Ariadne
system.
in contrast to the other gesture practices, makes
the gesturer himself a part of the depiction, not
just his hands or arms.
Indexing A deictic gesture that singles out a point
in the gesture space which thereby gets “se-
mantically loaded”, e.g., becomes a proxy for
an object of the narrative.
Grasping If the hand touches or holds an object,
but does not shape its body, then a Grasping-
gesture is performed.
Counting If the fingers are used to enumerate
things. Gestural counting can be seen as an
iconic representation of a tally sheet.
Hedging Sometimes a wiggling or shrugging
movement is used in order to depict uncer-
tainty. We call this metaphoric gesture method
‘Hedging’.
In sum, there are 25 direction-giving dyads with a
total of 4961 gestures and 39.435 words.
Our multimodal dialogue data are stored, re-
trieved, transformed, and statistically explored
within the Ariadne system (Gleim et al., 2007)
which is used as an Alignment Corpus Management
System (ACMS) – see the screen shot displayed as
Figure 2(c).
2.2 Reliability
Since the classification of gestures in terms of rep-
resentation modes is interpretive data, it is question-
able whether it is reproducible (Krippendorff, 1980).
Our evaluation of gesture classification data follows
the discussion in (Stegmann and Lu¨cking, 2005).
A sample of gestures large enough to test for the
reasonable agreement level of 70% with an α-error
of 0.05 and a β -error of 0.85 (set in the run-up to
the reliability study) has been classified by three ex-
pert annotators. The resulting first-order agreement
coefficient AC1 (Gwet, 2001) is 0.784. It’s confi-
dence interval is (0.758,0.81), so that the probabil-
ity for agreement on gestures’ representation modes
– given that the agreement is not due to chance – is
significantly greater than 75%.
3 Measuring Procedure and Results
Our starting point of indirectly measuring an im-
pact of gestures on the choice of lexical units is
Zipf’s law (Zipf, 1972) which we denote as follows
(Adamic, 2000):
n∼ r−γ (1)
n is the frequency of the rth most frequent word in
the given text (or dialogue) for which Model (1) is
fitted. Roughly, Zipf and related studies show that
γ ∼ 1 for written texts (Rapoport, 1982; Tuldava,
1998). Taking this as a reference value we expect
– according to our hypothesis – a lower value of γ
in the case of dialogical communication, that is, a
flatter straight line which results from a log-log plot
of the Rank Frequency Model (1). Note that −γ is
the slope of that line. Look, for example, at Fig-
ure 3(a), where we have fitted the power law Cx−γ
to the Rank Frequency Distribution (RFD) of lexical
units used by some interlocutor in a dialogue from
our corpus. That is, the first rank is the one of the
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most frequent word, the second the one of the sec-
ond most frequent word, and so on till we finally
reach the ranks of hapax legomena. Fitting this em-
pirical curve and plotting the result in a log-log plot
we see that γ = .678 while the adjusted coefficient
of determination R¯2 equals .9674. This indicates a
good fit.5 This result is in support of our hypothe-
sis of a gesture-based impact on lexical choices – it
does not falsify the hypothesis about the existence of
this impact: as the exponent is smaller than one, the
curve is flatter than suggested by the results derived
from written texts.
However, according to (Newman, 2005) fittings
change for the better by operating on the Comple-
mentary Cumulative Distribution (CCD), that is, on
the probability function P(X ≥ x) of words which
occur at least x times. In the case of our exam-
ple the results of fitting to the CCD derived from
the corresponding RFD are shown in Figure 3(b):
Now, γ = 1.145 and R¯2 = .9937 what indicates a
slightly better fit. Can these two measurements be
compared? According to (Adamic, 2000) the expo-
nent γ of a Zipfian RFD corresponding to a given
CCD with exponent β is computed by γ = 1/β – in
the present case we achieve γ ∼ .873.
That is, relying on the CCD which gives a bet-
ter fit than the previously observed RFD and deriv-
ing the exponent of a RFD – which corresponds to
the latter CCD on the same level of goodness of fit-
ting – the absolute value of the exponent is raised
(.873 > .678). This is what we actually observe in
nearly all cases of our corpus of 24 dialogues.6 The
corresponding box plots of the 24 exponents γ and
the corresponding determination coefficients R¯2 are
shown in Figure 4: Not only are the absolute val-
ues of the exponents of the power laws fitted to the
corresponding CCDs higher than the one of the pri-
marily observed RFDs. More important is the obser-
vation of remarkably higher values of R¯2 – that is, as
indicated by (Newman, 2005), CCDs are more reli-
able reference points of power law fitting. Thus, we
additionally derive – according to the approach of
(Adamic, 2000) – the exponents of those rank fre-
quency distributions which correspond to the latter
5The adjusted coefficient of determination is a measure of
goodness of fitting: the nearer its value to 1, the better the fit.
6Note that we deleted one dialogue from the corpus because
of too many uncertain annotations.
CCDs on the same level of goodness of fitting. As
a result we see that we get on average higher val-
ues than in the case of the primarily observed RFDs
(cf. Figure 4(c)). Moreover, the newly derived val-
ues disperse around 1 and are, therefore, in a good
neighborhood of those values which were observed
by Zipf. In this sense, our results do not indicate a
difference between written and dialogical commu-
nication – at least under the regime of our exper-
imental setting. Following this line of argumenta-
tion, there is no effect on the frequency distribution
of lexical units. This hypothesis is only upheld by
referring to the fittings of the left part of Figure 4 –
however at the price of relying on worse fittings.
As our distribution analysis does not shed much
light on the existence of bimodal ensembles we now
compute a measure of interactivity between selec-
tions on the lexical and gestural layer. Such cross-
modal selections are called interactive if, for exam-
ple, the selection of lexical units constrains the se-
lection of gestural units, that is, if there is a tendency
of co-occurrence among lexical and gestural units.
If we could measure such a tendency, this could be
interpreted as a support of our hypothesis about the
existence of bimodal ensembles. As we will see, this
is not achieved.
In order to get a first measure of the interaction of
cross-modal selections we compute the information
transmission between selecting from the set of parts
of speech X and the set of representation techniques
Y . Generally speaking, the information transmission
between n sets X1, . . . ,Xn is defined as follows (Klir
and Folger, 1988):
T (X1, . . . ,Xn) =
n
∑
i=1
I(Xi)− I(X1, . . . ,Xn) (2)
where I(X) = log2 |X | is the simple Hartley infor-
mation of X (cf. (Klir and Folger, 1988) for the
details of this and related definitions), I(X ,Y ) =
log2 |R|,R ⊆ X × Y , is the joint (Hartley) infor-
mation. In our case R is the set of all co-
articulated parts of speech and representation tech-
niques: Generally speaking, the sets X1, . . . ,Xn are
called non-interactive if T (X1, . . . ,Xn) = 0, other-
wise we observe that T (X1, . . . ,Xn) > 0. Note that
T (X1, . . . ,Xn) = 0 if and only if R = X1× . . .×Xn.
In this case, any selection from set Xi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
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(a) Results of fitting to the Rank Frequency Dis-
tribution (RFD – Zipfian scenario).
(b) Results of fitting to the Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution (CCD) derived from the lat-
ter RFD.
Figure 3: Two sample power law fittings of the frequency distribution of lexical units of a single interlocutor
(in the role of the router). In both cases, the model y =Cx−γ is used.
may be combined with any selection from any other
set Xj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}\{i}. As the range of values of
T is not limited, we standardize it as follows:
Tˆ (X1, . . . ,Xn) =
T (X1, . . . ,Xn)
∑ni=1 I(Xi)
∈ [0,1] (3)
Now, we see that for Tˆ (X1, . . . ,Xn) + 1 the sets
X1, . . . ,Xn tend to be non-interactive, while they tend
to be interactive if in contrast to this Tˆ (X1, . . . ,Xn),
0. In other words: 0 indicates minimal and 1 max-
imal interactivity. In Figure 5 we report the results
of measuring the interaction between the selection
of parts of speech and of gestural practices by 24
interlocutors in 24 dialogues. Obviously, the sets
are far from being interactive according to this mea-
sure of interactivity (which measures on an ordinal
scale). However, as we do not yet know anything
about expected values of such an interaction among
elements of different modes in multimodal commu-
nication, we hesitate to value this as a falsification of
our starting hypothesis. Anyhow, this hypothesis is
not supported by both of our measurements, neither
on the level of lexical distributions nor on the level
of interactions of cross-modal choices. If we rely
on the classical operation of rank frequency distri-
bution, our hypothesis is not falsified. However, if
we use the CCD we get a hint that there is no distri-
Figure 5: The distribution of information transmis-
sion between the selection of parts of speech and
gestural practices by interlocutors in 24 dialogues.
butional difference.
4 Conclusion
One reason for the rather ambivalent result might
be that its underlying presupposition does not hold.
Ambivalent means that the rejection of the hypoth-
esis depends on whether the fit is based on chosing
the rank frequency distribution or the complemen-
tary cumulative distribution.
Recall from Section 1 that a BME e leaves a fre-
quency distributional fingerprint only if there is a
usage-chain connecting first occurrences of a fully
specified e to subsequent shortened manifestations.
The progressive rhematic structure of the direction-
162
(a) Exponent values (b) Adjusted coefficients of de-
termination
(c) Range of derived exponents
of rank frequency distributions
Figure 4: Box plots of the exponent values (a), the corresponding adjusted coefficients of determination (b),
and of the range of derived exponents of rank frequency distributions which correspond to the primarily
observed complementary cumulative distributions (c) of all 24 dialogues of our corpus. The first column of
both the (a) and the (b) sub-figures denotes the rank frequency model while the second column denotes the
complementary cumulative model.
giving dialogues might block the establishment of a
usage-chain for a certain BME e, leaving e an merely
ephemeral phenomenon.7
As exposed in the preceding section, the rejec-
tion or affirmation of the hypothesis investigated in
our analysis partly depends on “baseline values” for
the different measuring procedures. Even if we can-
not maintain our working hypothesis – and we have
been very careful not to overstate our results, cf.
Section 3 – analyses like the one carried out make up
the pieces of the puzzle needed in order for a more
comprehensive exploration of multimodal data. If
BMEs indeed leave fingerprints that are measurable
in the way explored in this article, this result clearly
has an impact on cognitive theories, for instance the-
ories of speech-and-gesture production. If there is an
intra-personal alignment of words and gesture dur-
ing a dialogue, the production of units on the respec-
tive modalities interacts. That is, empirical, quan-
titative research like the one presented here might
help to collect evidence for or against different views
of production processes as developed by (McNeill
and Duncan, 2000; Kita and O¨zyu¨rek, 2003; de
Ruiter, 2000; Krauss et al., 2000).
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Introduction
Generation of Referring Expressions (GRE), e.g.,
Dale and Reiter (1995), is one of the core tasks of
Natural Language Generation (NLG) systems. Usu-
ally it is formulated as an identification problem:
given a domain representing entities and their prop-
erties, construct a referring expression for a target
referent or set of target referents which singles it
out from its distractors. Recently, researchers in
this area have turned their attention to multimodal
referring acts, in particular, the interaction between
the two modalities of pointing and describing – e.g.,
Kranstedt et al. (2006), Piwek (2007), and Van der
Sluis and Krahmer (2007). Additionally, psycholin-
guistic work is increasingly investigating the condi-
tions governing the use of pointing gestures as part
of referring acts in dialogue, opposed to monologue.
Here, we present the design of an experiment on
multimodal reference in two-party dialogue. The
purpose of the experiment is to create a corpus that
can inform the development of multimodal GRE al-
gorithms.
Collecting a Balanced Corpus
We have paid specific attention to balancing the
corpus: the conditions under which references
were elicited correspond to experimental variables
that are counter-balanced. The use of a dia-
logue setting will allow us to investigate both
the speaker/generator’s and hearer/reader’s point of
view, with potentially useful data on such factors as
alignment and entrainment, and the nature of col-
laboration or negotiation, topics of much debate in
the psycholinguistic literature (Pickering and Gar-
rod, 2004).
In our setup for collecting dialogues, a director
and a follower are talking about a map that is sit-
uated on the wall in front of them, henceforth the
shared map. Both can interact freely using speech
and gesture, without touching the shared map or
standing up. Each also has a private copy of the map;
the director’s copy has an itinerary on it, and her task
is to communicate the itinerary to the follower. The
follower needs to reproduce the itinerary on his pri-
vate copy. The rules of for the interaction were as
follows:
• Since this is a conversation, the follower is free
to interrupt the director and ask for any clarifi-
cation s/he thinks is necessary.
• Both participants are free to indicate landmarks
or parts of the shared map to their partner in any
way they like.
• Both participants are not permitted to show
their partner their private map at any point.
They can only discuss the shared map.
• Both participants must remain seated through-
out the experiment.
While this task resembles the MapTask experiments
(Anderson et al., 1991), the latter manipulated mis-
matches between features on the director and fol-
lower map, phonological properties of feature labels
on maps, familiarity of participants with each other,
and eye contact between participants. The current
experiment systematically manipulates target size,
colour, cardinality, prior reference and domain fo-
cus, in a balanced design. Though this arguably
leads to a certain degree of artificiality in the con-
versational setting, the balance would not be easy
to obtain in an uncontrolled setting or with off-the-
shelf materials like real maps. Further properties of
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our experiment that distinguish it from the MapTask
are: (1) objects in the visual domains are not named,
so that participants need to produce their own refer-
ring expressions, (2) the participants are always able
to see each other; (3) the participants are allowed to
include pointing gestures in their referring expres-
sions.
Four maps were constructed, consisting of sim-
ple geometrical landmarks (ovals or squares). Two
of the maps (one each for ovals and squares) have
group landmarks, whereas the other two have sin-
gletons. Objects differ in their size (large, medium,
small) and colour (red, blue, green). Each dyad in
the experiment discusses all four maps. Per dyad,
the participants switch director/follower roles after
each map. The order in which dyads discuss maps is
counter balanced across dyads. There are four inde-
pendent variables in this experiment:
• Cardinality The target destinations in the
itineraries are either singleton sets or sets of 5
objects that have the same attributes (e.g., all
green squares)
• Visual Attributes: Targets on the itinerary
differ from their distractors – the objects in
their immediate vicinity (the ‘focus area’) – in
colour, or in size, or in both colour and size.
The focus area is defined as the set of objects
immediately surrounding a target.
• Prior reference: Some of the targets are vis-
ited twice in the itinerary.
• Shift of domain focus: Targets are located
near to or far away from the previous target. If
two targets t1 and t2 are in the near condition,
then t1 is one of the distractors of t2 and vice
versa.
Current Status and Further Work
After a pilot of the experiment, data was collected
from 22 dyads with the validated setup. Currently,
the data is being transcribed, see Figure 1 for an
example. Our next task is to annotate the data, fo-
cussing on identification of multimodal referring ex-
pressions, linking of referring expressions with do-
main objects (i.e., intended referents) and segmen-
tation of dialogue into episodes spanning the point
in time from initiation to successful completion of
a target identification. Elsewhere (van der Sluis et
128 D Uh and if you go straight up from D points at the map and moves his
that you’ve got five blue ones finger upwards
129 F Yeah [there?] D is still pointing F points
130 D [There] yeah D is still pointing F is still pointing
131 F one two three four five D is still pointing F is still pointing
132 D Yeah. They’re all number three D is still pointing
133 F Right. Right.
134 D And the five reds just D points and moves his finger to the right
to the right over
135 F And like a kind of downwards arrow D is still pointing F moves his hand upwards
136 D Arrow yeah they’re all number four. D stops pointing
Number five. Uh and five is paired
with one with these ones. D points
137 F All right.
Figure 1: Excerpt from dialogue O17-S33-S34, where D =
director, F = follower and where the brackets indicate overlap-
ping speech and the text in italics indicates approximately the
co-duration of gesture and speech
al., 2008), we provide information on the hypothe-
ses that we intend to test on the annotated corpus.
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Abstract
This paper deals mainly with iconic ges-
ture in two-agent route description dialogue
and focuses largely on the interface of
word semantics and gesture. The modelling
tools used come from formal semantics and
pragmatics. The empirical background of
the study is a partly annotated corpus of
ca 5.000 gestures collected in the Biele-
feld Speech-and-Gesture-Alignment Corpus
(SAGA). The approach taken is entirely
new: an interface comprising word mean-
ing and gesture meaning is constructed, the
point of contact being the temporal over-
lap between gesture and speech in the an-
notated data. Gesture meaning is computed
via a mapping rep from the set of annota-
tion predicates onto a meaning representa-
tion. There is a discussion concerning the
trade-off between context-free vs. context-
dependent word meaning and gesture mean-
ing. The interfaced speech-gesture meaning
is represented in a dynamic semantics for-
mat easily grafted on a formal syntax frag-
ment.
∗MM stands for multi-modal.
1 Introduction1
It is well known that gestures of agents are ubiqui-
tous in dialogue (cf. McNeill (ed. (2000)), Kita (ed.
(2003)) but not where it can be placed in dialogue
and what then will be its function there. Judged by
experience with corpus data and the gesture folklore
there is little doubt that there is pointing to objects in
context (cf. Rieser (2008)) and that properties such
as rectangularity can in a way be indicated by ges-
ture. However, is there something more definite that
can be said? As far as we know there has been no
work on MM dialogue so far investigating these mat-
ters on a more principled basis. Below it will be
shown that gestures can go into different structural
positions in dialogue, exhibiting different meanings
and functions. Even if we rely on a fairly large cor-
pus of multi-modal dialogue, the (Bielefeld Univer-
sity) SAGA corpus elicited in a strictly controlled
VR experiment, comprising roughly 5.000 gestures,
the evidence presented here cannot be conclusive.
There might still be other functions and most plausi-
bly, there are. Nevertheless, we claim that the find-
ings we show and explain are prototypical for nat-
ural MM dialogue. So, in section 1 we will pro-
vide an overview on structural positions observed
for gestures in MM dialogue. Ch. 2 will deal with a
binding problem of some sort, namely, how gesture
1In this paper only literature is quoted which has been eval-
uated as relevant for its methodological concerns, which is
largely formal theory building. So, some readers might miss
their favourite papers. Thanks go to three anonymous reviewers
who raised a lot of interesting issues. Some of their arguments
are taken up below, space permitting. Sometimes I will refer to
a reviewer’s (abbr. as rev. n’s) remark.
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information can be ‘bound’2 to speech information.
Ch. 3 will deal with the interface of gesture meaning
and verbal meaning, restricted to word meaning, and
there will be a brief discussion of the methodologi-
cal problems with this approach in ch. 4.
2 Overview on Structural Positions
Observed for Gesture in Dialogue
As an introduction to the function of gesture in dia-
logue, we set out with a naı¨ve methodology and pro-
vide prototypical speech-gesture occurrences. We
might view these as instances of ratings leading
to systematic annotation, i.e. we first do speech-
gesture pairings in a naı¨ve way; as a consequence,
the total meaning of speech plus gesture is given in
the short descriptions. Of course, the coordination of
speech and gesture information is a major explican-
dum of this paper, so this introductory perspective
will be given up in sections 2-4, where the ontolog-
ical status of speech meaning and gesture meaning
is discussed and the speech-gesture interface is the
central issue. The stills in fig. 1 below show the
stroke positions of iconic gestures; it should be kept
in mind that gestures are incomplete and even non-
standard in various ways and provide partial infor-
mation at best. So, in interpreting gestures we have
to assume top-down Gestaltist processes at work. (a)
is an oval gesture accompanying the description of
a sculpture indicating part of the concrete basis for
the sculpture, (b) presents a gesture indicating the
two towers of a church, in (c) the route follower im-
itates the router’s gesture indicating the U-shape of
the town hall, (d) has an other-correction carried out
by a router’s gesture, (e) has a two-handed gesture
which depicts a situation containing a chapel and
a tree. (a) and (b) are routers gestures, (d) has in-
teraction resting on gestures functioning like turns.
Fig. 2 gives a summary of these findings, indicating
the various functions of gestures.The data in Fig. 1
are related to Fig. 2 as follows: The gesture in still
(a) is related to word semantics, the one in (b) to
the semantics of an NP-constituent, in (c) a gesture
goes proxy for a propositional content which gets
acknowledged, (d) shows that a gesture is used in a
2The notion of binding used here is taken from neuro-
biology and vision research. There is little doubt that the logical
notion of operator binding can also be related to these more fun-
damental notions.
next turn repair, in (e), finally, the right hand models
a tree while the left hand indicates the location of the
tree beside a chapel.
The example 1 discussed below (cf. fig. 4) will
deal in some detail with the extension of word mean-
ing by gestural meaning.
Situation
Dialogue-structure
Propositions
Constituents
Words
Gesture
Meta-language
Object-language
Figure 2: Summary of observations concerning the
structural positions and functions of gestures in MM
dialogue.3
3 A Binding Problem Involving two
Representations: How Speech and
Gesture Information Are Interfaced
The description of gesture functions provided above
may seem fairly convincing, however, we are in-
terested in answering the following questions (a)
Do iconic gestures have meaning? (b) Given that
they do, how does their meaning interact with verbal
meaning? Question (a) has been answered positively
in the tradition of semiotic research going back at
least to Ch. S. Peirce and carried on in the gesture
context by McNeill, Cassell and others. Even if it is
difficult to tell how exactly one can provide mean-
ings for gestures on the basis of gesture tokens, we
assume here that the representation of gesture mean-
3Rev. 1 did not approve of the meta-language label used
here. The point is simply that there is no a priori argument for
putting the formally reconstructed gesture meaning into either
the object language or into the specification of the model used.
Intuitively, the information of some bi-manual non-symmetric
gestures is better placed into a model’s definition of domains.
One could even start with the hypothesis that gestures generally
depict partial models and do not go into the object language at
all but investigation of this research line has to wait for another
paper.
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(a) The concrete sculpture base (b) Two towers of a church (c) The U-shape of the town
hall
(d) Other correction of fol-
lower’s gesture
(e) The chapel and a neigh-
bouring tree
Figure 1: Stills showing structural positions of iconic gestures in MM dialogue.
ing can be given in much the same way as for verbal
tokens. As a first orientation, assume that gesture
meaning behaves functionally like the meaning of
deictic expressions. Turning to (b), we will gradu-
ally develop a workable schema for a speech-gesture
interface below. Starting from the folklore assump-
tion that speech and gesture sit on different chan-
nels, we get the picture in Fig. 3, with two channels
running in parallel and no interaction specified be-
tween speech and gesture. This is meant to serve as
our didactic starting point to be modified in stepwise
fashion.
Figure 3: Speech channel and visual channel run-
ning in parallel
speech channel
visual channel
direction of time flow
However, there must be an interaction of some
sort, since non-lexicalized iconic gestures cannot
provide a semantics on their own, so the argument
goes in some of the literature (see Kopp et al. (2004)
and Lascarides and Stone (2006)). Now the interac-
tion could be of different sorts, e.g. it might be the
case that (a1) we can construct some total object lan-
guage meaning out of the two sorts of meanings or
that (a2) we consider one type of meaning as a con-
text to interpret the other type of meaning. An ex-
treme version of (a2) delegates gesture meaning to
the context, in particular, to the specification of the
model, over which the object language expression
is interpreted. So, the function of the MM mean-
ing produced or observed is split, some part goes
into the object language and the other into the meta-
language. Fig. 2 above indicates that data tell us,
when to regard gesture meaning as part of the ob-
ject language and when to consider it as part of the
model. (a2) has as a consequence that one considers
only models which satisfy the information provided
by the gesture. As a matter of fact, we get most of
the information needed for our design decision for
an object language (a1) or a meta-language (a2) so-
lution from the annotation depicted in Fig. 4.
4The annotation follows two working manuals (Bergmann
et al. (2007b) for practices and Bergmann et al. (2008) for
handshapes). The six researchers annotating have been trained
over some month on ample raw data; their rate of agreement was
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Start Time End Time
0:39.170 0:41.780
Right.Handshape.Shape large C
Right.Path.of.Handshape 0
Right.Handshape.Movement.Direction 0
Right.Handshape.Movement.Repetition 0
Right.Palm.Direction PAB
Right.Path.of.Palm.Direction 0
Right.Palm.Direction.Movement.Direction 0
Right.Palm.Direction.Movement.Repetition 0
Right.Back.of.Hand.Direction BAB/BUP
Right.Path.of.Back.of.Hand.Direction 0
Right.Back.of.Hand.Direction.Movement.Direction 0
Right.Back.of.Hand.Direction.Movement.Repetition 0
Right.Path.of.Wrist.Location ARC
Right.Wrist.Location.Movement.Direction MR > MF
Right.Wrist.Location.Movement.Repetition 0
Right.Extent medium
Right.Temporal.Sequence 0
Left.Handshape.Shape large C
Left.Path.of.Handshape 0
Left.Handshape.Movement.Direction 0
Left.Handshape.Movement.Repetition 0
Left.Palm.Direction PAB
Left.Path.of.Palm.Direction 0
Left.Palm.Direction.Movement.Direction 0
Left.Palm.Direction.Movement.Repetition 0
Left.Back.of.Hand.Direction BAB/BUP
Left.Path.of.Back.of.Hand.Direction 0
Left.Back.of.Hand.Direction.Movement.Direction 0
Left.Back.of.Hand.Direction.Movement.Repetition 0
Left.Path.of.Wrist.Location ARC
Left.Wrist.Location.Movement.Direction ML > MF
Left.Wrist.Location.Movement.Repetition 0
Left.Extent medium
Left.Temporal.Sequence 0
Two.Handed.Configuration FTT > BHA
Movement.realtive.to.other.hand mirror-sagittal
Figure 4: Annotation of example: router’s contribu-
tion (1) die Skulptur die die hat ’n Betonsockel / the
sculpture it it has a concrete base 4
The annotation specifies features and functions of
the router’s left and right hand, both, on a more
global level (the so-called practices like indexing,
shaping or grasping giving the global function of the
gesture) and on a more fine-grained level which cap-
tures the postures of both hands, their parts (palm,
back-of-hand, wrist etc.) and their respective move-
ments (left, right, forward etc.). However, the most
important thing in the annotation grid is that it maps
speech and gesture onto a time line; hence, we can
see which speech occurrences overlap with which
gesture occurrences. Intuitively, we consider the
flowing time as more basic information by help of
which speech and gesture events can communicate.
Communication among events on different channels
is brought about or even caused by temporal syn-
tested in several studies and amounted to 80% in most cases.
The temporal boundaries used in example 4 were rated.
chronization of inputs. This is the concept of bind-
ing referred to above. There are several supporting
arguments for the binding of gesture meaning to ver-
bal meaning and vice versa:
(1) McNeill (1995, pp. 26-31) considers the stroke
information as the carrier of the central se-
mantic and pragmatic information of the ges-
ture. It is in turn tied to the corresponding con-
stituent’s stressed syllable or, as we prefer to
put it, ‘aligned’, i.e. synchronized with it. See
(Lu¨cking, Rieser, Stegmann (2004)) for exper-
imental evidence.
Supporting arguments (2) and (3) operate on a
neuro-information level, (2) concerns vision and (3)
cognition in general:
(2) Neuro-biological research on vision is devoted
to the so-called binding problem, the domi-
nant model entertained being the time-coding
model: the temporal synchronization of the
stimuli is the decisive mechanism for integra-
tion (Detel (2007), p. 33, translated by the au-
thor).
(3) [Likewise] events that coincide in time are in-
terpreted with greater probability as [being]
related than events separated in time (Singer
(1999)).
(4) Finally, from a Gestaltist perspective, rules of
grouping and proximity apply.
We cannot enter the difficult problem of neural
representation here but will stick to the tools of lin-
guistics and philosophy of language. A rough pic-
ture illustrating the information flow of synchro-
nized (aligned) information still using the channel
concept is provided in fig. 5. It shows that if there is
temporal alignment among events from the different
channels, then information from the gesture channel
is coordinated with the information from the verbal
channel by binding.
4 Interface of Gesture Meaning and
Verbal Meaning
We now follow the research strategy a1 introduced
in sect. 3. From fig. 5 we see that the following
is needed to model the interaction of gesture and
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window by
temporal overlap
communincation
speech channel
visual channel
representation of verbal tokens
representation of gestural tokens
direction of time flow
Figure 5: Binding in between the gestural and the
verbal channel depending on time synchrony.
speech: a representation of (a) the verbal informa-
tion, of (b) the gesture information compatible with
‘Marr structures’ (Marr (1982)), and (c) a point of
contact for linking the different types of information.
(a), (b), and (c) can be achieved using type logics or
unification. Gesture information is drawn from the
descriptive predicates and values of the fine-grained
annotation. For reasons of simplicity we can regard
the verbal information as the function operating on
the information of the gesture level. However, both
must be conceived of as dynamic, due to the direc-
tion of time flow on both channels. These inherent
constraints can be met by several types of Dynamic
Semantics, inter alia classical DRT, SDRT, Muskens
LDG and PTT, all these add information updating
already existing information. The point of contact
between the verbal and the gestural level is provided
by the window given by temporal overlap (see fig.5),
hence temporal synchrony is what matters (i.e. re-
garded as a necessary condition).5 The methodolog-
ical grid now emerging is shown in fig. 6: verbal
information and gesture information are interfaced
and establish together the context for new informa-
tion to be integrated. Integration will be anticipated
by open slots in the already existing information.
We now specify the procedures for the annotation
example in some more detail and concentrate on ex-
tracting the semantics of the gesture out of the anno-
5Rev. 1 does not agree with this assumption, whereas rev. 3
finds it trivial. However, temporal relation of events is the most
conspicuous information we can get hold of in the observational
data. The ultimate evidence is, of course, a consistent formal
model, cf. the remarks in section 2 A Binding Problem etc.
verbal meaning and
gestural meaning in
one object language
Interface of
communication window
speech channel
visual channel
direction of time flow
Figure 6: Interface in the communication window
established in between the channels.
tation predicates; the representation of the dynamic
semantics of the verbal contribution die Skulptur die
die hat ’n Betonsockel / the sculpture it it has a con-
crete base is far from trivial, but we gloss over it
here. In the MM example we have the temporal
overlap between Betonsockel/concrete base and the
gesture shown in fig. 1 (a). So, the necessary condi-
tion for a fusion of the verbal meaning and the ges-
tural meaning is given, meeting hypotheses (2) - (4)
in sec. 3. What do the hands involved sign or in-
scribe? Here we consider only the relevant param-
eters in the stroke phase, meeting in particular Mc-
Neill’s hypothesis (1). The parameters and their val-
ues are represented as typed feature structures with
types written in italics and standard attribute value
pairs <attribute value> used (fig.7).
The matrices show postures of the router’s left
and right hand as well as two-handed postures.
In methodological terms, the annotation predicates
constitute the observational language which pro-
vides the foundation for our theoretical terms, i.e.
the semantic predicates. Figure 8 shows the volume
or space shaped by both hands using the annotation
predicates as labels.
So, what do both hands depict? Looking at the
R.G.Left and the R.G.Right information, we see that
the wrists follow ARC paths. In the beginning, fin-
gers and thumbs touch (= FTT ), but they sepa-
rate immediately (= ¬FTT ). The C-shapes on both
hands provide us with a dense series of verticality
informations. They also indicate some of the infor-
mation of a top and a bottom (marked by the top-
and bottom-curves of C respectively). ML > MF
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
Both hands
R.G.Left
HandShape loose C
Palm Direction PAB
BackofHand BAB/BUP
PathofWrist ARC
WristLocation ML > MF


R.G.Right
HandShape loose C
Palm Direction PAB
BackofHand BAB/BUP
PathofWrist ARC
WristLocation MR > MF

Two-handedConfiguration FTT > ¬FTT
Movement relative to other hand Mirror-sagittal

Figure 7: Typed feature structures for some of the information provided in the annotation of fig. 4.
¬ FTT ¬ FTT
LeftHand RightHand
Mirror sagittal
FTT
FTT
C
ARC
MR > MF
ARC
ML > MF
Figure 8: Typed feature structures for some of the
information provided in the annotation of fig. 4.
(left forward) and MR > MF (right forward) trace
the extent of the curved lines of the sectors bounded
by ARC lines. PalmDirection values and Backof-
Hand values follow from the ARC and the Wrist-
Location predicates. We have wrist movements to
the left and the right. Finally, Mirror-sagittal shows
symmetric extent of the left and the right segment
from the router’s perspective. What we do now is
provide a mapping from the descriptive annotation
predicates into a semantic domain. It must spec-
ify the depictional value of the gestures and also
fix their iconic functions. Thus, the notion of ‘sim-
ilarity’ is eliminated via a semantic interpretation.
Mappings like these have been argued for in (Rieser
(2004)) and in (Lascarides and Stone (2006)). We
assume a conventional basis for these mappings in
Grice’s or Lewis’ sense, which might depend on a
class of contexts: obviously, there must be a reason
why we understand gestures and can reliably anno-
tate occurrences of them. The function rep indicates
representation. rep goes from the set of annotation
predicates into open formulas. So, the denotation for
gestures is provided via translation.6
(2) (a) rep(HandShape looseC) =
hight(x,u)∧ top(t,u)∧bottom(b,u)
(b) rep(PathofWrist ARC) =
curved-side(s,u)
(c) rep(WristLocat ML > MF) =
curved-side-le f t(sl,u,router)
(d) rep(WristLocat MR > MF) =
curved-side-right(sr,u,router)
(e) rep(Movement relative to other hand Mirror-
sagittal) = part(p1,u)∧ part(p2,u)∧(p1 #= p2)∧
(p1⊗ p2) = u 7
In (c) and (d) the routers perspective is coded be-
cause of the direction information requiring a Bu¨hler
origo. The function rep induces a mapping from the
gesture space GS onto a semantic space SGS.
5 Canonical Word Meaning and How it
Can be Extended Using Gesture
Information
For purposes of illustration we now assume
the following word meaning for concrete
base/Betonsockel:
(3) concretebase(x) := support(x,y) ∧ made-
o f -concrete(x) ∧ rigid(x) ∧ ob ject(y) ∧ (x #=
y)∧hight(h,x)∧ side(s,x)∧ top(t,x)∧bottom(b,x).
6(Taking up remarks by all three reviewers). Two problems
should be mentioned here. The mapping rep is based on ob-
servations. It should doubtlessly be backed by statistical data,
which are, as yet, not available. Another interesting point is
which formal language should be used to represent the gesture
meaning. Here I’m still experimenting (cf. also foot-note 7 on
fusion). Looking into versions of Mereotopology (see Casati
and Varsi (1999) for an overview), I find, that the standard sys-
tems available are not strong enough to represent indexical spa-
tial gestures.
7The conjunct (p1⊗ p2) = u is read as ‘parts p1⊗ p2 fused
yield the whole u’, a suggestion I owe to A. Lu¨cking.
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part p1 part p2
curved-side-r.curved-side-l.
height
curved-side
top
bottom
Figure 9: Semantic space SGS induced by gesture
space GS, curved lines indicating partiality
So, a concrete base is a support x for an object y
iff8 it is made of concrete, has hight, a side, a top
and a bottom. Now, (3) may well be too rich a word
meaning for concrete base/Betonsockel. So we re-
duce it and provide an open slot gest for the conjunc-
tion of the contextual gestural information coded by
λ -abstraction in the following way:
(4) λgest(concretebase(x) := support(x,y) ∧ made-o f -
concrete(x)∧ob ject(y)∧ rigid(x)∧ (x #= y)∧gest)
The idea is to model binding between the verbal
meaning and the gesture meaning using functional
application of (4) for the right-hand-side of (2) as
the argument. Hence (4) acts as a context for the
gesture information and consumes it. We get
(5) concretebase(x) := support(x,y) ∧ made-
o f -concrete(x) ∧ ob ject(y) ∧ rigid(x) ∧ (x #=
y) ∧ hight(z,u) ∧ top(t,u) ∧ bottom(b,u) ∧ curved-
side(s,u)∧ curved-side-le f t(sl,u,router)∧ curved-side-
right(sr,u,router) ∧ part(p1,u) ∧ part(p2,u) ∧ (p1 #=
p2)∧ (p1⊗ p2) = u.
What we want to show is:
(a) Contextually, we can do with a minimal word
meaning for concrete base/Betonsockel con-
sisting of concrete support x for an object y.
(b) Word meaning and gesture meaning interact in
context due to temporal binding.
(c) The interface between word meaning and ges-
ture meaning gives us the contextually needed
MM meaning which will be more specific than
8The iff -condition will, as a rule, be too strong for word
meanings. It is here chosen for reasons of simplicity and per-
spicuity.
the typical context-free word meaning, and,
above all, depend on the situated perspective of
the router.
Before we can succeed with (a) - (c), however, we
have to deal with the alignment of the objects in-
volved in gesture and speech. Observe that the vari-
ables for the logical subjects in (5), x and u, will, as a
rule, denote different objects and only contingently
refer to the same thing. Intuitively, however, words
and gestures in the interface window are about the
same object. So, we can formulate the following
alignment-of-variables convention:
(6) If words and gestures are about the same ob-
ject, the same variable must be used for it in
the specification of the MM content.
Observing (6) we get an intuitively adequate word
meaning.9
6 Discussion
In this paper we have only treated the ”gesture mean-
ing specifies word meaning” case. We want to take
up a few problems. They concern in turn: (1) The re-
liability of the mapping (2); (2) Dynamic Semantics
for lexical information and the embedding of word
meaning into the meaning of example (1); (3) Op-
tions for reconstructing the relation of word mean-
ing and gestural meaning. Ad (1): Reliability con-
siderations are of course important here, since inter-
pretation and interface construction depend on them.
From observation we know that C typically has the
function indicated and the same holds for the wrist
movements. A slightly different argument in support
of the mapping is that one would not find a natural
model for example (1) which does not exhibit the
gesture semantics indicated. Ad (2): Observe that
we can use a dynamic semantics format for the lexi-
cal entries. In (5), e.g., we can establish equivalence
between two DRSs.We cannot go into matters of es-
tablishing a full syntax-semantics interface here, so
a few hints must suffice. (7) shows a representation
of example (1) in a Muskens LDG format (Muskens
9(Taking up rev. 1’s remarks): All iconic gestures will get
a representation using the mapping rep. The step from (4) to
(5) is computed as described above, modelling binding between
the verbal meaning and the gesture meaning using functional
application of (4) for the right-hand-side of (2) as argument.
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(1996)), based on an LTAG representation for rea-
sons of getting at incrementality:
(7) [x|concretebase(x); ιy[ |sculpture(y)] = it;have(it,x)].
Sticking to the format of explicit definition, we
can substitute the right side of expression (5) suit-
ably represented for concrete base(x). Hence,
intuitively, we will get suitable derivation- and
entailment-relations. Ad (3): You may have noticed
that the word meaning in (3) does not fully spec-
ify the shape of the figure’s tops and bottoms. As-
sume, we add elliptical(t) and elliptical(b) in order
to provide the missing information. Then we run
into a problem with (5), since (5) only partially pro-
vides the information of an extended (3). It turns
out that we encounter a Gestalt regularity here, the
principle of Pra¨gnanz (minimum principle) being at
stake. Perhaps we could solve cases like this one us-
ing abduction but it is not trivial to do this. Another
Gestalt issue is that gestural movements are not pre-
cise in the geometry sense. We leave these topics for
a methodology paper.
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Abstract 
The problem of resolving ambiguous, im-
plicit and non-literal references exemplifies 
many difficult issues in understanding lan-
guage.   We describe an approach for deal-
ing with these by representing and jointly 
reasoning over linguistic and non-linguistic 
knowledge (including structures such as 
scripts and frames) within the same infe-
rence framework.  This approach enables a 
treatment of several reference resolution 
phenomena that to our knowledge have not 
previously been the subject of a unified 
analysis.  These results suggest that treating 
language understanding as an inference 
problem encompassing nonlinguistic know-
ledge can expand the ability of computa-
tional systems to use language. 
1 Difficult references 
Ambiguous, implicit and non-literal references 
embody several difficult problems in language un-
derstanding.  We propose an approach for dealing 
with these problems that involves representing and 
jointly reasoning over syntactic, semantic and non-
linguistic knowledge. 
Formal and computational accounts of language 
use have difficulties with utterances whose mean-
ing cannot be compactly and unambiguously cap-
tured as a function the meanings of the elements of 
an utterance.  Many of these problems are evident 
in reference resolution and they involve the inte-
raction of linguistic and nonlinguistic information.  
The following examples (adapted from (Hobbs, 
Stickel, Appelt, & Martin, 1990)) illustrate this: 
 
(1) Dave hid Paul’s keys.  He was drunk. 
(2) Dave hid Paul’s keys.  He often jokes with him. 
 
Finding the  most  likely  antecedent  for  “he”  in 
each sentence depends in part on nonlinguistic fac-
tors such as the relationship of the people dis-
cussed, the necessity of keys in driving and the 
effects of drunken driving. 
The following cases (copied or adapted from 
(McShane, in preparation)) illustrate references 
items not explicitly mentioned in discourse. 
 
(3) The couple went for a walk.  He held her hand.  
(Referent of “he” is member of set). 
(4) The home goalie played hard but the visiting 
goalie played even harder.  Both of them got 
special mention after the game. (Referent of 
“both”  is  set  formed by previously mentioned 
objects).  
(5) The storm lasted for hours.  The thunder scared 
my dog.  (Referent for  “thunder”  implied  by 
noun). 
(6) It thundered for hours.  The thunder scares my 
dog.  (Verbal antecedent). 
(7) George Bush signed the bill.  (Referent of 
“George Bush” is in common knowledge). 
 
Finally, the actual reference of an utterance can 
be entirely different from the literal reference: 
 
(8) The author began the book. (Pustejovsky, 1995) 
(The writing of the book was begun.) 
(9) The ham sandwich ordered some coffee.  
(Nunberg, 1979)  (The person who is eating 
the ham sandwich ordered the coffee).  
 
Several approaches have been used to resolve 
references computationally.  One approach is first 
the  “structured  knowledge”  approach.    Relatively 
large and complex structures such as scripts 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977) and frames (Minsky, 
1975) can be used to encode much of the know-
ledge needed to resolve references.  For example, 
consider a typical frame-based account of (3).  It 
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presumes a “couple frame” that has two slots, one 
for each member.  One slot (M) is marked as male 
and the other (F) as female.  During processing, 
when  “couple”  is  encountered,  an  instance  of  the 
couple frame is instantiated.  When “he” and “she” 
are processed, the task is to “match” them to slots 
in frames that have already been instantiated.  In 
this  case,  “he”  and  “she” match  the male  and  fe-
male member of the couple frame respectively.   
Although capable of dealing with many other-
wise difficult cases, the structured knowledge ap-
proach has several problems.  First, structures of-
ten do not work in cases that vary slightly from 
those for which they were designed.  Second, the 
matching process is not always smooth.  For ex-
ample,  in  “The couple went for a walk with their 
daughter.  They held her hand”, “her” could match 
the female member of the couple and also the 
daughter.  Matching algorithms that deal with such 
ambiguities are very complex and imperfect.  They 
cannot easily incorporate “common sense” reason-
ing that would in this case infer that “her” refers to 
the daughter since otherwise the couple would be 
holding the hand of the female member of the 
couple, which is highly unusual. 
The statistical, corpus driven approach to refer-
ence resolution (e.g., (Mitkov, 2000)) relies on the 
premise that there is enough information latent in 
actual instances of language use to successfully 
resolves inferences.  By not involving complex 
structures or matching algorithms, they do not raise 
many of the difficulties of the structured know-
ledge approach.  On some corpora, they can 
achieve upwards of 90% accuracy.  However, 
many of these results rely on very specific assump-
tions, e.g., that the antecedent to a referent is expli-
citly mentioned in the text.  However, as (3)-(7) 
illustrate, there are many cases where antecedents 
do not occur anywhere in the text.  Current corpora 
cannot be used to deal with such cases because 
they only mark antecedents that explicitly occur.  
Additionally, there are many cases where even in-
fants can find referents of novel words for which 
they have no statistical information.  Finally, per-
formance even in cases where corpora can be used 
has plateaued in the field, suggestion limits to the 
potential purely statistical approaches. 
The  “inferential”  approach to reference resolu-
tion (e.g., (Hobbs et al., 1990)) eases the combina-
tion of reasoning over world and linguistic know-
ledge that seems to be required for reference reso-
lution.  The inference approach views utterances as 
actions taken by people and the problem of lan-
guage understanding as a kind of action under-
standing or abduction problem.  By formulating 
both the linguistic and nonlinguistic constraints 
using the same inferential framework, the hope is 
that the right meaning for an utterance can be in-
ferred using general-purpose and flexible inference 
engines rather than precarious structure-matching 
algorithms.  In (1), for example, an abduction 
process  would  explain  Dave’s  hiding  of  Paul’s 
keys by Dave’s desire to prevent Paul from inuring 
himself while driving drunk.  Once this has been 
inferred,  then  the subject of “was drunk” must  re-
fer to Paul and thus the coreference  of  “he”  and 
“Paul” is inferred. 
Although the inferential approach has achieved 
some success, it has suffered from the lack of po-
werful enough inference mechanisms has not so far 
yielded an analysis of non-literal uses of language. 
2 An inferential approach 
The work described in this paper is based on a new 
incarnation of the inference approach that is in-
tended to address some of its past deficiencies and 
broaden the range of linguistic phenomena ex-
plainable within a single formal or computational 
framework.  It is based on several precepts: 
Action understanding.  We adopt the view 
(Clark, 1996) that conceives of utterances as ac-
tions taken by a user and the problem of language 
understanding as one of finding the best explana-
tion of these actions. 
Non-linguistic constraints.  We believe that non-
linguistic knowledge and information is often key 
to inferring the meaning of an utterance.  This can 
include  knowledge  about  the  world,  people’s  be-
liefs and desires and perceptual salience.  One con-
sequence is that nonlinguistic knowledge must be 
part of explaining many linguistic phenomena. 
Single inferential substrate.  In order to explain 
how linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge con-
strain language understanding, we use the same 
“substrate”  of  relations  and  inference  methods to 
encode and reason over this knowledge.  Some 
constraints  “span”  linguistic  and nonlinguistic in-
formation.  For example, lexical entries often in-
clude phonological information about a word as 
well as what aspects of the world the word normal-
ly refers to.  Thus, by combining linguistic, non-
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linguistic and spanning constraints into one set of 
constraints, a reasoning engine that operates over 
this set will automatically and without any special 
provision use linguistic and non-linguistic informa-
tion to constraint interpretation. 
Structures as sets of constraints.  Although we 
take the inferential approach, we presume that 
scripts, frames and other elements from structured 
knowledge approaches are required to explain lan-
guage use.  We thus encode this knowledge using 
the same constraint language use to encode other 
knowledge.  Since structures tend to have excep-
tions (e.g., although a room script would include 
slots for windows, not all rooms have windows), it 
is  important  to  use  a  framework  that  uses  “soft” 
constraints that can be violated. 
3 Inferential framework 
Our approach relies on a language for expressing 
probabilistic constraints over relations among ob-
jects.  Many aspects of the language has characte-
ristics common to typical logical and probabilistic 
reasoning frameworks.  Although work with such 
languages typically involves logical or probabilis-
tic reasoning methods (such as MCMC, SAT solv-
ing or resolution), we remain agnostic in this paper 
as to which mechanisms are used.  We do suspect 
however, that analogical, case-based and neural-
network methods not normally associated with log-
ical and probabilistic inference will also be re-
quired for the kind of inferences we describe here 
to be made in any kind of realistic scenario. 
In this language, constraints are probabilistic 
conditionals whose antecedent and consequents are 
possibly negated first-order literals.  Variables all 
start  with  “?”.    For example, the constraint, !"#(? $)  +  %&'((? $)  .95 )*+#(? $)  states 
that if something is wet and iron, it has a 95% of 
rusting because of this.  Facts can be stated as con-
straints with antecedents that are always true, e.g., ,&*"()  1 )-+"+(+*().  This can be abbreviated 
simple as )-+"+(+*(). 
Constraints can also be followed by “posited va-
riables” that license the positing of objects.  Con-
sider, for example: 
 ./0("(?1)^%()0(2"(?1, ? &) .87  5/-1(? &), ?1 
 
This constraint states that a plane in range of a 
radar station has an 87% chance of causing a blip.  
In the case where a particular radar station has a 
blip, one can infer the existence of a plane that 
caused that blip, even if the plane was not known 
about in advance. 
Finally, we presuppose the ability to find the 
most likely world(s) given a set of constraints.  
Specifically, given a set of constraints C, there are 
several worlds consistent with it.  A world is simp-
ly an assignment of truth values to the propositions 
in or licensed by C.  For example, if 6  = (,&*"()0-((#'708)) .8 ⌐)0-((#'708)),  there 
are two worlds consistent with that: 91  =()0-((#'708), #&*")  and 92 = ()0-((#'708),:0/+").  Worlds have a probability of being actual.  
The probability of 91 is . 2 and of 92 is . 8.   
Finally, identity is an important relation in what 
follows.   ;0<"($,8) states that $ and 8 name the 
same object.  We will presume the axioms of iden-
tity.  E.g., if .($) and ;0<"($,8), then .(8). 
Although apparently straightforward, inference 
approaches for languages with identity that license 
the positing of objects raise several difficult tech-
nical issues that have not begun to be dealt with 
until recently (e.g., (Milch et al., 2005)). 
4 Fundamentals 
Our overall goal is to represent and jointly reason 
over linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge in or-
der to provide a unified account of some difficult 
aspects of language use.  This section presents 
some basic precepts of how to use the inferential 
framework described in the last section to accom-
plish this.  
4.1 Linguistic knowledge 
We will assume that the totality of a language un-
derstander’s  linguistic  and  non-linguistic know-
ledge is encoded in a set of constraints, C.  In what 
follows, we illustrate the kinds of constraints our 
approach uses. 
Utterances can be represented using logical 
propositions.  For example, we indicate that “Mary 
likes John” was uttered with the following proposi-
tions:  
 %+=(91,!'&7), .ℎ'('/'28(91, "<0&8"), ?@@*&+(91, #1), %+=(92,!'&7),… . 
 
177
In our analyses, we presume that the syntactic 
structure of utterances as given.  However, work 
casting parsing as an inference problem (Muruge-
san & Cassimatis, 2006) makes us optimistic that 
syntactic parsing can also be dealt with as an infe-
rence problem. 
The literal reference and semantic information 
of a word or phrase can be indicated thus: 
 A-#)":(91, /-#)":)  ^ B0<"(/-#)":, “D0&8”)   ^  %+=(/-#)":,F"<0/") 
 
The literal reference of a word is not always its 
actual reference.  For example, in the case where 
the  speaker  means  that  Mary’s  dog  likes  John’s 
dog, we can say:  )":(91,7'212). 
How this reference is determined will be dis-
cussed in the next section. 
We can represent that that the literal reference is 
often the actual references with: 
 A-#)":(?9, ? /-#)":) 1/-#  )":(?9, ? /-#)":). 
 
How the actual value of 1/-# , the probability that 
phrases are used literally, is arrived at is left for 
future research.  All we assume in what follows 
that it is relatively close to 1. 
Coreference in this framework is an identity re-
lationship.  For example, if in “John likes himself” 
the actual referent of John is j‐ref  and “himself” is h‐ref,  then  “John”  and  “himself”  corefer  if Same(h‐ref,j‐ref). 
    Ambiguity of reference is uncertainty about 
identity.  For example, in (10), the reference of 
“he” can be John or Fred. 
 
(10) John and Fred are friends because he is 
rich. 
 
This is represented thus: )":(91, G'ℎ(),)":(93,:&"7),)":(97,ℎ) .    “he”  can  refer  to 
John: ;0<"(ℎ, G'ℎ() or to ;0<"(ℎ,:&"7).  If we 
assume the background knowledge that 
⌐;0<"(:&"7, G'ℎ() , then ℎ  cannot equal both :&"7 and G'ℎ(. 
We have thus far presumed several components 
of C, the constraints representing the listener’s 
knowledge.  To summarize, these include the set of 
utterances (H) heard, syntactic knowledge (;IB), 
semantic knowledge (;JD) (e.g, that literal refer-
ence of Mary is a female named Mary), pragmatic 
(.)=K, e.g., that the literal reference tends to be 
the actual referent) and non-linguistic knowledge 
(!?)AL, e.g., that John is not the same person as 
Fred).   
The debate as to whether or how to precisely 
distinguish between syntactic, semantic and prag-
matic knowledge need not be settled to proceed 
with our analyses.  All forms of knowledge, lin-
guistic and non-linguistic, are treated identically 
within the inferential framework we are using.  
They are all simply constraints. 
4.2 Non-linguistic knowledge 
How to represent the full range of non-linguistic 
knowledge is of course a very broad and difficult 
problem.  However, for our purposes, it is enough 
to describe how we use constraints to represent 
structures such as frames and scripts. 
Frames and scripts can both be characterized in 
terms of “slot-filler” pairs together with properties 
of the fillers and relationships between the fillers.  
For example, imagine a couple frame that has two 
slots.  The filler of one slot has the property of be-
ing a male and the filler of the other is a female. 
The information in scripts and frames can be 
captured by constraints.  For example, the follow-
ing constraints represent the information encoded 
in the couple frame: 
 6'*1/"(? @) 1 .0&#?:(?<, ? @) ^ .0&#?:(?<, ? @), ?<, ?:  
(Couple frames have two slots, each of whose filler 
is a part of the couple). 
 6'*1/"(? @) ^ .0&#?:(? $, ? @)  (.5) D0/"(? $) 6'*1/"(? @)^.0&#?:(?<, ? @)^D0/"(?<) ^ .0&#?:(?:, ? @)  F"<0/"(?:). 
(One slot filler of a couple is male and the other is 
female.) 
 
As we have noted, one of the problems with 
such structures has been that they have exceptions.  
This can be straightforwardly dealt with by using 
probabilities near, but less than, 1  on the con-
straints characterizing a structure.  This high prob-
ability biases inference according to the informa-
tion in the structure while permitting exceptions. 
A key aspect in using scripts and frames is the 
matching process.  For example, in a typical ap-
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proach to resolving the pronominal references in 
“the couple went for a walk, he held her hand”, the 
referent  of  “he”  and  the  possessor indicated by 
“her” are matched to the male and female members 
of the couple frame.  In our approach, these 
matches are represented by identity propositions.  
To say  that  the referent of “he”  is  the male of  the 
couple is to say that they are identical, i.e., ;0<"(ℎ")":,<0/";/'#F-//"&). 
In this approach, therefore, the procedural prob-
lem of matching an object to a slot becomes a fac-
tual question about identity.  As will be illustrated 
in the next section, this helps explain how the full 
range of a person’s knowledge and inference abili-
ties can be used to find the best filler for a slot.  
This is a much harder task when matching is a pro-
cedural matter that is conducted by a separate algo-
rithm or subsystem from inference about the world. 
Finally, we need one more constraint to infer 
that matches are made at all.  For example, the 
constraints mentioned thus far would not favor a 
world where a pronoun has an antecedent, e.g., 
where ℎ")": is identical to some other object in-
troduced into the discourse.  We can favor such 
worlds with the following “minimal interpretation” 
constraint: ,&*"()  .51 ;0<"(? $, ?8). 
All else being equal, this reduces the probability 
of worlds where two objects are not equal. Of 
course, other constraints,  e.g.,  that  “he”  typically 
refers to a male, can override this bias. 
This is, of course, a gross oversimplification.  A 
much richer set of constraints are involved in fa-
voring interpretations with reference, but this will 
be sufficient for our purposes. 
4.3 Language understanding as a M AP infe-
rence problem 
It is now possible to somewhat more precisely cha-
racterize the language understanding problem 
within the inferential approach.  The listener’s 
knowledge is characterized by the set of con-
straints, C = U ⋃    SYN ⋃    SEM ⋃    PRAG  ⋃  WORLD, i.e., the union of knowledge of the 
specific utterances made together with linguistic 
and nonlinguistic knowledge.  The goal of listening 
is characterized as finding the most likely world 
given this knowledge.  This world includes the 
identity relationships characterizing the references 
of phrases in H.  For example, if one of the utter-
ances encoded in H is  “John  likes  Mary  because 
she  is  funny”,  the most  likely world will have  the 
statement ;0<"(+ℎ")":,<0&8). 
More technically, this characterization treats 
language as a maximum a posteriori inference 
(MAP) problem.  This does not however fully cap-
ture the listener’s situation.  For example, the case 
where the most likely interpretation of a sentence 
has 99% probability is different from the situation 
where the most likely interpretation has 33% and 
the next most likely has 31%.  In the work pre-
sented here, it will be sufficient to illustrate the 
benefits of the inferential approach by treating un-
derstanding as a MAP problem, although future 
work will need to address this issue. 
5 Analyses 
We now demonstrate how the substrate approach 
enables a unified analysis of the difficult kinds of 
utterances that motivated this investigation. 
This is a new incarnation of the inferential ap-
proach and thus many aspects of it are oversimpli-
fied and provisional.  In particular, many of the 
analyses below rely on simplified constraints that 
use probabilities that are at present guessed at.  
These were adequate and necessary for the goal of 
this work, namely to begin to develop an approach 
that provides a unified treatment of many difficult 
aspects of  language.  Once the outline of an ap-
proach exists, it will then become possible to more 
carefully elaborate aspects of the theory. 
5.1 Nonlinguistic inference 
We begin first by illustrating how cases where 
nonlinguistic inference help disambiguate a refer-
ence.  Consider: 
 
(11) John paid Fred for the car he gave him. 
(12) John paid Fred for the car he wrecked. 
 
In the most likely interpretation of (11), Fred 
(“he”)  sold  the  car  to  John.    In  (12), John  (“he”) 
wrecked  Fred’s  car  and  compensated  him.  Con-
straints such as the following capture the relevant 
knowledge: 
 K-N" (? $, ?8)  1 .08(?8, ? $) L0<02"(O,I)  +  ?9("7(O,?)  .8 .08(O,?) 
 
In each sentence, there are two possible refe-
rents  for  “he”  in  the  text:  John  (;0<"(ℎ")":,
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G'ℎ()) and Fred (;0<"(ℎ")":, F&"7)).  In the 
first sentence, there is a world where Fred is the 
referent.  In this case, the commercial transaction 
would explain the paying of the money.  In the 
world John is the referent, then John giving Fred a 
car would not explain John paying Fred, the paying 
event would be unexplained and that world would 
have a lower probability.  Thus, we infer that Fred 
is the referent.  A similar pattern of reasoning 
yields the correct referent in the second sentence.  
In general, each possible identity relation will 
imply a possible world.  Since world and linguistic 
knowledge are represented using constraints, they 
both jointly determine a probability for that world.  
The best referent is the one that is true in the world 
with the highest probability. 
5.2 Implicit co-referent 
Although we deal with several kinds of implicit 
reference (e.g., references from common know-
ledge, members of sets and sets composed of past 
elements in discourse), it is possible to give them a 
unified treatment.  In each of these cases, world 
knowledge licenses the inference of implied ob-
jects not explicitly referred to in the utterance.  
Then the minimal interpretation constraint favors 
possible identities between the explicit referent and 
the implied objects.  Finally, world knowledge 
helps rank these identities according to their like-
lihood.  The following cases illustrate this chain of 
inference. 
Referent is member of set.  Consider (3).  As de-
scribed in section 4, “couple” licenses the infe-
rence of two entities who are likely to be a male 
(<) and a female (:).  “he” liscences a male (ℎ<) 
and “she” a female (+:).   
There are several worlds based on combinations 
of identity propositions.  These are a few: 
 
1. < = :<;  : = ℎ<.    “he”  refers  to  the  female 
member of the couple and “she” to the male. 
2. < = ℎ<;  : = :<.  “he” and “she” refer to the 
male and female member of the couple respec-
tively. 
3. < = ℎ<;  : ≠ :<.   “he” refers to the male of 
the couple but f refers to someone not men-
tioned in the couple. 
... . 
  
All worlds (e.g,. world 1) where “he” and “she” 
refer to people of the wrong gender are given very 
low probability because of the conditionals de-
scribing the semantics of the pronouns.    Worlds 
where one of the pronouns do not refer to some-
thing explicit or implicit in the discourse (worlds 3 
onward) have their probability decreased by the 
minimal interpretation constraint.    World 2, 
where “he” and “she” refer to the male and female 
of the couple respectively is the only one that does 
not violate the semantic and minimal interpretation 
constraints and thus is the one with the highest 
probability. 
A more complicated variation of (3) is (13): 
 
(13) The couple went for a walk with their 
daughter.  They held her hand. 
 
There are two antecedent females for “her”, the 
daughter and the female member of the couple, 
although the case where “her” refers to the “daugh-
ter”  is  clearly  more  likely.    Such  examples  pose 
severe difficulties for algorithms used in structured 
knowledge  approaches.    Properly  matching  “her” 
to the female slot of the couple frame requires rul-
ing out the match with daughter based on a chain 
of inference involving the fact that people tend not 
to hold their own hands and matching the referent 
of “her”  to  the female member  implies  that she  is 
holding her own hand.  Matching algorithms gen-
erally do not themselves make such inferences and 
are difficult to integrate with algorithms that do. 
In the inference approach, one needs simply add 
a constraint indicating that people tend to hold oth-
er people’s hands: 
 Q'/7Q0(7(? $, ?8)  .98 ⌐;0<"(? $, ?8). 
 
Adding this constraint makes the interpretation 
where  “her”  refers  to  the  female  member  of  the 
couple less likely and thus the most likely world 
will have “she” refer to the daughter.   
Composed referent.  In (4), “both” refers to the 
set composed of the home and visiting goalies.  
The analysis here is similar to the previous case.  
“Both” implies the existence of a set with two ob-
jects, '1 and '2.  The minimal interpretation con-
straint favors worlds where '1 and '2 are identical 
to elements in the discourse.  This leaves possible 
worlds with two different sets of assumptions:  
 '1 = visiting goalie; '2 = home goalie or  '1 = home goalie; '2 = visiting goalie.  
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Each possibility is equally likely and thus there 
will be a tie for the most likely world.  Ideally, 
there would be some way of inferring the equiva-
lence of these worlds and thus in some sense col-
lapsing them into one world or interpretation.  
However, even under the present circumstance, in 
each of the most likely worlds, the goalie NPs refer 
to members of the set “both” refers to. 
Part of event.  In (5), “the thunder” refers to the 
thunder that was a part of the storm mentioned in 
the first sentence.  If the listener knows the follow-
ing constraint, i.e., that thunder tends to be part of 
storms, then the finding the referent is simple. 
 ;#'&<(? +) (. 7),ℎ*(7"&(? #)^ .0&#?:(? #, ? +), ? # 
 
  “The storm”  licenses the inference of a storm, +, 
and the constraint licenses the possible existence of 
thunder, #, that is part of the storm.  “the thunder” 
licenses the inference of thunder (#ℎ*(7"&).  The 
minimal interpretation constraint favors worlds 
where “;0<"(#, #ℎ*(7"&)”, i.e., the interpretation 
that “the thunder” refers to the thunder that is part 
of “the storm”.  As in the previous cases, the inter-
pretation follows directly from the meaning of 
phrases and the minimal interpretation constraint. 
Verbal antecedent.  The analysis of (6) is nearly 
identical.  The only difference is that the thunder is 
inferred from the mention of the thundering event. 
Common Knowledge.  In (7), George Bush is not 
introduced or implied previously in the utterance.  
However, for most people his existence is known 
and hence part of the 6  via !?)AL .  Thus, 
“George Bush”  licenses the existence of a person 
whose name is “George Bush” and the minimal 
interpretation constraint favors worlds in which the 
referent  of  “George  Bush”  is identical to the 
George Bush of common knowledge. 
5.3 Non-literal reference 
Cases of non-literal reference can also be dealt 
with using a combination of identity matching and 
the minimal interpretation constraint.  In this case, 
non-literal referents are identified on the basis of 
their relation to the literal referent.   
To illustrate, in (9), while the ham sandwich did 
not order the coffee, the person who did was re-
lated to that ham sandwich (by virtue of having 
ordered it).  This suggests that in cases where the 
actual referent is not the literal referent, that there 
is often nevertheless a relation between them.  If so, 
then many non-literal references can be understood 
by first determining the literal reference to be un-
likely and then searching for an object related to it 
that can plausibly be the actual referent.  
We represent the possibility of non-literal refer-
ences being related to literal references with the 
“related referent constraint”:  
 A-#)":(?9, ? /-#)":) 1('(/-#   )":(?9, ? &":)^ ?)(? &":, ? /-#)":). 
 
This constraint is similar in spirit to formula oc-
curring in Pustejvsky’s  (1995)  treatment  of  coer-
cion, though in its present manifestation, it is used 
to explain a wider range of other phenomena. 
Treatments of coercion and other phenomena try 
to limit the set of relations that can be involved in 
these phenomena.  Although we take no stance on 
the content of such sets, constraints can be formu-
lated to restrict the set of relations that can relate 
literal and non-literal referents. 
We can deal with several cases of non-literal 
reference.  Each analysis only involves the few 
very general constraints about reference already 
discussed, the literal semantics of each utterance 
and some world knowledge.  No special provision 
need be made for each phenomenon.  Much varia-
tion is accounted for by non-linguistic “context”. 
Coersion.  In coercion, a phrase appears in a po-
sition that calls for a different type of referent then 
the actual referent of the phrase.  For example, in 
(8) and (14),  “begin”  requires  an  event  or  action, 
while book is an object. 
 
(14) The student began the book. 
 
In (8) the action is the writing of the book while 
in (14) it is the reading of the book.  In both cases, 
the literal referent is “coerced” from being of type 
object to type action.  These also illustrate that 
coercion can be ambiguous and context-sensitive.  
Coercion and the disambiguation of coercion are 
straightforwardly explained by the related referent 
constraint.    We  call  the  actual  referent  of  “the 
book”,  R''S)": , and the literal reference, R''SA-#)":.  The semantics of “began” constrains 
the category of book-ref to be an action 
(%+=(R''S)":,=@#-'()).  Thus, worlds where the 
actual  reference  of  “the  book”  is  the  literal  refer-
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ence (i.e., ;0<"(/-#)":, R''SA-#)":)) have very 
low probability because the category of literal ref-
erence is an object (-+=(R''SA-#)":, 'RG"@#)) and 
not an event.  (This presumes background know-
ledge  that books are not objects). 
Only worlds where the actual referent is a non-
literal referent (that is, related (by relation )) to the 
literal referent) remain.  At least two actions are 
related to books: reading and writing. 
 =*#ℎ'&(?1) (. 2)!&-#"(? 1, ? R)^    5''S(? R), ? R, ?9  
(Some authors write books.) ;#*7"(#(?1)  (.9) )"07(? 1, ? R) ^ 5''S(? R)  
(Most students read books.) ;#*7"(#+(?1)  (.99) ⌐=*#ℎ'&(?1). 
(Most students are not authors.)  
 
Since students are more likely to read books 
than write them, the world where the student began 
reading (;0<"(),)"07) ) the book is favored.  
Likewise, since authors write books, the world 
were the actual referent is a writing event 
(;0<"(),!&-#")) is more likely in (8). 
Metonymy.  The account of metonymic refer-
ences is almost identical.  Worlds where the literal 
referent is the actual referent have low probability 
because they clash with world knowledge.  Thus, a 
metonymic reference is more probable. 
For example, with respect to (9), ham sandwich-
es  do  not  order  coffee.    Thus,  “ham  sandwich” 
cannot refer to the ham sandwich and must instead 
refer to something related to it.  There are many 
things related to the ham sandwich: e.g., the chef, 
the plate, the ham in it, and the waiter who served 
it.   However, since these order coffee infrequently, 
if ever, worlds where they are the actual referent 
have low probability.  Since customers do often 
order coffee, the world where the customer is the 
referent is most likely. 
6 Conclusions 
Language use involves difficult problems, many of 
which are manifest in resolving ambiguous, im-
plied and non-literal references.  These problems 
seem to involve the interaction of linguistic and 
nonlinguistic factors.   Our approach attempts to 
deal with these problems by framing language un-
derstanding as an action understanding inference 
problem.  This enables a unified treatment of phe-
nomena that to our knowledge have not yet been 
given a single explanation.  It accounts for subtle 
variations in reference judgments based on nonlin-
guistic context.  This work differs from past infe-
rential approaches by extensively using identity 
constraints and thereby enabling an account of 
non-literal references, which had not been hereto-
fore possible in inferential frameworks. 
Fully realizing this approach will require a much 
more linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge.  Ac-
quiring it will involve learning from many in-
stances of actual utterances.  The preceding analy-
sis provides a target for this effort and suggests 
significant benefits would result from it. 
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Abstract 
A telephony dialogue system is described 
that performs speech-driven terminological 
translation. In particular, a novel approach 
is presented and discussed that is designed 
to probabilistically choose from a set of 
predefined, plan-based dialogue modules in 
order to maximise system usability. It is 
shown that words of different lengths, de-
fined in terms of characters and syllables, 
demonstrate predictable degrees of recog-
nition accuracy by the ASR engine. When 
expressed probabilistically, such varying 
degrees can be effectively used for the 
choice of appropriate dialogue modules. 
The novelty of this work is the measure-
ment of word correct rate (WCR) as a 
function of grammar size and word length, 
expressed as WCR based on characters 
(WCR-C) and WCR based on syllables 
(WCR-S). The experimental results show 
that WCR-C and WCR-S can offer strong 
support in the development of an effective 
dialogue system, enhance dialogue flow 
and improve usability. 
1 Introduction 
Man-machine dialogue systems make use of dif-
ferent dialogue strategies to clarify user intent 
and to respond in an appropriate way. Typically, 
a dialogue system comprises different dialogue 
modules that handle different situations in the 
process of intension clarification. In speech-
driven systems in practice, this boils down to the 
accuracy of the automatic speech recognition 
(ASR) system and how the system responds to 
different situations. For example, given the fol-
lowing dialogue turn: 
 
System: Which term  would you like to translate? 
User: Gearbox. 
 
the ASR engine will have a Boolean return. In 
the case of a positive one, the dialogue system 
will respond: 
 
System: You said ‘gearbox’. Its translation in 
Chinese is !"#. 
 
With a negative ASR return, the system will say 
something like: 
 
System: I’m sorry. Could you please repeat? 
User: I said gearbox. 
 
To enhance system usability, a third scenario is 
often necessary, where the caller is asked to con-
firm the ASR return: 
 
System: Did you say gearbox? 
User: Yes. 
 
As can be seen, the three dialogue modules are 
components of an interactive session that at-
tempts to verify the semantics of caller intent. A 
spoken dialogue system is typically configured 
to make use of the confidence level provided by 
the ASR engine in order to decide which module 
to opt for. There is also work to combine a sec-
ond confidence score that represents an estima-
tion of the mapping between the ASR result and 
user intention. 
In this article, we report our work that aims 
to establish a third confidence score that is esti-
mated externally on the linguistic string uttered 
by the speaker. Simply put, the score is an esti-
mation of the probable ASR error rate according 
to the length of the word. The proposal of this 
additional confidence score is necessary since 
the other two scores do not take into account the 
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fact that words of different lengths tent to have a 
different impact on the ASR engine. In addition, 
the size of ASR language models or grammars 
also has a significant impact on ASR perform-
ance. Our work to be reported here is therefore 
concerned with ASR evaluation according to 
two parameters: word length and grammar size. 
Effective evaluation is an important task in 
spoken language dialogue systems (SLDS). 
Generally speaking, there are two purposes. One 
is to compare performance of different systems. 
The other is to improve the evaluated system 
itself. Different methodologies have been pro-
posed to evaluate components in spoken lan-
guage dialogue systems, such as Word Error 
Rate (WER) and weighted keyword error rate 
(WKER) (Nanjo and Kawahara, 2005; 
Hildebrandt et al., 1996). Higashinaka and col-
leagues describe a method for creating an 
evaluation measure for discourse understanding 
in spoken dialogue systems (Higashinaka et al., 
2004). There is also a focus on user-related is-
sues, such as user reactions to SLDS, user lin-
guistic behaviour or major factors which 
determine overall user satisfaction (Walker et al., 
1997; Walker et al., 2001; Hartikainen et al., 
2004). There is increased focus on usability 
evaluation of SLDS in recent years (Dybkjr and 
Bernsen, 2001; Park et al., 2007) and metrics 
have been proposed, such as modality appropri-
ateness, naturalness of user speech, and output 
voice quality. 
All these methods are concerned with objec-
tive or subjective criteria of SLDS (Larsen, 
2003). They aim to describe the system per-
formance on the whole or part. Additionally, 
they all evaluate SLDS beyond the word level. 
This article discusses the fine evaluation of 
word-level performance in terms of word correct 
rate (WCR) and argues that there is much useful 
information at the word level that can improve 
SLDS performance effectively and efficiently. 
    
2 Motivation 
RAMCORP is a project that aims at the design 
and construction of a telephony dialogue system 
that provides on-the-spot machine translation of 
terminologies of a pre-defined domain. The in-
teractive dialogue system uses Nuance, an off-
the-shelf automatic speech recognition system, 
for the recognition of key words. In order to 
maximize transaction completion rate, 
RAMCORP will consist of several dialogue 
modules with different dialogue turns. A novelty 
of the project is to dynamically determine which 
dialogue to opt for according to the word being 
recognized. To achieve this, empirical experi-
ments were carried out to ascertain the word cor-
rect rate (WCR) according to grammar size and 
word length. While it is common practice to 
measure WCR according to grammar size, the 
measurement of WCR as a function of word 
length has not been widely reported before. We 
define word length in two different ways: ac-
cording to number of characters (WCR-C) and 
according to number of syllables (WCR-S). Re-
sults of the empirical experiments will ulti-
mately inform the design of a formula that 
dynamically calculate the likelihood of a word 
being correctly recognized according to the three 
parameters, i.e., grammar size, number of char-
acters, and number of syllables. Effectively, the 
system will be able to predict the likelihood of a 
word being correctly recognized and choose a 
corresponding dialogue module according to this 
likelihood. 
    This paper will focus on the empirical ex-
periments that were carried out to establish the 
baseline statistics for Nuance. It will first of all 
report data selection including the selection of 
participating subjects and the selection of words 
that were used to form mock-up grammars of 
various sizes. It will then evaluate the ASR per-
formance and report the resulting WCRs accord-
ing in and discuss major findings. 
 
3 Experiments and Analysis 
3.1 Experimental setting 
The off-the-shelf application used in this paper 
is Nuance Voice Platform (NVP). A demo dia-
logue system with word grammar rules is built 
for evaluation. Four grammars were constructed, 
consisting of only words to be recognized with-
out any context cues. They respectively include 
500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 words randomly se-
lected the machine readable Collins English Dic-
tionary. Twenty subjects as evaluators were 
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invited to participate in the experiment. Each 
was asked to read four groups of 50 words ran-
domly selected from the four grammars. 
We thus obtained 20 sets of recognition re-
sults for grammars of four different sizes. The 
results of the experiment are summaries in Table 
1. 
S WCR500 WCR1000 WCR2000 WCR4000 M 
1 68.0 60.0 60.0 48.0 59.0 
2 48.0 62.0 44.0 44.0 49.5 
3 64.0 70.0 62.0 52.0 62.0 
4 78.0 84.0 64.0 62.0 72.0 
5 72.0 64.0 66.0 60.0 65 .5 
6 62.0 60.0 46.0 44.0 53.0 
7 84.0 58.0 58.0 50.0 62.5 
8 88.0 66.0 76.0 64.0 73.5 
9 72.0 80.0 56.0 50.0 64.5 
10 68.0 52.0 58.0 58.0 59.0 
11 64.0 64.0 56.0 50.0 58.5 
12 74.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 56.0 
13 58.0 58.0 64.0 54.0 58.5 
14 72.0 44.0 66.0 44.0 56.5 
15 82.0 74.0 76.0 50.0 70.5 
16 82.0 78.0 82.0 58.0 75.0 
17 76.0 72.0 74.0 56.0 69.5 
18 82.0 84.0 62.0 58.0 71.5 
19 78.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 70.5 
20 76.0 70.0 76.0 58.0 70.0 
M 72.4 66.4 63 .2 53.4 63.85 
Table 1: Word correct accuracy and grammar size 
3.2 Evaluation of WCR on Grammar Size 
The most popular evaluation metric of ASR is 
Word Error Rate (WER), which is the minimum 
string edit distance between the correct tran-
scription and the recognition hypothesis. There 
will be some new measures to propose to finely 
evaluate the dialogue system. In order to distin-
guish traditional WER, Word Correct Rate 
(WCR) is defined in this paper: 
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CorrectCountWCR !  (1) 
 
Count(Correct) is the number of words recog-
nized correctly, and Count(Total) is the total 
number of words to be recognized. WCR de-
scribes the performance of dialogue system with 
a certain number of grammar rules. The average 
WCR of the system with four different grammar 
scales is called WCRa. It can be calculated: 
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The average WCR of twenty evaluators on the 
system with certain scale grammar rules is called  
WCRsca, which can be calculated through the fol-
lowing formula:   
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The number n is the number of evaluators. There are 
twenty persons to participate in our experiments. 
    The evaluation results show that dialogue 
system has different recognition performance 
with different grammar sizes. According to 
Figure 1, the observable trend is that there is a 
consistent reduction of system performance 
with increased grammar size. 
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Figure 1: Word accurate rate and grammar size 
 
Figure 1 shows that recognition accuracy drops 
from 72.4% to 53.4% with a mean of 63.85% 
when grammar size is increased from 500 to 
4000. This observation suggests the need to 
improve system performance by using dynami-
cally constructed hierarchical grammars instead 
of monotonic grammars for every recognition 
slot. Dynamically constructed hierarchical 
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grammars are different from monotonic gram-
mars in that grammar rules are typically classi-
fied into several groups according to their prior 
probabilities to be recognized. The prior prob-
abilities can be obtained from context and other 
related information. How to get operable hier-
archical grammars will be an important part of 
our future work on RAMCORP. 
    See Figure 2 for system performance with the 
20 subjects. 
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Figure 2: System performance with the 20 subjects 
in the experiment 
 
There is considerable fluctuation in WCR for 
the 20 subjects with a standard deviation of 
7.56, as demonstrated in Figure 2, which is ex-
pected for a telephony dialogue system. It 
should be noted that the twenty evaluators are 
non-native English speakers from China so the 
actual WCR of the evaluated system would be 
higher than the WCR values required in our 
experiments if the callers were native speakers 
requesting the translation of terminologies from 
English to Chinese. 
Figure 3 shows that, across the four gram-
mars on average, the system had varying de-
grees of performance with the 20 subjects. The 
maximum is 75.0% and the minimum 49.5% 
with a mean of 64.1. The standard deviation is 
7.56%. Such variations are expected for a te-
lephony dialogue system open to a wide range 
of speaker diversity. 
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   Figure 3: Average WCR with different evaluators 
 
 
3.3 WCR Variation and Word Length in 
Characters 
Word length defined in number of characters is 
the second parameter concerned in this study 
that is expected to have an impact on recogni-
tion performance. The WCR based on character 
length is called WCRc l . It is an average value 
calculated according to Equation (4): 
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where, SSet is scale set which represents the 
same meaning in Equation (3). ESet is the 
evaluator set {1, 2, 3, ..., 20}. Count(Correctcl) 
is the correctly recognized number of words 
with length “character length (abbr. cl)”. 
Count(Totalcl) is all test words which length is 
equal to cl. The evaluation results are summa-
rized in Table 2. The second column in Table 2, 
marked Test Set, lists the word length distribu-
tion of all the test words randomly selected in 
the experiment with # indicating the actual 
number of words selected and % its proportion 
in all of the test words selected. The third col-
umn, Lexicon, is the distribution of all words in 
the dictionary with # indicating the total num-
ber of words of the concerned length and % the 
proportion of such words in the dictionary. 
It can be seen that the word length varies 
from 1 to 21 characters and that the selected 
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words in the test set form a good representation 
of those in the lexicon in terms of distribution 
of character lengths. Words with lengths be-
tween 4 and 12 characters account for about 90 
percent of total number. 
 
Test set Lexicon 
C 
# % # % 
WCRcl 
1 6 0.15 32 0.06 50.00 
2 4 0.10 248 0.46 75.00 
3 79 1.98 841 1.56 35.44 
4 218 5.45 2399 4.45 53.67 
5 320 8.00 3995 7.41 49.06 
6 471 11.77 5958 11.05 58.81 
7 588 14.70 7187 13.33 61.22 
8 528 13.20 7554 14.01 61.36 
9 572 14.30 7306 13.55 71.15 
10 456 11.40 6066 11.25 72.15 
11 313 7.83 4448 8.25 70.93 
12 177 4.42 3133 5.81 71.19 
13 136 3.40 2043 3.79 75 .74 
14 59 1.47 1240 2.30 64.41 
15 38 0.95 744 1.38 73.68 
16 18 0.45 388 0.72 77.78 
17 9 0.22 216 0.40 66.67 
18 5 0.13 81 0.15 100.00 
19 2 0.05 38 0.07 100.00 
21 1 0.03 5 0.01 0.00 
M 4000 100.00 53916 100.00 63.85 
Table 2: WCR based on character length 
 
As Figure 4 clearly shows, words with different 
character lengths have different impact on sys-
tem performance as suggested by WCRcl. It can 
be observed from the graph that there are some 
ups and downs at the two ends of WCRcl-length 
curve. This phenomenon can be caused by two 
possible reasons. Firstly, words shorter than 4 
and longer than 12 characters in length are rela-
tively small in population. The randomly se-
lected few cannot support statistic results 
sufficiently. Secondly, the evaluators involved 
in these experiments are non-native speakers of 
English while all the test words were selected 
randomly from a large dictionary. Therefore 
there were unfamiliar words for the evaluators, 
which resulted in inaccurate pronunciations and 
subsequently recognized inaccuracies by the 
system. 
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Figure 4: WCR based on character length 
 
But the predominate words with lengths be-
tween 4 and 12 have a consistent trend and 
WCRcl increases steadily with word length. 
Generally, the longer a word is, the more likely 
the word is accurately recognized. One observa-
tion is that words between 6 and 8 characters in 
length have a similar WCR while those between 
9 and 12 have a similar but higher WCR. This 
suggests that the use of word character as a 
measurement unit has a wide range of variation 
in terms of WCR, which calls for the use of 
another measurement unit that exhibits a lower 
degree of variation. As a result, we introduced 
the use of syllables as a second measurement 
unit, to be discussed in 3.4 below. 
Based on the evaluation results of WCRcl, a 
more suitable dialogue model can be designed 
for improving performance of dialogue systems. 
Simple dialogue modules can be applied to rec-
ognize long words because these words have a 
relatively high WCRcl. Conversely, complex 
dialogue modules with extended interactive 
turns will be needed for shorter words that typi-
cally have a lower WCRcl. By doing so, a dia-
logue system with a good balance between 
conciseness and accuracy can be achieved. 
 
3.4 WCR Variation and Word Length in 
Syllable 
As mentioned above, words of different lengths 
have different impact on system performance 
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measured in WCRcl. In fact, the major factor can 
be attributed to syllable information, which in-
fluences the accuracy of word speech recogni-
tion significantly. In this sense, the number of 
syllables of a word may demonstrate more pre-
cisely the correlation between word length and 
recognition accuracy. 
For this purpose, a machine-readable pro-
nunciation dictionary was used to retrieve the 
number of syllables for each of the test words 
selected for the experiment. The WCR based on 
syllable length, WCRsl, is calculated by the fol-
lowing formula: 
 
 & 
 & 
( )
( )
sl
scale SSet i ESet
sl
sl
scale SSet i ESet
Count Correct
WCR
Count Total
# #
# #
!
"
"
 (5) 
 
The formula is similar to Equation 4. The only 
difference between them is that Count(Correctsl) 
is the word count with syllable length “sl” be-
ing recognized correctly. The WCRsl results are 
listed in Table 3. 
 
Test set Lexicon 
S 
# % # % 
WCRsl 
1 429 10.73 4028 0.06 50.00 
2 1283 32.07 15582 0.46 75.00 
3 1103 27.58 15501 1.56 35.44 
4 775 19.38 11020 4.45 53.67 
5 293 7.32 5322 7.41 49.06 
6 91 2.27 1871 11.05 58.81 
7 19 0.47 507 13.33 61.22 
8 7 0.18 86 14.01 61.36 
M 4000 100.00 53916 13.55 71.15 
Table 3: WCR based on syllable length 
 
The first column S shows the word length in 
terms of syllables. The second column in Table 
3 is the syllable length distribution of all test 
words with # indicating the actual number of 
words selected and % the proportion of such 
words in the total number of test words. The 
third column, marked Lexicon, is the distribu-
tion of all words in the machine-readable pro-
nunciation dictionary. # indicates the actual 
number of words of a certain length and % the 
proportion of such words in the lexicon. As can 
be seen from the table, the selected words and 
the lexicon show good similarity in terms of 
distribution, suggesting that the test data are 
sufficiently representative. Words of up to 6 
syllables in length make up more than 99 per-
cent of the total test set with a small margin of 
proportion for words with 7 syllables or more. 
Figure 5 is a graphical representation of Ta-
ble 3. It can be observed that WCRsl for words 
with less than 7 syllables shows a consistent 
rise as a function of syllable number, increasing 
steadily together with the increase of word 
length measured in terms of syllables. 
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Figure 5: WCR based on syllable length 
 
Compared the results with Figure 4, we can de-
termine that the WCRcl jump from 5 characters 
to characters is because words with 5 characters 
and 6 characters will have different syllables 
which influence the accuracy of their speech 
recognition. A similar phenomenon happens in 
8 characters and 9 characters in Figure 4. The 
evaluation results offer support for designing an 
effective dialogue system. 
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper presented an experiment to evaluate 
the performance of Nuance for its recognition 
accuracy measured in word accurate rate 
(WCR). While conventional measurement is 
typically conducted in conjunction with gram-
mar size, we designed a novel approach to 
measure WCR as a function of word length 
measured in terms of characters and syllables. 
Results show that while WCR drops with the 
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increase of grammar size, there is also the ten-
dency for WCR to rise as a function of word 
length. Between characters and syllables, the 
experiment demonstrated that the latter is a bet-
ter indication of the correlation between WCR 
and word length. 
The results confirms the conventional wis-
dom in the first place that, instead of using a 
monotonic grammar which tends to be large in 
size and therefore affects WCR, a hierarchical 
grammar generated dynamically should be pre-
ferred for better WCR. This raises an interest-
ing suggestion for the RAMCORP project to 
augment the list of terminologies in such a way 
that they can be effectively sub-classified in 
order to reduce recognition space and therefore 
to increase WCR. Secondly, the results suggest 
that better system performance can be expected 
when RAMCORP moves into a stage that in-
volves the recognition of longer terminological 
phrases. 
The most significant suggestion from the 
experiment is that a dynamically constructed 
dialogue model can be possibly achieved based 
on the word returned by the recognition slot. 
Such a model can be driven by a probabilistic 
engine that considers grammar size and word 
length measured in characters and syllables. 
Within such a probabilistic dialogue model, 
modules with different interactive turns can be 
selected according to the word recognized and 
returned by the system. While the general prin-
ciple is that shorter terminologies require more 
dialogue turns to achieve a completed transac-
tion, the system can be fine tuned for even bet-
ter transaction completion rate based on 
probabilities associated to each keyword in the 
grammar. Such a dialogue system will require a 
self-maintenance mechanism of the grammar 
that updates itself for recognition probabilities 
for each individual rule. 
On the basis of the suggestions above, future 
work will be carried out in two key areas: one is 
to construct effective hierarchical grammar 
rules using context and other features of the 
terminologies concerned in RAMCORP. The 
other is to design a probabilistic dialogue model 
for improving the usability of the service 
through maximally enhanced system perform-
ance. In addition, similar evaluation is required 
for the other languages involved in the project, 
including Chinese in the first instance and Ko-
rean and Japanese in the future. 
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A Grammar Formalism for Specifying
ISU-based Dialogue Systems
Peter Ljunglöf, Department of Linguistics, University of Gothenburg
We describe how to give a full specification of an
ISU-based dialogue system as a grammar. For this
we use Grammatical Framework (GF), which sep-
arates grammars into abstract and concrete syntax.
All components necessary for a complete GoDiS di-
alogue system are specified in the abstract syntax,
while the linguistic details are defined in the con-
crete syntax. Since GF is a multilingual grammar
formalism, it is straightforward to extend the dia-
logue system to several languages.
The information-state update approach
The GoDiS dialogue manager [1] is based on for-
mal semantic and pragmatic theories of dialogue,
and provides general and fairly sophisticated ac-
counts of several common dialogue phenomena such
as interactive grounding (a.k.a. verification), accom-
modation, keeping track of multiple conversational
threads, and mixed initiative. General solutions to
general problems allow modularity, re-use and rapid
prototyping.
GoDiS is based on the Information State Update
(ISU) approach to dialogue management [4]. The
ISU approach, which has been developed over the
last 10 years in several EU-funded projects, provides
a generalization over previous theories of dialogue
management and allows exploring a middle ground
between sophisticated but brittle research systems,
and robust but simplistic commercial systems. In the
ISU approach, a dialogue manager is formalized as:
(i) an information state (IS) type declaration, (ii) a
set of dialogue moves, and (iii) information state up-
date rules.
In GoDiS, which is based on a theory of Issue-
Based Dialogue Management (IBDM), a single
script (called a dialogue plan) can be used flexibly
by the dialogue manager to allow for a wide range
of dialogues. The main benefit of the IBDM account
as implemented in GoDiS is the combination of ad-
vanced dialogue management and rapid prototyping
enabled by cleanly separating generic dialogue prin-
ciples from application-specific domain knowledge.
GoDiS enables rapid prototyping of systems with
advanced dialogue behavior. However, the GoDiS
dialogue manager only communicates with the out-
side world using semantic representations called di-
alogue moves. The designer of the dialogue system
must implement a translation between natural lan-
guage utterances and dialogue moves, be it through
a simple lookup table, or an advanced feature-based
grammar. Furthermore, a speech-based system also
needs a statistical language model or a speech recog-
nition grammar. In this paper we show how a GoDiS
dialogue system can be specified as a single gram-
mar in the Grammatical Framework. All compo-
nents necessary for a ISU-based dialogue system are
then automatically generated from the grammar.
The GoDiS dialogue manager
The GoDiS system communicates with the user via
dialogue moves. There are three main dialogue
moves – requesting actions, asking questions and
giving answers. Apart from the three main moves
there are also different kinds of feedback moves –
confirmations, failure reports and interactive com-
munications management.
The basic building blocks in GoDiS are individ-
uals, sorts, one-place predicates and actions. From
these all necessay dialogue moves can be built, such
as questions, answers, requests and feedback. To
specify a GoDiS dialogue system, we have to give
the following information: (i) the sortal hierarchy,
(ii) the individuals and the sorts they belong to, (iii)
the predicates and their domains, (iv) the actions,
and (v) the dialogue plans. Furthermore, there has
to be an interface to each external device.
Dialogue plans convey what the system can do
and/or give information about. A dialogue plan is
a receipt for the system, so it knows how to answer
a specific question, or how to perform a given ac-
tion. The dialogue plans can roughly be divided into
three different kinds – actions, issues and menus. An
action plan is when the user wants the system to per-
form an action, e.g., to call a contact in the address
book. An issue plan is when the user wants the sys-
tem to give information, such as telling the phone
number of a contact in the address book. A spe-
cial kind of action plan is the menu, where the user
can select from any of a given number of sub-plans
which the system then performs.
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Grammatical Framework
Grammatical Framework [2] is a grammar formal-
ism based on type theory. The main feature is the
separation of abstract and concrete syntax, which is
crucial for our treatment of dialogue systems. The
abstract syntax of a GF grammar consists of declara-
tions of categories and functions. Function declara-
tions correspond to rules in a context-free grammar.
The concrete syntax consists of linearizations of
the abstract functions. Linearizations are written in
a typed functional programming language, which is
very expressive but still decidable.
It is possible to define different concrete syn-
taxes for one particular abstract syntax, making GF a
multilingual grammar formalism. Furthermore, the
abstract syntax of one grammar can be used as a
concrete syntax of another grammar, which makes
it possible to implement grammar resources to be
used in several different application domains. These
points are currently exploited in the GF Resource
Grammar Library [3], which is a multilingual GF
grammar with a common abstract syntax for 13 lan-
guages, including Arabic, Finnish and Russian.
GoDiS specification as GF abstract syntax
Action and issue plans are specified as functions
with result categories Action(m) and Issue(m) re-
spectively, where m specifies which menu they be-
long to:
fun callContact : Name→ Action(MakeCall)
fun searchForNumber : Name→ Number→
Issue(ManageContacts)
The first specification states that callContact is an ac-
tion plan in the MakeCall menu. It takes one argu-
ment, which is the Name of the contact to call. The
second specification is the issue plan searchForNum-
ber. It also takes one Name argument, which the sys-
tem will ask for if not already said by the user. The
final Number argument represents the system’s an-
swer, and will be filled by the system when it knows
the answer.
Everything else in the GF grammar specifies the
ontology of the dialogue system. From the grammar
we can extract the sorts and the sortal hierarchy, the
individuals and the predicates.
Dialogue utterances as GF concrete syntax
The concrete syntax is responsible for translating ev-
erthing the user says into dialogue moves, and what
the system might want to say into natural language.
For each function in the abstract syntax, there has to
be a corresponding linearization. E.g., the callCon-
tact action might have the following linearization:
lin callContact(x) = “call”++ variants{x ; “a contact”}
This linearization will be used in several places by
the dialogue system. First, we can use it in parsing
the user utterances “call anna” (or “call a contact”):
The result is the GF term callContact(anna) (or call-
Contact(?)), which will be automatically translated
into GoDiS dialogue moves. Second, the system will
use it when presenting the MakeCall menu: “do you
want to call a contact or call a number?” . Third,
the system will generate different kinds of feedback
moves containing the GF term: “so, you want to call
a contact” or “I’m sorry, I cannot call a contact at
this moment”.
A short example
Assume that the user says “I’d like to call a con-
tact please”. This is recognized by the system
as the dialogue move request(callContact), which
means that GoDiS loads the associated action plan.
In this plan it sees that it needs a value for
callContact:Name, so it utters the dialogue move
ask(?x.callContact:Name(x)). There is an extra lin-
earization for callContact for handling wh-questions
(not shown above), translating the dialogue move
into “Which name do you want to call?”. GoDiS in-
corporates the user answer as answer(Name(Kim)),
and then tells the phone to look up Kim’s number in
the phone book and call. A confirmation dialogue
move, confirm(callContact), is at the same time pre-
sented to the user.
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Abstract
We describe a two layer Markov Logic Net-
work (MLN) model for the Spoken Lan-
guage Understanding (SLU) task in dialogue
systems. We augment the set of features
used in Meza-Ruiz et al. (2008) with the
help of off-the-shelf resources. We show
that this setup increases the performance of
the previous MLN models, which also out-
perform the state-of-the art “Hidden Vector
State” (HVS) model of He and Young 2006.
In particular the 2 layer approach produces
more accurate sets of slot-values for user ut-
terances (9% improvement).
1 Introduction
The Spoken Language Understanding (SLU) task
in dialogue systems consists in producing seman-
tic representations for user utterances. In this work,
our approach is trained on slot-value representations
which are a common choice in the development of
dialogue systems. Table 1 shows an example of slot-
values as a semantic representation.
USER:what flights are there arriving in Chicago on conti-
nental airlines after 11pm
GOAL =FLIGHT
TOLOC.CITY NAME =Chicago
AIRLINE NAME =continental airlines
ARRIV E TIME.TIME RELATIV E =after
ARRIV E TIME.TIME =11pm
Table 1: Slot-values as a semantic representation.
∗This work is partially funded by EPSRC grant number
EP/E019501/1 and the EC FP7 project “CLASSiC” (ICT-
216594). www.classic-project.org.
In particular, we are exploring robust statisti-
cal models of the SLU task using the Markov
Logic Network (MLN) framework(Richardson and
Domingos, 2007). An MLN is a collection of
weighted First Order Logic (FOL) formulae that
serves as a template to instantiate complex Markov
Networks (MNs). MLNs are particularly interesting
for language modelling because they are easy exten-
sible with new features and allow the use of complex
relations between nodes of the networks. Figure 1
shows a MN for a slot-value representation. In this
case, the lighter nodes represent the hidden variables
(i.e., the slots to produce) while the darker nodes
represent the observable variables (i.e., the words of
the utterance).
Figure 1: Markov Network as slot-values
In this paper, we focus on two aspects. First, the
use of a two-layer MLN model to represent the slots.
And second, the use off-the-shelf resources to ex-
tend the set of features available (e.g. POS taggers).
2 The MLN model
We split the SLU task into two. The first task con-
sists into modelling the GOAL element of the slot-
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values. Figure 2 shows a MN for the goal of our
example. You can notice, that the GOAL element,
depends on the whole utterance. The second task
consists of modelling the rest of the slots. Figure 1
shows a two-layer MN for the slots of our example.
The first layer can be seen as a named entity, while
the second layer represents a modifier/function for
those named entities.
Figure 2: Markov Network for the goal slot
With the two layer model we aim to capture the re-
lations between elements which constitute the slots.
This is achieved by specifying the edges between the
two layers using the FOL of the MLN. This model
also includes the 1st and 2nd order Markov assump-
tions for the second layer. With these we aim to cap-
ture any dependency in the sequence of slots.
2.1 Feature extensions
In MLNs it is possible to add more observable vari-
ables which will be related to the input words. For
this purpose, we use off-the-shelf resources to gen-
erate (i) POS tags for the words of the utterances
using the TnT tagger (Brants, 2000), and (ii) syn-
tactic chunks for the words of the utterances using
the CASS chunker (Abney, 1996). With this infor-
mation we define the following features for the slot
model: Orthography and POS task of the word for
a window of two previous and next words; a binary
feature if the word is a number or the word is un-
known ; and the head words of syntactic chunks.
3 Experiments and Results
For our experiments we use the Air Travel Infor-
mation System corpus extended by (He and Young,
2006). This version is composed of slot-value la-
bellings of the ATIS-2 and ATIS-3 training sets, and
the ATIS-3 NOV 93 testing set. We measured the
global score and exact match metrics. This first met-
ric measures the amount of slot-values recovered in
the whole experiment, while the second one mea-
sures the exact set of slot-values recovered for each
utterance.
The experiments tested the two layer models de-
scribed in the previous sections. Table 2 presents
the final results. Our baseline corresponds to the
previous best result for the task, which outperforms
the HVS model of (He and Young, 2006) on the la-
belling task (Meza and et al., 2008). In this case,
the baseline is our starting point. The MLN2−layer
model uses the features described in the previous
section, plus a two layer model. The difference
bewteen both models is statistically significant with
ρ < 0.05.
MLNbaseline Global 91.56%
Exact 69.89%
MLN2−layer Global 92.99%
Exact 78.97%
Table 2: f -scores for baseline and two layer model
4 Summary and discussion
We have shown an improvement on the performance
of the SLU task by using a two layer model and by
augmenting extra features in our previous model. In
particular, the improvement of 9.08% in the exact
match metric is interesting. This is because it shows
that not only was the model able to identify more
slot-values, but the set of slot-values for each utter-
ance were more accurate.
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Abstract
This paper presents a new algorithm to pri-
oritise user constraints for problem solving in
task-oriented multi-party dialogues. The situ-
ation of (at least) two users pursuing a com-
mon goal supersede the need for exhaustive
semantic analysis which is commonly used
in dialogue systems to prioritise user con-
straints. Instead, we suggest to use the on-
going discourse, especially the order of oc-
currence of the constraints for prioritisation.
In this paper, we describe our algorithm and
the scenario in which it was applied. We fur-
ther present a first evaluation in which we
compared our approach to semantic prioritisa-
tion which showed very promising results. It
proofed that for our domain our simple algo-
rithm outperformed its opponent by far.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a new algorithm to prioritise
user constraints for problem solving in task-oriented
multi-party dialogue systems. Most prevailing spo-
ken language dialogue systems (SLDS) are single-
user systems. One user is interacting with the com-
puter while the computer collects the information
provided by the user. Multi-party systems pose new
challenges, however, also new opportunities consid-
ering their characteristics. The multi-party SLDS in-
teracts with more than one user, the users interact
with the computer and additionally with each other.
Thus, the system not only needs to understand the
requests posed directly towards it but additionally
has to follow the dialogue between the users in order
to comprehend the entire conversation and grasp the
context.
Naturally, the conversation partners often have
different preferences which complicate the problem
solving process immensely. The course of the dia-
logue also depends on the sort of dialogue and do-
main. In our example domain of restaurant selection
two human dialogue partners and a computer inter-
act with each other. The dialogue partners are gener-
ally not interested in a long discussion but rather in
coming to a quick consensus. Besides uttering their
own preferences and dislikes, the dialogue partners
evaluate each other’s preferences against their own
and react accordingly.
The system therefore does not model the prefer-
ences of each user independently but collects all in-
formation relevant for the task to form a set of so-
called constraints for the data base queries. If the
query does not yield any results (’over-constraint sit-
uation’), an intelligent system is expected to provide
an alternative solution. The common approach to
that is to relax less important constraints. In single-
user systems the prioritising of constraints is mainly
performed by semantically analysing the constraint-
bearing utterances in terms of keywords that denote
the importance of the constraint to the user. How-
ever, the collection of valid constraints is also more
straight-forward, depending on the preferences of
the single user and on data-base constraints.
In the multi-party case, in the course of the di-
alogue each introduced constraint is discussed, re-
jected or accepted by the other dialogue partner.
This makes automatic semantic analysis very com-
plicated. We claim that in this case the prioritisation
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process can be a lot simpler. We take the content
of the discourse into account, i.e. the longer a con-
straint is valid in the dialogue, the more important it
gets.
Various research groups have been working on the
same domain of restaurant selection. For the sys-
tem to cooperatively find a suitable restaurant, it has
been found to be of utmost importance to consider
the users’ preferences, as well as also the strengths
of these preferences (e.g. (Carberry et al., 1999)).
Work on the closely related matter of presenting
information and options in a SLDS can be found
e.g. in (Demberg and Moore, 2006), (Walker et al.,
2004), and (Carenini and Moore, 2001).
However, all of these surveyed dialogue systems
are single-user systems. We state in the following
sections why and how the multi-party situation dif-
fers from prevalent single-user systems and why it
gives rise to new approaches. We briefly present the
scenario and dialogue system in which we deploy
the presented approach in Section 2. Section 3 fo-
cuses on different aspects of multi-party interaction.
Section 4 introduces our approach to prioritisation
exploiting multi-party characteristics to enhance the
constraint based problem solving used in our sys-
tem. The evaluation is described in Section 5 before
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Multi-Party Dialogue System
Two human dialogue partners interact with a com-
puter which acts as an independent dialogue part-
ner in the scenario of restaurant selection (Strauss,
2006). In the beginning of the dialogue, the users
talk about an optional topic while the system pas-
sively observes and captures the relevant conversa-
tional context. As soon as the users come to speak
of the specified domain the system starts to ”listen”
attentively. When required by the conversational sit-
uation, it takes the initiative to get meaningfully in-
volved in the communication and to help solve the
task, i.e. help the users to find a suitable restaurant.
The analyses presented in this paper were per-
formed on a set of dialogues from a corpus ob-
tained through Wizard-of-Oz recordings (Strauss et
al., 2008). The dialogues were transcribed and anno-
tated with a simple tagset of 10 dialogue acts (refer
to Section 3.2).
3 Multi-Party Interaction
Multi-party dialogue systems differ in many ways
from single-user systems. The counterparts of the
system are at least two people who interact with the
system and additionally with each other. The face-
to-face interaction with human dialogue partners is
for humans still the most natural and comfortable
way of communicating. Presumably, it is also faster
and more efficient, e.g. due to the human ability
of dissolving ambiguity by interpreting paralinguis-
tic phenomena of communication such as emotions
and facial expressions of the other dialogue partner.
Thus, multi-party dialogue systems can be very ad-
vantageous in terms of that humans still communi-
cate with each other and additionally turn towards
the system only when necessary. The system is act-
ing only as a side-participant of the conversation
when the users don’t need it.
Consequently, the design of our system is conve-
nient as the users are able to first come to an initial
agreement among themselves before the system gets
involved in the conversation. This seems more effi-
cient and faster than if they would have been inter-
acting with the system during the entire process.
A further point crucial for the system’s usability
is the process of problem solving itself and how the
results are presented to the users. Consideration and
prioritisation of the users’ preferences is an impor-
tant issue in this respect. The research addressing
this problem has so far been only considering single-
user situation (e.g. (Carberry et al., 1999)). Before
we present a new approach for the multi-party situ-
ation that utilises all the benefits that come with the
additional dialogue partner, we discuss a few more
points relevant for multi-party interaction.
3.1 Communication Roles
The situation in which the communication takes
place has a substantial impact on the conversation.
Next to the conversational roles such as speaker, ad-
dressee and overhearer (Clark, 1996), the roles the
participants take on socially in the conversation play
an important role in dialogues. (Bunt, 1994) intro-
duced the social context as part of the dialogue con-
text. (Traum, 2004) talks about the specific task
roles which relate dialogue participants in certain
ways.
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Utterance DA, Reference
A5: Let’s go to an Italian (sugg,{})
restaurant.
B6: An Italian restaurant? (check,A5)
A7: Yes. (ack,B6)
B8: Ok. (acc,A5)
Table 1: Dialogue snippet
During the Wizard-of-Oz recordings we ran-
domly assigned different roles and scenarios to the
dialogue partners. These included e.g. employer and
employee, lovers, business colleagues, or friends.
This way, we tried to obtain a wide range of dif-
ferent (such as superior / inferior) behaviour in our
corpus which is important to be able to evaluate our
approach on a broad variety of dialogues.
3.2 Interaction Phenomena
Task-oriented human-human dialogue shows a cer-
tain pattern which needs to be understood by the
system to be able to model the conversation. The
users mainly exchange proposals, introducing their
preferences into the conversation. A proposal from
one of the dialogue partners induces a reaction from
the other dialogue participant. This response may
consist of a simple acknowledgement, an accept or
reject, a response with further content, or possibly a
counter-proposal. Sometimes, the dialogue partner
repeats the proposal which can have the function of
acknowledgement, of checking if it was understood
correctly or as a way of deferring the dialogue in
order to win time to think. The response does not
necessarily follow up a proposal but can also occur
various turns later in the conversation with possibly
even talking about a different topic in the meantime.
Table 1 shows a short example dialogue snip-
pet labelled with the according dialogue act and the
number of the utterance it refers to. We deploy a
tagset of 10 basic dialogue acts which satisfies our
domain and dialogue system requirements: request,
suggest, inform, acknowledge, check, accept, reject,
stall, greet, other.
User A proposes to go to an Italian restaurant. In-
stead of accepting right away, User B repeats A’s
proposal whereupon A acknowledges B’s repetition.
In this case, the repetition is to be interpreted as a
request for clarification (check act).
4 Discourse Motivated Constraint
Prioritisation
During the course of the conversation, the system
collects all information relevant for the task which
forms the basis for the database query and thus nar-
rows down the result set in terms of positive or neg-
ative constraints.
If no results are obtained, i.e. an over-constraint
situation occurred, the system should offer the users
an alternative result. For this, we deploy constraint
prioritisation in order to take user preferences into
account. Different approaches to user preferences
have been introduced (e.g. (Carberry et al., 1999)),
however, only for single user dialogue systems. In a
single-user system, finding out user preferences can
be done using different methods. One is to analyse
the semantic content of an utterance looking for spe-
cific words that show some kind of sign of impor-
tance, e.g. ’maybe’, ’definitely’, etc.1 Another way
is to simply ask the user about which constraint is
more important in case that the system encounters
an over-constraint situation.
In contrast, a multi-party system has one big ad-
vantage over all single-user systems: The additional
- human - dialogue partner who already analyses the
utterances from the other dialogue partner. When
a suggestion is introduced with a ’maybe’, this low
priority is recognised by the dialogue partner, who
can then accept the suggestion, or, being aware of
the low priority of the proposal, make his or her own
counter-suggestion which might be more precise.
A request to the computer is generally expressed
only when the dialogue participants have found their
highest common priorities. In the following, we de-
scribe the algorithm in detail.
4.1 Prioritisation Scheme
For prioritisation, information is extracted of each
utterances according to three categories: Changing
Categories, Current Preferences, and Prioritisation
Values.
1Actually, it is not that simple as e.g. ’inferior’ words
are also more likely uttered by ’inferior’ dialogue participants.
However, a further elaboration on this aspect goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Changing Categories (CC) indicate the topic(s)
of the current utterance. For instance, if one of the
participants makes the statement of wanting to eat
Italian food, the CC field is tagged with category (F)
which stands for food or cuisine.
The other distinguishable categories are location
(L), ambiance (A), category (C), price range (P),
specials (S) and opening hours (O).
Current Preferences (CP) lists all currently valid
constraints represented by individuals of the respec-
tive category and is thus used for a database query.
In the example above, ’Italian’ would be categorised
as food (F) and individual F1 (taken it is the first F-
subject in this conversation). A second F-value later
on in the dialogue, e.g. Mexican food, would then
be tagged F2, etc. This is applied analogously to all
other categories (L1, L2, P1 etc.).
Prioritisation Values (PV) assign a priority value
to every individual. With every recalculation (in-
duced by a change in the CP section) all currently
valid values rise by ’1 point’. A new individual is in-
troduced with the value ’1’, i.e. it has risen ’1 point’
from the default value of ’0’. Negative constraints
or dislikes are represented with negative values ac-
cordingly (starting at ’-1’).
4.2 Executing the Prioritisation Scheme
In the following, the prioritisation algorithm is ap-
plied to a dialogue.
Introducing Preferences
At the beginning of a dialogue, the table contains
no entries. As soon as a topic is raised, it is displayed
in the CC section. The corresponding individual is
inserted into the CP column of the table and the PV
value is ’1’ (or ’-1’ in case of negation).
During the Dialogue
Every time the users modify their constraints, e.g.
by proposing or dismissing one, a change in the CP
section occurs and the PV are recalculated: The val-
ues of all individuals that are currently represented
as valid preferences (in CP) are raised by ’1’ (or low-
ered by ’1’ for negative values).
Thus, the longer a subject stays valid, the higher
its priority value becomes, which is obviously the
desired effect. That means, as long as a subject is not
explicitly abandoned or replaced by a different value
due to incompatibility between constraints, it is con-
sidered valid and part of the current preferences. If
a constraint is dismissed it is taken out of CP, its PV
stays at the current value. Should it be re-introduced
in the dialogue with the same polarity, it is reinserted
into CP and the priority calculation starts at the for-
mer value. A change in the polarity of a valid con-
straint is performed by simply adding or removing
the ’-’.
System Involvement
All currently valid individuals are listed in the CP
section which serves as the basis for the system’s
database queries. Every change in the constraint set
induces a database query so the system is always up-
to-date and ready to interact. Generally, the system
interacts for the first time after the users have al-
ready come to an initial agreement. As also noted
by (Carberry et al., 1999), this first request to the
computer deserves special attention as it displays the
users’ original preference. Thus, all valid individu-
als at the time of the first computer request receive
a first request bonus of ’2’. This number provides
an adequate trade-off between raising the priorities
enough to stand out, but at the same time not too
high so they can still be ’overruled’, if necessary.
Table 2 shows a short part of a dialogue. At the
beginning of this dialogue snippet, new individuals
are introduced, namely ’Spanish’ and ’Italian’, ’F2’
and ’F3’. It can be seen that the highest priority for
the users at that point have the location ’L1’ and the
ambiance ’A1’. Both are at value ’5’, which means
they assumably were the first constraints to be in-
troduced in the dialogue and also received 2 points
bonus. The second displayed utterance does not in-
duce a recalculation of new preferences, due to the
fact that nothing has changed. The request is sim-
ply repeated by the other dialogue participant. In
the following utterance, the introduction of German
cuisine as a negative value induces a change in CP
and triggers a recalculation of the priorities.
4.3 Applying Prioritisation to Constraint
Based Problem Solving
At present, the prioritisation only comes into play in
the case of an over-constraint situation, i.e. if the
database query does not yield any results. In order
to offer the users a best possible alternative result
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Utterance CC CP PV
. . .
B: I would like something F F2 F3 C1 L1 A1 F2 = 1 (italian)
Italian or Spanish. F3 = 1 (spanish)
C1 = 4 (restaurant)
L1 = 5 (river)
A1 = 5 (beergarden)
A: Italian or Spanish is
fine with me.
A: I just don’t want German F F4 F2 F3 C1 L1 A1 F4 =-1 (german)
food. F2 = 2 (italian)
F3 = 2 (spanish)
C1 = 5 (restaurant)
L1 = 6 (river)
A1 = 6 (beergarden)
. . .
Table 2: Prioritisation scheme applied to an extract of a dialogue.
the system has to decide which constraint(s) to relax.
We deploy the following (simplified) algorithm:
while overconstraint OR resultset ==
previous resultset do
if onto check(relax candidate).succeed then
present results();
break;
else
if relax(relax candidate).succeed then
present results();
break;
end
end
relax candidate++;
end
Algorithm 1: Simplified relaxation algorithm
The constraint with the lowest priority value is
chosen as the first relaxation candidate. The result of
the following query is analysed in terms of another
over-constraint situation. The result set is further
compared to the result set that was presented to the
users in the system’s last turn before the initial over-
constraint situation occurred. If the result sets are
the same, i.e. the same result set that obviously had
just been rejected or further constrained by the users
would be presented again. Thus, the relaxation algo-
rithm proceeds at this point. If again no result was
obtained, the relaxed value is reinserted before the
next relaxing candidate is considered for relaxation.
After another unsatisfying result, both values are re-
laxed etc. The presented algorithm is simplified in
this matter and also in the way that it assumes that
each time there is exactly one constraint with mini-
mal priority value which, however, is not always the
case. The implemented algorithm handles this by
trying out each of the potential relaxation candidates
and taking the one with the best results.
Before relaxing, the relaxation candidate is in-
spected in the context of the ontology to take related
values into account. If e.g. no restaurant can be
found near the town-hall before relaxing this con-
straint, it will be checked if there would possibly be
one around the cathedral which is the adjacent area.
This kind of ontology check can be performed for all
exclusive categories (L, F, P, C, and A). However,
the observation of the recorded dialogues showed
that some values should not be relaxed if possible.
They include e.g. the values of category S (i.e. ’spe-
cials’, such as cocktails), or ’expensive’ of category
P, as well as negative constraints. No matter at what
point these values were introduced in the dialogue,
they were very important to the users and therefore
not relaxed.
5 Evaluation
We performed evaluation on a set of dialogues from
our corpus (Strauss et al., 2008). In the normal
course of a dialogue all constraints are considered
in each database query regardless of their priority.
Therefore, evaluation can only be performed on di-
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alogues where over-constraint situations occurred.
This resulted in a set of 14 dialogues.
At recording time, the system simply told the
users that there were no results found. The users
then modified their query according to their pref-
erences. For evaluation we compared the outcome
of our algorithm to the users’ reaction to the over-
constraint situation and how they proceeded in the
dialogue, i.e. which constraints they relaxed or mod-
ified. The relaxation algorithm performed equally
well or better in 13 out of 14 dialogues, i.e. the al-
gorithm leaded to relaxing the same constraints as
the users did. By conducting the ontology check, in
5 of the 13 cases the outcome would have even been
better as the system would have suggested a result
closer to the original preferences than what was ob-
tained in the dialogue.
We further compared the performance of our al-
gorithm to semantic prioritisation. For this, we
hand-annotated the constraints (mainly by consid-
ering keywords that denote importance) using a
weighting scheme from ’1’ (little interest) to ’5’
(strongest interest). The same range is applied to
dislikes (’-5’ to ’-1’, with ’-5’ meaning strongest dis-
like). Weights were dynamically adapted during the
course of the dialogue, if necessary. The semantic
algorithm performed as well as ours in 6 cases. In
most cases it relaxed the constraints in a different
order which mostly also lead to a different result set.
The semantic algorithm repeatedly tried to relax one
or more of the users’ main preferences which e.g.
becomes apparent in one of the dialogues just after
the over-constraint situation when the users tried to
rephrase their main preferences which at this point
the system already would have had relaxed. In 1
case, the semantic algorithm performed better than
ours in the way that it relaxed the same constraint as
the users when ours did not.
The overall result is therefore very affirmative:
Our algorithm represents user preferences equally
well or better than a similar method using seman-
tic analysis for prioritising user constraints in all but
one evaluated cases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new algorithm to priori-
tise user preferences in a task-oriented multi-party
dialogue system. We use the ongoing dialogue to as-
sign priority values to the constraints, i.e. the longer
a constraint is valid in the dialogue the more impor-
tant it gets. The evaluation of our simple approach
showed auspicious performance. We compared it to
a semantic prioritisation approach as well as to how
the users actually proceeded after an over-constraint
situation had occurred in the analysed dialogues. In
all but one case, our algorithm performed equally
well or better.
Future work includes further evaluation, also us-
ing different domains. Additionally, we are planning
to take the frequency of changes in a certain category
into account. For instance, if the users switch many
times between different kinds of cuisine, the value
for this category would be rather high and imply a
sort of uncertainty and flexibility in this aspect.
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Abstract 
How do addressees who are not informed 
about targets contribute in a conversation 
to the negotiation of spatial locations? Re-
sults in dialogue research show the general 
importance of the addressee's reactions to a 
speaker's utterances. Results in spatial lan-
guage research demonstrate the range of 
variability available to a speaker when pro-
viding a spatial description. In this paper, 
we combine these two approaches in order 
to investigate how the spatial position of 
objects in a dolls' house is negotiated, using 
a naturalistic dialogue scenario. Results 
show the ways in which the instructed per-
son actively supports the negotiation of 
spatial reference, for example by pointing 
out ambiguities and suggesting alternative 
conceptual perspectives on the scene. 
1 Introduction 
When engaged in joint action, you may be asked to 
place an object in a particular position. How do 
you react? In theory, all you need to do is place the 
object and wait for the next instruction. However, 
in natural dialogue addressees do much more than 
that (e.g., Clark, 1996): they acknowledge the 
speaker's request, ask for clarification, or contrib-
ute to the description by expanding it or suggesting 
a different description. When placing objects, the 
situation becomes particularly complicated, as spa-
tial terms can typically be interpreted in more than 
one way (e.g., Schober, 1993). Then how do ad-
dressees contribute to the given task of a spatial 
placement so that an agreement can be reached 
"well enough for current purposes" (Clark, 1996)?  
Previous work on spatial language in dialogue 
has focused, for example, on direction-giving 
through a maze (Garrod & Anderson, 1987) or 
map task (Filipi & Wales, 2004), on spatial object 
reference, i.e., the identification of an object in 
contrast to other objects present in a scene accessi-
ble to both dialogue partners (e.g., Schober, in 
press), on route descriptions (Muller & Prévot, in 
press), and on the description of spatial relation-
ships in pictures (Watson et al., 2004). In contrast, 
in a situation like the one just sketched, spatial lan-
guage is used to instruct someone to place an ob-
ject in a particular position. Such a situation in-
volves a fairly strong knowledge discrepancy, rais-
ing the question whether the instructed person will 
be able to contribute any suggestions of their own 
at all. However, even at a brief glance at our data 
corpus (targeting such a scenario), we encounter 
the following exchange:  
director: also oben links in dem Ba+ in dem Zimmer 
also oben links [okay, at the top and left in the ba+ in 
the room that is at the top left] 
matcher: neben dem Fenster die Dusche? 
[next to the window the shower?] 
director: ne - mehr rechts also im Raum hinten rechts 
[no - more right that is in the room at the back right] 
Apparently, the matcher has quite a good idea al-
ready of where the shower (a piece of dolls' house 
furniture) is to be placed, and makes an informed 
suggestion, which is taken up and corrected by the 
director. Strikingly, the director's subsequent de-
scription departs fundamentally from the original: 
obviously, the conceptual perspective on the scene 
201
has changed by the matcher's utterance. This phe-
nomenon can be regarded as a specific case of the 
generally well-documented dialogue processes of 
repair, clarification, and grounding (e.g., Clark & 
Krych, 2004); or in Schegloff's (1997) terms, 'can-
didate understandings' or 'appendor questions'. In 
this paper we ask how the peculiarities of spatial 
language come into play in this kind of collabora-
tive negotiation procedure. 
Spatial language constitutes a common class of 
natural language that is particularly regularly used 
in everyday discourse (Talmy, 2000). This includes 
the so-called projective terms which indicate a di-
rection (left, right, above, below, front, back); these 
are interpreted against conceptual reference sys-
tems (Levinson, 2003; Tenbrink, 2007) and may be 
relevant in a static or a dynamic sense (van der Zee 
and Slack, 2003). Further, there are topological 
terms which indicate aspects of contiguity (on, in, 
at), path-related terms (e.g., across, through, 
along), distance-related terms (e.g., near, far, 
close), and others. These terms can be used in a 
broad variety of discourse tasks and then exhibit 
different features and implications (Bateman et al., 
2007). For instance, searching a hidden object in a 
small-scale array requires descriptions on a differ-
ent level of granularity than describing a route for 
a stranger in town. Furthermore, spatial terms may 
be used in order to describe an object for reference 
purposes (e.g., the car with the blue top), or in or-
der to describe an object's location (e.g., the car is 
in front of the house). To describe an object's posi-
tion in yet more detail, one may wish to describe 
the orientation of an object, again using spatial 
terms (e.g., the front of the car points towards the 
house). Here we focus on a scenario designed to 
maximise the occurrence of spatial terms by com-
bining the latter three options in an object place-
ment task. To reach that goal successfully, speak-
ers must agree on an object's identity as well as its 
location and orientation.  
Much work on dialogue (e.g., Garrod & Ander-
son, 1987) relates to spatial settings, but the intri-
cate repertory of how to describe spatial relation-
ships has not yet been explored thoroughly with 
respect to dialogue phenomena. Crucially for our 
present interests, little is known yet about how the 
addressee contributes to establishing spatial rela-
tionships in task-oriented dialogue, since the focus 
of attention in most analyses mostly lies either on 
the direction giver or on particular discourse proc-
esses such as interactive alignment (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004). Our present contribution provides a 
complementary perspective, exploring those in-
stances in which not alignment is at stake but 
rather the contrary: the introduction of new spatial 
lexical material by addressees. 
2 Empirical study 
We designed an empirical study to investigate the 
dynamics of dialogic interaction in a joint spatial 
task. A scenario was chosen in which it was likely 
that participants would spontaneously use spatial 
terms in a variety of ways (as explained above). 
Pairs of participants were confronted with the task 
of furnishing a dolls' house. This situation can be 
characterized as a referential communication task 
(similar to many earlier studies, e.g., Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2005) com-
bined with joint spatial action (cf. Rickheit & 
Wachsmuth, 2006). While this corpus is still being 
prepared for several purposes, we focus here on a 
subset of data investigated as to the addressee's 
contribution as just motivated.  
2.1 Method and Procedure 
For this task, two sets of dolls' house furniture to-
gether with two open wooden dolls' houses were 
used. One of the houses was fully furnished (see 
Figure 1 below), while the other was empty, with 
the furniture positioned randomly beside the house. 
The participants were placed facing each other, but 
separated by a screen. One of them (henceforth 
called matcher) was placed in front of the empty 
dolls' house, the other one (henceforth called direc-
tor) in front of the furnished one. Now the director 
was asked to describe the positions of the furniture 
in their house in such a way that the matcher could 
furnish the empty one in exactly the same way. 
They were encouraged to talk to each other and ask 
clarification questions, and they were told that the 
results would be photographed afterwards. 
The dialogues (covering between 30 and 90 
minutes each) were recorded and transcribed. For 
present purposes we analyze an extract of the col-
lected data as follows. We focus on the first 50 
utterances (segmented according to turn-taking 
shifts as well as content-related criteria) of 11 dif-
ferent same-sex dyads (3 of which male) of stu-
dents between 17 and 24 years of age. This way we 
address a manageable proportion (3.968 words in 
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total) of the dialogic data that allows for a rough 
assessment of relative frequencies across a range 
of participants, while still allowing for a fairly ex-
haustive qualitative coverage.  
 
Figure 1. Dolls' house arrangement. During the 
experiment the dolls' house was arranged with two 
floors on top of each other and a roof.  
2.2 Data Annotation  
Prior to the qualitative analysis, we developed 
three simple (i.e., fairly well definable) annotation 
steps in order to assess the quantitative relationship 
of the phenomenon we are interested in with other 
kinds of dialogue contributions by the matcher. 
First, we investigated the lexical material con-
tributed by the matcher. We classified all utter-
ances as ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS that do not contain 
any lexical material other than (typically back-
grounded) acknowledgements of the previous in-
struction (Clark 1996:231; Carletta et al. 1997), 
expressed by the German equivalents of "yes",  
"okay", and affirmative feedback signals (uhuh). 
For the remaining utterances, we investigated the 
extent to which new content is contributed. There 
are many different ways of distinguishing between 
given and new in discourse (e.g., Prince, 1981; 
Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999). Aiming at the de-
velopment of operationalizable criteria, we deter-
mined for each utterance whether it consists only 
of lexical material present in the previous dis-
course context, or whether it introduces new lexi-
cal material with respect to the current discourse 
topic. This way we avoided relying on the subjec-
tive interpretation of possible inferences from the 
earlier discourse. In fact, it is precisely by analyz-
ing the new lexical items that we can gain insights 
about how inferences are made by the matcher.  
Second, we determined whether or not each 
matcher utterance contained a spatial term, since 
we are interested in the usage of spatial language. 
Spatial terms here include various morphological 
and syntactic forms expressing spatial relationships 
of any kind, e.g., left, in front, frontal, middle, to, 
at, through, out, in, where, here, parallel, there. 
From this analysis we extracted those utterances by 
the matcher that involve the contribution of new 
spatial content. In our scenario, reaching the dis-
course goal consists of three steps:  
1. Identifying an object (out of the range of objects 
that still need to be placed) 
2. Locating the object's position in the dolls' house  
3. Orienting the object in the correct direction in 
the dolls' house.  
The data were also annotated with respect to each 
of these discourse topics. These steps of analysis 
were done by two different coders independently, 
with overlaps for substantial portions of the data 
and identical annotation results for more than 90%. 
3 Results 
3.1 Distribution of matcher's utterances 
Of a total of 238 utterances by matchers, 98 
(41.18%) contained new lexical material, and 114 
(47.90%) were ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS without no 
new content (which are not analyzed further here). 
Thus, 10.92% of matcher utterances that are not 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS repeat previous lexical ma-
terial. They can typically be interpreted as RE-
QUESTS FOR EXPANSION (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986:22), as in the following example (1): 
director: äh die Toilette is äh parallel zur Dusche prak-
tisch an die Hinterwand gestellt. kannst du dir das vor-
stellen? 
[uh the toilet is uh parallel to the shower standing 
virtually at the back wall. can you imagine that?] 
matcher: parallel zur Dusche [parallel to the shower] 
director: [provides further information] 
82 utterances (34.45% of the total of 238) con-
tained one or more spatial terms; all of these are 
not classified as ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 30 
(12.61%) concerned the identification of objects, 
11 of which contain spatial terms. 62 (26.05%) 
concern the location of objects, 60 of which con-
tain spatial terms; and 16 (6.72%) concern the ori-
entation of objects (in 5 cases together with loca-
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tion-related content), 12 of which use spatial terms. 
The remaining 21 utterances concerned other top-
ics; 2 of these contained spatial terms. Thus, spatial 
terms were mostly used to express location or ori-
entation. Here are some examples: 
Example (2) Identification: 
dir: da kommt dieser Herd dran, 
[there the stove is attached] 
match: ein Herd. der mit dem Abzug oben? 
[a stove. the one with the hood on top?] 
Example (3) Location: 
dir: ähm dann steht im rechten Zimmer an der Wand das 
große Bett. [uhm then in the room on right there is the 
big bed at the wall.] 
match: hinten an der Wand? [at the back at the wall?] 
Example (4) Orientation: 
dir: so dass der Kreis so äh zum Bett zeigt. 
[so that the circle points uh to the bed] 
match: zum Bett? [to the bed?] 
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Table 1. Distribution of matcher's utterances 
Of the 82 utterances containing a spatial term, 64 
contained new lexical material, which did not con-
cern the spatial term in only 8 of the cases. Thus, 
the matcher regularly contributed new spatial con-
tent to the dialogue, sometimes for purposes of 
identification of objects, sometimes requesting in-
formation about the orientation about the object to 
be placed. In as many as 41 cases (17.23% of all 
238 matcher utterances), however, new spatial con-
tent was used for location-related utterances. In the 
following subsection we take a closer look at these 
instances, investigating how the matcher may con-
tribute spatial content to the placement of objects. 
Table 1 summarizes the categories of matcher's 
utterances as described so far.  
3.2 Negotiation of spatial object location  
As Tversky (1999) and others observed, speakers 
often mix and change perspectives on a spatial 
scene. In fact, agreeing on a shared perspective 
poses the most prominent problem in much spatial 
dialogue research (e.g., Schober, 1993). In our sce-
nario, the director and matcher both have their own 
dolls' house in front of them so that they share per-
spective functionally; therefore this kind of conflict 
should not arise. 1  Nevertheless, there are many 
ways of conceiving of – and describing – a spatial 
situation (Tenbrink, 2007); new conceptual per-
spectives may be added to the information avail-
able so far.  
Spatial location descriptions consist of three 
main elements (e.g., Bateman et al., 2007): one (or 
more) spatial term(s), the locatum (the object cur-
rently described and – in our scenario – to be 
placed), and a relatum (another object or entity that 
the locatum is spatially related to) which may re-
main implicit. Our criterion for identifying new 
spatial content is based only on the spatial term. To 
get a clearer idea of how new spatial content is 
presented we categorized our utterances according 
to whether the locatum and the relatum, or both, 
are also new, and develop on this basis a first clas-
sification of spatial content suggested by matchers.  
All elements new. Utterances that contain new 
spatial terms, a new locatum, and a new relatum 
can be said to introduce a completely new spatial 
description. We identified only three such in-
stances in our data, one of them is example (5): 
                                                 
1 There are, in fact, a few instances in the data reflecting 
that the participants did not always realize that perspec-
tive was actually shared, as in "also links von meiner 
Seite aus oder links von deiner Seite aus?" [that is, left 
from my side or left from your side?] asked by the 
matcher; this is then clarified by the director: "es steht ja 
auch vor Dir das Ding das Haus." [it stands in front of 
you as well you know, the thing the house.] 
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match: wir sind noch links ne? 
[we are still on the left side, right?] 
Such instances can be interpreted as clarifying a 
global aspect of the current situation, removing 
uncertainty based on the complexity of the task. 
Locatum new. There were no instances in 
which the locatum was new but not the relatum, 
which would mean that a new object was described 
in relation to another object that had just been used 
to describe the position of a different object.  
Relatum new. In 16 instances in our data 
(39.02% of the 41 location-related utterances con-
taining new spatial content), the relatum was new 
but the locatum was not. Thus, the object currently 
in focus was described in relation to a different 
object than the one that the director related it to. In 
the following example (6), the matcher shows con-
siderable initiative by first summarizing a previous 
(complex) spatial description by the director (not 
represented here), and then offering a new descrip-
tion (for the same object location) in addition, 
marking this explicitly by "also" (that is):  
match: und der kommt direkt daneben. 
[and this one is put directly beside it] 
dir: ja an die Wand ran [yes, at the wall] 
match: also hinten links von links von dem Spülbecken. 
[that is, at the back left of left of the sink] 
dir: ja aber an die Wand so ran an die, 
[yes but at the wall at the] 
Notice also how the director repeats her own de-
scription "an die Wand ran". Apparently these two 
interlocutors have different conceptions of the 
scene and wish these to be clarified or confirmed 
before moving on. Crucially, for the matcher the 
object location becomes clearer when seen in rela-
tion to another object in addition to the one the 
director chose to relate it to. This possibility arises 
because of the fact that the matcher has already 
placed several objects, so that the visual scene of-
fers more than one basis for spatial descriptions. 
Sometimes the matcher's suggestion of an alterna-
tive relatum is used to disambiguate the director's 
description, as in the following example (7): 
match: neben das Klo an die Wand? oder an die andere 
Wand, [beside the toilet at the wall? or at the other wall] 
dir: an die andere Wand. [at the other wall] 
In example (8), the matcher's suggestion of a new 
relatum clarifies a misunderstanding, highlighting 
an underdeterminacy in the director's instruction: 
dir: das Waschbecken stellst Du jetzt so dass das ähm in 
die Lücke ja okay, [now you place the sink so that it fits 
into the gap yes okay] 
match: ja? zwischen Toilette und Dusche? 
[yes? between the toilet and the shower?] 
dir: nee nee nee. [no no no.] 
match: okay. [okay.] 
dir: ähm (…) da fehlt doch so'n Stück der Wand ne? 
[uhm (…) there is you know a piece of the wall 
missing, okay?] 
Here, the director offered a "gap" as a relatum, ac-
tually not an object but rather a kind of non-entity 
defined by further entities that are left implicit. The 
matcher identifies a different interpretation than 
the one intended and clarifies this by explicitly 
mentioning the relata she is thinking of (toilet and 
shower). This induces the director to make the in-
tended underlying relatum (the basis for the non-
entity) explicit, namely, the wall. 
Another possibility is to offer a first spatial de-
scription for the object currently in focus, as in (9): 
dir: dann is' das nächste Ding du hast ähm 
[then is the next thing that you have uhm] 
match: noch immer im selben Raum? 
[still in the same room?] 
dir: genau. [exactly.] 
In this example, the matcher's suggestion remains 
on a fairly high level of granularity – the relatum 
"room" together with the spatial term "in" leaves 
much room for interpretation. The suggestion is 
based on expectations from the previous discourse 
context, which the matcher wishes to confirm. 
Only spatial term new. In 21 of our 41 cases 
(51.22%), neither the locatum nor the relatum is 
new, so that only the spatial term is changed. Typi-
cally in these cases, the matcher has detected a spa-
tial ambiguity or underspecification in the direc-
tor's utterances, which is clarified by changes con-
cerning the spatial term. In five cases in our data 
(clearly identifiable by the use of "or"), their reac-
tion is to make the options explicit and request a 
choice, as in the following example (10): 
dir: ja genau. stell's an die Wand (…)  
[yes, exactly, put it at the wall (…)] 
match: frontal , frontal an die Wand,  
[frontally, frontally at the wall] 
dir: ja genau frontal (...) [yes, exactly, frontally] 
match: links oder recht [left or right] 
dir: ähm äh, rechts [uhm, uh, right] 
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Here there are two specific possible positions (left 
or right) to choose from. In example (11), the prob-
lem seems to consist of the area being too large 
which has so far been determined, so the matcher 
wishes to clarify the precise position of the object 
in this area, again by making the options explicit: 
dir: an der hinteren Wand dran so dass ähm ja die Füße 
quasi zu dir zeigen. [at the back wall so that uhm yes the 
feet point to you so to speak] 
match: hinten links oder rechts oder in der Mitte? 
[at the back left or right or in the middle?] 
dir: ach so genau in der Mitte. 
[I see, exactly, in the middle.] 
However, not all of the utterances in this category 
are formulated in this multiple-choice fashion. 
Sometimes the matcher simply adds further (spatial) 
aspects to the previous description, as in (12): 
dir: ähm dann steht im rechten Zimmer an der Wand 
das große Bett. [uhm then there is the big bed in the 
room on the right at the wall] 
match: hinten an der Wand? [in the back2 at the wall?] 
In other cases, the matcher simply re-formulates 
the spatial description so that the spatial relation-
ship between locatum and relatum is highlighted in 
a different way, as in the following example (13): 
dir: die steht da so [it stands there in such a way] 
match: die passt da so rein? 
[it fits in there in such a way?] 
In sum. To sum up the results of this subsection, 
the matcher's contributions of new spatial content 
in order to locate an object's position may fulfill 
the following functions: 
! to clarify a global aspect of the current situation 
(using a completely new spatial description) 
! to (further) specify an object's position by relat-
ing it to an(other) object already placed  
! to (further) specify an object's position by sug-
gesting a different or additional spatial term to 
describe the spatial relationship (in more detail) 
! to disambiguate an ambiguous description by 
explicitly mentioning options.  
4 Discussion 
How does the addressee (or matcher) contribute to 
the negotiation of object placement in joint action? 
                                                 
2 As Carroll (1993) points out, German speakers some-
times partition the visual field into regions; more distant 
positions are then referred to as "back".   
In the present study we investigated the matcher's 
utterances with respect to the extent to which they 
introduced new lexical material. About half of the 
matcher's utterances did not contain any new lexi-
cal content; these were typically either acknowl-
edgements or requests for expansion. Half of those 
utterances that did contain new lexical material 
concerned either the identification (prior to its 
placement) or the orientation of an object (after the 
location has been identified). Only a relatively 
small number of matcher utterances concerned ori-
entation; this is somewhat surprising given that 
theoretically objects could be placed in many dif-
ferent orientations. However, in practice the par-
ticipants may have assumed a standard orientation 
of the objects according to their expectations as to 
how dolls' houses should be furnished; and in fact, 
our arrangements in the present study did not de-
part from such standard expectations.  
Our main interest, however, concerned the other 
half of those matchers' utterances that contained 
new lexical material, namely, those negotiating the 
location of objects. Here we determined more 
closely which part of the utterance was new: the 
spatial term, the locatum, the relatum, or any com-
bination of these. It turned out that most utterances 
fell into either one of two major categories, both of 
which concern the suggestion of a new conceptual 
perspective on the current spatial scene. Matchers  
regularly attempted to further specify an object's 
position by either modifying the spatial term used 
to describe the position, or by relating the object to  
another entity that had already been placed.  
Why is such an additional specification neces-
sary, and how does the matcher succeed in sug-
gesting spatial content in spite of the fact that only 
the director has precise knowledge about how the 
object should be placed? The spatial situation in 
our scenario – positioning many different objects 
in a fairly complex array – clearly poses a number 
of problems such as ambiguity, underspecification, 
and vagueness. Rather than passively wait for, or 
simply request, further information in such inde-
terminate cases, the matchers actively collaborated 
in identifying the intended location of an object in 
a range of ways, based on their assumptions about 
probable object locations. These may be derived 
from various sources, such as the actual spatial 
situation that is visually accessible to the partici-
pants, the previous discourse context, and default 
assumptions about typical arrangements of objects 
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in dolls' houses. The consistent setting used here is 
supportive of this process, as opposed to the Map 
Task (Anderson et al., 1991), for instance, which 
uses diverging maps as basis for communication, 
necessitating additional negotiation processes not 
inherent to the task itself. Paralleling the seminal 
findings by Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), thus, 
not only referring is a collaborative process, but 
also spatial locations are negotiated jointly, draw-
ing on a well-established set of expectations and a 
broad range of available conceptual perspectives 
on the scene. 
5 Dialogue structure 
How do our findings on dialogic contributions by 
the matcher relate to previous findings on dialogue 
structure? There are a number of candidates for 
dialogue schemes that support categorizing our 
data in terms of dialogue structure. While they 
were developed in different contexts and for vari-
ous purposes, some of the proposed categories 
match quite straightforwardly to our data, such as 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT and REQUEST FOR EXPAN-
SION (cf. Section 3.1 above). In Carletta et al. 
(1997)'s move coding scheme the QUERY-W move 
matches the disambiguation questions found in our 
data. The CHECK move "requests the partner to 
confirm information that the speaker has some rea-
son to believe, but is not entirely sure about." (Car-
letta et al., 1997:3), which is close to the idea of 
making concrete suggestions for grounding, al-
though they are in our data typically not repre-
sented as requests for confirmation. Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986, pp. 22-24) suggest EXPAN-
SIONS which contain a request for confirmation (of 
the expansion) while basically accepting the de-
scription so far, and REPLACEMENTS which reject 
the previous description and offer a new one. On a 
general level, approaches to clarification and 
grounding procedures found in the literature (e.g., 
Schlangen, 2004; Purver et al., 2003) fit to our data 
to a certain extent, though they are typically 
viewed as contributing to a REPAIR of failing 
communication, which seems to miss the mark in 
our case.3 Clark's notion of SECOND-TURN REPAIR 
                                                 
3 Sack's notion of 'appendor question' as reported by 
Schegloff (1997:510f.) seems close to the phenomenon 
we have described for a spatial context; it is categorized 
by Schegloff as a form of repair initiation. 
(1996:245), for instance, concerns the clarification 
of a particular aspect of the description. DAMSL 
(Allen & Core, 1997) does not have a general cate-
gory of REPAIR but distinguishes between back-
ward- and forward looking functions. The back-
ward-looking tag HOLD is used in cases where the 
response to the previous utterance (which may be 
an instruction as in our context) is postponed pend-
ing further clarification. Crucially, this does not 
signal misunderstanding. As a forward-looking tag,  
the utterances may further be marked as INFO-
REQUEST, defined as "an utterance that creates an 
obligation for the hearer to provide information." 
As yet, none of these approaches capture the 
finer conceptual distinctions reflected by the usage 
of spatial language that we have pursued. Our aim 
in the long run is thus to develop operationalizable 
criteria for a reliable categorization of each utter-
ance, and to account for the various kinds of prin-
ciples governing dialogue contributions in spatial 
contexts. 
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper we have investigated the collaborative 
negotiation of spatial object placement in joint ac-
tion in a novel naturalistic dialogue setting. Our 
findings show that addressees actively contribute 
to the dialogue by offering well-informed sugges-
tions based on their expectations concerning how 
an object should be placed, specifying earlier de-
scriptions further by suggesting a new conceptual 
perspective on the scene.  
Future work using our dolls' house dialogue 
corpus will address both dialogue partners' choices 
of spatial language more closely for example with 
respect to reference frames and alignment proc-
esses, and we will investigate the degree to which 
features of the scenario influence the addressees' 
expectations, as reflected in their reactions. In a 
second line of research, we pursue in our project 
the modelling of dialogue structure within DAMSL. 
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